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This book attempts a comparative study between Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), a Neo-
Confucian master of the Song Dynasty in China, and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), a 
scholastic and mystic in the medieval West. With a focus on the theme of human 
intellect as presented in the works of the two thinkers, this study also explores the 
massive hermeneutical framework in which that concept is unfolded in Zhu Xi and in 
Eckhart. Thus, the complexity of each thinker’s understanding of the human intellect is 
demonstrated in its own context, and the common themes between them are discussed 
in their own terms. Based on a systematic study of the original texts, the comparison 
between Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart goes much deeper than a general dialogue between 
East and West. The comparative model of this book, based strictly on textual study, 
aims to develop an in-depth communication between a scholastic Confucian mind and 
his equally sophisticated counterpart in Christendom, in the hope that the intellectual 
brilliance and spiritual splendour of one thinker will be illuminated by the light of the 
other. Probably only when one encounters a like-minded counterpart brought up in a 
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The intellectual and spiritual splendour of the medieval period is marked not only by 
the achievements of the great souls in Christendom, but also by the accomplishments 
of their counterparts in the Confucian world. Despite being brought up according to 
different scriptures, living in different social and cultural milieus, thinking and writing 
in different languages, still some similarities can be seen between a medieval Christian 
theologian and his counterpart in the Far East. A comparative research that aims to 
reveal the inter-cultural or inter-religious analogies between the two traditions is a risky 
but intriguing journey. The case of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) and Meister Eckhart (1260-
1328) offers an exemplary pair of such inter-religious analogies, a unique and 
fascinating one.  
At first sight it seems out of the question to draw an analogy between Zhu Xi the 
rationalistic Neo-Confucian master and Eckhart the Dominican master of mysticism, 
let alone to embark upon a comparative study of the two. Admittedly, in general terms 
the similarities between Zhu Xi and Eckhart are not as obvious as those between Zhu 
Xi and Thomas Aquinas, between Eckhart and Zen Buddhism or even between Eckhart 
and Wang Yangming. It takes further exploration of their academic works to detect the 
correspondence between Eckhart and Zhu Xi. Once we turn to the masterpieces of the 
two thinkers, in particular the sophisticated scriptural commentaries they have 
contributed to their respective intellectual traditions, it will become explicit to us that 
beneath all the differences lie two great minds whose intellectual and spiritual brilliance 
refuses a single epithet such as ‘rationalistic’ or ‘mystic’. A systematic study of primary 
sources brings to light a common ground between the two great minds, namely their 
emphasis on the power of the human intellect, and the kind of intellectualism expressed 
through their works.  
Such a common ground allows us to place Zhu Xi and Eckhart together and to 
embark on a comparative study.  Accordingly, this study will focus on the concept of 
the human intellect. The task of this book, therefore, is not to give a general explanation 
of the differences and similarities between the two thinkers, but to consider a more 
specific question, that of how the concept of the human intellect is unfolded in Zhu Xi 
and in Eckhart. For that purpose the hermeneutical framework must also be considered. 
Hence, this book will explore not only Zhu Xi and Eckhart’s understanding of the 
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human intellect, but also the issue of hermeneutics, which speaks of the unique 
expression of their thinking. 
The hypothesis to be put forward in this study is that for both Zhu Xi and Meister 
Eckhart the concept of the human intellect constitutes a principal theme running 
through their works, ranging from scriptural commentary to systematic philosophical 
discourse. In both thinkers we see reformative or revolutionary ideas that are developed 
surrounding the notion of ‘knowing’. Such is the vitality of this notion that it is through 
rethinking and redefining the power of ‘knowing’ that both Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart 
surpass the conventional way of their antecedents, and achieve more than their own 
traditions may allow for. In Zhu Xi’s ingenious treatment of Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning, in particular his Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement to the section on the investigation 
of things and extension of knowledge, and in Eckhart’s Parisian Question 1, a similar 
provocative voice is heard.  
The methodology of this book encompasses three main points. First, the scope of the 
study is clearly defined, so as to focus on one common theme running through major 
works of the two thinkers, rather than forming a comparison in general terms. For that 
reason it does not address the conventional views deriving from general discussions 
over the differences between East and West, or between Confucianism and Christianity. 
Secondly, the book attempts to embed systematic textual analysis into the structure of 
a comparative model, in order that the characteristics and complexity of Zhu Xi and 
Eckhart’s thought concerning the human intellect can be demonstrated in considerable 
detail with the support of textual studies. Thirdly, since both thinkers employ a set of 
philosophical terminologies and weave philosophical speculation into their scriptural 
commentaries, the study combines discussion of their philosophical ideas with an 
analysis of the hermeneutical rules that underpin their philosophical interpretation of 
the relevant scriptural texts.      
As suggested above, the choice of Zhu Xi and Eckhart and the focus on the issue of 
the human intellect constitute a deliberate attempt to move away from the over-stressed 
issue of moral subjectivity within Confucian studies of the last few decades, and to turn 
to the rational line of thought that represents another essential thread of Confucian 
tradition. In relation to this concern, this study will give more consideration to the 
historical proceedings of a philosophical notion and the inner logic of Chinese 
intellectual history, rather than the forging of a highly individualised conception whose 
origin is beyond the scope of history and whose justification is based solely on personal 
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intuition or experience. As will be revealed, original thinkers such as Zhu Xi and 
Eckhart do not necessarily break away from their own intellectual tradition: despite a 
tension with some conventional approaches or traditional ways of thinking, both Zhu 
Xi and Eckhart endeavour to merge their thought into the scholarly tradition so as to 
enrich it by bringing about new perspectives and shedding new light on old topics. 
Based on the consideration of a philosophical idea’s dependence on its intellectual 
tradition, this book will not follow the modern New-Confucian scholars’ promotion of 
the so-called Confucian moral subjectivity or moral idealism, despite taking into 
account their criticism of Zhu Xi on this ground. Instead it will place more emphasis 
on the historical study of Zhu Xi’s thought, which offers a contextual reading of Zhu 
Xi.  
The need to address the hermeneutical issue derives solely from the significant role 
it plays in the primary sources, those of both Zhu Xi and Eckhart. For the sake of clarity 
and fluency in expression, I will not insert into this comparative study a dialogue with 
the modern theory of hermeneutics or epistemology, or a conversation with Buddhism 
on the issue of spirituality. These extended questions and topics will be better addressed 
in another monograph or paper.        
 Given the copious primary sources left by Zhu Xi, this study will focus only on the 
texts essential to the question under discussion.  Hence his Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 
Commentary on The Great Learning and Da Xue Huo Wen 大學或問 Questions and 
Answers concerning The Great Learning will be the fundamental texts for the study of 
Zhu Xi’s thought, with further reference to more detailed elaboration, as seen in Yu Lei
語類 Conversations and Wen Ji 文集 Literary Works.1  
As historical study has long been the weightiest part of Confucian tradition, an 
exploration of the philosophical ideas of Confucian masters cannot be performed 
without considering their historical significance. 2  It is remarkable in Confucian 
tradition that historical consciousness has the upper hand over philosophical 
speculation.  Even if we believe that Confucian masters have developed philosophical 
concepts capable of universal application, a systematic formulation of such 
philosophical ideas is rarely seen; moreover, given the emphasis on historical concerns, 
                                                          
1 All the aforementioned sources are included in Zhuzi Quanshu 朱子全書 Complete Works of Master Zhu 
(2003), 27 volumes.  
2 Collingwood’s insightful explanation as to the distinction between the method of history and the method 
of science is of great help in the pursuit of proper methodology for the study of Confucianism in the 
modern era. See R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (1961). 
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it is very hard to look at a philosophical Confucian notion outside of its specific 
historical framework. As a result there is always a tension between philosophy and 
historicity, between a historical approach and a philosophical approach, in the study of 
the philosophy of Confucianism, or of Chinese thought on a large scale. Hence it is 
necessary that the research on Zhu Xi’s notion of knowing is built on a general 
understanding of the history of Chinese philosophy, and in that respect this book has 
recourse chiefly to the work of Feng Youlan 馮友蘭. 3 For the period of Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism, it relies mainly on the sources provided by the two Xue An 學案
Anthologies;4 the work of Lao Siguang 勞思光5 is also referred to.6 
The understanding of Zhu Xi in this book is indebted to the researches done by Qian 
Mu 錢穆 and Yu Yingshi 余英時, in particular Qian Mu’s 錢穆 Zhuzi Xin Xue An 朱子新
學案 A New Anthology of Zhu Xi, 7 and Yu Yingshi’s 余英時 Zhu Xi de Lishi Shijie 朱熹
的历史世界 The Historical World of Zhu Xi.8 In the scholarly works of both Qian and 
Yu, we find a comprehensive account of textual analysis as well as the details 
concerning the historical and political context in which Zhu Xi lived. As historians both 
Qian and Yu attempt to embed an individual thinker into the whole history of 
intellectual development of Confucian tradition, so as to reveal the continuation from 
and variation between one and another. The innovative element in one’s thought will 
be examined in the light of the long-standing scholarly tradition in which the thinker 
has been brought up. The vast landscape of Chinese thought depicted by Qian Mu and 
the complex historical context of Zhu Xi unfolded in Yu Yingshi’s work have 
established the groundwork for this study, and their approaches also have an impact on 
its methodology, although the focus of this research is on philosophical ideas rather 
than historical facts.  
                                                          
3 Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, Zhongguo Zhexueshi 中國哲學史 History of Chinese Philosophy (1992), 2 volumes. 
4 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 and Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (eds.), Song-Yuan Xue An 宋元學案 Anthology of Song-
Yuan Confucianism (1986), 4 volumes; Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (ed.), Ming Ru Xue An 明儒學案 Anthology 
of the Ming Confucian Masters (2008), 2 volumes.  
5 Lao Siguang 勞思光, Zhongguo Zhexueshi 中國哲學史 History of Chinese Philosophy (1981), part 3, 2 
volumes. 
6 For an analysis of typical New-Confucian notions such as moral subjectivity or moral idealism, and 
their influence on the stance towards Confucian intellectual history, see Ma Kaizhi 馬愷之, ‘Lishixing, 
Zhexue yu Xiandaixing de Mingyun: Lao Siguang de Zhongguo Zhexueshi yu Leo Strauss 歷史性、哲學
與現代性的命運：勞思光的《中國哲學史》與列奧施特勞斯 Historicity, Philosophy and the Fate of Modernity: 
Lao Siguang’s History of Chinese Philosophy and Leo Strauss’ (2008), 51-104.  
7 Qian Mu 錢穆, Zhuzi Xin Xue An 朱子新學案 A New Anthology of Master Zhu, collected in Qian Binsi 
Xianshen Quanji 錢賓四先生全集 Complete Works of Qian Mu (1994-1998), 11-5.  




In contrast to Qian and Yu, the modern New-Confucian scholars have adopted a 
different approach, reinterpreting Confucian tradition according to a new theoretical 
framework borrowed from Buddhism and the West; in other words, they read 
Confucianism in the light of Buddhism and Western philosophy, in particular the 
philosophical conceptions of Kant and Hegel. Among these scholars the most 
prominent and influential figure is Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. Mou’s reinterpretation or 
reconstruction of Confucian tradition is based on a systematic borrowing of Kantian 
concepts: to be precise, a cross-reading of Kant and Confucianism. Inspired by Kant, 
Mou intends to anchor his thinking in the realm of the noumenal; but unlike Kant, who 
seeks the metaphysical principles or non-empirical conditions for morals, Mou assigns 
his ‘moral metaphysics’ a rather different task, to formulate within Confucian tradition 
a practical or experiential approach toward self-accomplishment that is simultaneously 
performing in the dimension of metaphysical, cosmological or ontological reality. The 
term ‘daode de xingshangxue 道德的形上學 moral metaphysics’ in Mou’s context has an 
origin in Kant’s thinking concerning the metaphysics of morals, but, Mou claims, it 
aims to overcome the limitation of Kant’s daode de shenxue道德的神學 moral theology.9 
While Mou draws upon Kant with regard to philosophical speculation, he has never 
intended to think in the vein of Kant or to form a criticism in Kantian terms, but is 
simply ‘borrowing’ Kantian conceptions to serve his own theoretical purposes. Such a 
stance somehow determines Mou’s failure in many aspects from an academic point of 
view. His understanding of Kant is problematic, and his application of Kantian concepts 
to Confucian ethics invites more questions, as pointed out by Confucian scholars in the 
Chinese tradition and in the West.10 Mou’s three volumes of Xinti yu Xingti 心體與性體
Constitutive Mind and Constitutive Nature11 and the subsequent Cong Lu Xiangshan 
dao Liu Jishan 從陸象山到劉蕺山 From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan12  give a new 
classification of the intellectual development in Confucian history. In these four 
volumes, Mou falls back on Kant and uses Kantian concepts to undermine Zhu Xi’s 
orthodox status. According to Mou’s innovative classification, Zhu Xi is treated as a 
side branch in contrast to mainstream Confucianism, which is believed to be 
                                                          
9 Mou Zongsan牟宗三, Xinti yu Xingti心體與性體Constitutive Mind and Constitutive Nature (1968), 1,181. 
10 For a detailed explication of this problem in Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, see S. Billioud, 
Thinking through Confucian Modernity (2012). 
11 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Xinti yu Xingti 心體與性體 Constitutive Mind and Constitutive Nature (1968), 3 
volumes. 




represented by masters from the School of Mind. The defect of Mou Zongsan’s 
approach has been pointed out by many Chinese scholars, among them Zhu Pingci, 
whose 祝平次, a critique of Mou’s methodology, stands out. Zhu reflects the three 
Kantian terminologies - will, knowledge and morality - which dominate Mou’s 
criticism of Zhu Xi, and points out the conceptual inappropriateness in Mou’s system, 
which seems to undermine the legitimacy of his approach according to the modern 
academic standard.13  
Mou Zongsan’s criticism of Zhu Xi is made explicit in the works of Tang Junyi 唐君
毅14 and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀,15 and is implicit in Tu Weiming’s 杜維明 interpretation of 
Confucian thought.16 In line with Mou’s classification, Tang, Xu and Tu all take Zhu 
Xi as one who contributed a great deal to Confucian learning yet missed the point of 
Confucian morality and spirituality, as formally established in Mencius. Due to a rather 
unreflective adoption of Kantian conceptions, as pointed out by Zhu Pingci, they hold 
a strong presupposition of a distinction between knowledge and morality, which leads 
them to conclude that Zhu Xi has failed to break through the boundary between the two 
spheres, and to maintain that Zhu Xi’s methodology, particularly with regard to his 
doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格物致知  the investigation of things and the extension of 
knowledge, does not represent the authentic way of sage-making as suggested by 
Mencius, Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming.  
Unlike Mou, Tang, Xu and Tu, who share the same research interest in Confucian 
morality, in their research on Zhu Xi Wing-Tsit Chan 陳榮捷17 and Chen Lai 陳來18 
                                                          
13 See Zhu Pingci 祝平次, ‘Yizhi, Zhishi yu Daode: Lun Zhu Xi Lunlixue de Jige Wenti 意志，知识与道德：
论朱熹伦理学的几个问题 Will, Knowledge and Morality on a Few Questions in Zhu Xi’s Ethics’ (2009), 
164-77. 
14 Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Zhongguo Zhexue Yuanlun-Yuan Dao Pian, Juan 3 中國哲學原論 - 原道篇卷三 On 
Chinese Philosophy-interpretation of the Dao (1974), 3, 1408-79. 
Tang’s contribution to the study of Chinese philosophy can hardly be exaggerated. With regard to this 
research, I am indebted to him for his systematic exploration of the meaning and usage of the 
philosophical terms throughout the history of classical Chinese, see Tang Junyi 唐君毅,  Zhongguo Zhexue 
Yuanlun: Daolun Pian 中國哲學原論:導論篇 On Chinese Philosophy: Introduction (1986). 
15Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Zhongguo Renxinglun Shi: Xianqin Pian 中國人性論史：先秦篇 History concerning 
the Development of Chinese Thought on Human Nature: pre-Qin (1979), 63-102. 
16 Tu Weiming, Way, Learning and Politics (1989); Humanity and Self-Cultivation (1979). 
17 Most of Wing-Tsit Chan’s academic works on Zhu Xi have been translated into Chinese and recently 
published in mainland China; for instance, his Zhuzi Xin Tansuo 朱子新探索 New Studies of Master Zhu, 
Zhu Xue Lunji 朱学论集 A Collection of Papers on Zhu Xi’s Thought, Zhuzi Menren 朱子门人 Pupils of 
Master Zhu (2007). 
18 Chen Lai 陈来，Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu 朱子哲学研究 A Study of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy (2008); Chen Lai 
(ed.), Zaoqi Daoxue Huayu de Xingcheng yu Yanbian 早期道 学话语的形成与演变 The Formation and 
Development of the Early Neo-Confucian Discourse (2007). 
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attempt to combine a philological approach with a philosophical perspective. This has 
resulted in some systematic studies of Zhu Xi’s major texts and in-depth analysis of the 
principal concepts in his work. Daniel K. Gardner’s study of Zhu Xi’s treatment of Si 
Shu 四書 The Four Books, in particular Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, make manifest 
the importance of Zhu Xi’s intellectual brilliance to the Song scholarship.19 The last 
thirty to forty years have seen a mounting interest in Zhu Xi, and three international 
conferences on the great thinker, held in 1982, 2008 and 2011, each resulted in a 
collection of academic papers.20 Among these papers A. C. Graham’s What is New in 
Cheng-Chu Theory of Human Nature gives a real insight into what Zhu Xi means by 
‘knowing’. Graham particularly stresses the penetrating power of li 理 the Principle 
over qi 氣 the cosmic matter, and takes ‘knowing’ as the innovative element in the 
theory of human nature promoted by the Cheng-Zhu school. 21 Seen in the light of 
human nature, the notion of ‘knowing’ is no longer examined solely from an 
epistemological stance, but is brought back to the context of the Cheng-Zhu school, and 
hence acquires moral and even spiritual significance. Graham’s analysis of the role of 
‘knowing’ in the thought of the Cheng-Zhu school sheds new light on Zhu Xi’s notion 
of zhi 知.  
The issue of hermeneutics first came under heated discussion in China in the 1980s, 
leading to the emergence of a new scholarly field of ‘Chinese Hermeneutics’. 
Contrasting views are expressed on this, as seen in the debate between Wolfgang Kubin 
and Chungying Cheng.22 With regard to the hermeneutic rules derived from Zhu Xi’s 
texts, we have the excellent studies conducted by Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, in particular the 
two papers collected in Zhongguo Jingdian Quanshi Chuantong-Ruxue Pian 中國經典
詮釋傳統-儒學篇 The Tradition of Scriptural Exegesis in China – Confucianism.23  
                                                          
19 D.K. Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-Hsueh (1986); and The Four Books (2007). 
20 The three volumes are Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (1986); Wang Zhen 王震  
(ed.), Songdai Xin Ruxue de Jingshen Shijie-yi Zhuzi Xue we Zhongxin 宋代新儒学的精神世界: 以朱子学为中
心 The Spiritual and Intellectual World of Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty with a Focus on the 
Study of Master Zhu (2009); Chen Lai 陈来 (ed.), Zhexue yu Shidai 哲学与时代 Philosophy and its Time 
(2012).  
21 See A.C. Graham, ‘What Was New in the Cheng-Chu Theory of Human Nature’ in Wing-tsit Chan 
(ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (Honolulu, 1986), 138-57.  
22 Cheng-I Tu (ed.), Interpretation and Intellectual Change (2005). 
23 Li Minghui 李明輝 (ed.), Zhongguo Jingdian Quanshi Chuantong-Ruxue Pian 中國經典詮釋傳統-儒學篇
The Tradition of Scriptural Exegesis in China – Confucianism (2002). 
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In the case of Eckhart, this book is indebted to the following works on medieval 
studies and on Eckhart. Bernard McGinn’s six volumes of The Presence of God: A 
History of Western Christian Mysticism24 depicts the vast landscape of the longstanding 
spiritual tradition in which Eckhart was raised. For the background knowledge of 
medieval philosophy and theology, which is essential to understanding Eckhart, this 
book has recourse mainly to Etienne Gilson’s History of Christian Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages;25 Norman Kretzmann’s Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: 
From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600;26 
Ulrich G Leinsle’s Introduction to Scholastic Theology;27 and the various introductions 
to medieval thought authored by B. B. Price,28 John Marenbon,29 and David Knowles.30 
With regard to the intellectual figures whose thinking had an evident impact on Eckhart, 
this book refers mainly to John F. Wippel’s study of the metaphysical thought of 
Thomas Aquinas,31 Jan A. Aertsen’s Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: 
the Case of Thomas Aquinas;32 Philipp W. Rosemann’s account of Peter Lombard;33 A. 
Hilary Armstrong’s understanding of Plotinus as well as his exposition of the Plotinian 
and Christian traditions; 34  Gerard O’Daly’s analysis of Augustine’s philosophy of 
mind;35 Herbert A. Davidson’s study of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes’ theories of 
Aristotle’s active intellect and of human intellect;36 and Colette Sirat’s introduction to 
the Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages, in particular the philosophy of 
Maimonides.37 
In Eckhartian literature, of greatest importance has been McGinn’s reading of 
Eckhart as unfolded in his The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart, which gives a 
                                                          
24 Two volumes in this series are particularly important to our study: I, The Foundation of Mysticism 
(1992); and IV, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (2005). 
25 E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1955). 
26 N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy 
(1982).  
27 U.G. Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology (2010). 
28 B.B. Price, Medieval Thought (1992). 
29 J. Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350) (1987). 
30 D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (1963). 
31 J.F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (1984). 
32 J.A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals (1996). 
33 P.W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (2004). 
34 A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (1940); 
Plotinian and Christian Studies (1979). 
35 G. O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (1987). 
36 H.A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect (1992). 
37 C. Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1985). 
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picture of Eckhart as a mystic and a scholastic thinker.38 Similar work has been done 
by Oliver Davies in his Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian, albeit that Davies 
intends to highlight the personal experience of Eckhart that enables his vernacular 
sermons to be charged with heartfelt power.39 In both McGinn and Davies, the language 
of transcendence and immanence prevails. The issue of intellectualism is brought to 
light in Reiner Schürmann’s Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher; by comparing 
Eckhart with Heidegger, Schürmann puts forward the thesis that in Eckhart the role of 
intellect is to be revealed through the threefold interplay between God, man and the 
world. 40  The complexity of Eckhart’s thought is largely displayed in Reiner 
Manstetten’s Esse est Deus, in which Manstetten attempts to demonstrate how the 
multi-layers of thought, i.e., the metaphysical, theological, liturgical and spiritual 
dimensions, are interwoven in Eckhart’s texts.41 Markus Vinzent’s study of Eckhart, in 
particular the two recently published monographs, The Art of Detachment and On the 
Lord’s Prayer,42 together with his rediscovery and translation of Eckhart’s four new 
Parisian Questions,43 makes clear the kind of systematic thinking to be found in Eckhart, 
and the sense in which Eckhart’s thinking possesses the power to redefine or even 
undermine the traditional ways of doing theology. The genre of scholastic quaestio is 
explored in Palémon Glorieux’s La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320,44 while a 
detailed expounding of Eckhart’s apophatic theology is provided in V. Lossky’s 
Théologie négative et connaissance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart.45 
Although no comparison has been done between Zhu Xi and Eckhart, we have a 
number of comparative studies with reference to one or other of these thinkers, for 
instance, John H. Berthrong’s Concerning Creativity: A Comparison of Chu Hsi, 
Whitehead, and Neville.46 Great attempts have been made to compare Zhu Xi and 
                                                          
38 B. McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (2001).  
39 O. Davies, Meister Eckhart (1991). 
40 R. Schürmann, Meister Eckhart (1978). 
41 R. Manstetten, Esse est Deus (1993). 
42 M. Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (2011); id., Meister Eckhart, On the Lord’s Prayer (2012). 
43 M. Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attributes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian Questions of Meister 
Eckhart’, Journal of Theological Studies, 63, (2012), 156-86. 
44 P. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320 (1925). 
45 V. Lossky, Théologie négative et connaissance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart (1960). 
46 J. Berthrong, Concerning Creativity (1997).  
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Thomas Aquinas, both in Chinese47 and in English.48 As for studies that intend to 
contribute to inter-religious dialogue, we have Rudolf Otto’s Mysticism East and 
West,49 and D. T. Suzuki’s Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist.50 
None of the aforementioned works touch on the concept of intellect in Zhu Xi, 
although studies of Eckhart cannot avoid his notion of intellect. The depth of an idea 
can become clearer once it is compared with another tradition; however, in both Suzuki 
and Otto, the textual study is inadequate, and arguably an oversimplification. By taking 
the hermeneutical framework fully into consideration, this research aims to cover 
different literary forms and to cross-read texts, so that the development of the idea in it 
will become lively and concrete. A comparison based on textual study makes it clear 
that in both Zhu Xi and Eckhart, the hermeneutical, intellectual and spiritual dimensions 
are closely bound together, and the three are often fused into one. As the first ever 
comparative study between Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart, this book aims to find the 
common ground beneath the seeming contrast between the two great thinkers, using 
these exemplars to bridge the different intellectual traditions on a specific point, which 
will enhance the reception of Zhu Xi in Christian tradition as well as the reception of 
Eckhart in the Confucian world. Since the focus of this book is on intellect and the kind 
of intellectualism expressed in Zhu Xi and Eckhart, it will offer two intellectual profiles, 
which will underline the resemblance between Zhu Xi’s intellectual spirituality and 
Eckhart’s intellectual mysticism. Such is the potential contribution this book intends to 
make. 
Following the formula of a comparative study, this book comprises three chapters. 
Chapter 1 deals with Zhu Xi’s hermeneutical framework for his understanding of the 
human intellect.  In three sections it addresses, first, how Zhu Xi ‘the editor’ edits the 
text of Da Xue大學 The Great Learning; second, how Zhu Xi ‘the commentator’ weaves 
his philosophical ideas into the text of Da Xue 大學  The Great Learning through 
commentary writing; and third, how Zhu Xi ‘the philosopher’ formulates a systematic 
elucidation of his thinking in the form of Q&A. Through the three inter-related sections 
we can find in Zhu Xi a persistent stress on the importance of knowing and his attempt 
                                                          
47 Li Jianqiu 黎建球, Zhu Xi yu Duomasi Xingshang Sixiang de Bijiao 朱熹與多馬斯形上思想的比較 A 
Comparison between Zhu Xi’s Metaphysical Thinking and that of Thomas Aquinas (1977). 
48 J.J. Griffin, Caritas and Ren (1988). 
49 R. Otto, Mysticism East and West (1970). 
50 D.T. Suzuki, Mysticism (1957).  
16 
 
to establish an ontological and epistemological ground for Confucian morality and 
spirituality in terms of self-realisation.  
    With a structure similar to Chapter 1, Chapter 2 addresses the hermeneutical 
framework for Eckhart’s notion of the human intellect. Once again, the chapter includes 
three sections: first, how Eckhart ‘the philosopher’ spells out his revolutionary thinking 
of intellect in the form of quaestio; second, how Eckhart ‘the theologian’ addresses the 
priority of knowing through extensive biblical commentaries; and third, how Eckhart 
‘the friar’ manages to communicate his profound philosophical and theological thinking 
by delivering sermons to the public, in both scholastic Latin and the vernacular Middle 
High German.  
Based on a systematic study of the two thinkers as presented in Chapters 1 and 2, 
Chapter 3 will form a comparison between Zhu Xi and Eckhart with a focus on their 
thinking concerning the human intellect and the relevant hermeneutical considerations 
expressed by both scholars. 
The translation of Zhu Xi’s works in this study is mostly that of the author; where 
that is not the case the translator’s name will be given. The treatment of the fundamental 
concepts in Zhu Xi mainly follows Wing-Tsit Chan’s translation as seen in his Source 
Book.51 In line with Chan, in this study li 理 will be translated as Principle, xin 心 as 
mind, and yi 意 as will, on the grounds of the prevailing role of philosophical thinking 
in the Song, especially in the Cheng-Zhu School. The Song masters’ interest in 
philosophical discussion is undoubtedly a testimony to the enduring influence that Zen 
Buddhism exerted on the theoretical reconstruction of Confucianism in the Song. Given 
the Neo-Confucian masters’ affinity with Zen, the translation of their work will 
naturally take into account the meaning of the same term in the context of Zen, which 
explains why ‘mind’, rather than ‘mind-heart’ is to be chosen as the translation of xin
心 . Similarly ‘Principle’ rather than ‘pattern’ or ‘coherence’ will be treated as the 
equivalent of Li 理 in English, in order to convey the metaphysical or ontological 
implications these Neo-Confucian terminologies may have.52 It is the author’s idea to 
translate Zhu Xi’s zhi知 as intellect, which will be explained at length in the first chapter.   
                                                          
51 See Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1969), 588-653. 
52 In addition to ‘principle’, ‘pattern’ and ‘coherence’, there are many other options for Li, such as ‘form’ 
and ‘order’. Given the fundamental differences between the two linguistic systems and the two 
intellectual traditions, it is obvious that no one will ever find a perfect match for Li in English, a 
translator/author’s choice of word is determined by his or her interpretation of the source text, and in 
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Considering the sense of mission shared by the Song masters, which involves the 
task to rehabilitate the cultural and spiritual identity of the Confucian literati at that time, 
this book uses the word ‘scripture’ rather than ‘classic’ when alluding to the 
fundamental texts that have shaped the Confucian tradition and have been widely 
treated as the manifestation of the Dao道Way through the words and lives of the ancient 
sages. Hence, scripture stands for something sacred and embodies the universal and 
eternal truth whose validity is not affected by the fluctuation of social and cultural 
circumstances. The role of scripture was particularly addressed by the Neo-Confucian 
masters when they committed themselves to resuming the Confucian spiritual identity 
and reconstructing the Confucian intellectual tradition. Such spiritual and intellectual 
commitment is also entangled with a profound political or social concern. The subtle 
difference between the scriptural texts and the classical texts became an issue in the 
transmission of the divine lineage within Confucian tradition. A classical text may be 
an historical document or a literary work that does not lead directly to a spiritual or 
religious identity; only a scriptural text holds the key to one’s spiritual or religious 
identity, due to its divine origin and sacred nature. Partly for that reason, Zhu Xi gives 
primacy to Si Shu 四書 The Four Books, which enjoy a higher status than Wu Jing 五經
The Five Classics. That also explains why du shu fa 讀書法 is preferably translated as 
‘Method of Scriptural Reading’ rather than ‘Method of Reading’, as in the context of 
Zhu Xi it mainly applies to scriptural reading.  
This book uses traditional Chinese characters and Pinyin in the main text; however, 
some simplified Chinese characters and Wade-Giles may be found in the footnotes if 
they are so printed in the original texts.  
With regard to English translations of Eckhart, this study relies on Edmund Colledge, 
Oliver Davies, Frank Tobin and Maurice O’C Walshe for their translation of Eckhart’s 
German works. For Eckhart’s scholastic Latin works, the book follows the translations 
offered by Bernard McGinn, Armand A. Maurer and Markus Vinzent. The footnotes 
will give the place of the relevant English translation alongside its place in the German 
Works (DW) or the Latin Works (LW) if that passage has been translated into English. 
                                                          
other words, one’s translation is shaped by the respective interpretation. In that sense translation has 
raised new questions and also opened up more avenues for the study of Chinese thought in the West. 
This issue has been particularly addressed by Brook Ziporyn in two monographs. See Brook Ziporyn, 
Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought; Prolegomena to the Study of 




Three appendices are attached to the main text. Appendix 1 is the table of the four 
versions of The Great Learning; Appendix 2 is a Chinese-English glossary giving a list 
of the Chinese terms relevant to this book; Appendix 3 is the author’s translation of Zhu 
Xi’s Q&A concerning The Great Learning, which covers all the passages quoted from 
in this book.  
I am deeply indebted to my teachers and friends, without whose continuous support 
I would have lost my confidence and probably abandoned this project.  
    My thanks go first to my PhD supervisor Prof. Markus Vinzent.  The past four years 
have been a process of intensive learning under his supervision, and the training I have 
received from him will continue to have an impact on my study in the future. I can 
recall all the meetings we had in the British Library or in his office, when we sat down 
and went through my immature work line-by-line. He checked every single word of my 
writing, picking up all the possible mistakes ranging from grammatical errors to 
incoherence in my argument and mistakes in my understanding of Eckhart. Sometimes 
I simply came to him with question upon question concerning the background 
knowledge of Eckhart, philosophical or theological enquiries, ranging from Aristotle or 
Plotinus to Hegel, even to the modern theory of hermeneutics. I am amazed by the fact 
that to all my ridiculously unlimited questioning, his answers were always clear. I 
cannot imagine how much more time I would have needed to solve these puzzles in my 
head without the navigation of an erudite supervisor like Markus. I always find it a 
pleasure to listen to his personal view, especially when it sounds as provocative and 
daring as that of Eckhart. The four years I have spent under his supervision have led 
me into the world of medieval theology, allowing me a glimpse of the spiritual and 
intellectual splendour of that age.  
    I am indebted to Prof. Xinzhong Yao at King’s College London for my research on 
Zhu Xi. In addition to helping me with my thesis, he also kindly allowed me to 
participate in lecturing the undergraduate courses on Confucian Ethics and Chinese 
Religion, which has broadened my view of Confucian tradition in general terms, and in 
particular has deepened my understanding of the methodology advocated by the modern 
New-Confucian scholars from Mou Zongsan to Tu Weiming.   
    I owe a huge thank you to Prof. Edmond Tang at the University of Birmingham. 
Without his continuous support and encouragement, I would not have had the 
confidence to take up this research in the first place. He also kindly let me have access 
to the Chinese books he has collected over decades. This resource treasure spared me 
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the pain of carrying home the essential reference books from the SOAS library, and in 
the course of writing my thesis I enjoyed the freedom to look up a specific chapter or 
page whenever I needed to.    
    I am also thankful for the support of my teachers in China, in particular my previous 
supervisor Prof. Chen Shaoming and his wife Prof. Li Lanfen, Prof. Chen Lisheng and 
Prof. Gong Jun at Zhongshan University (Guangzhou, China). In addition to reading 
the draft of my thesis, they all gave me information about the current research on Zhu 
Xi in China, which helped me to improve and adjust my reading of Zhu Xi. 
   My thanks and gratitude also go to Prof. Wu Zhanliang at the National University of 
Taiwan and Dr Youxuan Wang at the University of Portsmouth; both offered valuable 
feedback to my work despite not knowing me in person. Prof. Wu gave me suggestions 
about the title of my thesis at the beginning of this research, and Dr Wang checked my 
translation of Zhu Xi’s work.  
   I am grateful to all my fellow PhD students for the fascinating discussions and 
exchange of ideas at postgraduate seminars. In particular I would like to thank Chris 
Wojtulewicz, whose thesis is on Eckhart’s thought of creation, and Yen-yi Lee, who 
majored in Chinese literature and is now Dr Lee in theology. Chris took the trouble to 
go through the whole thesis with a focus on grammar and style, while Yen-yi read the 
first chapter and we had long conversations at Birmingham with regard to the literature 
on Zhu Xi.   
   Finally, a few personal words to my families in China and the UK. I will always be 
grateful to my parents for allowing me to take up the study of philosophy against their 
wishes when I was eighteen. I also thank my son Aaron and my husband Jin for their 
love and support. Despite all the ups and downs I encountered over the past four years, 
the company of Jin and Aaron made this research an enjoyable process. Therefore, I 





Chapter 1 The Notion of zhi 知 and Intellectualism as Unfolded in Zhu 
Xi’s Hermeneutical Framework  
 
Like Confucian scholars today, who cannot escape the prevalence of philosophical 
terminologies borrowed from the West, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) could not avoid non-
Confucian concepts – mainly the Daoist and Buddhist categories – when committing to 
the Neo-Confucian project, the reconstruction of Confucian tradition. That theoretical 
attempt at a comprehensive reconstruction of Confucianism can be traced back to the 
late Tang 唐 (618-907)53 scholars Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) and Li Ao 李翺 (774-836), in 
whom we see the aspiration to rehabilitate the orthodox status of Confucianism, and 
who, more importantly, both started to compose philosophical treatises in order to shed 
new light on fundamental Confucian concepts such as Dao 道 Way and xing 性 nature.54 
A genuine revival of Confucian education and scriptural learning occurred in the early 
Song 宋 (960-1279), which is collectively represented by Sun Fu 孫復 (992-1057), Hu 
Yuan 胡瑗 (993-1059), Shi Jie 石介 (1005-1045) and Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989-1052). 
Under this academic climate emerged the five eminent Confucian masters in the 
Northern Song (960-1127): Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1078), Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017-
1073), Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011-1077), and the Cheng brothers Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032-
1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107).55  
                                                          
53 It is still open to question whether the origin of the Neo-Confucian movement might be found in the 
work of Wang Tong 王通 (584-617), who lived in the period of the Sui dynasty 隋 (581-618). This 
controversial question has been addressed by both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. In conversing with his 
pupils Zhu Xi gives a critical comment on Wang Tong’s Zhong Shuo 中說 On Confucian Doctrine, noting 
that the authorship of this book cannot be ascribed to Wang. See ZZYL, Juan 137 in ZZQS, 18,4251-5. 
Unlike Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming pays more attention to the significance of Zhong Shuo 中說 On 
Confucian Doctrine; in his Chuan Xi Lu 傳習錄 Instructions for Practical Living Wang Yangming 
compares Han Yu韓愈 (768-824) with Wang Tong 王通 (584-617), and openly plays down the importance 
of Han Yu in Confucian history. From Wang Yangming’s perspective Han Yu is only a genius in 
literature, whereas Wang Tong as a worthy Confucian has made a far greater contribution to reveal Dao 
道 Way. See Wing-tsit Chan 陈荣捷, Wang Yangming Chuan Xi Lu Xiangzhu Jiping 王陽明《傳習錄》詳註
集評 Detailed Commentary and Collective Remarks on Wang Yingming’s Instructions for Practical 
Living (2009), 26-9, 138-40.  
54 The pioneer spirit of Han Yu and Li Ao is best revealed through two philosophical treatises: Han Yu’s
韓愈 ‘Yuan Dao 原道 An Inquiry on the Way’ and Li Ao’s 李翺‘Fu Xing Shu 復性書 The Recovery of the 
Nature’; both see a new reading of Confucian scriptures characterised by a hybrid of Buddhist 
terminologies with Confucian doctrines.   
55 For a detailed genealogy of the Song Confucian masters, see Quan Zuwang 全祖望, ‘Song Yuan Ru 
Xue An Xulu 宋元儒學案序錄 Preface to Song-Yuan Confucian Anthology’, in Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 and 
Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (eds.), Song Yuan Xue An 宋元學案 Song-Yuan Confucian Anthology (1986), 1,1-18.  
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It was the Cheng brothers’ advocating of tian li 天理 the Heavenly Principle that 
finally clarified the direction of the Song scholarly tradition, 56  and the theoretical 
accomplishment of the Cheng brothers, especially that of Cheng Yi, formed the 
groundwork for Zhu Xi’s thinking. Unlike his predecessors, who made their 
proclamations without systematically backing these up by scriptures, Zhu Xi weaved 
his philosophical thinking into scriptural texts by writing commentaries on them.  
In Zhu Xi’s work the philosophical categories are always intertwined with scriptures, 
and often serve as the hermeneutical keys to a creative understanding of the transmitted 
texts. It might not be too far from the truth to describe Zhu Xi’s thinking as systematic; 
however this could be misleading if we overlook his fundamental role as an 
authoritative commentator and treat him solely as a systematic philosopher. The 
insufficiency of such a philosophical approach will become strikingly evident once we 
take into account the expression of his thought.  
It is remarkable that beneath Zhu Xi’s philosophical ideas lies the scriptural ground. 
That kind of purely philosophical exposition of an abstract concept which bears no 
scriptural reference seems to be alien to Zhu Xi, and probably to many other Confucian 
thinkers. This issue has been addressed by Feng Youlan馮友蘭 (1895-1990), who claims 
that from Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179-104 B.C.) onwards, the majority of Confucian 
authors, no matter how innovative a theory is to be proposed, resort to scriptural 
learning and attempt to substantiate their own ideas with scriptural proof, since only in 
this way will a theory be generally accepted.57 Despite all the controversies surrounding 
Feng’s claim, his judgement certainly gives some insight into the characteristics of Zhu 
Xi’s thought. Indeed, Zhu Xi hardly ever conducts philosophical speculation without 
considering its scriptural support; the philosophical ideas in his work are almost 
exclusively formulated through a dialogue with Confucian scriptures. It will be very 
hard, if not impossible, to grasp the depth and complexity of Zhu Xi’s thought without 
                                                          
56 Cheng Hao openly proclaimed his own attainment of the Heavenly Principle, ‘although some parts of 
my thought are handed down by the predecessors, the two words “Heavenly Principle” are derived from 
my own experience (吾學雖有所受，“天理”二字卻是自家體貼出來)’. See ‘Henan Chengshi Waishu 河南程氏外
書 External Works of the Chengs’, Juan 12, Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,424.  
57 The validity of Feng Youlan’s observation is still open to discussion, thus constituting another huge 
topic that cannot be dealt with in this research. Based on his professional training in Western philosophy, 
Feng’s perspective provides us with some insights into the hermeneutical dimension of Confucian 
scholarship. He divides the history of Chinese intellectual tradition into two main stages: the age of Zi 
Xue 子學 (the thought of the masters) beginning with Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and ending with King 
Huainan 淮南王 (179-122 B.C.), and the age of Jing Xue 經學 scriptural learning, from Dong Zhongshu 董
仲舒 (179-104 B.C.) to Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927). For details, see Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, Zhongguo 
Zhexueshi 中國哲學史 History of Chinese Philosophy (1992), 1,370. 
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a close scrutiny of the hermeneutical framework within which his philosophical 
thinking is so splendidly unfolded.   
Throughout the history of Confucianism the method of philosophising has varied. In 
the Confucian context there seem to be no philosophical glossaries that allow concepts 
originated from Buddhism or Taoism to be universally applied to the extent that the 
Aristotelian concepts have been adopted in the context of Christian theology. Taking 
into account the disputable role played by philosophical speculation in the proceedings 
of Confucianism as a tradition of thought, the level of difficulty and complexity 
involved in Zhu Xi’s treatment of Confucian scriptures is multiplied. Zhu Xi 
appropriates a wide range of Daoist and Buddhist philosophical categories, and uses 
them as the hermeneutical key to a philosophical reading of Confucian scriptures. On 
the other hand, a great deal of preparation has been done to ensure that all the exotic 
philosophical concepts are subject to the Confucian values and suitable to be merged 
into the scriptural texts, so that the original Daoist or Buddhist colour will fade into the 
background, and those borrowed ideas finally acquire a Confucian expression.58 Daniel 
K Gardner’s research depicts an overall account of the Song Confucian scholarship. He 
rightly points out that at least three approaches have been generally adopted by the Song 
Confucian scholars, namely the critical, the programmatic and the philosophical. Zhu 
Xi’s main interest undoubtedly falls into the last category.59  
Indeed, Zhu Xi assigns himself an unprecedentedly demanding task: to provide a 
coherent and systematic philosophical interpretation of the principal Confucian 
scriptures. Such a massive academic assignment generally entails a twofold operation, 
namely compiling and interpreting scriptures, both of which require the intellectual 
capacity for systematic thinking which enables personal thought to run through the 
scriptural texts while at the same time rising above them. This task inevitably demands 
from the author an architectonic ability that will be lacking in an ordinary commentator 
                                                          
58 Zhu Xi’s Commentaries came in for severe criticism during the Qing Dynasty, when the paradigm of 
scholarship radically shifted, with the philosophical aspirations shared by the Song Confucian scholars 
gradually being replaced by fervent interest in philology. Zhu Xi’s thought was mostly rejected due to 
its impurity, in the sense that  his interpretation is tainted with Buddhist and Daoist categories. 
Nevertheless, Zhu Xi’s approach has been deeply appreciated by many prominent Confucian scholars in 
the modern era of China; for example, the renowned historian Cheng Yinke 陈寅恪 expresses his 
sympathetic understanding of the Song Confucian masters’ work, in particular Zhu Xi’s commentaries 
on Confucian scriptures. See Wu Xuezhao 吴学昭, Wu Mi yu Chen Yinke 吴宓与陈寅恪 Wu Mi and Chen 
Yinke (1992), 9-11. 
59 For the development of a schematisation of the Confucian classical studies in the Song Dynasty, see 
D.K. Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh (1986), 9-16.  
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equipped only with textual knowledge. Certainly one must acquire a high level of 
familiarity with scriptures and a mastery of language before embarking upon this 
academic enterprise, but these are only the basic requirements. It takes much more to 
engage in compiling and interpreting a whole set of Confucian scriptures. In other 
words, the traditional training in language and textual scholarship will not suffice. It is 
the grand vision, the original thinking and the faith in scriptures that really count. And 
it is here that Zhu Xi’s intellectual brilliance and his architectonic strength gain full 
display. This may also explain why it is that we see in Zhu Xi, more clearly than in any 
other Confucian master, a sustained striving for, and commitment to, order, structure, 
system and logic.   
In comparison with the preceding masters in the Northern Song 北宋 (960-1127) and 
with most of his contemporaries, Zhu Xi undoubtedly gives more thought to the 
structure of a text, rather than focusing only on the content. His work noticeably 
indicates an awareness of the fundamental importance of logical reasoning and 
structuring in both understanding and interpreting scriptures. 60  It is this kind of 
awareness that drives Zhu Xi to scrutinise the implicit structure of a scriptural text and 
also to attempt to systematise the Confucian teachings and values conveyed through the 
ancient texts. The effort in structuring and systematising a transmitted text never stands 
alone; it is always accompanied by an unconventional vision or perspective which 
allows new light to be shed upon the old text. And these unconventional ideas are often 
derived from philosophical speculation. In Zhu Xi, this unconventional element is 
obviously his doctrine of li 理 the Principle. 
It is worth noting that one does not need to affiliate with a certain tradition in order 
to conduct philosophical thinking; a philosophical insight can be shared by people of 
diverse backgrounds and be universally applied to various traditions. In other words, 
philosophical truth is bound to grow out of a specific linguistic framework, while 
lending itself to a wider application. But scripture has a more complex role to play in 
the development of a tradition. A scripture, insofar as it is the fundamental text of a 
certain tradition, usually demonstrates the uniqueness of that tradition as well as 
endorsing some doctrines that can be shared by all, for the uniqueness of a scriptural 
text concerns the spiritual or religious identity of those who have been brought up in it.  
                                                          
60 This is exemplified particularly by the arguments presented in his Da Xue Huo Wen 大學或問 Questions 
and Answers concerning The Great Learning, as will be discussed below.   
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Ironically, the abstract philosophical terms borrowed from other traditions serve the 
purpose of asserting the uniqueness of Confucianism intellectually and spiritually. Zhu 
Xi’s Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books undoubtedly 
represents his intellectual accomplishment as a commentator. Given the ultimate goal 
of the Neo-Confucian movement and the social context in which Zhu Xi’s 
Commentaries emerged, we cannot deny that his commentary writing does entail a 
spiritual dimension. As the historical study of Yu Yingshi 余英時 has revealed that the 
competitions between Confucian masters and Buddhist monks in the Song Dynasty 
actually occurred in the realm that is beyond this world, what they aimed for is not 
political or social privileges, but rather spiritual supriority. 61  A similar view is 
expressed by Tu Weiming 杜維明, who depicts the Neo-Confucian movement as “a 
long and strenuous process of searching for a new spiritual identity following the 
decline of Confucian thinking over a period of centuries.” 62 Seen in this light Zhu Xi’s 
completion of this masterpiece cannot be deemed an intellectual achievement which is 
independent from the Neo-Confucians’ collective efforts in striving for a new spiritual 
identity. To Zhu Xi and his contemporaries, his Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 
Commentaries on The Four Books is no less than a well structured and systematically 
interpreted Confucian sutra, which contains the wisdom of the Confucian sages whose 
lives and words are the embodiment of Dao 道 Way. When Zhu Xi openly proclaims 
the divine origin63 of Sishu 四書 The Four Books and regards these texts as sacred, the 
spiritual and religious implications of his Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四 書 章 句 集 註 
Commentaries on The Four Books also become self-evident. Although they appeared 
as Zhu Xi’s personal intellectual output, in the Neo-Confucian context this series of 
Commentaries automatically acquire a peculiar spiritual significance. Hence the 
hermeneutical, the intellectual and the spiritual dimensions are fused into one in Zhu 
Xi’s Commentaries.  
                                                          
61 For a detailed survey of the historical development of the Neo-Confucian movement, see Ying-shih 
Yu, ‘Intellectual Breakthroughs in the T’ang-Sung Transition’, in Willard J. Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks 
and Ying-shih Yu (eds.), The Power of Culture (Hong Kong, 1994), 158-71. [The conventions with 
transcription of Chinese names have changed over the last few decades, it is now commonly accepted 
that the author’s name is given in Pinyin and no hyphen between the two characters of the first name, for 
instance, ‘Yu Yingshi’ instead of ‘Yu Ying-shi’, ‘Wang Yangming’ instead of ‘Wang Yang-ming’.] 
62 See Tu Wei-ming, Humanity and Self-Cultivation (1979), 83-101. 
63 This line of thought is clearly expressed in Zhu Xi’s ‘Da Xue Zhangju Xu 大學章句序 Preface to The 
Great Learning’ and ‘Zhong Yong Zhangju Xu 中庸章句序 Preface to The Doctrine of the Mean’, in Sishu 
Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 1, 14. 
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Clearly Zhu Xi concerns himself more with the philosophical ideas than with the 
historical facts or literary vocabulary, grammar and rhetoric, and it is the ideas that 
constitute the core of his work, as explicitly instanced by his Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 
Commentary on The Great Learning. It is by means of interpreting a crucial scriptural 
phrase gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and extension of knowledge that 
Zhu Xi unfolds his insights into a hidden line of Confucian tradition which, he believes, 
has long been overlooked by previous commentators and many contemporary 
Confucian scholars. His dialogue with this scripture opens up a new approach to 
scriptural learning and self-cultivation. Indeed, such is the importance of Da Xue 大學 
The Great Learning that he finds it necessary to insert into the the original text a Bu 
Zhuan 補傳 Supplement to the section of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things 
and extension of knowledge, so as to make it complete in terms of structure and 
meaning. This unconventional way of exegetical practice allows Zhu Xi’s personal 
thought to partake of the character of the scriptural text. This little change represents 
the crux of his entire hermeneutical project, even possessing the power to rethink or 
rewrite the Confucian tradition; evidently in this little change consists the originality of 
his thinking.64  
The phrase ‘gewu zhizhi 格物致知’ may sound familiar to many Confucian adherents, 
as it had existed in the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning for centuries before Zhu 
Xi’s discovery of its vital importance to the reconstruction of Confucianism. Zhu Xi’s 
contribution lies mainly in formulating a systematic interpretation of this phrase in the 
form of Supplement, as a result ‘zhi 知 knowing’65 gains a central role in Confucian way 
of self-cultivation, and becomes an essential element in Confucian morality and 
spirituality. In other words, ‘zhi 知 knowing’ starts to assume moral (political) and 
spiritual significance, and the epistemological implication of zhi 知 is relatively less 
important in Zhu Xi’s thought. Despite a persistent emphasis on zhi 知 knowing, Zhu 
Xi categorically puts ren 仁 humaneness in front of zhi 知 knowing, 66 likewise he 
subordinates the issue of intellective conduct to the Confucian theme of moral 
                                                          
64 A.C. Graham maintains that the innovative element of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s theory of human nature 
lies in their notion of ‘knowing’. See A.C. Graham, ‘What Was New in the Cheng-Chu Theory of Human 
Nature’ (1986), 138-57.  
65 zhi 知 can be a verb or a noun, depending on the context in which it appears.  
66 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 32: ‘知對仁言，則仁是體，知是用。只就知言，則知又自有體，用。淳錄’ ZZQS, 
15,1163.   
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cultivation67 and the pursuit of spiritual maturity throughout his exegeses, in the sense 
that knowing leads to moral action and thinking paves the way for sagehood. 
Philosophically speaking the concept of zhi 知 knowing stands at a relatively lower level 
than that of li 理 Principle, of xin 心 mind, of xing 性 nature and of ming 命 mandate, in 
Zhu Xi zhi 知 knowing is defined as a major function of xin 心 mind which is deemed 
the platform where the practice of self-cultivation is to be carried out.68 Here we are 
confronted with the difficulty that the distinction, which we may take for granted, 
between facts and values or between epistemology and morality, does not necessarily 
concern a Neo-Confucian master like Zhu Xi. Although what Zhu Xi means by zhi 知 
knowing may refer to the pursuit of structure and order, and also associates with logical 
reasoning and analytical expression, it is not fitting to read too much epistemological 
meaning into Zhu Xi’s notion of zhi 知 knowing, for zhi 知 knowing in Confucian 
context does not have an end in itself, it often refers to one’s experiential awareness of 
one’s own existence as well as the existence of the world,69 in Zhu Xi’s case zhi 知 
knowing serves as the means by which the meaning of li 理 Principle, the power of xin 
心 mind, the greatness of xing 性 human nature and the secret of tian ming 天命 the 
heavenly mandate of  are to be brought to light.70  
In relation to ren 仁 humaneness, li 理 Principle, xin 心 mind, xing 性 nature and ming 
命 mandate, zhi 知 knowing ought to be understood in terms of yong 用 function; 
whereas standing alone, zhi 知 knowing can have its own ti 體 substance and yong 用 
                                                          
67 With regard to the relation of morality to knowledge in Zhu Xi, see Yu Ying-shi, ‘Morality and 
Knowledge in Chu Hsi’s Philosophical System’, in Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism 
(Honolulu, 1986), 228-54. 
68 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 5: ‘心是做工夫处。端蒙錄’  ZZQS, 14,230. 
69 See Zhu Pingci 祝平次,  ‘Yizhi, Zhishi yu Daode: Lun Zhu Xi Lunlixue de Jige Wenti 意志，知识与道德：
论朱熹伦理学的几个问题 Will, Knowledge and Morality: on a Few Questions in Zhu Xi’s Ethics’, in Wang 
Zhen 王震 (ed.), Songdai Xin Ruxue de Jingshen Shijie-yi Zhuzi Xue we Zhongxin 宋代新儒学的精神世界: 以
朱子学为中心 The Spiritual and Intellectual World of Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty-with a focus 
on the study of Master Zhu (2009), 171. 
70 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 14: ‘大學須自格物入，格物從敬入最好。只敬，便能格物。敬是個瑩徹底物事。今人卻塊坐
了，相似昏倦，要須提撕著。提撕便敬；昏倦便是肆，肆便不敬。德明 錄’ ZZQS, 14,443. 
Ibid.Juan 15: ‘格物、致知，是極粗底事；“天命之謂性”，是極精底事。但致知、格物， 便是那 “天命之謂性” 底事。
下等事，便是上等工夫。義剛錄’  ZZQS, 14,475. 
In line with Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi interprets gewu 格物 the investigation of things as qiongli 穷理 probing the 
Principle, zhizhi 致知 the extension of knowledge is taken in the sense of extending what one has known 
to what is yet to be known, which has its end in illuminating the substance and function of xin 心 mind. 
Cheng Yi also identifies qiongli 窮理 probing the Principle with jinxing 尽性 realising the potential in 
one’s nature and zhiming 至命 attaining the heavenly mandate; he particularly highlights the point that 
these three should be treated as one, and can be accomplished at the same time. See Cheng Yi, ‘Henan 
Chengshi Yishu 河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 18, Er Cheng Ji 二程
集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,193. 
27 
 
function as Zhu Xi claims. The doctrine of ti-yong 體用 substance-function firstly 
appeared in Wang Bi 王弼(226－249)’s Laozi Zhu 老子注 Commentary on Laozi chapter 
38, later on was widely adopted by Buddhism. As a philosophical terminology ti-yong 
體用 substance-function has been employed in both Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s works. 
Cheng Yi applies it to his theory of li yi fen shu 理一分殊 one Principle with diverse 
manifestations. It gains even a wider application in Zhu Xi without being clearly 
redefined. Wing-tsit Chan on the basis of his extensive study of Zhu Xi summarises the 
meaning of ti-yong 體用 substance-function into four: 1) a thing and its function, for 
instance, ear and hearing; 2) the source or origin from which a thing is derived, for 
instance, ren 仁 humaneness and ai 爱 love; 3) the two sides of one thing, for instance, 
xing 性 nature and qing 情 feeling represent ti 體 the substance and yong 用 function of 
xin 心  mind; 4) the cause or reasons for something to be so, for instance ren 仁 
humaneness rooted in human nature as ti 體 the substance and the sympathy one feels 
for others as yong 用 function. 71  
Having this clarified, we have to ask the question - what does Zhu Xi mean by the 
substance and fuction of zhi 知 knowing? Is he trying to highlight the autonomy of 
knowing or knowledge by addressing the substance of zhi 知? To answer this question, 
it is necessary to go back to the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning where gewu 
zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and extension of knowledge is followed by 
chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will and zhengxin 正心 the rectification of the mind. 
Since zhengxin 正心 the rectification of the mind pertains to modifying the feelings such 
as wrath, fear, fondness and worries aroused in an individual’s mind, it becomes explicit 
that the three consecutive steps zhizhi 致知, chengyi 誠意 and zhengxin are dealing with 
the three functions of xin 心 mind, namely zhi 知 knowing, yi 意 willing and qing 情 
feeling 72 which in turn, represent the intellect, the will and the sentiments in us. In Yu 
Lei 語類 Conversations Zhu Xi expounds at length in what sense xin 心 mind is deemed 
ti 體 the substance from which arise zhi 知 knowing, yi 意 willing and qing 情 feeling.73 
                                                          
71 See Wing-tsit Chan 陈荣捷, Zhu Xue Lunji 朱学论集 Collection of Papers on Zhu Xi (2007), 55-60. 
72 Zhu Xi explains that the word qing 情 covers such a broad domain that the activity of will can be 
included in it. In that sense what he means by qing 情 overarches both sentiment and will: so long as a 
certain kind of feeling is aroused, the activity of will becomes involved.  See ZZYL, Juan 5: ‘情又是意底
骨子。志與意都屬情，情字較大。僩 錄’ ZZQS, 14,232. 
73 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 15:  ‘致知、誠意、正心，知與意皆從心出來。端蒙錄’ ZZQS, 14,489. 
Ibid.Juan 5: ‘性、情、心，惟孟子橫渠說得好。仁是性，惻隱是情，須從心上發出來。蓋卿錄’ ZZQS, 14,229. 
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Obviously in relation to yi 意 willing and qing 情 feeling, zhi 知 has its own substance 
and function, and together they form the major functions of xin 心 mind.  
Given the context in which Zhu Xi notion of zhi 知 appears, we cannot come to the 
conclusion that a stress on the autonomy of knowing or knowledge is seen in Zhu Xi, 
simply because he puts knowing in front of willing and feeling. What Zhu Xi means by 
zhi 知 is fundamentally a great function of xin 心 mind, peculiar to xin 心 mind is this 
extremely subtle and miraculous faculty of knowing which is called xuling zhijue 虛靈
知覺 in his Zhong Yong Zhangju 中庸章句 Commentary on The Doctrine of the Mean, 74 
and ren zhi shenming 人之神明 in his Mengzi Jizhu 孟子集註 Commentary on The Book 
of Mencius. 75  Different from these two texts, in his Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 
Commentary on The Great Learning Zhu Xi explicitly establishes a correspondence 
between xin zhi zhi 心之知 the knowing faculty of the mind and wu zhi li 物之理 the 
Principle of things, his work surrounding Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning sees a 
systematic philosophical expression of Zhu Xi’s notion of zhi 知.  
Thanks to Mou Zongsan’s influence, 76  a large proportion of the previous 
interpretation of Zhu Xi’s doctrine of ‘gewu zhizhi 格物致知’ draws heavily on the 
Kantian concepts, even Yu Yingshi’s analysis in this respect is not exempt from the 
kind of dichotomy between epistemology and morality. 77  Nonetheless a close 
examination of the context makes it necessary to move away from the epistemological 
perspective, because zhi 知 in Zhu Xi does not entail a quest for the conditions, limits 
and sources of knowledge as in Kant, nor does it concern the question of how to justify 
or prove a religious belief by rational means as in Thomas Aquinas. Alternatively we 
will take a contextual approach and see Zhu Xi’s doctrine of ‘gewu zhizhi 格物致知’ in 
light of his sophisticated interpretation of xin 心 mind which is scattered in his Sishu 
Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on The Four Books, Wen Ji 文集 Literary 
Works and Yu Lei 語類 Conversations. Once we affiliate Zhu Xi’s notion of zhi 知 
knowing with his doctrine of xin 心 mind according to the way it is presented in Yu Lei
語類 Conversations, and bear in mind his associating the doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格物致
                                                          
74 Zhu Xi, ‘Zhong Yong Zhangju Xu 中庸章句序 Preface to The Doctrine of the Mean’, in Sishu Zhangju 
Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 14.  
75 Zhu Xi, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 349. See Chen Lai
陈来, Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu 朱子哲学研究 A Study of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy (2008), 213. 
76 Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu Xingti 心體與性體 Constitutive Mind and Constitutive Nature (1968), 3 volumes.  
77 Yu Yingshi, ‘Morality and Knowledge in Chu Hsi’s Philosophical System’ (1986), 228-54. 
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知 with xue ju wen bian 學聚問辨 learning, congregating, questioning, and debating in 
Wen Yan 文言 The Commentary on the Text of Qian Diagram, mingshan zeshan 明善擇
善 knowing and choosing what is good in Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean, 
and zhixing zhitian 知性知天 knowing nature and the Heaven in Mengzi 孟子 The Book 
of Mencius,78 it becomes clear that what Zhu Xi means by zhi 知 is fundamentally 
different from what we mean by knowledge in the modern sense, it primarily concerns 
the innate faculty of knowing which enables us to realise the existence of li 理 Principle 
and the good nature namely xing 性 that tian 天 Heaven bestows upon us, and none of 
the three - li 理, xing 性, tian 天- can be known on an empirical ground.  
In his review on Mou Zongsan’s three volumes Xinti yu Xingti心體與性體Constitutive 
Mind and Constitutive Nature, Tu Weiming acknowledges that Zhu Xi’s concept of ge 
wu 格物 is ethical-religious rather than empirical-scientific, but still insists that the road 
to sagehood in Zhu Xi differs not only from that of Mencius but also from those of the 
early Song masters including Cheng Yi.79 Obviously the line drawn by Mou Zongsan 
which separates Zhu Xi from Mencius and other Song masters has little relevance to 
Zhu Xi’s own understanding of gewu zhizhi 格物致知, for he clearly refers this doctrine 
to the teaching of Mencisu as shown above. We cannot discuss at length how much 
justice Mou and Tu’s interpretation does to Zhu Xi, but to the least it is plain that if Zhu 
Xi’s ge wu 格物 is not empirical-scientific as explained by Tu, then the concept of zhizhi
致知 in Zhu Xi ought not to be understood on empirical-scientific ground in the sense 
of acquiring the knowledge of an external object. In Zhu Xi’s own terms, the doctrine 
of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 is meant to overarch both xing er shang 形而上 the metaphysical 
and xing er xia 形而下 the physical, for he does not presuppose a two-world system, but 
one world that consists of two dimensions, namely xing er shang 形而上 and xing er xia
形而下. On that basis Zhu Xi can easily relate zhi 知 to the metaphysical concepts such 
as li 理, xing 性 and tian 天, while in the same time insists that self-cultivation should 
start with the effort in gewu 格物 the investigation of things. Thus Zhu Xi’s concept of 
zhi 知 covers a spectrum which is much broader than knowledge or what can to be 
known, it also pertains to what can be thought, be realised, or even be experienced.  
                                                          
78 See Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 45: ‘凡程子之爲說者不過如此。其於格物致知之傳詳矣。今也尋其義理旣無可疑、考其
字義亦皆有據。至以他書論之、則文言所謂學聚問辨、中庸所謂明善擇善、孟子所謂知性知天、又皆在乎固守力行之
先、而可以驗夫大學始敎之功爲有在乎此也。愚嘗反覆考之而有以信其必然。是以竊取其意以補傳文之闕。不然、則
又安敢犯不韙之罪、爲無證之言、以自託於聖經賢傳之閒乎。’  ZZQS, 6,526. 
79 Tu Weiming, ‘Mind and Human Nature’, in Humanity and Self-Cultivation (1979), 111-8.  
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A contextual study makes it clear that we cannot easily find equivalence in English 
for Zhu Xi’s zhi 知. As explained above, it could be misleading if zhi 知 is literally 
translated as knowledge or reason.80 Since zhi 知 in Zhu Xi mostly pertains to the faculty 
of knowing which is deemed a function of xin 心 mind, a relatively better translation 
for zhi 知 is probably the human intellect. Nonetheless it is worth noting that Zhu Xi 
does not in particular distinguish sensory faculty from intellectual faculty as Aristotle 
does in his De Anima, nor does he clearly differentiate perception from thought in 
philosophical terms.81 To rephrase it in Zhu Xi’s terms, zhi 知 the human intellect 
together with yi 意 will and qing 情 sentiment constitute the major functions of xin 心 
mind, whereas standing on its own, each of the three has its own ti 體 substance and 
yong 用 function, if applying this ti-yong 體用 theory to zhi 知, we can treat the human 
intellect as the substance of zhi 知 while the activity of knowing and what is known will 
fall into the category of its function, hence three possible translations of zhi 知 are to be 
considered, namely the human intellect or intellect, knowing and knowledge.  
By translating Zhu Xi’s zhi 知 as the human intellect rather than knowledge, the focus 
of attention in this research will consequently diviate from an epistemological ground. 
We will instead concentrate on the moral and spiritual implications of zhi知 as presented 
in Zhu Xi’s thinking, in other words, how the intellectual dimension is weaved into the 
tradition of Confucian morality and eventually serves to reinstate Confucian spirituality 
by establishing Dao Tong 道統 the transmission of the Way in a new social context. As 
this line of thought is more systematically formulated in his work on Da Xue 大學 The 
Great Learning than elsewhere, we will narrow the primary sources down to those 
concerning Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, which consist mainly in Da Xue Zhangju
                                                          
80 For a detailed discussion of fundamental differences between Zhu Xi’s notion of zhi 知 and the 
epistemological sense of knowing, see Zhang Rulun 张汝伦, ‘Guanyu Gewuzhizhi de Ruogan Wenti: yi 
Zhu Xi de Chanshi wei Zhongxin 关于格物致知的若干问题-以朱熹的阐释为中心  On a Few Questions 
regarding “the Investigation of Things and Extension of Knowledge”: with a focus on Zhu Xi’s 
Interpretation’, in Wang Zhen 王震 (ed.), Songdai Xin Ruxue de Jingshen Shijie-yi Zhuzi Xue we Zhongxin
宋代新儒学的精神世界: 以朱子学为中心 The Spiritual and Intellectual World of Neo-Confucianism in the 
Song Dynasty-with a focus on the study of Master Zhu (2009), 52-71. 
81 Unlike Zhang Zai 張載 and Cheng Yi 程頤 Zhu Xi’s doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 does not entail an 
emphasis on the distinction between dexing zhizhi 德性之知 innate knowledge and wenjian zhizhi 聞見之知
knowledge acquired through the senses.  
See Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 34: ‘問：知，有聞見之知否？曰：知，只是一樣知，但有真不真。爭這些子，不是後來又
別有一項知。淳錄’ ZZQS, 15,1255. 
Ibid.Juan 98: ‘世人之心止於見聞之狹，聖人盡性，不以見聞梏其心。 ”伯豐問：“如何得不以見聞梏其心？ ”曰：“張
子此說，是說聖人盡性事。如今人理會學，須是有見聞，豈能捨此？先是於見聞上做工夫到，然後脫然貫通。蓋尋常
見聞，一事只知得一個道理，若到貫通，便都是一理，曾子是已。盡性，是論聖人事。’ ZZQS, 17,3311. 
Ibid.Juan 99: ‘問橫渠“耳目知，德性知”。答：便是差了雖在聞見，亦同此理。不知他資質如此，何故如此差！可學
錄’ ZZQS, 17,3334. 
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大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning and Da Xue Huo Wen 大學或問 Questions 
and Answers concerning The Great Learning, more detailed elaboration is found in Yu 
Lei 語類 Conversations and Wen Ji 文集 Literary Works, as the contents of the two often 
encompassed each other, we will give priority to Yu Lei 語類 Conversations, and keep 
Wen Ji 文集 Literary Works as back-up source to refer to, hence is hardly quoted in this 
study.  
Clearly it is from the Confucian notion of zhi 知 that the notion of the human intellect 
is to be elicited. This chapter, with a focus on Zhu Xi’s understanding of the human 
intellect based on his interpretation of zhi 知, will proceed in three parts. First, we will 
explore how Zhu Xi the editor re-edits and rearranges the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning. In the second part we will focus on his Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 Commentary 
on The Great Learning and discuss how Zhu Xi the commentator’s notion of the human 
intellect is unfolded through a philosophical interpretation of the text. In the third part 
we will focus on his Da Xue Huo Wen 大學或問 Questions and Answers concerning The 
Great Learning and examine how Zhu Xi the philosopher attempts to put his personal 
thought into philosophical terms and to express it in a systematic and dialectical manner.  
1.1 Zhu Xi the Editor:  Reshuffling the Schema of The Great Learning 
Zhu Xi’s work on Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning transforms this text in terms of its 
structure, meaning and status. As recent studies have discussed at length the ascent of 
this text in the Neo-Confucian movement in the Song Dynasty,82 it is unnecessary to 
present in detail a historical account of this issue here. Rather, we will focus on Zhu 
Xi’s critical work on this text, with the intention of revealing the profound implications 
of his editorial work, as well as its crucial importance to Zhu Xi’s intellectual 
reconstruction of Confucian tradition.  
    Unsatisfied with the editorial work of the prominent master Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-
200) in the East Han Dynasty 東漢 (25-220), and with that of his predecessor Cheng Yi
程頤 (1033-1107), Zhu Xi set out to rearrange the text of Da Xue 大學  The Great 
Learning based on the framework of the two preceding editions, an undertaking that 
finally resulted in the critical edition as shown in his Commentary. Owing to Zhu Xi’s 
                                                          
82 For instance, an excellent paper delivered by Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, ‘Zhong Yong Da Xue Biancheng 
Jingdian de Licheng:cong xinming zhishu de guandian lilun《中庸》、《大學》變成經典的歷程：從性命之書
的觀點立論 Proceedings as to the Ascent of The Doctrine of the Mean and The Great Learning’, in Li 
Minghui 李明輝(ed.), Zhongguo Jingdian Quanshi Chuantong-Ruxue Pian 中國經典詮釋傳統-儒學篇 The 
Tradition of Scriptural Exegesis in China – Confucianism (Taibei, 2002), 113-57.  
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edition and the subsequent line-by-line commentary, the architectonic beauty of this 
text was dramatically brought to light, and the logical rendering of it started to be 
accepted by Confucian scholars, irrespective of their diverse academic backgrounds 
and research interests. To Zhu Xi, Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning surely outstrips all 
the other Confucian scriptures insofar as structure and logic are concerned, as will be 
explained below.  
1.1.1 Affirming the Priority of The Great Learning  
With an aspiration to reinstate the education system believed to have been established 
by the ancient sages, Zhu Xi was fully engaged in preparing a set of Confucian 
textbooks for those keen to learn. That project was eventually crowned with the 
compilation of Si Shu 四書 The Four Books: Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, Lunyu 論
語 The Analects, Mengzi 孟子 The Book of Mencius, and Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine 
of the Mean, among which Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning occupies the first place.  
    Undoubtedly the logical structure contained in this old text constitutes the scriptural 
ground for Zhu Xi’s own reconstruction project. Nevertheless, Zhu Xi’s preference for 
Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning is not only an expression of his personal academic 
interest, but is driven by his profound sense of mission, to re-establish the   
eightoroederororderly Confucian education in the whole society. According to the 
eight-step program as presented in Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, namely gewu 
zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, chengyi 誠
意 the sincerity of the will, zhengxin 正心 the rectification of the mind, xiushen 修身 the 
cultivation of the self, qijia 齊家 the regulation of the family, zhiguo 治國 the governing 
of the state, and pingtianxia 平天下 the pacifying of the world. Clearly the Confucian 
way of self-cultivation does not cut off one’s link with the society but makes it a norm 
that self-cultivation ought to be performed within the social network.   
The integration of spiritual and social significance with regard to Confucian learning 
in the sense of self-cultivation has been addressed by eminent Confucian scholars such 
as Xu Fuguan and Wm. Theodore de Bary. Xu makes the point that Da Xue 大學 The 
Great Learning synthesises the diverse branches of Confucian thought in the xian Qin
先秦 (pre-Qin period -221 B.C.). He maintains that the method of Confucian learning in 
this text is expressed as ge wu 格物, which suggests the ability of empathy; hence the 
proceeding of Confucian learning lies in applying one’s empathy to an ever-extending 
realm, beginning with one’s shen 身 self, then reaching out to the family clan, the home 
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country, and finally the whole world.83 A similar point is made by de Bary, who holds 
that in the context of Neo-Confucianism84 the ‘learning of the sages’ or ‘Way of the 
sages’ takes on a deeper significance in the sense that an individual’s personal 
cultivation exemplifies the Way of the sages, and the moral self-reformation that is 
being carried out on the personal level holds the key to the renewal of the society in 
which one lives. Bary comes to the conclusion that following this path requires 
intellectual, moral and spiritual cultivation; therefore ‘undertaking such a commitment 
amounted virtually to a religious decision, it meant dedicating oneself to a set of 
ultimate values such as one could live or die for’.85 With regard to the Song Confucian 
masters who have cultivated a strong sense a mission and collectively intend to resume 
Dao tong 道統 the transmission of the Way, this statement holds true.  
    Seen in that light, it becomes clear that Zhu Xi’s academic endeavours surrounding 
the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning have profound social, moral and spiritual 
implications. Such is the importance of this text that the academic research on it 
somehow creates the possibility for a revival of Confucianism among the Song literati. 
The discovery of it can be traced back to the Tang Dynasty 唐 (618–907). Some Tang 
Confucian scholars had already begun to pay attention to this short text, in particular 
Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) and Li Ao 李翺 (772- 841). Li Ao quotes it in his essay Fu Xing 
Shu 復性書 The Recovery of the Nature,86 making particular reference to the line ‘zhizhi 
zai gewu 致知在格物 the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things’. This 
trend continues in the Song; for instance the distinguished historian Sima Guang 司馬
光 (1019-1086) starts to write a commentary87 on this chapter as a separate book, and 
lays emphasis on the line stressed by Li Ao. Another eminent Confucian master of the 
Northern Song, Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), also asserts the legitimacy of Da Xue 大
                                                          
83 Xu Fu-guan 徐復觀, ‘Xianqin Rujia Sixiang de Zonghe-Da Xue zhi Dao 先秦儒家思想的綜合-大學之道 The 
Synthesis of Confucian Thought in pre-Qin Time: The Art of the great learning’, in Zhongguo Renxinglun 
Shi-Xianqin Pian 中國人性論史：先秦篇 History concerning the Development of Chinese Thought on 
Human Nature: pre-Qin (Taibei, 1979), 263-314.  
84  For a brief and clear introduction to Neo-Confucianism, including its historical background and 
formation, see John H. Berthrong, Concerning Creativity: A Comparison of Chu Hsi, Whitehead, and 
Neville (Albany, 1998), 97-109. 
85 See Wm. Theodore De Bary, The Message of the Mind in Neo-Confucianism (New York, 1989), 2. 
86 For an English translation of Fu Xing Shu 復性書, see Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese 
Philosophy (Princeton, 1969), 456-9. 
87 A record of Sima’s commentary – Zhong Yong Da Xue guang yi《中庸》《大學》廣義 – is seen in the 
Song bibliography, but this text is no longer extant. 
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學 The Great Learning.88 All these preparatory works pave the way for the formal 
ascent of it, which is completed by the Cheng-Zhu school. Cheng brothers single Da 
Xue 大學 The Great Learning out from Li Ji 禮記 The Book of the Ritual, and make it 
stand on its own merit.89 With the independent status of the text already established, 
Zhu Xi reinforces its pedagogic significance and finally ranks Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning the first among Si Shu 四書 The Four Books. 
The reasons for such an innovative order are given as follows: 1) The teaching 
contained in Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning can be universally applied to the whole 
world, and its words handed down from generation to generation; 2) It possesses a 
massive structure with a well organised outline and is consistent from the beginning to 
the end; 3) It provides the learner with a method of self-cultivation, with step-by-step 
instructions; and 4) It refers to things at hand, thus can easily be grasped by a beginner.90 
                                                          
88 As Daniel K. Gardner points out, that the text had achieved a status independent of Li Ji 禮記 The Book 
of the Ritual by the middle of the eleventh century is evidenced by Zhang Zai’s comment. For details, 
see Daniel K. Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon 
(1986), 17-26. 
89 According to the historical research conducted by Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, the earliest record of the separate 
publication of The Great Learning  is in 1030, see note 81.  








於虛空、流於功利、而得罪於聖門者幾希矣。” ZZQS, 6,515. 
Question: Master Cheng gives this book priority over The Analects and The Book of Mencius, however 
his teaching does not seem to have touched on The Doctrine of the Mean, why? 
Answer: This book serves as the great scripture whose teaching can be universally applied to the whole 
world and its words meant to be handed down generation after generation. By contrast, The Analects and 
The Book of Mencius contain the aphorisms referring to the way one interacts with the surroundings, or 
hold the words that arise from specific circumstances. In spite of its massive structure, this book is 
consistent from the beginning to the end, the outlines of which can be grasped, the programs included in 
which are clearly laid out, and whose method for self-cultivation provides step by step instructions 
relevant to the daily life of a learner.  
    Although the teachings of The Analects and The Book of Mencius are also relevant to things at hand, 
however in both cases more than one person are involved in asking questions and more than one involved 
in scribing. Hence it lacks a clear order in laying out the sequence and the depth of the questions, and in 
its hints on moral judgement. In both there are elements showing no clear relevance to daily life and 
which cannot be grasped by a beginner. That is why Master Cheng gives this book priority over The 
Analects and The Book of Mencius on the ground of the levels of difficulty and the degrees of urgency, 
which does not mean that he differentiates the words of the sages in terms of quality.  
    As for The Doctrine of the Mean, it retains the ultimate words that have been transmitted within the 
school of Confucianism, and that are particularly hard for the learners in later generations to hear or attain 
to. For that reason, it is not touched on by Master Cheng in his teaching. Does that not give the hint that 
once the teaching of The Analects and The Book of Mencius is mastered, the access to The Doctrine of 
the Mean will then be available? So one who fails to start with the book of The Great Learning will by 
no means be able to grasp the main themes and outlines, so as to comprehend the subtlety and profundity 
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By contrast, Lunyu 論語 The Analects and Mengzi 孟子 The Book of Mencius are 
relatively less tidy in their format, since both texts are collections of aphorisms. To Zhu 
Xi such an aphoristic feature leads to limited application, for the words of Confucius 
and Mencius as reported in Lunyu 論語 The Analects and Mengzi 孟子 The Book of 
Mencius are always bound up with the specific occasions from which they arise, hence 
cannot be treated as norms for universal application. In addition, there is usually more 
than one person involved in asking questions, and likewise more than one engaged in 
transcribing the conversations. Hence these two texts share a deficiency in clarity of 
presentation. According to Zhu Xi’s observation, both lack a logical layout, given the 
depths of the questions and the sequence in which these questions are asked. 
Furthermore, both contain an element of ambiguity, since there are some sayings and 
words which indicate no explicit relevance to daily life, and will easily arouse confusion 
in a beginner.91  
With a focus on the text itself rather than its authorship, Zhu Xi shifts attention to the 
quality of the text, especially the logical rendering, the structure and the format, hence 
gives priority to Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning and allows it to stand before Lunyu
論語 The Analects and Mengzi 孟子 The Book of Mencius.92 On the other hand, the order 
of Sishu 四書 The Four Books suggests an increase in difficulty to the reader, especially 
as regards the last of the four, Zhong Yong 中庸  The Doctrine of the Mean. 
Unsurprisingly Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean is deemed the very vehicle 
through which the ultimate truth is to be transmitted from the ancient time down to the 
present. From Zhu Xi’s point of view, this book is too abstract and too weighty to be 
                                                          
of The Analects and The Book of Mencius. Without referring to The Analects and The Book of Mencius, 
there is no chance of completely understanding the whole system of thought and attaining the ultimate 
truth in which The Doctrine of the Mean reposes.  
    Provided the ultimate teaching of The Doctrine of the Mean is not grasped, on what could one fall 
back to establish the great foundation (for one’s learning) and to master the great scriptures, so that one 
will have the capacity for reading all books and discussing all affairs in the world? From that point of 
view, it is clear that those who engage with teaching Confucian classics cannot postpone the curriculum 
of The Four Books, and those who are studying The Four Books have to start with The Great Learning. 
Teachers nowadays may leave it aside and start with other teachings, very rarely will they escape from 
indulging in emptiness, getting lost in utilitarianism and deviating from the sacred teaching.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Despite the importance attached to Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, Cheng Yi suggests one should 
start with Lunyu 論語 The Analects and Mengzi 孟子 The Book of Mencius, and use the doctrines presented 
in these two Confucian scriptures to measure other books. See Cheng Yi, ‘Henan Chengshi Yishu 河南程
氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 18, Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two 
Chengs (1981), 1,205. 
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handled by an immature mind, and therefore it should not be introduced to a beginner.93 
Only after the other three have been properly understood, will one be able to assimilate 
the divine knowledge contained in this book.  
The interrelation between Sishu 四書  The Four Books constitutes the logic of a 
systematic training in Confucian classics, and also implies an orderly procedure of 
scriptural learning which should be followed by all.94 The curriculum of Sishu 四書 The 
Four Books should be addressed, and the orderly procedure ought to be observed by 
masters and students alike. One should start with Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning so 
as to grasp the framework of the whole Confucian doctrine, then move on to Lunyu 論
語 The Analects and Mengzi 孟子 The Book of Mencius, in which a detailed and vivid 
illustration of the divine teaching are to be found, and only then approach Zhong Yong
中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean, which retains the ultimate truth.95  
Having clarified the different roles played by each of Sishu 四書 The Four Books in 
the classical education, Zhu Xi comes back to the most urgent issue: how to initiate a 
beginner into this systematic training. In line with the teaching of Cheng Yi and also 
pushing it one step further, Zhu Xi takes Da Xue 大學  The Great Learning ‘as a 
surviving work of the Confucian school and the very gate through which a beginner 
may step into the realm of virtue’.96 He attaches ultimate importance to Da Xue 大學 
The Great Learning, considering it as the only scriptural text in which the wisdom of 
the ancient sages has been schematised into an orderly eight-step procedure. Hence Da 
Xue 大學 The Great Learning should be the very scripture that serves to initiate the 
learner into the path of the ancient sages.  
Zhu Xi gives the Cheng brothers all the credit for their discovering and revising of 
Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning: 
Since then [the death of Mencius], the essence of Confucianism was hardly 
seen in the prevailing trends of learning. The skills of reciting and learning the 
texts by heart had been practised by those worldly-minded Confucian scholars 
                                                          
93 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 17, ZZQS, 6,515. 
94  The method by which I choose to probe into Zhu Xi’s system is fundamentally an intellectual 
pondering upon the intellectual operation that Zhu Xi has performed on the Confucian classics. For a 
general discussion of the significance of The Four Books and the principal message Zhu Xi intends to 
convey through his work on them, see Daniel K. Gardner, The Four Books: The basic teachings of the 
later Confucian tradition (Indianapolis, 2007).  
95 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 17, ZZQS, 6,515. 
96 ‘子程子曰：“大学，孔氏之遗书，而初学入德之门也”。于今可见古人为学次第者，独赖此篇之存，而论、孟次之。
学者必由是而学焉，则庶乎其不差矣。’ See Zhu Xi, DXZJ, in Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentary 
on the Four Books (1983), 3. 
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whose painstaking effort was two times harder than the primary learning yet 
ended in futility. The heretical doctrine of emptiness and quietism seems to have 
possessed a foothold higher than the great learning yet hardly consisted in facts. 
Besides, there were many other schools of thought whose teaching may have 
focused on strategies and practical skills or aimed at seeking a political career. 
All of these had perplexed the society, deceived people and blocked the way of 
humanity and righteousness. Thus the noble men could not hear about the 
essence of the great Way, nor would the wicked ones benefit from a well-
organised society. …  
… Thus the society fell into chaos and turmoil until the Song Dynasty was 
founded, virtue started to take over and the right teaching came to predominate; 
under such a circumstance did the two Cheng masters stand out whose 
excellence makes them qualified to be the successors of Mencius. It is them who 
first picked up this treatise and gave interpretation of its hidden meaning. Due 
to their efforts, the method of the great learning practised by the ancients and 
the essence of the holy scriptures once again became manifest in the world. In 
spite of being unintelligent, I am so fortunate to have received education 
indirectly in their teaching. Having noticed that their editing of this book is not 
very focused, 97  I then collected their work and added my supplementary 
interpretation to it in the hope of serving the gentle men in the generations to 
come.98 
Zhu Xi ranks the two Cheng masters as the only people who had grasped the essence 
of Confucianism after Mencius, and presents himself as their successor, as one who 
attempts to sharpen their thought and complement it with his own interpretation. And 
only through Zhu Xi’s edition and interpretation did the educational, moral and political 
programs expressed in this book come to the fore. In his Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 
(Commentary on The Great Learning), Zhu Xi takes the ‘eight steps’ as the 
                                                          
97 The translation of ‘fangshi 放失’ is open to discussion. Daniel K. Gardner translates it as ‘errata and 
lacunae’, see Daniel K. Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian 
Canon (1986), 34. 






闲亦窃附己意，补其阙略，以俟后之君子。 ’ Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four 
Books (1983), 1. 
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unchangeable order of Confucian learning, and the investigation of things as the first 
step bears fundamental significance for the whole process. Zhu Xi claims that one who 
has failed to go through this order or overlooked the doctrine of the investigation of 
things is bound to deviate from the orthodox and slide into the heterodox.   
 In the eyes of his followers such as his favourite pupil Chen Chun 陳淳 (1159-1223) 
Zhu Xi was undoubtedly alone in having been commissioned to transmit the divine 
lineage. As his puts it: 
   The Way can be transmitted only when there is the proper person…. Who at 
the present time is perfectly qualified to be the true successor of the Chengs 
except you? …The Way of Confucius (551-479 B.C.), Mencius (372-289 B.C.), 
Chou Tun-I (1017-73), and the Chengs have become more brilliant in you. You 
alone can be called the leader of the generation.99  
In this letter addressed to his master, Chen Chun boldly expresses his admiration for 
Zhu Xi’s groundbreaking reconstruction of Confucianism. From his point of view Zhu 
Xi has outstripped his predecessors 100 in the sense that the Way presented by the 
Confucian sages has become ‘more brilliant’ in him, and he is also the most outstanding 
Confucian master among his contemporary counterparts; thus Zhu Xi ‘alone’ is 
qualified to lead the trend of Confucian thought of the time.  
In Confucian history, it was probably not until the Tang Dynasty 唐 (618-907) that 
dao tong 道統 the transmission of the Way became an issue to the Confucian literati, 
due to the stimulation and competitive force emanating from the prevailing trend of Zen 
Buddhism. The concept of dao tong 道統 the transmission of the Way is formally 
proposed by Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) in his renowned philosophical treatise Yuan Dao
                                                          
99 Chen Chun 陳淳, trans. by Wing-tsit Chan, Beixi Ziyi 北溪字義 Neo-Confucian Terms Explained (New 
York, 1986), 8.  
100 Here we find a controversy over the status of Zhou Dunyi. Chen Chun seems to hold a different view 
from his master, as Chen in particular mentions Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤,but Zhou’s name is not found in Zhu 
Xi’s Prefaces to Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning and Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean, nor 
in his Foreword to Mengzi 孟子 The Book of Mencius. To clarify Zhu Xi’s view of point, we have to refer 
this question back to what is stated in Yi Luo Yuanyuan Lu 伊洛淵源錄 The Intellectual Genealogy of 
Masters in the Region of Yi Luo, where Zhu Xi on the one hand retells the story that the Cheng brothers 
received the teaching of Zhou Dunyi (ZZQS, 12,926), but on the other hand makes it clear through the 
mouth of Hu Anguo 胡安國 (in his zou zhuang 奏狀 Memorial to the Throne) that the Way of the ancient 
sages was not brought to light until the emergence of the two Chengs (ZZQS, 12,975), which echoes the 
tone of  Zhu Xi’s Prefaces. For a detailed discussion over Zhu Xi’s treatment of Zhou Dunyi, see Ellen 
Neskar, Politics and Prayer: Shrines to Local Former Worthies in Sung China, Harvard-Yenching 
Institute Monograph Series 54 (Harvard, 2001).   
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原道 An Inquiry on the Way,101 in which he openly refutes the legitimacy of Buddhism 
and sets up the Confucian version of the succession of the spiritual lineage, namely the 
Way, starting from the ancient sage-kings Yao-尧, Shun-舜 and Yu-禹, to King Tang-汤 
of the Shang Dynasty 商 (1520-1030 B.C.) and the two kings Wen-文 and Wu-武 of the 
early Zhou period 西周  (1030-720 B.C.), to the duke of Zhou-周公 , from whom 
Confucius inherits the Way, and then from Confucius to Mencius, after whom the 
succession is cut off.102 
Han Yu’s account of the succession of the Way within Confucian tradition is highly 
regarded by the Cheng brothers and later stressed by Zhu Xi in his Mengzi Xushuo 孟子
序說 Foreword to The Book of Mencius.103 At the very beginning of the Foreword, Zhu 
Xi quotes the biography of Mencius provided by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145-90 B.C.), in 
which it is mentioned that Mencius received his education from the disciples of Zisi 子
思 (483-402 B.C.), the grandson of Confucius. In his Zhong Yong Zhangju Xu 中庸章句
序 Preface to The Doctrine of the Mean, Zhu Xi grants the authorship of Zhong Yong 
中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean to Zisi 子思, who received the transmission of the Way 
from Zengzi 曾子 (505-435 B.C.), a direct disciple of Confucius and author of Zhuan 傳 
the Commentary text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning. Zhu Xi thus inserts Zengzi 
曾子 and Zisi 子思 into the gap between Confucius and Mencius, thereby enriching Han 
Yu’s account of the transmission of the Way within Confucian tradition. Moreover, in 
his Da Xue Zhangju Xu 大學章句序 Preface to The Great Learning Zhu Xi depicts the 
Cheng brothers as the successors of Mencius after the transmission had been cut off for 
over a thousand years. As for the proof of his own legitimacy as a successor of Cheng 
Yi, Zhu Xi leaves it an issue to be dealt with in Da Xue Huo Wen 大學或問 Q&A 
                                                          
101 In his account of dao tong 道統 the transmission of the Way, Han Yu takes an apologetic stance, 
intending to highlight the one single line of orthodoxy in Confucian history. This account, however, is 
too narrow to accommodate the diversity of Confucianism as a tradition of thought. In contrast to Han 
Yu’s one-line-orthodoxy, modern scholars such as Qian Mu tend to delineate Confucianism as a tradition 
that is constantly broadening its realm; hence we see multiple lines of thought within the same tradition 
and a good variety of ways in which this tradition develops itself. For a detailed elaboration on this topic, 
see Yu Yingshi 余英时, ‘QianMu yu Xinrujia 钱穆与新儒家 Qian Mu and the New-Confucian Writers’, in 
Qian Mu yu Xiandai Zhongguo Xueshu 钱穆与现代中国学术 Qian Mu and the Modern Chinese Scholarship 
(Guilin, 2006), 26-80. 
102 Han Yu, Yuan Dao 原道: ‘尧以是传之舜，舜以是传之禹，禹以是传之汤，汤以是传之文武周公，文武周公传之
孔子，孔子传之孟轲。轲之死，不得其传焉。’ Han Changli Quanji 韩昌黎全集 Complete Works of Han Yu, 
Juan 11. For English translation of this text, see Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy 
(1969), 454-6. 
103 Zhu Xi, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 197-200. 
40 
 
concerning The Great Learning. The grounds for Zhu Xi’s self-defence have been 
clarified by his disciple Chen Chun, as shown above.  
Through the collective effort of the Cheng-Zhu school, the Confucian concept of dao 
tong 道統 the transmission of the Way was formally established and widely accepted 
by the Song Confucian adherents, scholars and non-scholars alike.104 This was decisive 
not only for the theoretical reconstruction of Confucianism in the Song, but also to the 
revival of the Confucianism as a tradition of religious thought. In line with Cheng Yi, 
Zhu Xi finds in the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning a brief and systematic 
expression of his own vision of the orthodox Confucian doctrine. This is because, ‘in it 
he found a brief but eloquent summary of Confucian ideals – personal cultivation and 
the ordering of society’.105 That discovery tremendously reinforced his ambition to 
reconstruct the Confucian tradition by means of rearranging this transmitted text. 
1.1.2 Re-editing The Great Learning 
Through the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, we find a clear logical continuity 
from the thought of Cheng Yi to that of Zhu Xi. In beginning the work to elevate this 
text to the status of an independent scripture, the Cheng brothers first single out the text 
of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning from Li Ji 禮記 The Book of the Ritual, and then re-
edit it on the basis of Zheng Xuan鄭玄 (127-200)’s edition. Although they never manage 
to compose a commentary on this newly canonised scripture, they do provide their own 
philosophical interpretation of it, which is mainly retained in Henan Chengshi Yishu 河
南程氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters edited and prefaced by Zhu 
Xi.106 Cheng Yi, in particular, elucidates the meaning of ge wu 格物 the investigation of 
things, which constitutes the core of his teaching.107 Yet in Cheng Yi the editorial work 
on Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning and a philosophical reading of the doctrine of ge 
wu 格物 the investigation of things are kept apart; despite the connection of the two, 
Cheng Yi never manages to fuse them in one text.    
                                                          
104 Jin Chunfeng 金春峰, ‘Zhuxi Daotongshuo de Jianli yu Wancheng-cong sixiangshi suozuo de fenxi 朱
熹道統說的建立與完成 -從思想史所作的分析 The Establishment and Completion of Zhu Xi’s Doctrine 
concerning the Transmission of the Way-analysis from the perspective of the intellectual history of 
Confucianism’, Qiuzhou Xuelin 九州學林 Qiuzhou Academic Journal 11 (2006), 45-77. 
105 Daniel K. Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon 
(1986), 42.  
106 This text is collected in Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1. 
107 Cheng Yi, ‘Henan Chengshi Yishu 河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 
18, Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,188. 
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That task was completed by Zhu Xi.108 With Cheng Yi’s doctrine of ge wu 格物 the 
investigation of things in mind, Zhu Xi pushes the editing one step further and creates 
a clear structure for this text, based on the edition of Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-200)109 and 
the two slightly different editions provided by Cheng Hao (1032-1085) 110 and Cheng 
Yi (1033-1107)111.  
The differences between the four eiditions are shown in the table as presented in 
Appendix 1.  
1.1.3 An Analysis of the Structure of Zhu Xi’s Edition 
At first glance, one may have the impression that the structure of Zhu Xi’s edition of 
Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning is achieved simply by editorial craft, by attaching to 
the original text a two-layer-division: the division between the Scripture and the 
Commentary and a subdivision of the commentary part. However, beneath this apparent 
simplicity there lies much more to be excavated.  
a. Division between the Scripture and the Commentary  
In comparison with Zheng Xuan and the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi is certainly treating 
scripture in a more innovative and daring manner. In separating the scriptural part from 
the commentatorial part, Zhu Xi is proposing an unprecedented methodology, which 
entails the necessity of differentiating the scriptural words from the words of 
commentary even within the same text, in this case, Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning. 
Zhu Xi regards the Jing 經 Scripture as containing the words of Confucius recorded by 
Zengzi, while the Zhuan 傳 Commentary represents the thought of Zengzi transcribed 
by his disciples.112Accordingly, the role of the former is to be distinguished from that 
of the latter, since the scriptural text represents an undiluted version of the sacred 
message directly from the ancient sages, whereas the commentatorial text serves to 
enhance the accessibility of the scriptural words, in the hope of getting the divine 
message across. Thus a hierarchical relationship between the two parts is brought to 
                                                          
108 Zhu Xi, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 1-13. 
109 Zheng Xuan, Shisanjing Zhushu Liu 十三經註疏六 Commentaries on the Thirteen Classics, 6, Liji 
Zhengyi Juan di Liushi 禮記正義卷第六十 Orthodox Interpretation of the Book of Rites, Juan 60, Da Xue 
di Sishier 大學第四十二 The Great Learning, No. 42 (Beijing, 1999), 1592-613. 
110 Cheng Hao, ‘Henan Chengshi Jingshuo 河南程氏經說 Comments on Scriptures’, Juan 5, Er Cheng Ji 
二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 4,1126-9. 
111 Cheng Yi, ‘Henan Chengshi Jingshuo 河南程氏經說 Comments on Scriptures’, Juan 5, Er Cheng Ji 二
程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 4,1129-32. 
112 Zhu Xi spells out the reasons for this speculation in DXHW No. 16, ZZQS, 6,514. 
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light: the Jing 經 Scripture commands the Zhuan 傳 Commentary and the Zhuan 傳
Commentary is subordinate to the Jing 經 Scripture.113 This division makes it obvious 
that Zhu Xi’s amendents are confined to the part of Zhuan 傳 Commentary, whereas 
the words of Confucius he claims to be contained in the part of Jing 經 Scripture, is left 
unchanged.  
b. Subdivision of the Commentary 
The Zhuan 傳 Commentary is then subdivided into ten chapters according to the order 
inherent in the Jing 經 Scripture. The first three chapters refer to the three items of the 
divine learning: to realise ming mingde 明明德 the enlightening virtue, to 新民 xin min 
renew the people and zhiyu zhishan 止於至善 to repose in the ultimate goodness; the 
fourth illustrates the meaning of and the relation of benmo 本末 root and branches or the 
essential and the trivial; the fifth deals with the first two steps: gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the 
investigation of things and the extension of knowledge; the sixth elaborates upon the 
meaning of chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will; the seventh upon that of zhengxin 
xiushen 正心修身 the rectification of the mind and the cultivation of the person; the 
eighth upon that of xiushen qijia 修身齊家 the cultivation of the person and the regulation 
of the family; the ninth upon that of qijia zhiguo 齊家治國 the regulation of the family 
and the governing of the state; and the tenth upon that of zhiguo pingtianxia 治國平天下 
the governing of the state and the pacifying of the world. 
This way of structuring presupposes a strong belief in the compatibility between 
wisdom and logic, whereby the words contained in Jing 經 Scripture will be better 
understood with the aid of the logical explanation provided in Zhuan 傳 Commentary. 
The Jing 經 Scripture is derived from personal experiential knowledge of the ancient 
sages; it thus bears the fullness and richness of a sagely life.  In contrast, the Zhuan 傳 
Commentary, as an explanation of the meaning of the sacred words, serves to analyse, 
excavate and organise the meaning of the Jing 經 Scripture. In other words, the Zhuan
傳 Commentary means to break the wholeness of the Jing 經 Scripture and aims to 
unfold the whole picture bit by bit, layer by layer. As a result, the Scripture gains its 
intellectual meaning and becomes accessible to a logical mind. Through the writing of 
the Zhuan 傳 Commentary, the Jing 經 Scripture is evolved from an experiential ground 
to an intellectual ground, hence becomes something that can be taught and discussed. 
                                                          




In that sense, the Zhuan 傳 Commentary ought not to bear the same style as that of 
the Jing 經 Scripture; rather, a different standard should be applied to the wording of 
the Zhuan 傳 Commentary as compared to that of the Jing 經 Scripture. The 
commentarial text should be rendered in a logical fashion, such that accuracy and clarity 
are privileged.  
c. Inserting a Supplement into the Commentary 
According to Zhu Xi’s arrangement of the Zhuan 傳 Commentary, it is clear that all the 
essential points listed in the Jing 經 Scripture are to be elaborated. On that ground, Zhu 
Xi maintains that if the explanation of the first two steps, namely the investigation of 
things and the extension of knowledge, is not seen in the existing text, it must have been 
omitted.  He then produces a Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement to this section which goes as 
follows: 
    “The Words, ‘the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things,’ 
mean that we should apply ourselves to things so as to gain an exhaustive 
knowledge of their Principles. This is because there is no human intelligence 
utterly devoid of knowledge, and no single thing in the world without Principle. 
So long as the investigation of these Principles is not exhaustive, the knowledge 
of them will by no means be comprehensive. That is why The Great Learning 
primarily commands all the students to seek the knowledge of the Principles by 
means of investigating all things in the world, namely to proceed from the 
Principles already known to him, to a further exhaustive knowledge and finally 
attaining the ultimate. After having exerted such an effort for a long time, 
suddenly a breakthrough will be made and the complete understanding will 
dawn on one. Thereby brings about a thorough comprehension of all the 
multitude of things, be it external or internal, fine or coarse; and the whole entity 
and the great function of one’s own mind will be fully realised, which, [as a 
whole] signifies the state after ‘things have been investigated’ and ‘the 
knowledge has been extended to the utmost.’” 114 
                                                          
114 Zhu Xi: “所謂致知在格物者，言欲致吾之知，在即物而窮其理也。蓋人心之靈莫不有知，而天下之物莫不有理，
惟于理有未窮，故其知有不盡也。是以大學始教，必使學者即凡天下之物，莫不因其已知之理而益窮之，以求至乎其
極。至于用力之久，而壹旦豁然貫通焉，則衆物之表裏精粗無不到，而吾心之全體大用無不明矣。此謂物格，此謂知
之至也。” Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 6-7. 
This section is based on Derk Bodde’s translation, with alterations made accordingly. For details, see 
Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. by Derk Bodde (Princeton, 1983), 2,561. 
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It goes without saying that this passage is loaded with philosophical terminologies 
that are hardly seen in the works of the Han and Tang Confucian editors and 
commentators such as Zheng Xuan 鄭 玄 (127-200) and Kong Yingda 
孔穎達 (574-648). The thought Zhu Xi expresses in his Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement calls 
for a philosophical analysis, which will be dealt with in next section.  
Here we only focus on the editorial preparations Zhu Xi has made to justify his daring 
and unconventional approach- providing a Supplement to the original text. The decisive 
step on this regard lies in Zhu Xi’s ingenious treatment of the sentence -ciwei zhiben, 
ciwei zhizhizhi ye 此謂知本。此謂知之至也。That is what is meant by ‘knowing the root’. 
That is what is meant by ‘knowing to the utmost’. Here the discerning mind of Zhu Xi 
becomes prominent, for none of his predecessors find it necessary to differentiate 
‘zhiben 知本 knowing the root’ from ‘zhizhizhi 知之至 knowing to the utmost’, to the 
extent that the two phrases should be relocated in two different paragraphs, hence 
indicating two differen notions. Probably due to his philosophically oriented mind, Zhu 
Xi acquires a rather different understanding which drives him to break the connection 
between the two phrases, and to regard “ciwei zhizhizhi ye 此謂知之至也 That is what is 
meant by ‘knowing to the utmost’ ” as an independent paragraph which, grammatically 
speaking, becomes an uncompleted closing sentence, standing for chapter five of the 
Zhuan 傳 Commentary.  
From a philosophical perspective, it is not hard to see why Zhu Xi has to make a 
distinction between the two. For Zhu Xi the notion of ‘zhizhizhi 知之至 knowing to the 
utmost’ is closely tied up with that of ‘zhizhi 致知 the extension of knowledge’, as it 
indicates the result or accomplishment of the first two steps of the great learning; hence 
the relation between ‘zhizhizhi 知之至 knowing to the utmost’ and ‘zhizhi 致知 the 
extension of knowledge’ is that of end to means. Therefore, ‘zhizhizhi 知之至 knowing 
to the utmost’ falls into the category of the eight steps, whereas ‘zhiben 知本 knowing 
the root’ does not. Zhu Xi gives no reasons as to why the Cheng brothers pay no 
attention to such a difference which is so obvious to him.115 Instead he leaves it as self-
evident, and based on his innovative understanding Zhu Xi re-edits this part of the text, 
making it explicit that the lack of an explanation of the first two steps, the investigation 
of things and the extension of knowledge, must be attributed to the omitted text. At the 
                                                          
115 See Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 45, ZZQS, 6,524-6. 
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same time, it necessitates an explanation to refer to, thus making the insertion of a 
Supplement a task to be completed by the Confucian scholars of the day. 
Zhu Xi, therefore, contributes a Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement to the existing text as 
shown above, and through that radical operation he underlines the crucial importance 
of the first two steps to the whole program of Confucian learning. His Supplement 
undoubtedly becomes the soul of the Zhuan 傳 Commentary, providing the whole text 
of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning with a central focus which is not found in Cheng 
Yi’s edition.    
Nevertheless, Zhu Xi insists that in his writing of Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement he is 
predominantly indebted to master Cheng, who defines the aim of Confucian learning 
as attaining sagehood,116 and makes the point that the great learning must embrace the 
academic training in classics and the Confucian way of self-cultivation.  
To Zhu Xi the provision of a Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement is based entirely on a 
scrutiny of the structure and the meaning of the whole text, it serves to construct an 
orderly and comprehensive account of Confucian learning, in the sense that all the eight 
steps involved in the great learning are adequately elaborated. Moreover, at the end of 
each chapter of the Zhuan 傳 Commentary, Zhu Xi summarises what has been done, 
using the same formula: ‘you zhuanzhi… zhang, shi… 右傳之…章，釋…above is the 
certain chapter of the Commentary, explaining so and so’. Thus, through the effort of 
the four editors the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning is eventually transformed 
into a well-structured, fine piece of work.                                                          
1.2 Zhu Xi the Commentator: Reinterpreting Scriptures with Philosophical Terms 
Distinctive of Zhu Xi’s commentary writing is to weave the typical Neo-Confucian 
philosophical concepts such as li 理 Principle, qi 氣 cosmic matter or material force, xin
心 mind or mind-heart, xing 性 nature, and zhi 知 intellect or knowing into a line-by-line 
commentary on the scriptural text. His approach, at least in the case of Da Xue 大學 The 
Great Learning, indicates a radical change in comparison to that of the Han Confucian 
scholars represented by Zheng Xuan.117 This change is a dramatic shift of focus from 
the prevailing role of semantics and phonetics in the mainstream of the Han scriptural 
                                                          
116 Cheng Yi’s influential treatise ‘Yanzi Suohao Hexue Lun 顔子所好何學論 What Kind of Learning is 
Yanzi in Favour of’, ‘Henan Chengshi Wenji 河南程氏文集 Literary Works of the Two Chengs’,  Juan 8, 
Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 2,577. 
117 For the differences between Zhu Xi and Zheng Xuan, see Kuang Pengfei 匡鹏飞, ‘Lunyu Zheng Zhuan 
Yu Zhu Xi Zhushi zhi Bijiao《论语》郑玄与朱熹解释之比较 A Comparison between Zhuxi’s Commentary 
on Analects and that of Zheng Xuan’, Kongzi Yanjiu 孔子研究 Confucius Studies 4 (2001), 106-13.   
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learning, to the Song Confucian literati’s quest for an ontological and cosmological 
foundation of the Confucian dogmatics. Under this academic climate Zhu Xi’s 
philosophical interpretation of scripture came into being, and it is only in his system 
that this type of intellectual penetration of scripture finally reaches its maturity.  
    Admittedly a longstanding exegetical tradition had existed before Zhu Xi, in which 
had emerged different approaches to Confucian classics. Yet despite all the praxis and 
methods concerning scriptural exegesis, many scholars today still wonder whether it is 
appropriate to apply the western term ‘hermeneutics’118 to the study of Confucianism, 
and more widely to the long history of intellectual development in China.119 With the 
thriving of the study of hermeneutics in the tradition of Chinese thought, Zhu Xi’s role 
as a commentator has been taken on board. The complexity involved in Zhu Xi’s 
commentary writing has been expounded at length by recent studies120 such as Liu 
Xiaogan 刘笑敢’s Quanshi yu Dingxiang 诠释与定向 Exegesis and its Directional Role, 
Liu summariese the characteristc of Zhu Xi’s scriptural commentary as ‘rongguanxing 
quanshi 融贯性诠释 coherent and penetrative exegesis’ in comparison with the works of 
other creative commentators such as Wang Bi王弼 (226-249) and Guo Xiang郭象 (252-
312). According to Liu’s observation, Zhu Xi’s Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 
Commentaries on The Four Books is marked by a sophisticated integration of 
annotation, exegesis and expression of Cheng-Zhu philosophy.121 In response to the 
extraordinary exegetical praxis as reflected by this master piece, Zhu Xi particularly 
spells out the thoughts he gives to the hermeneutical issue which are mostly retained in 
Yu Lei 語類 Conversations. As a commentator he not only clarify what is distinctive of 
the genre of commentary, but also sets up a standard for scriptural exegesis in general 
                                                          
118 Even in the West, the meaning of ‘hermeneutics’ varies in different periods of history; it was not until 
Schleiermacher that hermeneutics started to be treated as an independent discipline.  
119 Over the last few decades hermeneutics has been the subject of heated discussion by scholars involved 
in Chinese classical studies both in China and worldwide. The specific research into Chinese exegetical 
traditions started around the mid-1980s; subsequently the Western term ‘hermeneutics’ has been applied 
to this newly emerged scholarly field, thus we have ‘Chinese hermeneutics’. In 2001 a conference on 
Chinese hermeneutics held at Rutgers University resulted in a collection of papers as seen in Cheng-I Tu 
(ed.), Interpretation and Intellectual Change (New Brunswick & London, 2005). 
120 There are a number of valuable papers on this topic collected in Huang Junjie 黃俊傑 (ed.), Zhongri 
Sishu Quanshi Chuantong Chutan 中日四書詮釋傳統初探 An Initial Study of the Exegetical Tradition 
concerning The Four Books in China and Japan (Taibei, 2008), 2 volumes. 




and endorses a series of hermeneutic rules to reinforce Confucian scriptural learning in 
pedagogical terms.  
These hermeneutical rules include discussions over reading and interpreting 
scriptural texts. Generally speaking the job of scriptural exegesis is assigned 
exclusively to a mature mind such as Zhu Xi, whereas the students spend most of their 
time on reading scriptures under the guidance of a prominent master. Probably for 
supervision purposes, Zhu Xi gave his students a set of instructions in scriptural reading, 
entitled Dushu fa 讀書法 the Method of Reading 122 or to be precise, the Method of 
Scriptural Reading, as it focuses on scriptural learning in Zhu Xi’s context. 
In spite of the significance of this text, it is open to dispute whether this single treatise 
really presents a theory of understanding. Some treat it as a documentary proof of the 
hermeneutical concern in Zhu Xi, while others, such as Wolfgang Kubin, hesitate to 
link this text with ‘hermeneutics’. Kubin argues that Zhu Xi’s main concern as reflected 
here is not the text, but the reader and his reading practice; therefore his Dushu fa 讀書
法 the Method of Reading is far from a theory of understanding. According to Kubin’s 
observations, China neither invented a name for ‘the art of understanding’, nor has it 
ever developed a systematic theory of its own. On that account Kubin strongly disputes 
the application of ‘hermeneutics’ to the tradition of Chinese thought, to the extent that 
he takes the term ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ to be almost as odd as ‘a Chimera’.123 As a 
response to Kubin’s critical stance, Chung-ying Cheng poses a rhetorical question: ‘If 
we can speak of a hermeneutical tradition, can we speak of developing a hermeneutics 
for the tradition?’ Cheng highlights the divergence in our conception of ‘hermeneutics’: 
he argues that if we take ‘hermeneutics’ as an open concept rather than a closed concept 
hidden specifically in one tradition, then it is possible and justified to construct a 
different type of ‘hermeneutics’ or ‘art of understanding’ from another tradition so long 
as it does not lack exegetical praxis. From Cheng’s perspective the very notion of 
hermeneutics must presuppose an antecedent or a correlated notion of a hermeneutic 
tradition and vice versa.124   
                                                          
122 This text is collected in Yu Lei 語類 Conversations, Juan 10 and Juan 11, ZZQS, 14,313-57. 
123 See Wolfgang Kubin, ‘Chinese “Hermeneutics”- A Chimera? - Preliminary Remarks on Differences 
of Understanding’, in Cheng-I Tu (ed.), Interpretation and Intellectual Change (New Brunswick and 
London, 2005), 311-19. 
124 See Chung-ying Cheng, ‘Inquiring into the Primary Model: The Yijing and the Structure of the 




Given the heated debate over the legitimacy of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ as shown 
above, in particular Kubin’s opinion of Zhu Xi’s Dushu fa 讀書法  the Method of 
Reading, 125  we are compelled constantly to remind ourselves of the fundamental 
difference between Zhu Xi’s practical concern with the hermeneutical issues in his time, 
and the current debate over ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ which basically concerns how to 
justify (like Chung-ying Cheng) or refute (like Wolfgang Kubin) this newly emerged 
research trend according to the modern academic standard. Bearing that in mind, we 
will avoid directly imposing any modern theory of hermeneutics upon Zhu Xi, but focus 
instead on a textual study and analysis. Fixing our attention strictly on the original 
source, we will find that Zhu Xi’s hermeneutical concern is chiefly derived from his 
exegetical practice as a creative commentator, while also expressing his pedagogical 
concern as a prominent teacher, and that the two aspects boil down to a deep-rooted 
spiritual concern to take scriptural learning as the path to self-realisation; in other words, 
scriptural learning paves the way for one’s attainment of sagehood. In that sense, it is 
not appropriate to read Zhu Xi through the lens of Gadamer or even to extract a theory 
of ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ from Zhu Xi’s work. This does not mean that we must 
abandon the term ‘hermeneutics’ altogether in studying Zhu Xi; the employment of the 
term will do no harm, so long as we are aware of the possible confusion over 
terminologies, and make it clear that ‘hermeneutics’ in this study is used to mean 
‘hermeneutic considerations’ or ‘hermeneutic thinking’, which is closely tied up with 
the practice of reading and interpreting scriptures.  
1.2.1 Zhu Xi’s Method of Scriptural Reading 
Perhaps the most distinct impact of the Song scholarship on Confucian tradition has 
been its sustained emphasis on a philosophical understanding of, rather than a literal or 
philological approach to, the Confucian classics. That spirit gains a transparent 
expression in Zhu Xi’s predecessor Cheng Yi: ‘you jing qiong li 由經窮理 probing the 
Principle through scriptures.’126 So far as this pronouncement goes, it is clear that in the 
eyes of the Song Confucians, the scriptural texts left by the ancient sages should be 
treated as the means to pursue the ultimate goal, namely li 理 the Principle. Distinctive 
                                                          
125 It is beyond the scope of this study to participate in the debate over ‘Chinese hermeneutics’, however 
relevant the topic, nor is it necessary to refute Kubin’s downplaying of Zhu Xi’s Method of Reading here, 
as he simply uses this text as an example to dispute the term ‘Chinese hermeneutics’. A detailed analysis 
of this text will be presented below.  
126 Cheng Yi, ‘Henai Chengshi Yishu 河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 
15,  Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,158. 
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of Zhu Xi’s approach is the sort of systematic intellectual penetration of scripture, but 
the word ‘intellectualism’ does not suffice to illustrate the complex fusion of 
hermeneutic considerations and philosophical thoughts in Zhu Xi. In Neo-Confucian 
context especially with regard to the Cheng-Zhu school, li 理  the Principle is 
encapsulated in Confucian scriptures and at the same time inheres in the original state 
of ren xing 人性 human nature. Therefore the philosophical approach, which aims to 
appropriate li 理 the Principle as encapsulated in scriptures, also leads to a realisation of 
the goodness rooted in human nature.  
The Song masters no longer believe in the mastery of language will be sufficient for 
a comprehension of the profound meaning of a text. Likewise one’s comprehension of 
the literary meaning of a scripture does not necessarily result in a perfect understanding 
of the message of the ancient sages contained in the scriptural text. That should be the 
common ground shared by the Neo-Confucian masters in the Song despite their 
difference in research interest and method. Overall they adopt an approach to scripture 
which is in stark contrast to that of the Han scriptural learning. Among the various 
schools within Neo-Confucianism, li xue 理學 the school of the Principle represented 
by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi attaches more significance to the academic training in the 
Confucian classics, in comparison with its counterpart xin xue 心學 (the school of 
mind).127 Zhu Xi, in particular, furthers the necessity for a systematic and intensive 
classical learning. Through his effort the practice of scriptural reading is transformed 
into an essential element of the Confucian learning. Qian Mu 錢穆, on the basis of his 
extensive study of the history of Chinese thought, comes to the conclusion that neither 
the Han/Tang Confucians nor the Qing Confucian scholars are as competent as Zhu in 
respect to his insightful exposition of exegetical method.128 Qian’s remarks highlight 
Zhu Xi’s scholarly contribution to the theory of scriptural exegesis in Confucian history.  
                                                          
127 The conventional division of the two schools has, to a great extent, oversimplified the whole picture 
of the Song Confucian scholarship. However, as a way of delineating the historical development of the 
Confucian thought, it is overall a better version that Mou Zongsan’s classification, which is heavily 
reliant on an overwhelming preference for the method promoted by Mencius. 
With regard to the difference in scriptural exegesis between the two schools represented by Zhu Xi and 
Wang Yangming, see Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, ‘Shuiyue yu Jiji 水月與記籍：理學家如何詮釋經典 Moon in the 
Water and Registry of Account: how do the Neo-Confucian masters interpret scriptures’, in Li Minghui
李明輝 (ed.), Zhongguo Jingdian Quanshi Chuantong-Ruxue Pian 中國經典詮釋傳統-儒學篇 The Tradition 
of Scriptural Exegesis in China – Confucianism (2002), 158-92. 




 Within Zhu Xi’s system the method of dushu 讀書 scriptural reading functions as an 
exemplar of how to put the teaching of gewu 格物 the investigation of things into 
practice.129 Zhu Xi has no doubt as to the essential role of scriptural learning in personal 
cultivation; it is almost self-evident to him that the practice of scriptural learning will 
have an impact upon the practitioner.130 In that sense the lectures Zhu Xi delivered on 
dushu fa 讀書法 the Method of Scriptural Reading also serve moral and spiritual 
purposes, it is intended to rectify the over-subjective attitude and idealistic approach 
embodied by xin xue 心學 (the school of mind) and chan zong 禪宗 the school of Zen 
Buddhism in extreme form. Hence the following brief general guideline was given to 
all Confucian students: 
    With regard to the method of scriptural reading, I believe one should cover a 
broad realm, gain a thorough understanding and know the details. As to my 
personal view, I would go for details rather than brevity, for a lower rather than 
a higher level, for clumsiness rather than cunningness, and for something that 
lies in a nearer rather than a further place.131  
Zhu Xi deliberately chooses strong words to express his contempt for the blind 
adherence to subjectivity, simplicity and abstractness revealed by many Confucians of 
the day. The aforementioned principles are meant to ward off the defective approach 
promoted by his contemporaries. In order to tackle this problem in theoretical and 
practical terms, he provides the students with an alternative that is more constructive 
and concrete. Although his views in this regard are scattered among his literal and 
philosophical compositions, a number of fundamental rules are repeatedly addressed, 
which gives us a clue as to the intellectual climate of the day as well as the questions 
Zhu Xi bears in mind whist endorsing his method of reading. 
                                                          
In his Zhuzi Xin Xue An 朱子新學案 A New Anthology of Master Zhu, Qian also presents detailed discussion 
of Zhu’s hermeneutical principles under the title ‘Zhuzi Lun Jiejing 朱子論解經 Master Zhu on Scriptural 
Exegesis’, ibid. 257-337. 
129 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 10: ‘讀書是格物一事。今且須逐段子細玩味，反來覆去，或一日，或兩日，只看一段，則
這一段便是我底。腳踏這一段了，又看第二段。如此逐旋捱去，捱得多後，卻見頭頭道理都到。大雅錄’ ZZQS, 
14,319-20. 
130 Zhu Xi, Xinggong Biandian Zouzha Er 行宫便殿奏劄二: ‘蓋為學之道，莫先於窮理：窮理之要，必在於讀書。’ 
ZZWJ, Juan 14, ZZQS, 20,668. 
Zhu Xi, Da Jiang Duanbo 答江端伯 Reply to Jiang Duanbo: ‘示喻爲學之方，足見留意事物。未見不可逆
料，誠如所論。唯有因聖賢之所已言者而求之，爲庶幾耳。故爲學不可以不讀書，而讀書之法又當熟讀沈
思，反覆涵泳，銖積寸累，久自見功，不惟理明，心亦自定。’ ZZWJ, Juan 64, ZZQS, 23,3123. 




    As mentioned above there has been a longstanding exegetical tradition before Zhu 
Xi, his method of reading, therefore, draws heavily on the method followed by the 
commentators in the Han and Tang Dynasties. Like his predecessors Zhu Xi calls for a 
faithful and submissive attitude towards scripture. He maintains that one must first 
grasp the literal meaning of a text before moving on to the philosophical connotations. 
In Yu Lei 語類 Conversations Zhu Xi exhorts his students to first read the text and seek 
for the literal meaning, and only then to look at the commentaries. He mentions that 
people of the day mistakenly tend to do otherwise, fixing their eyes on what is beyond 
the text. 132  Due to obliviousness to the literal meaning and a deficiency in 
comprehension, many have distorted the scriptures. Zhu Xi repeatedly warns students 
that: ‘In handling the words of the ancients, it is always the one who does not understand 
it that jumps to conclusions, which is particularly harmful. Because in so doing one 
stands no chance of acquiring the truth; it is nothing but a waste of time.’133 Therefore, 
being faithful to the scripture is of crucial importance. This golden rule should be 
applied at all times. 
    When reading a scripture, one must keep a receptive mind, never rush into 
your own opinion. Do not move to the next paragraph unless you have fully 
understood this one. One must behave like a judge who, in dealing with a legal 
case, must first listen to the whole story before issuing a verdict.134   
That should be the attitude of a student in reading scriptures. The ‘receptive mind’ (xu 
xin 虛心) here is an ideal state of mind in which preconceived ideas and prejudice are 
suspended, so that a perfect reception of the text is possible. A man with a receptive 
mind is supposed to be impartial and always prepares himself to listen rather than judge. 
In other words, he is capable of suspending pre-judgement of any kind and of listening 
to the voice of a scripture with all his mind and heart. In the dialogue with a scripture, 
he is more inclined to be turned by it than to turn the scripture. That is what Zhu Xi 
means by a receptive and objective mind, which is the prerequisite to understanding a 
scripture. In contrast, being arbitrary and subjectivistic can be catastrophic, because it 
blocks the way to assimilate the teaching of the ancient sages. Zhu Xi affirms that there 
                                                          
132 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘讀書，須從文義上尋，次則看註解。今人卻於文義外尋索。蓋卿錄’ ZZQS, 14,351. 
133 Ibid.Juan 11: ‘看前人文字，未得其意，便容易立說，殊害事。蓋既不得正理，又枉費心力。不若虛心靜看，即
涵養、究索之功，一舉而兩得之也。時舉錄’ ZZQS, 14,335. 
134 Ibid.Juan 11: ‘凡看書，須虛心看，不要先立說。看一段有下落了，然後又看一段。須如人受詞訟，聽其說盡，
然後方可決斷。泳錄’ ZZQS, 14,335. 
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is no possibility for a man to take in the teaching of the sages unless he first puts aside 
his own opinions.135  
However the ability to assimilate the message of a scripture takes more than a 
receptive mind: it entails a life-long process of mental engagement with scriptures. Zhu 
Xi paints a vivid picture in this regard. “Reading scripture is like a valiant general 
fighting a fierce battle or a ruthless officer investigating a legal case, who cannot stop 
until he gets to the bottom of it.”136 Moreover “one ought to be captivated by the 
fascinating parts when reading a scripture, and to pull all one’s might together, never 
feel sleepy as if being threatened by a knife or a sword.”137 From the perspective of Zhu 
Xi, setting the mind upon a scripture means fighting a bloody war concerning life and 
death; thus the reader has no choice but to be utterly ruthless and fierce in wrestling 
with those questions and puzzles with which he or she is constantly obsessed. It is, after 
all, a solitary internal struggle which can only be carried out by an extremely inquisitive 
mind.  
Typical to Song Confucian masters in particular Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi reading is 
another word for thinking, to read a scripture means to think it through. On this respect 
Zhu Xi gives the instruction that whilst reading: “One need to pause and ponder upon 
the seemingly bland paragraphs; not until all kinds of doubts arise to the extent that one 
cannot eat or sleep, will a rapid progress then be made.” 138 Zhu Xi makes the point that 
thoroughly understanding a book necessitates independent thinking. This is because in 
                                                          
135  Ibid.Juan 11: ‘ 讀 書 須 是 虛 心 切 己 。 虛 心 ， 方 能 得 聖 賢 意 ； 切 己 ， 則 聖 賢 之 言 不 為 虛 說 。 
  看文字須是虛心。莫先立己意，少刻多錯了。又曰：虛心切己。虛心則見道理明；切己，自然體認得出。舉錄’ 
ZZQS, 14,335. 
136 Ibid.Juan 10: ‘看文字，須是如猛將用兵，直是鏖戰一陣；如酷吏治獄，直是推勘到底，決是不恕他，方得。夔
孫錄’ ZZQS, 14,316. 
137 Ibid.Juan 10: ‘看文字，须大段著精彩看。耸起精神，树起筋骨，不要困，如有刀剑在後一般！淳錄’ ZZQS, 
14,316.   
138 Ibid.Juan 10: ‘學者讀書，須是於無味處當致思焉。至於群疑並興，寢食俱廢，乃能驟進。賀孫錄’ ZZQS, 
14,315.  
Zhu Xi’s emphasis on the hardship involved in scriptural reading bears resemblance to the tips that a Zen 
master sometimes gives to his disciples concerning their persistent quest for the meaning of shengsi 生死 







攙一杓冷水相似。如此做工夫，定有到家時節。’ See Zhu Hong 袾宏 (ed.), Changuan Cejin 禪關策進 Method 




reading one will be confronted with some clearly different or even contradictory 
interpretations given by the past masters, which await an original mind to offer a 
solution.139 Thus thinking becomes an integral part of reading, and anyone who is lazy 
in thinking will surely fall short of Zhu Xi’s standard. Following this renewed concept 
of reading, Zhu Xi further clarifies the concrete intellective operations involved; for 
instance, ‘to discern the right from the wrong’,140 and to compare the differences and 
similarities between various perspectives, and that is the most spectacular part in 
reading a book.141 After being puzzled and confused, one may come up with some new 
ideas, thereby reach the point to present a comment or critique, even when it alludes to 
the work of the previous masters. To Zhu Xi, all the expert views about the meaning of 
a scripture stand apart from the scripture itself and are open to question.  
In addition, Zhu Xi highlights the kind of meditative reading which reflects the 
influence of Buddhism on Neo-Confucian masters in Song Dynasty. Reading scripture 
in that sense is a form of meditation which requires focus in terms of body, mind and 
spirit. Zhu Xi insists that ‘in reading a scripture, one has first to keep the body in a ready 
posture – sitting up and pulling oneself together – then focus one’s attention on the 
scripture and recite it at a slow pace and in a lower tone. Meanwhile, one ought to keep 
a clear and receptive mind so as to immerse oneself in scripture and obtain a 
sympathetic understanding of it by associating one’s life experience with the content of 
scripture.’142 In that way, one will be able to assimilate the meaning of a scripture. 143 
                                                          
139 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘許多道理，孔子恁地說一番，孟子恁地說一番，子思又恁地說一番，都恁地懸空掛在
那裡。自家須自去體認，始得。賀孫錄’ ZZQS, 14,345. 
140 Ibid.Juan 11: ‘讀書而講究其義理，判別其是非，臨事即此理。’ ZZQS, 14,339. 
141 Ibid.Juan 11: ‘凡看文字，諸家說有異同處，最可觀。謂如甲說如此，且挦扯住甲，窮盡其詞；乙說如此，且挦扯
住乙，窮盡其詞。兩家之說既盡，又參考而窮究之，必有一真是者出矣。學蒙錄’ ZZQS, 14,350. 




看。 震錄’ ZZQS, 14,334. 
143 As pointed out by Cheng Lisheng, what Zhu Xi has prescribed here as the method of reading actually 
has little in common with the modern theory of hermeneutics. It is basically designed for a group of 
readers who share the same faith in a scripture that is sacred to them. See Cheng Lisheng 陈立胜, ‘Zhuzi 
Dushufa: Quanshi Yu Quanshi zhiwai 朱子读书法：诠释与诠释之外 Zhu Xi’s Method of Scriptural Reading: 
Exegesis and beyond Exegesis’, in Li Minghui 李明辉 (ed.), Rujia Jingdian Quanshi Fangfa 儒家经典诠释
方法 The Method of Scriptural Exegesis in Confucianism (Taibei, 2003), 107-34.  
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Like the Cheng brothers144 and his contemporary Lu Xiangshan145, Zhu Xi also 
addresses the importance of zi de 自得 getting it oneself.146 With regard to the cultivation 
of an original mind, Zhu Xi seems to have a lot to learn from the methodology of the 
Zen masters. In private conversations with his favourite students Zhu Xi time and again 
reveals his deep appreciation of Zen on this respect. For instance, he points out to the 
Confucian students that the Zen methodology holds a significant advantage, one that is 
paradoxically associated with its counter-language disposition, because in Zen the 
abandoning of commentary on scripture gives the Zen practitioners no opportunity to 
follow other people’s thinking; each individual has to work out the meaning of the 
ineffable on his own. This explains why in the circle of Buddhism there always stands 
a qualified successor, whereas in Confucianism and Daoism the succession of the divine 
lineage is sometimes cut off.147 He also recognises a potential harm that a commentary, 
including his own, may do to learners, in the sense that the commentary will not be well 
received if it is presented to an unprepared mind. To a person who has no doubts and 
questions in mind, the answers provided by a commentary will deprive him of the 
opportunity to question the scriptures in his own way. By contrast, the methodology of 
Zen forces one to think independently and to work out the answers on one’s own, as 
the Zen masters refuse to explain anything at all. 
Zhu Xi makes it clear that one should not be content with a word-by-word 
comprehension of a text. The reading of a scripture is to be conducted in the sense of 
qiong li 窮理 probing the Principle, which requires introspective thinking on the part of 
the reader, who seeks intently the relevance of the scripture to his personal 
                                                          
144 Cheng Yi: ‘說書必非古意，轉使人薄。學者須是潛心積慮，優游涵養，使之自得。今一日說盡，只是教得薄。’ 
‘Henan Chengshi Yishu 河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 15, Er Cheng 
Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,168.  
145 The concept of zi de 自得 getting it oneself characterises the method of learning advocated by Lu 
Xiangshan, who openly proclaimed that he had worked out the essence of Confucianism by himself 
whilst reading The Book of Mencius (‘因讀孟子而自得之’). See Lu Xiangshan Quanji 陸象山全集 The 
Complete Work of Lu Xiangshan  (Beijing, 1992), 308, Juan 35. [The page nuber varies in different 
editions, but the number for Juan never changes.] 
146 Wm. Theodore de Bary, Learning for One’s Self: essays on the individual in Neo-Confucian Thought 
(New York, 1991), 8. 





孫 錄’ ZZQS, 14,429. 
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circumstance.148 In searching for the relevance of a scripture to one’s own experience 
in real life, one will be able to make a personal appropriation of that scripture. Only 
then does a scripture cease to be external and start to be meaningful to its reader, in 
other words, the meaning of a scripture is internalised. The exercise of scriptural 
reading will have little impact on a person unless he works out his personal affinity with 
that scripture and makes sense of it on his own. As a result, the distance between the 
scripture and the reader will be gradually diminished, to the extent that the words of the 
ancient texts become as vivid and meaningful as if they issued from the bottom of the 
reader’s heart. 149   
In both Yu Lei 語類 Conversations and Wen Ji 文集 Literary Works, Zhu Xi repeatedly 
attaches importance to the accumulative process of learning. He believes that provided 
the accumulation of the effort in learning reaches maturity, one will be able to achieve 
self-transformation, in the sense that one’s qibing 氣禀 physio-psychical constitution 
will be transformed due to the effective impact of learning on the learner.150 Zhu Xi 
admits it is very hard to achieve such a self-transformation, and explains to his pupils 
that probably due to the difficulty in this matter, Mencius seldom mentions the issue of 
qibing 氣禀 physio-psychical constitution; instead he only lays stress on the goodness 
within human nature and says ‘everyone can become a sage just like Yao and Shun’. 
Should one concentrate and work hard, the defects in one’s temperament will 
automatically be diminished, and the effort of self-cultivation will automatically bear 
fruit.151 Zhu Xi maintains that his emphasis on the way of learning which aims to 
transform man’s qibing 氣禀  physio-psychical constitution does not contradict the 
traditional Confucian belief in the goodness of human nature. Indeed, it is only through 
transforming qibing 氣禀 physio-psychical constitution by means of learning, that the 
innate goodness can be realised, as had once been achieved by the ancient sages.  
    Zhu Xi takes learning as a three-phase process which is particularly reflected in one’s 
praxis of reading. Accordingly one should start with yue 約 brevity, then moving on to 
                                                          
148 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘讀書窮理，當體之於身。凡平日所講貫窮究者，不知逐日常見得在心目間否。不然，
則隨文逐義，趕趂期限，不見悅處，恐終無益。蓋卿錄’ ZZQS, 14,331. 
149  Ibid.Juan 10: ‘尹先生門人言尹先生讀書云: “耳順心得，如誦己言。” 功夫到後，誦聖賢言語，都一似自己言
語。廣錄’ ZZQS, 14,328. 
150 A.C. Graham terms it the ‘permeation of the chi (qi) by li’; see his paper ‘What is New in Cheng-Chu 
Theory of Human Nature’, in Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (1986), 154. 
151 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 4: ‘人之為學，卻是要變化氣禀，然極難變化。如“孟子道性善”，不言氣禀，只言 “人皆可
以為堯舜”。若勇猛直前，氣禀之偏自消，功夫自成，故不言氣禀。璘錄’ ZZQS, 14,198. 
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the middle part which covers a broad and vast region, and returning to yue 約 brevity at 
the end.152  Given the intellectual context Zhu Xi lived in, this theory is probably 
constructed with an intention to rectify the academic trend at that time, for it apparently 
attempts to strike a balance between two extremes – an over-emphasis on simplicity as 
represented by Lu Xiangshan153 and his school located in the area of Jiangxi 江西, and 
the focus on complexity and erudition in historical studies which probably refers to his 
contemporary Confucian scholars in the area of Zhedong 浙東 (Eastern Zhejiang), from 
Zhu Xi’s point of view both have missed the point of learning. 154 Instead of opting for 
one extreme or the other, the authentic way of Confucian learning should embrace the 
three distinct stages: from simplicity to complexity and back to simplicity. This means 
that one who embarks upon scriptural learning should bear in mind the aspiration for 
the message of the ancient sages: having set one’s mind on seeking the ultimate truth, 
one then proceeds to the exploration of the details; after going through the complexity 
of the details, one finally comes back to the initial point of simplicity with a thorough 
understanding of the complexity. To illustrate this point Zhu Xi points out the 
difference between scriptures which are supposed to be out of the hand of ancient sages 
and those historical documents which are not free of mistakes, nonetheless he believes 
tian li 天理 the heavenly Principle remains intact even in historical books, thus historical 
studies can be sheng xue 聖學 the learning of the sages so long as the sacred message 
contained in historical documents are comprehended.155  
With a particular concern with the prevailing trend towards simplicity and brevity, 
Zhu Xi lays more emphasis on the vast area of the middle stage, and calls for an 
attentive attitude toward details, in order to broaden the horizon of the learner. To Zhu 
Xi the most harm a teacher can do to a student is to provide him with a brief abstract 
                                                          
152 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘為學須是先立大本。其初甚約，中間一節甚廣大，到末梢又約。可學錄’ ZZQS, 
14,345. 
153 For a discussion of the debate between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan concerning pedagogy and other 
issues such as the importance of reading the classics, see Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Confucian Discourse 
and Chu Hsi’s Ascendancy (Honolulu, 1992), 202-34.  
154 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘孟子曰：博學而詳說之，將以反說約也。故必先觀論孟大學中庸，以考聖賢之意；讀
史，以考存亡治亂之跡；讀諸子百家，以見其駁雜之病。其節目自有次序，不可逾越。近日學者多喜從約，而不於博
求之。不知不求於博，何以考驗其約！如某人好約，今只做得一僧，了得一身。又有專於博上求之，而不反其約，今
日考一制度，明日又考一制度，空於用處作工夫，其病又甚於約而不博者。要之，均是無益。可學錄’ ZZQS, 14,345. 
155 Ibid.Juan 11: ‘浩曰：趙書記云: “自有見後，只是看六經語孟，其他史書雜學皆不必看。” 其說謂買金須問賣金人，
雜賣店中那得金銀。不必問也。曰：如此，即不見古今成敗，便是荊公之學。書那有不可讀者？只怕無許多心力讀得。
六經是三代以上之書，曾經聖人手，全是天理。三代以下文字有得失，然而天理卻在這邊自若也。要有主，覷得破，
皆是學。浩錄’ ZZQS, 14,347.     
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summary before that student has acquired the slightest idea of any concrete content. 
Zhu Xi therefore sets a rigid academic standard for his students to refer to. We read:  
In reading scriptures, one must first master the text, then learn the notes by 
heart, and finally acquire a thorough understanding of the whole piece including 
the details. He must be familiar with whatever appears in the notes such as the 
meaning of a term, the particular thing it refers to, what it may imply or to which 
part of a certain scripture it is related. Only after he knows a scripture to the 
extent that he feels as if it were his own words, can he ponder over its subtle 
significance and penetrate upward [to reach the level of metaphysical questions]. 
Otherwise, he is only working on fallacious speculations, just like those who 
conduct learning with the purpose of passing the civil service exams, which 
means he is not learning for his own sake.156  
 This seems to be too demanding a standard to live up to. The point of making such 
a requirement is to exhort all to cultivate a conscientious attitude towards scriptures. 
This means that any comments or remarks on scriptures must be based on a thorough 
understanding of the details.157 On one occasion, coming across a student who knew 
nothing about Shi Jing 詩經 The Book of Poetry apart from the most popular comment 
on it – ‘le er buyin, ai er bushang 樂而不淫，哀而不傷 joy with no lust, sorrow with no 
distress’ – Zhu Xi made a mockery of him: ‘If you add another three words – ‘si wuxie
思無邪 no evil thought’ – to it, with the eleven words you may complete the whole of 
Mao Shi 毛詩 (The Book of Poetry as Commented by the School of Mao); the remaining 
three hundred pieces of poems could then be treated as dregs.’158   
    Clearly, Zhu Xi sees learning as a long and tedious process, there is no other way to 
perfect learning than to be extremely patient and attentive to the details. He takes 
hardship for granted and despises those who intend to seek a short-cut.159 Nonetheless 
the intensive and rigid academic training in classics as Zhu Xi thus commanded is 
                                                          
156 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘學者觀書，先須讀得正文，記得註解，成誦精熟。注中訓釋文意、事物、名義，發明
經指，相穿紐處，一一認得，如自己做出來底一般，方能玩味反覆，向上有透處。若不如此，只是虛設議論，如舉業
一般，非為己之學也。敬仲錄’  ZZQS, 14,349.     
157 Ibid.Juan 10: ‘學者初看文字，只見得個渾淪物事。久久看作三兩片，以至於十數片，方是長進。如庖丁解牛，目
視無全牛，是也。人傑 錄’ ZZQS, 14,315.     
158 Ibid.Juan 11: ‘曾見有人說詩，問他關雎篇，於其訓詁名物全未曉，便說：“樂而不淫，哀而不傷。”某因說與他
道：公而今說詩，只消這八字，更添 “思無邪” 三字，共成十一字，便是一部毛詩了。其他三百篇，皆成渣滓矣！敬仲
錄’ ZZQS, 14,349.     
159 Ibid.Juan 10: ‘為學讀書，須是耐煩細意去理會，切不可粗心。若曰何必讀書，自有個捷徑法，便是誤人底深坑也。
未見道理時，恰如數重物色包裹在里許，無緣可以便見得。須是今日去了一重，又見得一重；明日又去了一重，又見
得一重。去盡皮，方見肉；去盡肉，方見骨；去盡鼻，方見髓。使粗心大氣不得。廣錄’ ZZQS, 14,326.     
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deemed after all a means rather than an end, on the ground that an effective method of 
scriptural learning should and could lead to a radical transformation of one’s qizhi 
zhixing 氣質之性 (physical nature). Likewise, a defective approach to scripture will be 
detrimental to a learner, in the sense that it is very likely to trigger or intensify certain 
shortcomings in his personality. This line of thought is openly expressed in his debate 
with the Lu brothers over Zhu Dunyi 周敦頤’s Taiji Tushuo 太極圖說 (Explanation of 
the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate), surrounding the concept of wu ji 無極 (the Non-
Ultimate). 160   
1.2.2 Rules for the Interpreting of Scriptures 
A few decades before Zhu Xi, Cheng Yi made an account of the intellectual scenario 
of the Northern Song. He divides the scholars of his time into three groups due to their 
difference in research interest: literature, philology and the learning of Confucians, 
those who indulge in the heretical teaching of Buddhism and Taoism are not counted 
in.161 Likewise Cheng Yi detects three kinds of problems his contemporary learners are 
obsessed with, namely indulging in literature, being attached to philology and being 
perplexed by heretical teachings.162 He also points out that the words of the sages 
contained in scriptures are always concise; whereas what has been composed by people 
of later generations is not necessarily needed. 163  In Cheng Yi critical remarks are 
spotted here and there, but we do not see a systematic elaboration on the exegetical 
method that he himself intends to promote. 164   
                                                          




Id., ‘zhi Xiangshan shu 致象山書 Letter toLu Xiangshan’: ‘況理既未明，則於人之言，恐亦未免有未盡其意者，
又安可以遽絀古書為不足信，而直任胸臆之所裁乎？’   
See Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 and Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (eds.), Song-Yuan Xue An 宋元學案 Anthology of Song-
Yuan Confucianism (Beijing, 1986), Juan 57, 3,1866-8. 
161 Cheng Yi: ‘古之學者一，今之學者三，異端不與焉。一曰文章之學，二曰訓詁之學，三曰儒者之學。欲趨道，舍
儒者之學不可。’ ‘Henai Chengshi Yishu 河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 
18, Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,187. 
162 Cheng Yi: “今之學者有三弊：一溺於文章，二牽於訓詁，三惑於異端。苟無此三者，則將何歸？必趨於道矣。” 
Ibid. 
163 Cheng Yi: “聖人六經，皆不得已而作；如耒耜陶冶，一不制，則生人之用息。後世之言，無之不為缺，有之徒為
贅，雖多何益也？聖人言雖約，無有包含不盡處。” Ibid., 221. 
164 For details concerning the differences between Zhu Xi and the two Chengs in this regard, see Qian 
Mu 錢穆, Zhuzi Xin Xue An 朱子新學案 A New Anthology of Master Zhu, in Qian Binsi Xianshen Quanji 
錢賓四先生全集 Complete Works of Qian Mu (1998), 14,339-569.  
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In comparison there is remarkable advancement in theoretical construction in Zhu 
Xi, indeed Zhu Xi’s commentary writing comes along with a theory of scriptural 
exegesis which is mostly seen in Yu Lei 語類 Conversations, and is also touched upon 
in Sishu Huo Wen 四書或問 Questions and Answers concerning The Four Books. In that 
respect his Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註  Commentary on The Four Books 
especially Daxue Zhangju 大學章句  Commentary on The Great Learning 165  is the 
embodiment of the exegetical rules he puts forth.  
    With regard to the rules for scriptural interpretation, Zhu Xi fully endorses a 
receptive and submissive stance towards scriptures and proscribes any traces of 
arbitrary judgement and subjectivistic interpretation. He summarises the typical 
problems of his contemporary commentators into four categories: uplifting the original 
text to make it higher; excavating it to make it deeper; pushing it to make it reach further; 
and muddling it to make it obscure.166 These are all substantial mistakes and should be 
abstained from at all costs. To him the assimilating of a scripture is crucially 
conditioned by a full commitment to the words of the sages, which should be applied 
under all circumstances. This kind of unconditional commitment to scriptures is 
regarded as a predominant academic standard for scriptural interpretation, to be 
employed to scrutinise any existing commentary or sub-commentary on a scripture. Zhu 
Xi expounds it in the following three points:  
i. The relation of a commentary or sub-commentary to a scripture is that of a 
slave or servant to a master.167  
ii. The main job of writing a commentary is to untie the knot, to decode the 
words of the sages so as to make them more accessible.168  
iii. The inclusion of a treatise in the commentary is to be avoided.169 
                                                          
165 As a genre of commentary, zhangju 章句 usually focuses on the syntactic and semantic analysis of 
chapters, sections, sentences and phrases of an ancient text. In his treatment of The Great Learning, Zhu 
Xi evidently takes account of the philosophical interpretation; as a result, his Commentary on The Great 
Learning goes beyond the traditional framework of zhangju 章句.   
166 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘今之談經者，往往有四者之病：本卑也，而抗之使高；本淺也，而鑿之使深；本近也，
而推之使遠；本明也，而必使至於晦，此今日談經之大患也。蓋卿錄’ ZZQS, 14,351.        
167 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘聖經字若個主人，解者猶若奴僕。今人不識主人，且因奴僕通名，方識得主人，畢竟不如經字也。
泳錄’ ZZQS, 14,351.        
168 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘ 解 經 謂 之 解 者 ， 只 要 解 釋 出 來 。 將 聖 賢 之 語 解 開 了 ， 庶 易 讀 。 泳 錄 ’ 
 ‘解經當如破的。方子錄 ’ ZZQS, 14,351.        
169 Zhu Xi points out that even master Cheng’s commentary is tainted by this defect. See ZZYL, Juan 11: 
‘傳註，惟古註不作文，卻好看。只隨經句分說，不離經意，最好。疏亦然。今人解書，且圖要作文，又加辨說，百般
生疑。故其文雖可讀，而經意殊遠。程子易傳亦成作文，說了又說。故今人觀者更不看本經，只讀傳，亦非所以使人
思也。大雅錄 ’ ZZQS, 14,351.        
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The interpretation of a scripture must be based entirely on the scriptural text, and be 
kept as close to it as possible.170 The words of the sages are not delivered at random; 
rather the structure and order are subtly presented and demand extreme attentiveness.171  
    Contextualisation is another hermeneutical rule that is forcefully endorsed by Zhu 
Xi. When being puzzled by elusive expression, he always resorts to a contextual 
approach, and takes it as the only way to tackle the diversity of meaning and to enhance 
the comprehension of a phrase in terms of accuracy.172 Furthermore, given the various 
ways in which a word is used and interpreted, the reader is left no choice but to refer to 
the context in order to make sense of the seemingly paradoxical interpretations; only 
after that is done will the previous contradiction give way to compatibility.173 In both 
cases, the context rather than a single word is to be privileged. 
     His rearrangement of the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning draws heavily on 
the principle of contextualisation. In fact, the three crucial alterations that he makes on 
the basis of Cheng Yi and Zheng Xuan’s editions are all claimed as a result of a further 
exploration of the context. 174 Whether such a proclamation is sufficiently convincing 
is another question. But certainly it is clear that from Zhu Xi’s point of view the validity 
of the editing of this text is totally dependent on how well it fits the context, be it his 
edition or that of the previous masters. The rule of contextualisation should be 
universally applied to the evaluation of the editing or interpreting of a text. 
                                                          
170 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘隨文解義。方子錄 ’ ZZQS, 14,351.        
171 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘聖賢說出來底言語，自有語脈，安頓得各有所在，豈似後人胡亂說了也！須玩索其旨，所以學不
可以不講。講學固要大綱正，然其間子細處，亦不可以不講。只緣當初講得不子細，既不得聖賢之意，後來胡亂執得
一說，便以為是，只胡亂解將去！必大錄此下云：“古人似未嘗理會文義。今觀其說出底言語，不曾有一字用不當者。’ 
ZZQS, 14,352.        
172 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘ 凡 讀 書 問 ： 一 般 字 ， 卻 有 淺 深 輕 重 ， 如 何 看 ？ 曰 ： 當 看 上 下 文 。 節 錄 
  讀書，須從文義上尋，次則看註解。今人卻於文義外尋索。蓋卿錄’ ZZQS, 14,351.        
173 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘凡讀書，須看上下文意是如何，不可泥著一字。如揚子: “於仁也柔，於義也剛。” 到易中，又將
剛來配仁，柔來配義。如論語: “學不厭，智也；教不倦，仁也。” 到中庸又謂: “成己，仁也；成物，智也。” 此等須
是各隨本文意看，便自不相礙。淳錄’ ZZQS, 14,350-1.        
174 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 39: ‘或問、聽訟一章、鄭本元在止於信之後、正心脩身之前。程子又進而寘之經文之下、
此謂知之至也之上。子不之從、而寘之於此、何也。曰、以傳之結語考之、則其爲釋本末之義可知矣。以經之本文乘
之、則其當屬於此可見矣。二家之說有未安者。故不得而從也。’ ZZQS, 6,521. 






Ibid. No. 44: ‘曰、然則子何以知其爲釋知至之結語、而又知其上之當有闕文也。曰、以文義與下文推之、而知其釋
知至也。以句法推之、而知其爲結語也。以傳之例推之、而知其有闕文也。’ ZZQS, 6,523. 
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    In addition, Zhu Xi urges the commentators to make sense of the logic and structure 
of a scriptural text which is not always explicit. He maintains that although the ancients 
do not seem to pay much attention to coherence of meaning, it is worth noting that 
sometimes underneath a seemingly fragmented text lies a coherent system of thought. 
He has the impression that the words of the sages preserved in a scripture are always 
formulated in a structure as well balanced as that of the ‘leaves on the same tree that 
respond to one another (yeye xiangdang 葉葉相當)’, and the layout of a scripture 
suggests a mutual union, like the ‘branches of a tree spontaneously gazing at one 
another (zhizhi xiangdui 枝枝相對)’. 175 He is deeply amazed and captivated by the 
perfect arrangement presented in the scriptures passed down by the sages. 
Zhu Xi holds on to the assumption that every single word uttered by a sage will fall 
into place, and a text of a scripture as a collection of the sacred words never fails to 
hold a coherent meaning, which subsists in a semantic skeleton of its own.176 Thus he 
urges all to keep an eye on the framework hidden in a text.177  
As an experienced commentator, Zhu Xi tells his pupils that it is sometimes 
necessary to break up the whole into fragments, in order to grasp the structure and the 
logic of a text. But it takes some skill to dismantle a text properly, for one must first 
find the gaps and joints inherent within a text and then operate on it in line with those 
inbuilt gaps and joints.178 In so doing one will be able to probe into a text without doing 
too much injustice to its original meaning. On that account Zhu Xi relocates the 
quotations of the poems in Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning so as to form a text with 
coherent meaning. 179 
                                                          
175 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 10: ‘聖人言語皆枝枝相對，葉葉相當，不知怎生排得恁地齊整。道夫錄’ ZZQS, 14, 
325.        
176 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘聖賢說出來底言語，自有語脈，安頓得各有所在，豈似後人胡亂說了也！升卿錄’ ZZQS, 14, 
352.        
177 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘讀書之法，有大本大原處，有大綱大目處，又有逐事上理會處，又其次則解釋文義。雉  錄’ 
ZZQS, 14, 338.  
178 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘看文字，且依本句，不要添字。那裡元有縫罅，如合子相似。自家只去抉開，不是渾淪底物，硬
去鑿；亦不可先立說，牽古人意來湊。’ ZZQS, 14, 340-1.  
179 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 35: ‘曰、復引淇澳之詩、何也。曰、上言止於至善之理備矣。然其所以求之之方、與其得之
之驗、則未之及。故又引此詩以發明之也。夫如切如磋、言其所以講於學者已精、而益求其精也。如琢如磨、言其所
以脩於身者已密、而益求其密也。’ ZZQS, 6,520. 
Question: It is followed by another quotation of the poetry Qi-Yu, why?  
Answer: What is said in the preceding phrase has fully illustrated the meaning of ‘reposing in the ultimate 
good’. However it has not touched upon the question why it is by that means we will achieve the ultimate 
goal, nor does it mention the manifest signals by which one’s attainment of that state could be verified. 
For that reason this poetry is quoted to further expound it. The metaphor of ‘cutting and filing’ means to 
say that one endeavours to perfect one’s learning after having mastered it; and that of ‘chiselling and 
62 
 
    Just as a discerning eye is needed to see the hidden structure of a scriptural text, so 
an original mind is needed to find the profound meaning of a scripture. To Zhu Xi 
original ideas arise from diligence in thinking, and have little to do with subjectivism. 
Therefore the calling for originality does not contradict the aforementioned stress on 
objectivity. On the contrary, originality is in proportion to objectivity. Hence, in Zhu 
Xi’s system he urges all Confucian students to reinforce the effort to cultivate an 
objective and unbiased mind, and at the same time attaches importance to independent 
thinking.  
 When reading what is written by others, it is not appropriate to assent without 
thinking. Never believe it unless you really know it is right. It necessitates deep 
thinking and requires one to savour the words of a text, and that is the only way 
to achieve genuine understanding.180    
Unlike the many Confucians of the day who are content with repeating the expert 
view, Zhu Xi urges the younger generation to step out of the comfort zone and think on 
their own. Based on a scholastic ground, Zhu Xi encourages the young generation 
towards the effort of questing for the element of truth in a given text, and directs them 
to perform intellectual activities surrounding a text, to question, doubt, discuss and 
comment on it. In addition, he attributes ‘having nothing to present’ to the deficiency 
of an immature mind that has not fully developed to ‘the point of doubting and 
questioning’. 181  In making such a judgement, Zhu Xi is not only justifying the 
scholastic stance of doubting and questioning a text that he intends to promote within 
Confucian tradition; more importantly he is turning that kind of mental wrestling with 
a text into an integral part of scriptural learning which should be experienced by all 
                                                          
polishing’ intends to show that one attempts to enhance one’s personal quality despite having been 
through an elaborate procedure of self-cultivation.  
180 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘看人文字，不可隨聲遷就。我見得是處，方可信。須沉潛玩繹，方有見處。不然，人
說沙可做飯，我也說沙可做飯，如何可吃！謙錄’ ZZQS, 14,342.  
181 Ibid. Juan 11: ‘读书理会道理，只是将勤苦捱将去，不解得不成。文王犹勤，而况寡德乎！今世上有一般议论，
成就後生懒惰。如云不敢轻议前辈，不敢妄立论之类，皆中怠惰者之意。前辈固不敢妄议，然论其行事之是非，何害？
固不可凿空立论，然读书有疑，有所见，自不容不立论。其不立论者，只是读书不到疑处耳。将精义诸家说相比并，
求其是，便自有合辨处。璘錄’ ZZQS, 14,348.  
Zhu Xi gives more detailed instruction as to the key words hidden in footnotes on the basis of his own 
experience: ‘Never skip the key words in reading the notes and commentaries. For some parts of it are 
arranged in a sloppy manner and indicate what is of least importance, there is also a portion that is torn 
between the insignificant and the urgent, and another portion implies the matter of crucial importance. I 
always pick my words carefully, and dare not write down a word unless it is thoroughly weighed.’ See 
Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘看注解时，不可遗了紧要字。盖解中有极散缓者，有缓急之间者，有极紧要者。某下一
字时，直是称轻等重，方敢写出！方子錄 ’ ZZQS, 14,350.  
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Confucian learners. Thus he makes intellectual rigour an essential requirement, derived 
from the standard of the great learning.   
    In relation to the distinction he has made between the style of a scripture and that of 
a commentary, Zhu Xi points out the contrast between a general proposition and a 
detailed exposition, which drives him to stress the necessity for elaboration and analysis 
when commenting or interpreting a scripture. From his perspective, these two types of 
expression serve totally different purposes. Unlike a general proposition, which is 
expressed in an imperative tone and usually gives some precepts of moral significance, 
an exposition aims to spell out in detail the literal meaning of a precept, the scriptural 
ground upon which it is based, and the reasons for abiding by it.  
    In his Daxue Zhangju 大學章句  Commentary on The Great Learning, Zhu Xi 
occasionally gives his own interpretation, which seems to divert the reader’s attention 
from the meaning of the original text and towards the commentator’s speculation about 
it. A good example of this would be his interpretation of the five morals alluding to 
Wen Wang 文王 the King Wen, Zhu Xi makes it clear that the task of the Confucian 
scholars of the day is not to imitate the style of the scriptural text, but to quest for 
reasons, to elaborate upon what has been laid down by the ancient sages, and to 
contextualise it and root it into the longer scholarly tradition. 182  
From this academic standard arises the need to interpret the poems quoted in the 
scripture, and not simply provide an explanation of the literal meaning, so that some 
deeper implications pertaining to a quotation will be revealed. Overall Zhu Xi’s 
commentary on the four cardinal Confucian scriptures formally ushers in a new phase 
of hermeneutics in the history of Confucian tradition, which is to proceed from a literal 
comprehension to a philosophical interpretation. Likewise Zhu Xi stresses the necessity 
of adopting the analytical argument in interpreting scriptures, which as a result pushes 
the level of accuracy and clarity one step further in Zhu Xi’s writing of commentary, 
and also makes his editing of scripture more logically accountable.  
    Finally, Zhu Xi touches on those elements in a scripture that make no sense to the 
reader. He makes the straightforward suggestion: ‘When encountering a part of a 
                                                          




之理哉。’ ZZQS, 6,520. 
64 
 
scriptural text that does not make sense to you, just leave it as it is. If you insist on 
imposing an interpretation on it, you are bound to incur falsity.’183 Zhu Xi gives a very 
clear message: never attempt to make sense of a passage that is not understood; 
groundless assumptions out of personal caprice should be avoided in all circumstances.   
Nevertheless, Zhu Xi makes allowance for some unavoidable speculation, so long as 
this is based on logical reasoning and does not contradict the basic doctrines preserved 
in the Confucian classics. When challenged as to his view on the authorship of Daxue
大學 The Great Learning, Zhu Xi turns to his impression of the distinctive style of a 
master, here we read:  
The language of the scriptural text is concise yet contains complete truth; it 
concerns things at hand yet refers to what is deeper and far away, which cannot 
be achieved by one who is not a sage. 184 
Clearly, Zhu Xi cannot put his finger on precisely where solid scriptual evidence is 
to be found to back up his judgement, as a philological proof is nearly impossible in 
this case.185 Therefore he resorts to the mode of expression, which, he believes, is very 
much indicative of the author’s level of consciousness. To him, the distinctive style of 
a master is the manifestation of the inner holiness that master has achieved, therefore it 
cannot be mechanically imitated by one who is yet to attain the same level of 
consciousness. This speculation is of course open to question in terms of its historical 
accountability. That, however, is not Zhu Xi’s main concern. What is more urgent to 
him is to see the relevance of one scripture to another, in the hope of grasping the 
profound meaning contained in the sublime words of the sages.  
 
1.2.3 Unconventional Ideas of Zhu Xi: Focus on the Privilege of Knowing  
Through Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentary on the Four Books Zhu Xi 
makes himself the best exemplar of the hermeneutical rules he has set up for all 
Confucians. In his work is seen an intriguing combination of the typical Confucian 
conservative stance with an exceptionally original mind. There seems not to be a 
tension between his affiliating himself with the entire Confucian tradition and at the 
                                                          
183 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 11: ‘經書有不可解處，只得闕。若一向去解，便有不通而謬處。蓋卿錄’ ZZQS, 14,351.  
184 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 16: ‘曰、正經辭約而理備、言近而指遠。非聖人不能及也。’ ZZQS, 6,514. 
185 As Chen Lai points out, Zhu Xi’s view as to the authorship of the scriptural portion and commentary 
portion of The Great Learning is simply speculation. See Chen Lai 陈来, Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu 朱子哲学研
究 A Study of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy (2008), 279. 
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same time fulfilling his intellectual excellence. On the contrary, these two are conceived 
as interdependent in all circumstances.  
As an original thinker standing within the tradition of Confucianism, Zhu Xi is surely 
aware of the difference between his overall view of Confucian scriptures, which is 
woven into the fabric of his commentary, and the standpoint of the previous masters as 
revealed in their commentaries. Whenever there is a need to propose an unconventional 
idea, Zhu Xi first turns to a transmitted text for scriptural proof; if that is not possible 
he refers to the similar stance of a preceding master; finally he spells it out logically in 
an elegant and humble tone.186His writing of Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement is most 
illustrative of this characteristic. It seems to be less important a task to demonstrate 
one’s originality than to express one’s affinity with the whole scholarly tradition, which 
is normally achieved by illustrating a subtle continuity in thinking between a master 
and disciple. In Zhu Xi’s case, Cheng Yi is undoubtedly the chief intellectual 
predecessor from whom Zhu Xi finds the origin of his thought. In line with Cheng Yi, 
Zhu Xi maintains the standpoint that the ultimate goal of the Confucian way of learning 
can only be achieved through a step-by-step process that commences from the practice 
of gewu 格物 the investigation of things. Most of his unconventional ideas are tied up 
with his further development of Cheng Yi’s doctrine of gewu 格物 the investigation of 
things, which are expounded in three major themes: the relation of zhi 知 knowledge to 
xing 行 action; the correlation between zhi 知 intellect and yi 意 will; and in what sense 
zhi 知 knowing is relevant to cheng sheng 成聖 sage-becoming.  
 
1.2.3.1 Knowledge versus Action 
                                                          
186 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 45: ‘今也尋其義理旣無可疑、考其字義亦皆有據。至以他書論之、則文言所謂學聚問辨、
中庸所謂明善擇善、孟子所謂知性知天、又皆在乎固守力行之先、而可以驗夫大學始敎之功爲有在乎此也。愚嘗反覆
考之而有以信其必然。是以竊取其意以補傳文之闕。不然、則又安敢犯不韙之罪、爲無證之言、以自託於聖經賢傳之
閒乎。’ ZZQS, 6,526. 
Translation: Now I have little doubt in mind after checking the idea [spelled out at the end of this quote] 
and logic of it, and by examining the literal meaning of the words I see that it is well-grounded. As for 
its relevance to other books, we can list the sayings of ‘learning, congregating, discussing, and debating’ 
in the Commentary on the Text of Qian Diagram (in The Book of Change), the expression of ‘knowing 
and choosing the good’ in The Doctrine of the Mean, and that of ‘knowing nature and the Heaven’ in 
The Book of Mencius. All of these point to something that precedes the cultivation of holding fast [to 
oneness] and the effort of putting the knowledge into practice, which is also verified by the first 
instruction of the great learning whose focus lies in the same area. I once studied it time and again and 
now I believe it is certainly and necessarily so. Hence I adopt his [Cheng Yi’s] view to supplement the 
omitted text of commentary. How dare I commit the offence of using his name, utter groundless words 




The doctrine of zhi-xing 知行 knowledge versus action has long been a controversial 
issue in the Confucian tradition. The meaning of zhi 知 knowledge, in accordance with 
classical Confucianism, is most likely to be moral-oriented unless a Confucian master 
specifically defines it otherwise. Conventional expressions with regard to the relation 
of zhi 知 knowledge to xing 行 action are inclined to stress the importance of action in 
the sense that one’s knowledge of the moral precepts cannot carry weight unless one 
puts that knowledge into practice. Zhu Xi’s viewpoint concerning this question does, 
to a certain extent, conform to the conventional stance, as it is said in Yu Lei 語類
Conversations juan 9 that ‘knowledge and action always require each other … With 
respect to sequence, knowledge comes first, and with respect to importance, action is 
to be privileged.’187  
    It is the notion of ‘sequence’ that triggers an innovative understanding of zhi 知 
knowledge and xing 行 action within Cheng-Zhu school. The Neo-Confucians or at least 
those who affiliated with li xue 理學 the school of Principle came to realise that an 
individual brought up in the Confucian social milieu should function not only as a moral 
agent, but more importantly as a rational agent whose moral behaviour ought to derive 
from his own personal comprehension of the Confucian moral principles. Cheng Yi 
points out that the depth of an individual’s moral awareness or knowledge of the moral 
principles determines what stance he will take towards moral conduct and how much 
effort he will put into moral cultivation. For Cheng Yi zhen zhi 真知 genuine knowledge 
naturally results in li xing 力行 earnest action. One who possesses a genuine knowledge 
of li 理 the Principle will take delight in observing it, because in li 理 the Principle lies 
one’s own nature. 188 
Thinking in the same vein, Zhu Xi spells out in more detail the fundamental 
importance of zhi 知 knowledge to xing 行 action. The priority of zhi 知 knowledge over 
                                                          
187 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 9: ‘ 知、行常相須，如目無足不行，足無目不見。論先後，知為先；論輕重，行為重。閎
祖錄 
 論知之與行，曰：方其知之而行未及之，則知尚淺。既親歷其域，則知之益明，非前日之意味。公謹錄 
 聖賢說知，便說行。大學說“如切如磋，道學也’; 便說“如琢如磨，自修也”。中庸說“學、問、思、辨”, 便說“篤行”。
顏子說“博我以文，謂致知、格物”；“約我以禮”，謂 “克己復禮”。泳錄 
 致知、力行，用功不可偏。偏過一邊，則一邊受病。如程子云: “涵養須用敬，進學則在致知”。分明自作兩腳說，但只
要分先後輕重。論先後，當以致知為先；論輕重，當以力行為重。端蒙錄’ ZZQS, 14,298-9.  
188 Cheng Yi: ‘學者固當勉強，然不致知， 怎生行得？勉強行者，安能持久？除非燭理明，自然樂循理。性本善，循
理而行是須理事，本亦不難，但為人不知，旋安排著，便道難也。知有多少般數，煞有深淺。向親見一人，曾為虎傷，
因言及虎，神色便變。旁有數人，見他說虎，非不知虎這猛可畏，然不如他說了有畏懼之色，蓋真知虎者也。學者深
知亦如此。’ ‘Henan Chengshi Yishu 河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Work of the Two Cheng Masters’,  Juan 
18, Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,186. 
67 
 
xing 行 action is then formally weaved into the fabric of Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning in the form of commentary by referring to the order of the eight steps, in the 
sense that  the first two steps- gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and 
extension of knowledge - fall into the category of zhi 知 knowledge, and the rest into 
the category of xing 行 action. Thus the eight-step course presented in Da Xue 大學 The 
Great Learning is further condensed to a process composed of two parts: zhi 知 
knowledge and xing 行 action.189  
In a way that is not easily to be noticed Zhu Xi redefines the meaning of this concept, 
and takes chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will as the beginning of xing 行 action.190 In 
that sense, the notion of xing 行 in Zhu Xi goes beyond what we mean by action or 
moral deeds, but extends to the subtle and invisible efforts involved in one’s moral and 
spiritual life, such as chi jing 持敬 holding on to conscientiousness, chi shou 持守 
holding fast to the root or goodness, han yang 涵養 nourishing the self-nature. Likewise 
the meaning of zhi 知 is broadened and deepened with reference to zhi zhi 致知 the 
extension of knowledge, qiong li 窮理 probing the Principle, and jin xue 進學 to advance 
the learning .191 Instantly we are reminded of the motto of Cheng-Zhu school - ‘hanyang 
xu yongjing, jinxue zezai zhizhi 涵養須用敬，進學則在致知 the key to personal cultivation 
                                                          
189 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 9: ‘只有兩件事：理會，踐行。節錄’  ZZQS, 14,299.  
Ibid. Juan 8: ‘若物格、知至，則意自誠；意誠，則道理合做底事自然行將去，自無下面許多病痛也。“擴然而大公， 
物來而順應。” 力行錄’  ZZQS, 14,296.  










於不轉底。賀孫錄 ’  ZZQS, 14,289-90.  
190 Ibid. Juan 15: ‘格物者，知之始也；誠意者，行之始也。意誠則心正，自此去，一節易似一節。拱壽錄 ’  ZZQS, 
14,488.  
Ibid. Juan 15: ‘格物、致知，是求知其所止；誠意、正心、修身、齊家、治國、平天下，是求得其所止。物格、知至，
是知所止；意誠、心正、身修、家齊、國治、天下平，是得其所止。大學中大抵虛字多。如所謂 “欲”、“其”、“而
後”  ，皆虛字；“明明德、新民、止於至善”，“致知、格物、誠意、正心、修身、齊家、治國、平天下” ，是實字。今
當就其緊要實處著工夫。如何是致知、格物以至於治國、平天下，皆有節目，須要一一窮究著實，方是。道夫錄’  
ZZQS, 14,493.        
Ibid. Juan 15: ‘说大学次序，曰：致知、格物，是穷此理；诚意、正心、修身，是体此理；齐家、治国、平天下，只
是推此理。要做三节看。雉錄 ’  ZZQS, 14,496.       
191 Chen Lai lists over ten pairs of notions concerning zhi 知 knowledge and xing 行 action that prevail in 
the Neo-Confucian context. See Chen Lai 陈来, Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu 朱子哲学研究 A Study of Zhu Xi’s 
Philosophy (2008), 316. 
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lies in holding fast to earnestness or conscientiousness whereas the key to the 
advancement of learning lies in extending knowledge.’192 These two seemingly parallel 
lines give an example of what Zhu Xi means by zhixing xiangxu 知行相須 knowledge 
and action require each other,193 in a context where xing 行 refers to issues concerning 
han yang 涵養 nourishing the self-nature, zhi 知 does not necessarily hold priority,194 as 
jing 敬 conscientiousness should be practised at all time.195  
Another interpretation of zhi-xing 知行 is to take zhi 知 as ‘knowing’ and xing 行 as 
‘obtaining’,  referring back to the eight steps presented in Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning, the first two steps are intended to zhi qi suozhi知其所止 know the resting point, 
and the rest are meant to de qi suozhi 得其所止 obtain the resting point.196 
In comparison with Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi has a clear view as to the practical 
characteristic of the Confucian tradition, and is more aware of the danger in 
overstressing the privilege of knowing. Therefore, Zhu Xi conscientiously clarifies the 
boundary of intellectual operation so as to ensure that the intellectualist tendency 
represented by the doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and the 
extension of knowledge will eventually merge into the practical way of Confucianism. 
When it comes to the debate with Buddhism and Daoism over the legitimacy of the 
contemplative path promoted by either of them, Zhu Xi falls back on the practical 
character of Confucianism in terms of fusing the achievement of xiushen 修身 self-
cultivation into the practice of qijia 齊家  regulating one’s family and zhiguo 治國 
governing the state. His criticism of the contemplative life cultivated by Buddhists and 
Daoists is mainly performed by referring to the steps that fall into the sphere of xing 行 
action in accordance with his interpretation of the eight-step process of the great 
learning.     
In spite of the fact that the importance of xing 行 action is to be emphasised when 
addressing those standing outside the circle of Confucianism, the message to Confucian 
                                                          
192 See Cheng Yi, ‘Henan Chengshi Yishu河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Works of of the Two Cheng Masters’, 
Juan 18, Er Cheng Ji  二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 1,188. 
193 See Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 9, ZZQS, 14,298-312.  
194 See Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 45, ZZQS, 6,524-6.  
195 Ibid. No. 4, ZZQS, 6,505-6.  








adherents, in the view of both Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, is that more attention should be 
paid to the role of knowing. Both maintain that a moral action should be charged with 
an individual’s awareness of the moral principle that requires such conduct of him. 
Unless one is driven by a personal understanding of the moral principles, one will by 
no means act spontaneously in conformance with the moral precepts.  
 
1.2.3.2 Intellect versus Will  
Before probing into Zhu Xi’s analysis concerning the relation of intellect to will, we 
must first clarify the controversy that arises from the translation of cheng yi 誠意. James 
Legge translates it as ‘make thoughts sincere’,197 and Daniel K Gardner as ‘making the 
thoughts true’ or ‘thoughts become sincere’,198 whereas Wing Tsit Chan translates it as 
‘making wills sincere’.199  
It is true that the meaning of yi 意 is twofold: will and thought. However, by referring 
to the context of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, in particular the order of the eight 
steps, we have to conclude that Chan’s translation of yi 意 as ‘will’ does more justice to 
the text. If it is conceived that the program of the first two steps – the investigation of 
things and the extension of knowledge – does not point exclusively to external things, 
but also entails an internal dimension, then the examination of the thoughts in the mind 
should be included in the investigation of things. If it also holds true that the fourth step 
– the rectification of the mind – deals mainly with the sentiments in the mind, then 
cheng yi 誠意 as the third step is more likely to be referring to the will rather than to 
thoughts. Thus the first four steps of the great learning correspond to the three functions 
of the mind: investigating of things and extending knowledge –knowing; making the 
will sincere – willing; and rectifying the mind – feeling. 
    Heavily drawing on the sequence of the eight steps as presented in Da Xue 大學 The 
Great Learning, Zhu Xi starts to establish the primacy of knowing over willing in the 
Confucian way of personal cultivation, as we read:  
    In the Scripture it says: ‘One who intends to keep his will sincere has to 
extend his knowledge in advance.’ And it also says: ‘The sincerity of the will is 
preceded by the extension of knowledge.’ That means when the enlightening 
                                                          
197 For James Legge’s translation of The Great Learning,  see 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748g/ 
198 Daniel K Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon 
(1986), 36, 20.  
199 Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1969), 86. 
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brilliance consisting in the substance of the mind is yet to be thoroughly brought 
out, what issues from the mind will necessarily include the element of 
perfunctory self-deception due to a failure in applying this enlightening power 
to practice. However, if one has pursued this enlightening virtue yet is not 
rigorous enough in keeping the will sincere, then what he has achieved is not 
turned into his own property, thus cannot establish a foundation for the 
advancement in moral cultivation. Therefore, in order to see the core of this 
chapter one must refer to the previous chapter and investigate the two chapters 
together, only after that is done will one be able to see the beginning and the 
end involved in the process of exerting the effort into this practice, and to know 
that the sequence of it is irrevocable and none of the effort is to be skipped as it 
is thus stated.200   
Here, in chapter six of zhuan 傳 the Commentary, Zhu Xi elaborates upon the third step, 
cheng yi 誠意 the sincerity of the will. What he particularly stresses here is not the 
meaning of it, but the correlation between the effort of making the will sincere and that 
of the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. He affirms this stance by 
first referring to the scriptural text, and then addressing the dependence of cheng yi 誠
意 the sincerity of the will on zhi zhi 致知 the extension of knowledge in practice. At the 
same time Zhu Xi makes it clear that self-enlightenment is not sufficient for moral 
cultivation, but must be followed by the cultivation of the will. Hence zhi zhi 致知 the 
extension of knowledge is a prerequisite to the cultivation of a good will; but that does 
not mean zhi zhi 致知 the extension of knowledge has an end in itself, its perfection lies 
rather in the following step- cheng yi 誠意 the sincerity of the will. Zhu Xi forcefully 
drives it home that moral cultivation is bound to result in ‘perfunctory self-deception’ 
if the effort in zhi zhi 致知 the extension of knowledge is neglected.   
The priority of knowing to willing is further expounded in Da Xue Huowen 大學或問 
Questions and Answers concerning The Great Learning, where Zhu Xi gives an 
elucidation, starting with an analysis of the tension between the ideal state of human 
nature in terms of its origin and the real picture of human existence in which a mixture 
of goodness and evil is present.  
                                                          
200 Zhu Xi, DXZJ: ‘经曰: “欲诚其意，先致其知”。又曰: “知至而后意诚”。盖心体之明有所未尽，则其所发必有不能
实用其力，而苟且自欺者。然或己明而不谨乎此, 则其所明又非己有，而无以为进德之基。故此章之指，必承上章而通
考之，然后有以见其用力之始终，其序不可乱而功不可阙如此云。 ’ Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 
Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 8.  
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    A human being, once bearing the burden of the physical body, will be 
restricted by the dispositions he is endowed with. Thus man is surmounted by 
selfishness out of physical desire, and the natural state of the heavenly decree is 
blurred. In that case, his knowledge of the principles of things would surely be 
tainted with such an ambiguity that the place where the good or the evil exactly 
lies is hardly realised; or he would be stuck in a superficial understanding and 
unable to grasp the ultimate reason which tells why goodness is to be desired 
and evil to be loathed.201  
Notwithstanding his Confucian faith in the goodness of human nature, Zhu Xi clearly 
takes into account the inborn limitation of man’s knowledge and moral capacity due to 
qi bing 氣禀 the physio-psychical constitution with which man is endowed. In this 
respect Zhu Xi does not concern himself with an assertion of the original or ideal state 
of human nature, but rather turns to the simple fact that man is born with a physical 
body, which gives rise to the imperfections and ignorance that characterise his 
understanding of the world and himself, and thereby arises the necessity to probe the 
principles of things and to quest for the reasons for moral cultivation. Zhu Xi makes it 
clear that without first knowing where goodness lies and working out why goodness 
ought to be desired, one stands no chance of cultivating an inner tendency towards what 
is genuinely good. Therefore, a pure and wholehearted love for goodness is always 
based on the realisation that possesses the power to convince the whole person-body, 
mind and spirit, to look for nothing but goodness. That realisation, Zhu Xi believes, 
cannot be achieved without conducting intellectual inquiry into the reasons for moral 
cultivation.  
Even if we accept that the core of the Confucian moral cultivation consists in the 
cultivation of the will, it still holds true that the effort in keeping the will sincere is 
conditioned by the apprehension of the reasons for so doing. Otherwise, it will lead to 
a consequence that is much more detrimental than it appears to be. Zhu Xi thus takes 
deficiency in knowledge as the source of self-deception in moral practice. This point is 
fully expounded in Da Xue Huowen 大學或問 Questions and Answers concerning The 
Great Learning (No.51) where Zhu Xi argues that ‘without knowing that goodness is 
                                                          





truly loveable, one’s love for goodness will by no means be free from being entangled 
with his dislike for it, which means one is internally refusing goodness, despite his 
claiming of the love for it.’202 The same point is put more bluntly in another pair of 
Q&A (No.34): 
 Knowing the name of a concept without grasping the reasons for that name, 
it will incur unfavourable consequences, namely ‘humanity’ will be degraded 
into over-tolerance, ‘respectfulness’ will turn into flattering, ‘filial piety’ may 
ruin the father, and ‘kindness’ might spoil the son.203  
Over the history of Confucianism, Zhu Xi is probably the first one who has 
formulated so clearly a critical reflection on Confucian morality without abandoning 
the moral basis altogether. His apologetic stance does not seem to play a huge part in 
his theoretical questioning and analysis of the dogmas or creeds that have long been 
rooted in Confucian tradition. Instead of refuting or uprooting these widely accepted 
morals, Zhu Xi points out in a sharp tone that the observation of a moral precept, if not 
accompanied by a proper understanding of it, will give rise to all kinds of hypocrisy, 
stupidity and stubbornness. Zhu Xi, therefore, confirms that the third step, cheng yi 誠
意 the sincerity of the will, cannot be performed separately as if it could stand on its 
own; on the contrary, it must be treated as a continuation of the first two steps: gewu 
zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. 
In his Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning and the 
following elaboration in Da Xue Huowen 大學或問 Questions and Answers concerning 
The Great Learning, Zhu Xi’s arguments concerning the primacy of knowing over 
willing are based mainly on the detrimental consequences caused by one’s lack of effort 
in gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. A 
philosophical speculation on this topic is seen in Yu Lei 語類 Conversations where Zhu 
Xi claims ‘the role of zhi 知 intellect consists in the ability to discern and understand, 
while the role of yi 意 will is to bring knowledge into action. So zhi 知 intellect is more 
                                                          
202 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 51: ‘其本心莫不好善而惡惡。夫不知善之眞可好、則其好善也、雖曰好之、而未能無不好
者以拒之於内、不知惡之眞可惡、則其惡惡也、雖曰惡之、而未能無不惡者以挽之於中。是以不免於苟焉以自欺、而
意之所發有不誠者。夫好善而不誠、則非唯不足以爲善、而反有以賊乎其善、惡惡而不誠、則非唯不足以去惡、而適
所以長乎其惡。是則其爲害也、徒有甚焉、而何益之有哉。’ ZZQS, 6,532-3.  
For a detailed exposition of cheng yi 誠意 the sincerity of the will and zi qi 自欺 self-deception, as well as 
the relation between the two, see ZZYL, Juan 16, ZZQS, 14,514-32.  




relevant to xing 性 nature and closer to ti 體 substance and yi 意 will bears more 
resemblance to qing 情 sentiment and is closer to yong 用 function’.204 He takes xin 心 
mind as the breeding ground for both xing 性 nature and qing 情 sentiment. The former 
represents li 理  Principle that is manifested in every human being, and the latter 
corresponds to qi 氣 the cosmic matter that each individual receives when his physical 
body comes into existence. The former reflects pure goodness, whereas the latter could 
be both good and evil. Zhu Xi applies the concepts of ti 體 substance and yong 用 
function to the notions of xing 性 nature and qing 情 sentiment, and affiliates zhi 知
intellect with xing 性 nature and ti 體 substance, whereas yi 意 will with qing 情 sentiment 
and yong 用 function. In Zhu Xi zhi 知 intellect is not being identified with li 理 Principle 
and xing 性  nature, as it is still not free of qi 氣  the cosmic matter. However in 
comparison with yi 意 will, zhi 知 intellect is closer to li 理 Principle and xing 性 nature, 
and less dependent on qi 氣  the cosmic matter. Philosophically speaking, that is 
probably the reason why Zhu Xi allows zhi 知 intellect to have power over yi 意 will, 
and insists that chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will must be preceded by zhizhi 致知 the 
extension of knowledge.205 
The relative significance of zhi 知 intellect and yi 意 will is also metaphorically 
expressed in Yu Lei 語類 Conversations. Zhu Xi depicts gewu 格物 the investigation of 
things as the turning point which determines whether one is sleep or awake, whereas 
chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will resembles the transitional point between good and 
evil.206 It follows that one who attempts to cultivate a good will without the effort in 
gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge is no 
better than performing good in sleep. 
The vital importance of yi 意 will is to be revealed by the unique status of the third 
step chengyi 誠意  the sincerity of the will in the process of the great learning. In 
conversing with his pupils, Zhu Xi explains that chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will 
indicates the critical point where the sagely consciousness starts to diverge from an 
                                                          
204 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 15: ‘致知、誠意、正心，知與意皆從心出來。知則主於別識，意則主於營為。知近性，近
體；意近情，近用。端蒙錄’ ZZQS, 14,489.   
205 Ibid. Juan 15: ‘致知所以先於誠意者如何? 曰：致知者，須是知得盡，尤要親切。尋常只將 “知至” 之 “至” 作 “盡” 
字說，近來看得合作 “切至” 之 “至” 。知之者切，然後貫通得誠意底意思，如程先生所謂真知者是也。謨錄’ ZZQS, 
14,481.  
206 Ibid. Juan 15: ‘格物是夢覺關。格得來是覺，格不得只是夢。誠意是善惡關。誠得來是善，誠不得只是惡。過得
此二關，上面工夫卻一節易如一節了。到得平天下處，尚有些工夫。只為天下闊，須著如此點檢。 又曰：誠意是轉關
處。 又曰：誠意是人鬼關！ 誠得來是人，誠不得是鬼。夔孙錄’ ZZQS, 14,480-1.  
74 
 
uncultivated mind. One who has made a breakthrough in cultivating his volitional 
capacity will surely walk on the path of a gentleman, whereas one who fails in this 
respect may remain in the realm of the unworthy.207 He particularly points out that it is 
relatively more difficult to proceed from zhizhi 致知 the extension of knowledge to 
chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will,208 which, he believes, represents a leap in the 
process of the great learning. He takes chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will as the crucial 
step that holds the key to the transformation of knowledge into action. 
The problem is how to make that transformation take place in the intellectual, moral 
and spiritual progress of each individual Confucian practitioner. Zhu Xi’s solution is 
basically in line with that of Cheng Yi, which is to incorporate the step of chengyi 誠意
the sincerity of the will into that of zhizhi 致知 the extension of knowledge, on the basis 
of the pervasive power of zhi 知 intellect over yi 意 will as mentioned above.  
From the Cheng-Zhu perspective, zhenzhi 真 知 genuine knowledge entails a 
penetrating personal experience which always leads to a kind of self-transformation in 
terms of triggering a radical change in one’s mode of willing and feeling. In that sense 
knowledge naturally possesses the power to penetrate the whole being of the person, 
and knowing plays a leading and predominant role over willing and feeling. However, 
one should bear in mind that it takes a life-long struggle to acquire that kind of genuine 
knowledge. The transformation cannot be achieved through immediate enlightenment 
alone; it is a natural result of a long, gradual accumulation of the effort in probing the 
principles of things external and internal. In that sense it is justified to say that one who 
sets about extending his knowledge will make progress in cultivating his will in the 
long run. Despite being aware of the difference between the second step zhizhi 致知 the 
extension of knowledge and the third step chengyi 誠意 the sincerity of the will, as well 
as the difficulty of leaping from one to the other, both Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi believe 
that the gap between them can automatically be bridged if one goes deep enough in 
zhizhi 致知 the extension of knowledge.209  
Since zhizhi 致知 the extension of knowledge cannot be separated from gewu 格物 
the investigation of things, and gewu 格物 the investigation of things is to be understood 
in terms of qiong li 窮理 probing the Principle within Cheng-Zhu school, it follows that 
                                                          
207 Ibid. Juan 15: ‘大學所謂'知至、意誠'者，必須知至，然後能誠其意也。今之學者只說操存，而不知講明義理，則
此心憒憒，何事於操存也！某嘗謂誠意一節，正是聖凡分別關隘去處。若能誠意，則是透得此關；透此關後，滔滔然
自在去為君子。不然，則崎嶇反側，不免為小人之歸也。謨錄’ ZZQS, 14,481.  
208 Ibid.  Juan 18: ‘今却不用虑其他，只是个“知至而後意诚”，这一转较难。道夫錄’  ZZQS, 14,599.  
209 This theme runs through ZZYL, Juan 15 and Juan 18, ZZQS, 14,461-500, 596-643 respectively. 
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the effort in gewu zhizhi 格物致知 will be able to generate within an individual the 
capacity to bend the tendency of will and emotions towards what li 理 Principle calls 
for. In that sense the person will be able to adjust what is going on in his mind, be it the 
flow of thoughts, the fluctuation of feeling or the tendency of the will, in accordance 
with the command of li 理 Principle. Viewing the eight steps in the light of the concept 
of li 理 Principle, Zhu Xi depicts the process of Confucian learning as comprising three 
stages: to investigate li 理 Principle to the utmost; to gain a personal experience of li 理 
(Principle); and to extend li 理 Principle. On that account gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the 
investigation of things and the extension of knowledge is to be located in the domain 
of knowing li 理  Principle, and chengyi 誠意  the sincerity of the will in that of 
experiencing li 理 Principle. 210 
This way of interpretation makes the correlation between knowing and willing more 
transparent. It implies the knowledge of li 理 Principle spontaneously navigates will 
towards goodness. Likewise, action of any kind is always determined by the depth of 
relevant knowledge that an acting agent has acquired. Following that logic, any 
immoral conduct will necessarily be attributed to a cognitive failure, in the sense that 
one fails to know the reasons for observing morality. Once a person has acquired a 
genuine knowledge of the moral principles, his will and sentiment will naturally be led 
by li 理 Principle rather than by his personal desires, and this will never fail to yield 
good deeds.  
By stressing the irrevocable order of the eight steps, Zhu Xi makes it clear that the 
effort of making the will sincere is posterior to the quest for the truth in term of qiong 
li 窮理 probing the Principle. The sequence of the eight steps also justifies the way in 
which the three functions of the human mind are to be prioritised: that is, knowing is 
prior to willing and feeling.    
Such an order of priority established by Zhu Xi encountered severe challenge and 
criticism in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), in particular from Wang Yangming 王阳明 
(1472-1529) and Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 (1578-1645). 211  Wang draws heavily on the 
doctrine zhixing heyi 知行合一 the unity of knowledge and action, but he still maintains 
                                                          
210 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 15: ‘說大學次序，曰：致知、格物，是窮此理；誠意、正心、修身，是體此理；齊家、治
國、平天下，只是推此理。要做三節看。雉錄’ ZZQS, 14,496. 
211  It requires another monograph to explore the intellectual development from Zhu Xi to Wang 
Yangming and Liu Zongzhou; here, it suffices to address the question with which the three Confucian 
thinkers continuously wrestled.  
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the primary role of knowing, despite giving it a different interpretation. It is Liu 
Zongzhou 刘宗周  (1578-1645) who completely reverses the order of knowing and 
willing set up by Zhu Xi. Liu makes a distinction between yi 意 will and nian 念 
volitional idea,212 whereby yi 意 will serves as an ontological substance which persists 
through the fluctuation of the volitional ideas; hence arises the concept of yigen 意根 
the root of will. In contrast to Zhu Xi, Liu Zongzhou establishes a system of thought in 
which will holds an absolute priority over intellect; as a result, knowing is allocated to 
a subordinate level and is regarded as being posterior to both willing and feeling.213  
1.2.3.3 From Intelligence to Sageliness 
Instead of stressing the power of will, Zhu Xi fixes his attention on the role of the human 
intellect, and allows man’s intellective power the primacy over sentiment and will 
throughout the process of the Confucian way of personal cultivation. By bringing the 
concept of li 理 Principle into the program of gewu 格物 the investigation of things, he 
is actually embedding the program of qiong li 窮理 probing the Principle into the core 
of Confucian learning and self-cultivation; thus the depth of one’s penetration of li 理 
Principle is not merely an indication of one’s intellectual brilliance, but more 
importantly is regarded as the main factor that contributes to an individual’s realisation 
of his own xing 性 nature. To Zhu Xi, guan tong 貫通 a thorough comprehension of li 
理 Principle stands for the achievement of sageliness, which is fully unfolded in his 
interpretation of ‘cheng 誠sincerity’, one cardinal concept of Zhou Dun-yi (周敦頤1017-
1073).  
Zhu Xi believes master Zhou is expounding the same idea in his two major books, 
Taiji Tushuo 太極圖說 An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate and Tong 
Shu 通書 Penetrating the Book of Changes, as the former focuses on the concept of Taiji 
太極 the Great Ultimate and the latter on that of cheng 誠 sincerity. Hence Zhu Xi takes 
the two as interchangeable and uses one to interpret the other, claiming that: ‘What it 
                                                          
212 Tu Weiming translates yi 意 as intention and nian 念 as volitional idea; in line with Tang Junyi 唐君毅, 
he sums up Liu’s thesis in terms of the primacy of willing over feeling and knowing. For the details, see 
Tu Wei-ming, Subjectivity in Liu Tsung-chou’s Philosophical Anthropology in Way, Learning and 
Politics (1989), 93-116.  
213 T’ang Chun-I, ‘Liu Tsung-chou’s Doctrine of Moral Mind and Practice and His Critique of Wang 




means by cheng 誠 sincerity is the so-called Taiji 太極 the Great Ultimate.’214 Since he 
takes Taiji 太極 the Great Ultimate as li 理 Principle in its full sense, Zhu Xi then 
interprets cheng 誠 sincerity in terms of li 理 Principle.  
    Sincerity refers to what is the most truthful and real, the proper Principle that 
Heaven endows and things receive. Human beings all have it, but only the sages 
are able to complete it, that is the only reason why they are entitled to 
sagehood.215 
In so doing, he weaves the concept of li 理 (Principle) into the meaning of sheng 圣 
(sageliness); thus the effort in probing li 理 (Principle) shows a clear relevance to the 
aspiration for sagehood. 
    The reason for becoming a sage is nothing but to complete this real Principle 
which is the so-called ‘Great Ultimate’.216  
This means that if one has acquired a genuine knowledge of li 理 (Principle), he has 
achieved self-transformation, namely, from an ordinary, ignorant human into a sage. 
The same idea is expressed in an outspoken manner in private conversations, when 
Zhu Xi addresses this issue with his intimate friends and pupils. ‘Things in the world 
are so ephemeral that none is worth bearing in mind. Only the way of probing the 
Principle and personal cultivation suggests the ultimate path [leading to sagehood].’217 
Zhu Xi then redefines ‘sage’ as one who manifests the Great Ultimate in the full sense, 
and is always the ideal embodiment of the four cardinal Confucian virtues: zhong 中 
mean, zheng 正 correctness, ren 仁 humaneness and yi 義 righteousness. A sage, Zhu Xi 
believes, performs in an effortless, spontaneous way and never fails to respond to his 
surroundings in the most appropriate manner. However, for those who have not attained 
the realm of sagely consciousness, it is necessary to carry out personal cultivation. 
Through the effort of self-cultivation, a gentleman brings ji 吉 auspiciousness to his life; 
                                                          




216 Ibid. ‘聖人之所以聖，不過全此實理而已，即所謂 “太極” 者也。’ 





a mean person, on the other hand, goes against it and will incur xiong 凶 misfortune and 
disadvantage to his personal progress in all aspects.218   
Thus, the nobility of a gentleman lies in his aspiration for self-perfection, while a 
mean person belittles himself due to his obliviousness to the sagely character and his 
neglect of his own moral and spiritual growth. Hence a kind of accidental distinction 
arises between a gentleman and a mean person by virtue of the difference in personal 
choice. One makes himself a gentleman because he chooses the noble and moral way; 
and one becomes a mean person only because he chooses otherwise.  
A gentleman in the Confucian social context usually refers to the class of shi 士 the 
scholar-officials. According to Zhou Dunyi, shi 士 the scholar-officials should follow 
the steps of the ancient worthies and sages as described in the Confucian classics. He 
gives a formula of the Confucian spiritual progress, proceeding from shi 士 an official-
scholar to xian 賢 a worthy and finally to sheng 聖 a sage: ‘The sages emulate Heaven, 
the worthies emulate the sages, and the official-scholars emulate the worthies.’219 
Evidently, Zhou Dunyi depicts the Confucian learning as an enterprise that aims to 
create sagely characters in the present time. That is the vision shared by the Neo-
Confucian masters in the Song Dynasty to which Zhu Xi is not an exception. Zhu Xi 
repeatedly affirms that sageliness can be achieved through learning. To the Song 
Confucian masters, the sages and worthies as the protagonists in the classics are not 
merely legendary figures whose lives are frozen in the specific historical contexts in 
which they lived. The significance of an ancient sage or worthy lies in the fact that he 
functions as a concrete, lively embodiment of tiandi zhixing 天地之性 the heavenly 
nature of mankind. In other words, a sage is a manifestation of the great virtues inherent 
in each individual person.  
If a sage is believed to be one who has lived out the true nature of mankind or the 
great virtues of each of us, the question will be how to transform an ordinary human 
being into a sage.  To this question Zhu Xi and Zhou Dun-yi give the same answer, 
namely, thinking.  
a) The dialectical relation between thinking and non-thinking  
                                                          
218 Zhu Xi, ‘Taiji Tushuo Jie 太極圖說解 Exposition of An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great 
Ultimate’: ‘聖人太極之全體，一動一靜，無適而非中正仁義之極，蓋不假修為而自然也。未至此而修之，君子之所以
吉也；不知此而悖之，小人之所以凶也。’  ZZQS, 13,75.  
219 Zhou Dunyi, Tong Shu 通書 Penetrating the Book of Changes: ‘圣希天，贤希圣，士希贤。’ See Zhu Xi, 
Tong Shu Zhu 通書註 Commentary on Penetrating the Book of Changes, ZZQS, 13,107. 
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In line with the words stated in Hong Fan 洪範 The Great Norm, ‘si yue rui, rui zuo 
sheng 思曰睿，睿作聖 thinking is supposed to be profound and pervade all things, and 
such thinking enables one to be a sage’, Zhou Dunyi elaborates upon the meaning of 
sageliness in terms of si 思 thinking and wusi 無思 non-thinking: 
    Having no thought is the foundation, and thinking in a pervading manner is 
its function. No sooner does a subtle incipient activation become active than the 
inner sincerity is activated. Such is the response of a sage. Bearing no thought 
of anything yet pervading all things with his thinking, that is what is meant to 
be a sage.220 
Zhou ingeniously grasps the dialectical relation of wusi 無思 non-thinking to si 思 
thinking, and applies it to his account of the inner consciousness and the outer response 
of a Confucian sage. To him the thinking of a sage possesses the power to penetrate all 
in a spontaneous manner, which is fundamentally a passive response to subtle changes 
of surroundings. In that sense, a sage is not burdened with a single thought of any 
particular thing; hence he is free of thought. 
Nevertheless, in order to achieve the state of wusi 無思 non-thinking, Zhou says, one 
has to think. And si 思 thinking paves the way for sageliness:  
    Without thinking one cannot pervade the subtlety of things, and without 
profound thought it is impossible to pervade all. Thus the capability of 
pervading all derives from that of penetrating the subtlety of things, and the 
ability to penetrate the subtlety of things comes from thinking. Therefore 
thinking constitutes the ground for the effort of sage-making and also indicates 
the subtle, incipient activation of auspiciousness and ominousness.221 
Having addressed the two sides of si 思 thinking and wusi 無思 non-thinking embodied 
by a sagely character, Zhou turns to the importance of si 思 thinking and takes it as the 
focal point of the effort of sage-making.  
Zhu Xi makes this more obvious in his commentary on the line: ‘si 思 thinking to the 
utmost, one will become a sage and be omniscient.’ 222  In Conversations, Zhu Xi 
continually ponders on this topic. He affirms that ‘zhi 知 intellect and si 思 thinking are 
                                                          
220 Zhou Dunyi, Tong Shu 通書 Penetrating the Book of Changes: ‘無思，本也；思通，用也。幾動於彼，誠動
於此。無思而無不通，為聖人。’ ZZQS, 13,106.  
221 Ibid. ‘不思，則不能通微；不睿，則不能無不通。是則無不通，生於通微，通微，生於思。’  
222 Zhu Xi, Tong Shu Zhu 通書註 Commentary on Penetrating the Book of Changes: ‘思之至，可以作聖而
無不通。’ ZZQS, 13,106.  
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of the most crucial importance, but the two are only one thing. Intellect is like hand, 
thinking is to do things with the hand, and thinking is to use the intellect.’223  
 
b) From ‘zhi zhi 致知 the extension of knowledge’ to ‘zhi zhi 知至knowing to the utmost’  
Despite all the effort in defending Zhou’s thought, in particular his long and tedious 
debate with the Lu brothers over the legitimacy of Zhou Dunyi’s controversial concept 
of ‘wuji 無極 Non-Ultimate’, Zhu Xi is fully aware of the impact of the negative and 
passive tone of terms such as ‘Non-Ultimate’ and ‘non-thinking’, and somehow 
reverses it in his own system. His mode of expression prefers ‘taiji 太極 Supreme 
Ultimate’ to ‘wuji 無極 Non-Ultimate’, and ‘si zhi zhi 思之至 thinking to the utmost’ or 
‘si tong 思通 penetrative and profound thought’ to ‘wu si 無思 non-thinking or having 
no thought’. The concept of ‘si zhi zhi 思之至 thinking to the utmost’ is still too abstract 
and of too contemplative a flavour, so that Zhu Xi finally chooses the term ‘zhi zhi zhi 
知之至 or zhi zhi 知至 knowing to the utmost’ on the basis of his understanding of Da 
Xue 大學 The Great Learning, and takes the state of ‘zhi zhi 知至 knowing to the utmost’ 
as the goal or end of the effort of ‘zhi zhi 致知 the extension of knowledge’.224 From the 
practice of zhi zhi 致知 the extension of knowledge arises the necessity of gewu 格物 the 
investigating things.  
Following that logic, it is understandable why in Zhu Xi’s system gewu 格物 the 
investigating things and zhi zhi 致知 the extension of knowledge serve as the basis of 
the Confucian personal cultivation and are affiliated with the effort of sage-making. 
Zhu Xi claims: 
Each of us has knowledge; it cannot be true that we are all ignorant. The only 
problem is that we are not yet able to extend our knowledge and to investigate 
the principles of things to the utmost. And the investigation of things and the 
extension of knowledge are one thing.  
                                                          
223 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 5: ‘問：知與思，於人身最緊要。曰：然。二者也只是一事。知與手相似，思是交這手去做
事也，思所以用夫知也。卓 錄’ ZZQS, 14,234. 
224 Zhu Xi particularly highlights the difference between ‘zhi 致 extending’ and ‘zhi 至 to the utmost’, see 
ZZYL, Juan 15: ‘問：“致知” 之 “致”，“知至” 之 “至” ，有何分別？曰：上一 “致” 字，是推致，方為也。下一 “至”
字，是已至。先著 “至” 字，旁著 “人” 字，為 “致”。是人從旁推至。節錄’ ZZQS, 14,478. 
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It is not the case that we are to investigate things today, and to extend 
knowledge tomorrow. The investigation of things is an expression from the 
aspect of the Principle, and the extension of knowledge from that of the mind.225  
And:  
    To investigate things is to probe the ultimate principles of things; to extend 
knowledge means there is nothing that cannot be known by our mind. The 
investigation of things refers to the details; the extension of knowledge refers to 
the whole picture.226 
It is notable that Zhu Xi addresses the power of knowing all inherent in the human mind, 
which, he believes, can be fully realised by means of probing the principles of things. 
By stressing the step of gewu 格物 the investigating things and that of zhi zhi 致知 the 
extension of knowledge as one and the same exclusive and irreplaceable means, Zhu 
Xi is actually placing the cultivation of the intellective power with researching 
everything to the minute detail at the core of the Confucian personal cultivation and 
self-realisation. 
In that sense, it is justified to attribute to Zhu Xi’s system of thought an 
intellectualistic tendency. However, Zhu Xi’s emphasis on the role of intellect does not 
serve intellectual purposes alone, but aims to achieve something far beyond intellectual 
accomplishment. He makes it very clear that after the things have been investigated and 
knowledge extended, one can attain a level of consciousness or a state of mind such 
that one will acquire a ‘thorough comprehension of all the multitude of things, external 
or internal, fine or coarse, and every exercise of the mind will be marked by complete 
illumination’.227  
Zhu Xi assures his disciples that a long-term gradual accumulation of knowledge 
gives rise to a breakthrough that allows one to grasp the whole picture, in which all, be 
it the internal or the external, xin 心 mind or li 理 Principle, is fully revealed and fused 
into one. By using ‘guan tong 貫通 thorough comprehension’ and ‘wu bu ming 無不明
complete illumination’ to define the goal of Confucian learning, Zhu Xi is, in a sense, 
                                                          
225 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 15: ‘郭叔雲問：為學之初，在乎格物。物物有理，第恐氣禀昏愚，不能格至其理。曰：人
個個有知，不成都無知，但不能推而致之耳。格物理至徹底處。 又云：致知、格物，只是一事，非是今日格物，明日
又致知。格物，以理言也；致知，以心言也。恪錄’ ZZQS, 14,473. 
226 Ibid. Juan 15: ‘曰：格物，是物物上窮其至理；致知，是吾心無所不知。格物，是零細說；致知，是全體說。時
舉錄’ ZZQS, 14,471. 
227 Zhu Xi, DXZJ: ‘則眾物之表裡精粗無不到，而吾心之全體大用無不明矣’, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 
Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 7. 
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substituting a rationalistic description of the goal of Confucian learning and self-
cultivation for any type of expression phrased in mythological or supernatural terms. 
There is no promise of a celestial reality such as Heaven or Pure land, nor an aspiration 
for a joyful religious experience such as ecstasy or eternal peace. Moreover, he adheres 
to the same literary standard throughout his exegesis, thus making the whole piece of 
work seamless and consistent. The final stage of gewu 格物 the investigating things, 
according to Zhu Xi’s conception of Confucian learning, falls into the same category, 
but to a different degree; what seems incomprehensible is in fact a natural result, or in 
philosophical terms a qualitative leap, which is to be finally brought about by long-term 
observation of the human intellect.  
c) Knowing as a path to sageliness 
It is clear that Zhu Xi pays a great deal of attention to his wording, and chooses his 
vocabulary with care, due to a deep concern about the edifying effect of his teaching. 
He deliberately avoids ambiguous terms and vague statements. As to the abstract 
philosophical categories he intends to employ in his work, Zhu Xi handles them with 
great caution. But he is not the only one who has to confront the problem of language. 
In fact, most of the Neo-Confucian masters in the Song-Ming Dynasty had experienced 
the struggle for a new vocabulary, different from the Buddhist and Daoist terminologies, 
and here Zhu Xi’s work is no exception. He basically resorts to the book of Da Xue 大
學 The Great Learning, and as a result his wording assumes an intellectualistic colour. 
He falls back on terms such as ‘zhi zhi 知至 knowing to the utmost’, ‘guan tong 貫通
thorough comprehension’ and ‘wu bu ming 無不明 complete illumination’ to express the 
culmination of the practice of gewu 格物 the investigating things. It goes without saying 
that to combine an adjective such as ‘ultimate’, ‘utmost’, ‘thorough’ or ‘complete’ with 
the noun ‘knowledge’ or ‘comprehension’ does not make much sense from an 
epistemological standpoint, because it is simply impossible for human cognition. To 
make sense of these terms, we must see beyond epistemology. Probably that is what 
Zhu Xi intends to do. When he deliberately combines ‘ultimate’ with ‘knowledge’, 
‘thorough’ with ‘comprehension’, and ‘complete’ with ‘illumination’, he is talking 
about the unlimited potential or the ultimate goal of knowing, which consists precisely 
in our limited investigation of things. 
Zhu Xi takes the initiative to reveal the sagely wisdom concealed in the scriptural 
text through a language of intellectual nature. That explains why he takes pains to 
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redefine the ultimate goal of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and 
extension of knowledge, and stretch the power of knowing to extremes, so that the end 
of knowing is no longer the same as the beginning, hence a breakthrough is possible. 
In other words, the investigation of things is meant to go beyond the domain of 
intellectual enquiry. In contrast to the philological scholarship prevailing in the Qing 
Dynasty, Zhu Xi’s rearrangement of and Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement to the text of Da 
Xue 大學 The Great Learning, serve solely to formulate a systematic, philosophical 
interpretation of scripture, so as to transmit the message of the ancient sages in a more 
effective way. For that purpose, Zhu Xi attempts to rephrase the description of the 
sagely consciousness or sagely state of mind. What he does in this respect alone 
indicates a subtle yet groundbreaking change in the mode of thinking within Confucian 
tradition: the language employed in depicting a sagely character seems to be shifting 
from cosmological, mythological and ethical to intellectual and philosophical 
terminologies. A brief comparison between the diverse versions of the account of 
sageliness will shed some light on this point: 
1) The sage as one who can read the mystical code of the universe, thus participates in 
formulating the human culture: 
    Heaven gives birth to spirit-like things; the sage took them as models. Heaven 
and Earth produce changes; the sage imitated them. In the heavens hang images 
that reveal good and evil fortunes; the sage converted them into symbols. The 
Yellow River gave forth the plan, and the Lo River gave forth the script; the 
sage noted their meanings. 228  
2) The sage as a co-creator whose greatness is equivalent to Heaven and Earth: 
    Being able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and 
Earth, a sage may rise to be the equal of Heaven and Earth.229 (Zhong Yong 中
庸 The Doctrine of the Mean) 
3) The sage as one who has achieved an eternal harmony with the universe: 
                                                          
228 Jici Zhuan 繫辭傳 The Great Treatise section 11: ‘是故天生神物，聖人則之﹔天地變化，聖人效之﹔天垂象
見吉凶，聖人像之﹔河出圖，洛出書，聖人則之。易有四象，所以示也﹔繫辭焉，所以告也﹔定之以吉凶，所以斷
也。’  




    [A sage] in his moral qualities is in harmony with Heaven and Earth; in his 
brilliancy, with the sun and moon; in his orderly procedure, with the four 
seasons; and in his good and evil fortunes, with gods and demons.230  
4) The sage as one who is marked by ultimate knowledge:  
    When one has exerted oneself for a long time, finally a morning will come 
when complete understanding will open before one. Thereupon there will be 
thorough comprehension of all the multitude of things, external or internal, fine 
or coarse, and every exercise of the mind will be marked by complete 
illumination. That is the state of mind after the things have been investigated 
and the knowledge extended.231  
Although Zhu Xi does not make it explicit that one who has accomplished gewu zhizhi 
格物致知  (the investigation of things and extension of knowledge) is entitled to 
sagehood, the all-knowing qualities of ‘guan tong 貫通’ (thorough comprehension) and 
‘wu bu ming 無不明’ (complete illumination) can be attributed only to a sage. Bear in 
mind that Zhu Xi deliberately keeps a distance from the contemplative life advocated 
by Buddhism and Daoism, while also distinguishing himself from worldly-minded 
Confucians; moreover, he sternly opposes the idealistic approach promoted by xin xue 
心學 (the school of mind). Having discarded all the above solutions, Zhu Xi chooses a 
seemingly rationalistic path; hence arises the need to create the language that is most 
suitable for the rationalistic character of his thought.  
Thus emerges a new version of the sagely state of mind, an intellectualistic account 
of a sagely character, in Zhu Xi’s most important work: his Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement 
to the section of the investigation of things and extension of knowledge. In 134 words 
Zhu Xi manages to spell out the means and goal of the Confucian learning in intellectual 
terms, and consequently drives home the all-knowing attribute of the Confucian ideal 
personality. In Zhu Xi’s exegesis on the doctrine of the investigation of things, the 
desire for religious experience, the aspiration to spiritual bliss and the quest for celestial 
reality seem to have been translated into a step-by-step, rationalistic way of learning.  
Thereby we reach the kernel of Zhu Xi’s thought: the approach to sageliness and the 
key to sageliness both consist in the immense power of knowing, because the whole 
                                                          
230
 Qian Wenyan 乾文言 An Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate: ‘夫大人者，與天地合其
德，與日月合其明，與四時合其序，與鬼神合其吉凶。先天而天弗違，後天而奉天時。’ English translation is from 
Wei Tat, An exposition of the I-Ching or Book of Changes (Hong Kong, 1977), 71-2. 
231 Zhu Xi, Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement, DXZJ, sect. on ‘the investigation of things’, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu
四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 7.   
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substance and the great function of the mind lie in the capacity for qiong li 窮理 probing 
the Principle. The unification of xin 心 mind and li 理 Principle occurs only when li 理 
Principle is known to xin 心 mind. Otherwise it remains merely as an assumption. It is 
worth noting that in Zhu Xi’s system the doctrine of the investigation of things and the 
extension of knowledge is based precisely on such an assumption: the unity of xin 心 
mind and li 理 Principle, of external and internal. For that reason, the investigation of 
the principles of things entails two directions: on one hand it indicates man’s approach 
to things; and on the other the things are drawn to man. Once man starts to cast the light 
of intellect upon a thing, the principle inherent in it will be revealed, which in turn 
brings the dormant intellective power into effect. Thus li 理 Principle is to be revealed 
through the exercise of the human intellect, and the intellective power of xin 心 mind is 
to be unfolded through its comprehension of li 理 Principle.  
Following Zhu Xi’s understanding of the human intellect, it is a correlation rather 
than a tension that exists between the acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation of 
moral virtues. Likewise there is no substantial problem in transforming knowledge into 
wisdom, because the operation of the intellective power encompasses all these 
dimensions. Once a person aspires to a thorough understanding of all and embarks upon 
probing the principles of things at hand, he allows himself to be open to the whole 
universe, and at the same time the whole universe opens up to him. Such is the beauty 
of knowing that it leads a person to proceed from manhood to sagehood. To Zhu Xi, if 
it is possible for a man to be transformed into a sage through the Confucian way of 
personal cultivation, it can only be achieved through the exercise of the intellective 
power in its full sense, when things have been thoroughly investigated and knowledge 
fully extended. Thus sageliness should never be separated from the ground of human 
effort, and must be deemed the end in contrast to the means, the final result in contrast 
to a long process of gradual accumulation of knowledge. That is the core of Zhu Xi’s 
message.  
1.3 Zhu Xi the Philosopher: Promoting Intellectualism within Confucian Tradition  
After the completion of Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning, 
Zhu Xi went on to compose Da Xue Huowen 大學或問  Questions and Answers 
concerning The Great Learning, which can be deemed a complement to the 
Commentary, and is intended to enhance the reception of it. Zhu Xi’s main idea persists 
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throughout the two series of compositions, but the way in which it is unfolded differs 
between them.  
Although the difference between the two works is obvious, the reason remains 
obscure until we look more closely at the context in which they emerge. A brief glance 
at the history of Confucianism reveals the crucial importance of commentary writing. 
The authority of scriptural commentary is almost beyond dispute, and the way to 
preserve the traditional values and concepts is always to promote an orthodox 
commentary on a massive scale. Even before the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song 
Dynasty, throughout the previous ages and particularly that of the Han Dynasty, 
commentary was considered the most authoritative type of work, produced by the 
greatest minds. By contrast, a philosophical essay entitled ‘On…’ carries far less weight, 
and consequently has little impact on the development of this tradition.   
Put simply, the genre itself determines to what extent and in which manner the author 
is allowed to set forth his own idea. For instance, the writing of a commentary on 
scripture surely requires much more self-discipline than does a philosophical essay, 
since different academic criteria apply. The author of a commentary is expected to 
demonstrate his comprehension of the text rather than the depth and originality of his 
own thinking. For that reason the composition of commentary requires the writer to go 
through at least two steps: first to form a coherent understanding of the original text, 
and then to apply that understanding to the explanation of the text.  
That is precisely what Zhu Xi does in his line-by-line Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 
Commentary on The Great Learning, in which his idea permeates, and is often 
implicitly expressed through his explanation of the text, which could cover the literal 
meaning of a word, the moral and spiritual implications, and the points made by 
previous commentators. Clearly, within the framework of the Commentary there is little 
room for a systematic articulation of his philosophy. 
Therefore, the philosophical speculations are to be unfolded in a different format. 
This is done splendidly in Daxue Huowen 大學或問  Q&A concerning The Great 
Learning.232 The insightful thoughts and the seemingly unconventional ideas, having 
                                                          
232 Chen Fengyuan 陳逢源 highlights the importance of Zhu Xi’s Q&A. Through a comparative study of 
the two, Chen points out the parallels and differences between Zhu Xi’s commentary and his Q&A. See 
his paper ‘Zhu Xi Zhu Sishu Zhi Zhuanzhe-yi Xue Yong Zhangju yu Huowen wei Bidui Fanchou 朱熹註
四書之轉折-以〈學庸章句〉與〈或問〉為比對範疇 The Changes Zhu Xi had made in His Composing of 
Commentary on the Four Books’, Dongwu Zhongwen Xuebao 東吳中文學報 Chinese Academic Journal of 
Dongwu 15 (2008), 17-40. 
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been excluded from the Commentary, are now allowed to shine in Q&A. It is in Daxue 
Huowen 大學或問 Q&A concerning The Great Learning Zhu Xi’s own idea is being set 
forth, with little interruption and restriction. In this book he allows his personal 
approach free rein, and formulates his point of view in a highly logical and systematic 
manner.   
Put simply, Commentary and Q&A represent two different formats and fulfil 
different purposes. Commentary as a companion to scripture aims to theoretically 
reconstruct and enrich the Confucian tradition; thus it must be written in a style that is 
intelligible to all: to those inside and outside the Confucian tradition, to this generation 
and to generations to come. Zhu Xi is certainly aware of the nature of this task; he has 
spent over four decades on it. By contrast, Zhu Xi’s Q&A was intended for a very small 
circle, composed mainly of his pupils and friends who were concerned with 
philosophical speculations. As Zhu Xi himself insisted, it was not meant to be circulated 
in a broader community. Although he remained deeply occupied with metaphysical 
questions throughout his life, he did not believe that everyone must philosophise. His 
personal disposition to philosophical thinking happened to be in tune with the academic 
climate of his time, hence his undertaking of the Q&A. 
   
1.3.1 An Overall Description of Q&A concerning The Great Learning  
The format of Q&A had appeared before the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.), but a 
systematic application of Q&A as a literary form was seen in the works of the Han 
scholars, typically in Baihu Tongyi 白虎通義 Comprehensive Meaning as Discussed in 
the White Tiger Hall.233 The form of Q&A was also employed by the Song Confucian 
masters in answering questions of their students and in debating with each other over 
controversial issues of different kinds, as found in Zhu Xi’s Yu Lei 語類 Conversations 
and Wen Ji 文集 Literary Works. Cheng Yi’s Yi Shu 遺書 Posthumous Work is another 
good example of it.234 But none of the aforementioned works seems to contain a series 
of questions that can be compared with what Zhu Xi listed in his Daxue Huowen 大學
或問 Q&A concerning The Great Learning. The questions selected in this book are 
much more intellectually demanding, and the answers he gives reflect a higher level of 
                                                          
233 This book is derived from the debate over the Confucian classics, which was carried out among 
official scholars around 79 A.D. with the support of the emperor Xian in the Han dynasty. It stands as 
the orthodox doctrine of Confucianism and prevailed throughout the Han dynasty.  
234 In particular in Juan 18 we see a focused presentation of the philosophical questioning that contains 
the very element of Cheng Yi’s thought, which is adopted and further expounded by Zhu Xi.   
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complexity. It stands out among the massive intellectual output of Neo-Confucian 
masters in the Song, by virtue of the mode of thinking and expression demonstrated 
throughout; that is, thinking in philosophical and logical terms and giving systematic 
elucidation of that thinking.  
1.3.1.1 Account and Analysis of the Content  
This book consists of 86 pairs of Q&A, the contents of which fall into seven categories: 
1) Explanation and interpretation – 65 pairs (No. 1-6, 9-17, 19-26, 28-32, 35-
37, 40- 41, 48, 53, 55-74, 76-85) 
2) Editorial disputation – 9 pairs (No. 8, 18, 38- 39, 42-45, 86)  
3) Systematic elucidation – 4 pairs (No. 7, 46, 49, 51)  
4) Response to criticism – 3 pairs (No. 34, 47, 50) 
5) Semantic question – 3 pairs (No. 33, 52, 75) 
6) Phonetic question – 1 pair (No. 54) 
7) Philological question – 1 pair (No. 27) 
The proportion of each category makes it clear that the issue of hermeneutics prevails 
in this book, Q&A as a whole is not about a variety of contested topics, but focuses on 
interpretation, editing and language. Here Zhu Xi spells out in detail why and how his 
treatment of the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning differs from the previous 
editions. Based on the number of pairs of Q&A in each of the above categories, we can 
easily work out the proportion of each type of question to the whole book, which gives 
a clear indication of what Zhu Xi intends in composing this volume after his Da Xue 
Zhang ju 大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning.  
With regard to category 1, Zhu Xi gives his own explanation and interpretation of 
the original text, in what can be seen as a continued expounding of the views already 
stated in the Commentary. In so doing his stance on tradition and scripture becomes 
transparent, and the depth of his own appropriation of the scriptural text is intensified. 
Among 86 pairs of Q&A, Zhu Xi allows 65 to be bound up with his specific 
understanding of this ancient text. 
As shown above, Zhu Xi’s approach to the text is demonstrated primarily through 
his re-editing of it, in which he pinpoints the defects in the previous editions and openly 
expresses his disagreement with the previous masters, both Zheng Xuan and Cheng Yi. 
This can be seen in the second category of Q&A, the 9 pairs on editorial disputations. 
His original ideas and philosophical thinking are densely unfolded in categories 3 
and 4; Q&A in the former category are intended to establish his thesis in a systematic 
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manner, and those in the latter form an intellectual response to the typical challenges 
from those people inclined to the idealistic stance promoted by the other major school 
of thought of the day within the Confucian tradition.. 
As this book is written chiefly for an inquisitive mind who may be puzzled by Zhu 
Xi’s line-by-line commentary on Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, one who may hold 
serious doubts over the legitimacy of his interpretation and strong opposition to his 
overall approach, the literal meaning of the text is not greatly at issue here. Nevertheless, 
Zhu Xi makes some room for discussion over semantic and phonetic questions, as can 
be seen in categories 5 and 6. 
The existence of the seventh category is an indication that philological questions are 
also touched upon in this book. Zhu Xi briefly rectifies an erroneous view over the 
authorship of Kang Gao 康誥 The Announcement of Kang, and ends by making it clear 
that although he has no intention to expound it here, it is nevertheless an important 
question that should be fully elaborated elsewhere for the reader. 
1.3.1.2 Implicit Structure of the Book 
The structure of this book does not exhibit any unique or outstanding feature, apart from 
the format of Q&A. In Zhu Zi Quan Shu 朱子全書 The Complete Work of Zhu Xi235 the 
86 pairs of Q&A are divided into two parts: Nos.1-41constitute part one, and Nos.42-
86 part two, a division based mainly on length rather than a close examination of 
content. It is probable that only the sequence of these questions and answers will give 
us some clue as to the implicit structure of the whole book. Clearly the 86 pairs of Q&A 
are by no means compiled at random, but organised in accordance with Zhu Xi’s 
rearrangement of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, proceeding from the portion of Jing
經 the Scripture to that of Zhuan 傳 the Commentary. 
A basic structure hidden in Zhu Xi’s Daxue Huowen 大學或問 Q&A concerning The 
Great Learning can then be discerned as follows:  
Q&A as a general introduction – Nos.1-6; 
Q&A on the portion of the Scripture – Nos.7-17; 
Q&A on the portion of the Commentary – Nos.18-86. 
Nos.1-6 function as a general introduction to the whole book. Zhu Xi commences with 
an explanation of the two kinds of seemingly contrasting learning: the so-called ‘great 
learning’ and ‘elementary learning’. Then, in Nos.4-6, which represent the essence or 
                                                          
235 Zhu Xi, ZZQS, 6,504-47. 
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spirit of the Cheng-Zhu school in terms of their methodology, he incorporates the 
program of ‘elementary learning’ into that of the ‘great learning’ through the art of ‘jing 
敬 conscientiousness’.236 By ‘being conscientious’ Zhu Xi means being constantly alert 
and attentive, maintaining full concentration; this is in stark contrast to the concept of 
‘jing 静 quiescence’  advocated by Zhou Dunyi, which refers to a desireless, undisturbed 
state of mind tained with Daoist colour. Zhu Xi maintains that the practice of ‘being 
conscientious’ should persist throughout the whole process of learning and be 
universally applied to all learners regardless of the diversity in their age, background 
and intellectual capacity. 
Having clarified the meaning of the great learning, as well as the mentality that it 
requires, Zhu Xi moves to the text of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning. Nos.7-17 allude 
to Jing 經 the portion of the Scripture of this text. All of the questions and answers from 
No.18 onwards refer to the portion of Zhuan 傳 the Commentary, within which Nos. 
18-55 focus on the inner dimension of the great learning that contains the first five steps, 
which boil down to the issue of the Confucian way of personal cultivation; and Nos. 
56-86 cover the final three steps, the so-called outer dimension of the great learning, 
which aims to extend one’s personal cultivation to a larger area, namely family, state 
and the whole world.   
No.7 is a systematic elucidation 237  of his overall understanding of this newly 
emerged Confucian canon, in which Zhu Xi gives a lengthy philosophical interpretation 
of the three items: ming mingde 明明德 realising the enlightening virtue, xinmin 新民 
renewing the people, and zhiyu zhishan 止於至善 reposing in the ultimate goodness.  
The philosophical speculation unfolded here seems to have pushed Confucian 
thinking to a level of unprecedented complexity. For the sake of clarity, we may 
summarise Zhu Xi’s theoretical contribution into three: 1) Aided by philosophical 
concepts such as li 理 Principle, qi 氣 the cosmic matter and yin yang 阴阳 the negative 
and positive force of the universe, he has managed to establish an ontological and 
cosmological ground for the Confucian norms; 2) Due to his application of the two 
fundamental concepts li 理 Principle and qi 氣 the cosmic matter to the Confucian theory 
of human nature, Zhu Xi differentiates the inborn goodness and dignity of human nature 
from the vulnerability to temptation and the disposition to evil that derives from the 
                                                          
236 Daniel K. Gardner gives a brief explanation of this concept; he takes 敬 jing as a state of mind that is 
indicative of inner mental attentiveness. Daniel K. Gardner, Learning to be a Sage (Berkeley, 1990), 52. 
237 For the original text and English translation, see Appendix 3; it is too long to quote here.  
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constitution of the human body, hence refining the will; 3) Thanks to a new conception 
of learning which combines scriptural study with self-cultivation, Zhu Xi restating the 
necessity to perform the Confucian way of personal cultivation practiced by the 
ancients, the process and program of which is spelt out in Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning in terms of the three items and the eight steps, hence act according to intellect 
and will.  
Taking No.7 as an example, it is plain that Zhu Xi is composing a philosophical 
treatise in one single pair of Q&A. The form of Q&A enables him to systematically 
unfold the entirety of his own philosophical thinking within the framework of an ancient 
text, which has obviously outgrown the traditional mode of expression in commentary 
writing. As a philosopher he is deliberately seeking space within the Confucian tradition 
to accommodate the originality of his thought. 
1.3.1.3 The Focal Point of Q&A: A Further Exposition of the Supplement 
Zhu Xi’s work on Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning includes three integral steps: first, 
re-editing the text; second, writing a line-by-line commentary on it; and finally 
composing a collection of questions and answers concerning this scripture. Clearly 
Q&A is the result of his ceaseless pondering upon Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning and 
almost represents his finishing touch to the whole project. As a continuation of Zhu 
Xi’s exposition of the meaning of the scripture, Q&A does not stand on its own, and 
likewise cannot be understood without referring to the Commentary. The major theme 
of the Commentary runs through Q&A, and Q&A is deeply concerned with the most 
controversial issue of the Commentary, which is undoubtedly tied up with his most 
daring operation with regard to scriptural exegesis, namely writing Bu Zhuan 補傳 
Supplement to it. 
Among all the questions listed in Q&A, those regarding Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement 
are particularly indicative of intellectual challenge, and call for the kind of response 
that entails a higher standard of academic rigour. Zhu Xi certainly commits himself to 
fulfilling this challenge, and his intention to promote an academic standard for all who 
are engaged in the Confucian learning becomes manifest. We can assume that the 
sophisticated and discursive style Zhu Xi demonstrates here when dealing with the most 
severe challenges imposed upon him is meant to set an academic standard for Confucian 
learning. In formulating an answer, he always allows logical reasoning to play a leading 
role; as a result, authoritative views are taken as being naturally open to question rather 
than treated as final and as sealing the relevant discussion for good. Thus the issues 
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surrounding Bu Zhuan 補傳  Supplement deserve thorough discussion, and what is 
briefly spelt out in Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement needs to be extensively expounded in 
Q&A. Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement, as the outline of Zhu Xi’s methodology, is nothing 
less than the life and soul of the whole system of his thought. As a thorough exposition 
of Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement, Q&A will then be deemed a comprehensive illustration 
of that methodology, initially invented by Cheng Yi, formally and systematically 
established by Zhu Xi and later to become the symbol of the Cheng-Zhu school. In that 
sense, Q&A is not only an expression of the intellectual capacity and academic rigour 
of the author, but more importantly provides Confucian scholars with a concrete 
example of how to develop a viewpoint into a system of thought through the application 
of logical reasoning and scriptural research. 
Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement then, is merely the expression of an idea, whereas Q&A 
aims to explain how that idea is obtained and why it must be so, on the basis of logical 
speculation and scriptural evidence. 
In order to justify this observation, it is necessary to clarify first how Zhu Xi’s writing 
of Q&A (22,225 words) relates to that of Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement (134 words) with 
regard to the specific content of the two; and then how the format of Q&A concerning 
a scripture relates to the genre of a supplement to the same scripture.  
a) The content of Q&A in relation to The Supplement 
In a group of Q&A (Nos.45, 46 and 49) Zhu Xi spells out in detail the reasons for his 
writing Bu Zhuan 補傳 (Supplement), and elaborates upon the legitimacy of his claim to 
be an academic successor to Cheng Yi. The three questions are rooted in scriptural 
ground and proceed in a logical order, from Question 45, to Question 49 and ending 
with Question 46. Question 45 opens this still ongoing debate concerning Zhu Xi’s Bu 
Zhuan 補傳 Supplement: 
 … you provide a Supplement to it and claim that your Supplement is in  
accordance with the idea of master Cheng. How do you know that the words of 
master Cheng will necessarily match the original meaning of the scripture? And 
how do you know that what you have said does not seem to be entirely derived 
from master Cheng?238 
                                                          
238 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 45: ‘子乃自謂取程子之意以補之、則程子之言何以見其必合於經意、而子之言又似不盡出
於程子何耶。’ ZZQS, 6,524. 
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The question arises from two levels of doubt: 1) master Cheng’s reading of scripture 
might have already deviated from, if not distorted, the original meaning of the scripture; 
and 2) despite the linkage between Zhu Xi’s stance and that of master Cheng, there is 
still a difference between what he is saying and what master Cheng has said.  
Zhu Xi’s answer to this question is the longest, at 1521 words.239 He starts with a 
brief summary of Cheng Yi’s teaching, and affirms that what he himself has written in 
Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement represents the essence of Cheng Yi’s doctrine. He sums up 
Cheng Yi’s teaching into two integral parts: the concrete method and procedure of 
carrying out gewu zhizhi 格物致知  the investigation of things and extension of 
knowledge; and the effort in hanyang beiyuan 涵養本源 nourishing the original source 
of personal cultivation, which in turn reinforces the ability to investigate things and 
extend knowledge. He then seeks cross-textual evidence, and attempts to demonstrate 
that what is emphasised in Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning as to the priority of 
knowing is also articulated in other Confucian classics, despite being phrased 
differently. He ends by pointing out that what he is saying is based on a close 
examination of the logical reasoning, as well as the literal meaning of master Cheng’s 
work, which is also verified by other Confucian classics. Therefore, he has total 
confidence in the truthfulness of the idea he has thus conceived and has ventured to 
write Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement under master Cheng’s name.  
If it is indeed the case that Zhu Xi is the legitimate successor of Cheng Yi, entitled 
to supplement a scripture and attribute it to Cheng Yi, then he must face another 
challenge: By what reason are the pupils of master Cheng, who had personally received 
his direct edification, disqualified from this task? Does he think none of them are 
perfectly capable of understanding their master’s teaching? That is precisely the content 
of Question 49, which continues: 
    Ever since master Cheng interpreted the investigation of things as ‘probing 
the Principle’, his pupils have spread his teaching, which is widely seen in 
written books. Is there anyone who has developed his teacher’s doctrine, and 
whose theory is of some help to the learners of the later generations?240 
To this question Zhu Xi gives another lengthy response (1489 words), adopting an 
approach that is by nature intellectual, as evidenced by the rational rendering and the 
                                                          
239 For the original text and English translation, see Appendix 3.  
240 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 49: ‘自程子以格物爲窮理、而其學者傳之、見於文字多矣。是亦有以發其師說而有助於後
學者耶。’ ZZQS, 6,529. 
94 
 
device of rhetoric deliberately employed by the author. Zhu Xi commences from a 
general remark on master Cheng’s achievement, then draws attention to the refutable 
opinions of his disciples. In so doing he presents a noticeable variance between the 
great master and his less capable students, which disqualifies all of them from being 
successors to master Cheng. Finally, Zhu Xi mentions his tutor Li Tong241 who, despite 
lacking proficiency in theoretical construction, has surpassed all the aforementioned 
disciples in terms of moral and spiritual practice. In this way he puts forth a constructive 
and feasible solution for all to follow, on account of the complexity and profundity of 
master Cheng’s thinking as well as the intellectual capacity required of a learner to 
appreciate the architectonic virtue of master Cheng’s work. 
   It is worth noting that in his answer to Question 49, Zhu Xi pinpoints the way in which 
each of Cheng Yi’s main disciples deviates from his master’s teaching, such as  Lü 
Lantian 呂藍田, Xie Shangcai 谢上蔡, Yang Guishan 楊龜山, Yin Hejing 尹和靜, Hu 
Wending 胡文定, and Hu Wufeng 胡五峰. Zhu Xi discusses at length in what sense each 
of them fails to achieve a comprehensive knowledge of this doctrine. For instance, Lü 
fails to understand the dialectical relations between distinction and integration, or 
between particular and universal; Xie shows a deficiency derived from a state of 
conceptual confusion as to moral cultivation and intellectual acquisition; Yang fails to 
distinguish the cause from the effect, and likewise mistakes the end for the means, 
hence neglects the orderly procedure that ought to be followed in the practice of 
personal cultivation; Yin has totally overlooked the vital importance of the 
accumulative effort in the process of knowledge acquisition; Hu Wending falls into the 
tempting trap of projecting one’s own moral ideals onto the external things one is about 
to investigate; Hu Wufeng seems to have grasped the meaning of the investigation of 
things; however, it is still open to question whether he has really put his words into 
practice.  
Having listed the defective points of Cheng Yi’s disciples with accuracy, Zhu Xi 
turns to his tutor Li Tong, taking him as the one who has put Cheng Yi’s teaching into 
practice, irrespective of Li’s inability with regard to philosophical speculation. Zhu Xi 
makes it clear that compared with Cheng Yi’s disciples, his tutor Li Tong shows a better 
                                                          
241 Thus the line of the succession is presented as: Cheng Yi 程颐 - Yang Guishan 楊龜山 - Luo Yuzhang
羅豫章 - Li Tong 李侗 - Zhu Xi 朱熹, See Chen Lai 陈来, Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu 朱子哲学研究 A Study of Zhu 
Xi’s Philosophy (2008), 157. 
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appreciation of master Cheng’s teaching, and the practical points he addressed could be 
universally applied to all.  
If Cheng Yi’s disciples all miss the point one way or another, and Li Tong is the only 
one capable of applying the method to the practice of personal cultivation, then the 
burden of promoting master Cheng’s teaching may fall upon Zhu Xi’s shoulders. 
However, the question remains as to whether Zhu Xi is the most qualified person to 
accomplish this. After excluding all the prominent disciples of Cheng Yi from the circle 
of successors, Zhu Xi seems to have pushed himself to the front line, where he is obliged 
to demonstrate his brilliance in all aspects, both practical and intellectual, which will 
enable him to continue the reconstructive project started by Cheng Yi. Moreover, he 
has to make it transparent that academically he has a great deal to contribute to the 
groundwork performed by Cheng Yi.  
This leads us to Question 46: “With regard to your idea, may I have the chance of 
hearing the entirety of your own thinking?” 242 Unlike other questions, which are meant 
to pose a challenge to  the appropriateness of Zhu Xi’s reading of the scripture, this one 
invites Zhu Xi to speak his own mind, with the aim of presenting a full picture of his 
thought, which signifies the specific character that may distinguish his work from that 
of Cheng Yi. Zhu Xi manages to accomplish this in an answer comprising 869 words, 
in which his philosophical speculation and the traditional Confucian notions expressed 
by the Confucian classics and the previous masters are fused into one, but noticeably 
this time he incorporates the words of the sages and the worthies into his own 
philosophy, not the other way around.243 In answering this question, Zhu Xi is actually 
articulating a concise yet systematic introduction to the structure and fabric of his 
philosophical thinking, which, as he endeavours to prove to the reader, is deeply rooted 
in the Confucian tradition and shaped by the Confucian classics. At the end of this 
answer, Zhu Xi readdresses the issue of Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement, and makes it clear 
that although master Cheng’s words are not literally repeated here, the main idea of it 
is not at all incompatible with Cheng’s view. He then asks the reader to ponder upon 
                                                          
242 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 46:  ‘曰、然則吾子之意、亦可得而悉聞之乎。’ ZZQS, 6,526. 




能同耳。以其理之同、故以一人之心而於天下萬物之理無不能知。’ ZZQS, 6,527. 
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the profound reason why he found it necessary to compose Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement 
under master Cheng’s name.  
That reason, which has become increasingly explicit in the three aforementioned 
questions and answers, is Zhu Xi’s profound sense of mission to re-establish the 
orthodox line of the Confucian tradition. Such a project, according to Zhu Xi’s 
observation, was initiated by Cheng Yi, and the kind of structure and scale unfolded in 
Cheng’s work provides a framework for the whole reconstruction scheme. In addition, 
Zhu Xi sees in Cheng Yi’s thought a spark of genius with sufficient power to reshuffle 
the Confucian scriptures and to reform the Confucian tradition, where Cheng first raises 
the question of qiong li 窮理 probing the Principle and more importantly grasps the 
subtle dialectic between the aim and procedure of the Confucian learning on the 
scriptural ground of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, a point which, unfortunately, has 
not been well understood by his disciples.  
Based on a thorough understanding of Cheng Yi’s system, Zhu Xi affiliates himself 
with Cheng’s line of thought, and attempts to perfect the work started by his master. 
With this intention, he embarks upon the job of revising Cheng Yi’s version of Da Xue 
大學  The Great Learning, an essential part of which is to provide Bu Zhuan 補傳 
Supplement to the explanation of the first two steps of the great learning, namely, the 
investigation of things and extension of knowledge, so that Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning becomes a complete scripture in terms of meaning and structure.  
It goes without saying that Zhu Xi is conscious of the innovative nature of Bu Zhuan
補傳 Supplement, whose legitimacy is far from self-evident. Thus, it becomes the major 
task of Q&A to justify Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement academically. In Bu Zhuan 補傳 
Supplement a new conceptual frame is brought into being which, in contrast to the 
conventional one, emphasises the significance of the intellective power inherent in the 
human mind, which holds the key to qiong li 窮理 probing the Principle. This new 
conceptual frame is undoubtedly of crucial importance to Zhu Xi’s reconstruction of 
Confucianism. Although he inherits the concept of li 理 Principle from Cheng Yi and is 
also inspired by Cheng’s emphasis on knowing, in particular the incorporation of action 
into knowledge, Zhu Xi’s thinking far surpasses Cheng Yi’s system when he starts to 
touch upon the subtle bond that bridges the quest for ontological truth, li 理 Principle 
that sustains the whole universe and also defines the nature of each individual thing, 
and the exploration of the inner capacity of the human mind which makes it possible 
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for man to qiong li 窮理 probing the Principle, which, in turn, defines the nature of 
mankind. It is only in Zhu Xi’s thought that a network of the metaphysical concepts 
starts to emerge and prevail; in other words, the process of conceptualisation and 
systematisation is taking place for the first time in Zhu Xi’s metaphysical thinking, 
which is briefly outlined in Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement and further systematically 
elaborated in Q&A. 
In Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement the objectivity of the principles of things and the 
subjectivity of the intellective faculty of the mind are both mentioned, and the unity of 
the two is to be gradually fulfilled through the act of comprehending the principles of 
things. However, a detailed exposition is left for Q&A, in which we find a series of long 
philosophical treatises systematically formulated as answers to specific questions 
regarding Zhu Xi’s innovative approach, characterised by an intellectual reading of the 
Confucian classics. That innovative element fundamentally consists in the importance 
he has attached to the power of knowing.244 
In summary then, the depth of an answer is surely in proportion to that of the relevant 
question. Despite the polished language and the elegant manner in which the questions 
are raised, it is clear to the reader that each is backed up by a huge amount of intellectual 
input, and each deserves thorough discussion. In the cases where Zhu Xi gives 
extremely short answers, this is because these answers could be derived from the others, 
for all the questions and answers are closely bound up with each other and can be 
integrated into one. However, that does not mean that each of the questions in Q&A 
carries the same weight; the focal point of the whole book consists in the severe 
challenge regarding the legitimacy of Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement, which is seen in the 
three questions mentioned earlier (Nos.45, 49 and 46). The correlation of these three 
questions likewise requires three inter-related answers which, as a whole, suggest a 
continuation and progression of the discourse on this topic. Hence it is necessary to take 
account of logical reasoning and systematic thinking; in this case, it even entails the 
possibility to push such an intellectualistic disposition to the extreme.    
b)  The wording and format of Q&A in relation to the Supplement 
                                                          
244 A.C. Graham provides a very thoughtful analysis of the solution of the Cheng Chu school to the 
question of human nature. He points out that the innovation of this line of thought lies in its addressing 
the element of knowing. For details, see ‘What is New in Cheng-Chu Theory’, in Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), 
Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (1986), 138-57. 
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Clearly Q&A and Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement are representative of two different types 
of format and wording. In general a supplement to a scripture, by virtue of its existence, 
suggests a reformative intention, the aim to complete and perfect that scripture. Hence 
the wording of a supplement, irrespective of its innovative nature, must fit perfectly 
into the original text in terms of its style, length and, more importantly, tone. In contrast, 
the format of Q&A concerning a scripture is indicative of the distinction between the 
questions arising from the scripture and the text of the scripture itself; hence the 
wording of Q&A does not necessarily match the style of the original text.  
In the case of Zhu Xi, both Q&A and Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement reflect his innovative 
work on the same scripture, Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning. The difference is that 
Q&A, as a collection of questions and answers concerning the scripture, does not touch 
on the integral part of that scripture, but focuses solely on developing an in-depth 
explanation and interpretation of it; whereas Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement is working 
directly from the interior of the scripture, with a clear aspiration to complete the existing 
text by means of revealing a perfect structure and profound meaning. In short, Bu Zhuan
補傳 Supplement sits within, whereas Q&A stands outside of the text of Da Xue 大學 
The Great Learning.  
Remaining outside the core of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, Q&A is meant to 
reveal the details of the debate so as to provide a full account of the mental wrestling 
between the two sides: one raises a question and the other gives an answer. The overall 
purpose is to unfold a vivid picture of the rigorous academic debate between the two 
sides, rather than presenting a monologue. The language appropriate to this end will be 
by no means proclamatory or aphoristic; on the contrary, it ought to be logical, 
analytical and rhetorical. In that sense, the format of Q&A opens up a new channel for 
Zhu Xi to exercise his philosophical speculation through logical reasoning, which 
allows him to express his thought in his own way. It is precisely on this point that Zhu 
Xi detaches his mode of expression from the predominant style of the scriptural text, 
that of proclamation and aphorism.  
Zhu Xi’s intention to promote logical reasoning within the Confucian tradition is 
obvious, but such an aspiration cannot be explained solely by his personal academic 
interest and disposition; rather, it is deeply entangled with the urgent need of 
Confucianism for self-transformation, without which the Confucian moral precepts 
passed down from the ancients may lose their appropriateness to the current situation 
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and stop making sense to the people of the day. To Zhu Xi, both a logical and reasonable 
interpretation of the Confucian morals and a comprehension of the reasons for these 
morals are necessary, as he explains in the answer to Question 34, in which he is 
accused of imposing a farfetched interpretation upon the scriptural text concerning the 
five moral virtues exemplified by King Wen: ren 仁 humaneness, jing 敬 respectfulness, 
xiao 孝 filial piety, ci 慈 kindness and xin 信 faithfulness, which arise from the three 
types of relations – lord and subject, father and son, and the inter-personal relationship 
as a citizen. 
In his Da Xue Zhang ju 大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning, Zhu Xi directly 
encourages the reader to first seek a deep understanding of the five morals, and then 
extend this knowledge to the understanding of others. He goes on to point out that 
advancing in this way would enable a person to find the perfect resting place whilst 
dealing with things and affairs in the world. To some, what Zhu Xi puts in his 
commentary are ‘superfluous’ and ‘too far from the original’ in comparison with the 
scriptural text.245 In response to this criticism Zhu Xi defends his interpretation in four 
aspects. Facing the accusation of being ‘superfluous’, Zhu Xi starts his refutation by 
clarifying the difference between the two modes of expression, to generalise and to 
reason:  
    Concerning the sketch of the morals and a general name for all of them, one 
word or sentence might suffice. However, when it comes to the reasons for that, 
one word or sentence may never be enough to expound the beginning and the 
end, the essential and the accidental of it. 246 
He admits it is necessary to be concise when giving a sketch or a general name, which 
applies to the style of the scriptural text here. However, in the situation where one is 
expected to give reasons for a general name, a detailed explanation will be called for, 
which entails the task of expounding ‘the beginning and the end’ as well as ‘the 
essential and the accidental’; clearly it takes more than one word or sentence to spell 
all these out. With regard to reasoning, it is not appropriate merely to point to the 
importance of being concise, let alone to take concision as the only standard upon which 
to base a criticism. 
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The implication will be that those who take his words as ‘superfluous’ have failed to 
understand the fundamental difference between scriptural writing and commentary 
writing. As a result, they take it for granted that the style of a scriptural text should be 
extensively applied to the composition of a commentary; thus the difference in style 
between the original text and Zhu Xi’s commentary becomes problematic to them. 
Zhu Xi makes it very clear that the conciseness of the scriptural words only serves to 
provide a general idea or name; when it comes to expounding the reasons for it, a 
concise expression will be inadequate, thus a different form of expression is called for. 
To Zhu Xi a commentary on a scripture is intended to enrich the meaning of that 
scripture, but that does not entail the necessity of adhering to the manner in which the 
scriptural text is formulated. On the contrary, the style most appropriate to a 
commentary arises from the proceeding of the logical reasoning on a specific topic, and 
could be totally different from that of the scripture on which a commentary is based. 
Having clarified the theoretical need for logical reasoning with regard to the writing 
of a commentary, Zhu Xi turns to the practical side and points out knowing the name 
of a moral concept without grasping the reasons for holding that name will incur 
unfavourable consequences. From his perspective, it is clear that to put a moral concept 
into practice entails a proper understanding of it. Therefore, in practical terms it 
becomes even more urgent to bring forward the issue of reasoning, as it is essential to 
the preservation of the Confucian morals in reality.  
As well as seeking the reasons for the five morals, Zhu Xi invites the reader to extend 
his knowledge concerning this subject to the understanding of other things and affairs. 
The aforementioned morals do not form a full picture of the Confucian morality, but 
cover only three of the five cardinal moral relations promoted by Confucianism. In that 
sense, it is necessary to extend the understanding of the five morals to the whole of 
Confucian morality, and further extend it beyond the realm of morality, in Zhu Xi’s 
term, ‘jin tianxia zhili 盡天下之理 to probe all the principles in the world’. This clearly 
relates to what he has written in Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement. 
Taking Question 34 as an example, we see that in formulating a fourfold answer to 
this question, Zhu Xi is trying to disclose the background knowledge that supports the 
two sentences given in Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning. 
On the one hand, he reveals the original ideas he has obtained from a long dedication 
to scriptural learning, and on the other he hints at his ambition to reconstruct 
Confucianism by means of rereading and reinterpreting the Confucian scriptures. 
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Therefore, what Zhu Xi has accomplished in Q&A is far more than to refute criticism 
and justify his way of doing commentary; the debate unfolded in Q&A is also indicative 
of a revolutionary and destructive operation in the sense that Zhu Xi’s refutation 
actually undermines the ground upon which the criticism is predicated. That ground, 
put simply, would be the old scholarship expressed in particular by the Han scriptural 
learning. Thus it becomes clear that the importance of Q&A goes far beyond that of a 
footnote to Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning, and a 
footnote to a footnote in relation to Da Xue 大學  The Great Learning. The real 
significance lies in the fact that in Daxue Huowen 大學或問 Q&A concerning The Great 
Learning Zhu Xi gains the freedom to systematically elucidate the innovative ideas he 
has read into the Confucian scriptures. Indeed, in this book more clearly than in any 
other is seen the birth of a new paradigm, one that is intended to encapsulate the whole 
picture of the Song scholarship.   
1.3.2 Systematic Elucidation as the Paradigm of the Song Scholarship 
As a tradition of thought, Confucianism has taken various forms to express itself. A 
glimpse of the intellectual trends or paradigms developed over the periods before and 
after the Song will help us to understand the uniqueness of the Song scholarship.  
    For the sake of clarity, we divide the pre-Song Confucianism into four stages: the 
formative age of Confucianism in the pre-Qin 先 秦 period (-221B.C.); the 
professionalization of Confucianism in the Qin 秦  (221B.C -206B.C.) and Han 汉 
periods (206B.C.-220A.D.); the further expansion of Confucianism in the Wei-Jin 魏晋 
(220-420) and the South-North Dynasties 南北朝 (420-589); the integration of literature 
into Confucianism in the Sui 隋 (581-618) and Tang 唐 Dynasties (618-907).  
    Due to an unprecedented reconstruction project, a transition of intellectual paradigm 
occurred in the Song 宋  Dynasty (960-1227) which ushered in the era of Neo-
Confucianism. The legacy of the Song scholarship as a whole has long been regarded 
as a conscientious aspiration for system and structure. 
Although the theoretical reconstruction of Confucianism initiated by the Song 
masters continued to develop in the following Yuan 元 (1271-1368) and Ming 明(1368-
1644) Dynasties, the Ming thinkers no longer focus their attention on system- building. 
It is justified to say that the framework had been completed by the great minds of the 
Song; the contribution of the Ming masters consists mainly in their driving home the 
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inwardness or subtlety of the Confucian way of self-reflection;247 as a result this age 
sees more light being shed upon the dimension of an individual’s personal progress in 
moral and spiritual practice. The grand vision of the Song literati was gradually fading 
into the background and finally gave way to the enthusiasm for an idealistic view of 
world, and the philosophical speculation once flourished in the Song was gradually 
diverted into the dimension of personal experience.248  
The linguistic turn that occurred during the period of the Qing 清 Dynasty (1644-
1912) marks a systematic defiance of the Song scholarship, and the revival of the Han 
scriptural learning that took place in the mid-Qing period represents the peak of 
intellectualism in Confucian history.249 But the intellectualistic character of the Qing 
scholarship is overwhelmingly expressed through attentiveness to the details rather than 
system and structure; likewise the quest for historical authenticity has replaced the 
pursuit of ontological truth. According to the academic standard upheld by the erudite 
Qing scholars, the philosophical speculation carried out by their predecessors in the 
Song is no more than empty words born of irredeemable subjectivity. Unsurprisingly 
the theme of ontological quest of the Song is by no means fully retained in the philology 
of the Qing, and under the intellectualistic climate of the Qing the aspiration for system 
and structure is often ridiculed as a symptom of deficiency in both scriptural learning 
and academic rigour. Generally speaking, the Qing intellectuals are more inclined to 
affiliate with the methodology promoted by the of the Han commentators. The revival 
                                                          
247
 The quest for a genuine method of sage-making plays a more significant role in the Ming period 
compared with the Song, and was discussed at length by the Ming masters. From a historical perspective, 
this question was initially brought to light by Chen Baisha 陳白沙, but a mature theory of this new method 
of sage-making was only achieved in Wang Yangming. The continuity between the two masters was 
particularly stressed by Huang Zongxi, see ‘Baisha Xue An 白沙學案 Anthology of Chen Baisha’, in 
Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (ed.), Ming Ru Xue An 明儒學案 Anthology of the Ming Confucian Masters (Beijing, 
2008), Juan 5, 1,79-109.  
248 This generalisation does not apply to the spirit of the late Ming masters.  In his unpublished work 清
儒學案 Anthology of the Qing Confucian Masters, Qian Mu speaks of the late Ming and early Qing as 
sharing the same scholarship and thus classifies the two as the first stage of the Qing scholarship. See 
Chen Zuwu 陈祖武, ‘Qianbinsi Xianshen yu Qingru Xuean 钱宾四先生与清儒学案 Qian Mu and his 
Anthology of the Qing Confucian Masters’, http://www.qingstudy.com/data/articles/a03/25.html 
249 Yu Yingshi 余英時, Lun Daizhen yu Zhang Xuecheng-Qingdai Zhongqi Xueshu Sixiangshi Yanjiu 論戴
震與章學誠—清代中期學術思想史研究  Discourse on Daizhen and Zhang Xuecheng - A Study of the 
Intellectual History in the Period of Mid-Qing (Hong Kong, 1976). 
For a detailed discussion of the meaning of intellectualism in the context of Chinese thought, see Yu 
Yingshi 余英時, ‘Zhongguo Sixiangshi shangde Zhishilun yu Fanzhishilun 中國思想史上的智識論與反智識論
Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism in the History of Chinese Thought’, in Yu Yingshi, Renwen yu 
Lixing de Zhongguo 人文與理性的中國 Humanity and Rationality in China, trans. by Cheng Nensheng 程嫩
生 and Luo Qun 羅群，(Taibei,  2008), 190-6. 
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of the Han scholarship in the Qing academia constitutes a significant part of its reaction 
against the paradigm of the Song scholarship, of which Zhu Xi is doubtless the 
protagonist.250  
Like other traditions of thought Confucianism has its own character and also 
proceeds according to its inner logic. However when it comes to the contributive factors 
which triggerred the Neo-Confucian movement the stimulus of Buddhism should never 
be overlooked. The aspiration for system and the search for a new language or even a 
new literary form expressed by the Song Confucian masters cannot be easily understood 
without taking into account the compelling force of Buddhism, in particular the 
prevailing trend of Chan Zong 禅宗 Zen in the Song. Generally speaking the school of 
Zen Buddhism has an immense and enduring influence on the thinking of the Song 
literati. The Song masters in one way or another give their reponse to the theoretical 
challenge of the Buddhist teaching. In both Cheng Yi’s Cui Yan 粹言 251 and Zhu Xi’s 
Yu Lei 語類 (juan 4, 126) we see both the criticism of Buddhism and records of the 
interaction between a Confucian learner and a Zen Master. Like many other Confucian 
scholars of the Song, Zhu Xi in his youth was fascinated by Zen, the eulogy Ji Kaishan 
Qianchanshi Wen《祭开善谦禅师文》he composed for Dao Qian 道謙 (?-1152) gives us 
an indication as to his engagement with Zen in his early years. 252 According to the 
research of Shu Jingnan, Zhu Xi had personally seen both Dao Qian 道謙 and his master 
Zonggao 宗杲 (1089 -1163)-the one who fomally established the line of ‘kanhua chan 
看話禪 meditation on a word or phrase’. It is very likely that Zhu Xi in his youth was 
not only fascinated by the teaching of Zonggao 宗杲, but also practised the method of 
‘kanhua chan 看話禪 meditation on a word or phrase’. More importantly Zonggao 宗
杲 ’s sharp criticism of the method of ‘mozhao chan 默照禪 meditation on silent 
                                                          
250 Dai Zhen’s sharp criticism of Zhu Xi is seen in his Menzi Ziyi Shuzheng 孟子字義疏證; for English 
translation of this text, see Ann-ping Chin and Mansfield Freeman (trans.), Tai Chen’s On Mencius: 
Explorations in Words and Meaning (Yale, 1990).  
251 Cheng Yi: ‘子謂門人曰：昨日之會，談空寂者紛紛，吾有所不能。噫！此風既成，其何能救也？古者釋氏盛時，
尚只是崇像設教，其害小爾。今之言者，乃及乎性命道德，謂佛為不可不學，使明智之士先受其惑。嗚呼！清談甚，
晉室衰，況有甚者乎！夫明智之士，中人以上之資也，其才足以自立，則反之難矣。學者必至於自信，而不惑，則彼
不能亂。不然，猶之淫言美色，戒而遠之，尚恐不免也。’ ‘Henan Chengshi Cuiyan 河南程氏粹言 Essential 
Sayings of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 1, Er Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 4,1196. 
252 According to the research of Shu Jingnan, Zhu Xi had personally met both Dao Qian 道謙 (?-1152) 
and his master Zonggao 宗杲 (1089-1163). See Shu Jingnan 束景南, Zhu Xi Yanjiu 朱熹研究 A Study of Zhu 
Xi (Beijing, 2008), 46-53. 
This story is also found in ZZYL, Juan 104: ‘某年十五六時，亦嘗留心於此。一日在病翁所會一僧，與之語。其
僧只相應和了說，也不說是不是。卻與劉說，某也理會得個昭昭靈靈底禪。劉后說與某，某遂疑此僧更有要妙處在，
遂去扣問他，見他說得也煞好。’ ZZQS, 17,3437-8. 
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illumination’ may also have an enduring impact on Zhu Xi’s critique of Zen from a 
Confucian standpoint. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine Zhu Xi’s affinity with Zen throughout 
his long academic career. 253 What we intend to explore here is the relation of Zhu Xi’s 
doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and extension of knowledge 
to the teaching of Zen. It goes without saying that his sever criticism of Zen is derived 
from a profound and sympathetic understanding of it, which of course serves apologetic 
purposes. From the Confucian standpoint, Zhu Xi conceives the doctine of Zen as 
defective and incomplete, meaning it only contains the upper part and lacks the lower 
part. He explains that in the Confucian context: ‘What is meant by the enlightening 
virtue refers to the miraculous and unobscured spiritual nature that man receives from 
Heaven, which therefore contains the multiple principles and responds to all things and 
affairs in the world accordingly.’ But, ‘from the perspective of Zen this spiritual nature 
is merely understood as something miraculous and unobscured, which is totally devoid 
of the multiple principles’. 254  For Zhu Xi the doctrine of Zen Buddhism fails to 
thoroughly integrate spirituality into humanity, this kind of spirituality promoted by 
Zen Buddhism consequently lacks a foothold in the realm of human life, which 
inevitably leaves the Zen practitioners nowhere to turn with regard to family problems 
and social and political affairs.  
On that basis, Zhu Xi claims, the Confucian teaching as presented in Da Xue 大學 
(The Great Learning) is more complete and advanced than the doctrine of Zen, as it 
will lead one to a broader horizon, meaning to apply one’s personal spiritual awareness 
to the reconstruction of the social and political order in this world.255 The intention to 
overcome the impact of Zen has a significant part to play in Zhu Xi’s work on Da Xue 
大學 (The Great Learning), especially in his philosophical interpretation of gewu zhizhi 
格物致知 (the investigation of things and extension of knowledge). His emphasis on 
gewu 格物 is meant to make a connection with things in the world, so as to substitute 
                                                          
253 See Qian Mu 錢穆, ‘Zhuzi Lun Chanxue 朱子论禅学 Zhu Xi’s Remarks on the Teaching of Zen’, in  
Zhuzixue Tigang 朱子学提纲 An Outline of the Study of Zhu Xi (Beijing, 2002), 142-50. 
Yu Yingshi, ‘Intellectual Breakthroughs in the T’ang-Sung Transition’, in Willard J. Peterson, Andrew 
H. Plaks and Ying-shih Yu (eds.), The Power of Culture (Hong Kong, 1994), 158-71. 
This question is also discussed by Julia Ching in her The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi (Oxford & New 
York, 2000), 171-89.  
254 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 14: ‘明德者，人之所得乎天，而虛靈不昧，以具眾理而應萬事者也。禪家則但以虛靈不昧
者為性，而無以具眾理以下之事。僩錄’ ZZQS, 14,439. 
255 Zhu Xi, ZZYL, Juan 12: ‘今說求放心，說來說去，卻似釋老說入定一般。但彼到此便死了；吾輩卻要得此心主
宰得定，方賴此做事業，所以不同也。大雅錄’ ZZQS, 14,362.   
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the contemplation of Zen, namely yi xin guan xin 以心觀心 (to reflect upon mind with 
mind itself), likewise the importance he attaches to zhi 知 (intellelct, knowledge or 
knowing) suggests a link with the prevailing Buddhist terminologies such as shi 識 
(consciousness), jue覺 (awareness), or wu悟 (realisation). Moreover the gradual process 
of accumulation and the sudden breakthrough involved in gewu zhizhi 格物致知 (the 
investigation of things and extension of knowledge) indicate a solution to the debate 
over jianxiu 漸修 (gradual practice) and dunwu 頓悟 (immediate enlightenment) within 
the school of Zen. Bearing the subtle defects of Zen doctrine in mind, 256  Zhu Xi 
attempts to formulate a methodology that will integrate the internal and the external, 
this world and the world beyond into one without dissolving the distinction between 
them.  
As pointed out by Qian Mu and others, Zhu Xi’s system of thought is basically an 
integration of Qin-Han Confucianism and the widespread Buddhist doctrines in Tang 
and Song.257 Qian sees parallels between Zhu Xi with Zong Mi 宗密 (780-841), who 
was renowned for being a master situated within two prominent schools of the Chinese 
Buddhism- Chan zong 禪宗 Zen and Hua Yan zong 華嚴宗. According to Qian Mu, 
distinctive of Zhu Xi’s system is to integrate different schools of thought into one (hehui 
yiqie 和會一切), whereas Lu Xiang Shan is characterised by a method which is meant to 
wipe everything out (saodang yiqie 掃蕩一切 ). 258  In spite of their differences in 
methodology, the great minds of the Song all agree on the goal of Confucian learning-
to attain sagehood, and they share a deep-rooted intention to push the Confucian 
moralistic disposition beyond the level of its customary appropriateness, and further 
transform it into the truth of eternal legitimacy and universal applicability. The Song 
Confucian masters in their critique of Buddhism, in their personal interaction with the 
Zen masters of the time, have already brought Buddhist terminologies and questions 
into their own thinking.  
                                                          
256 Zhu Xi does not make a distinction between the different schools of Buddhism, although names of 
these schools of thought are mentioned. As presented in Yu Lei 語類 he seems to take it for granted that 
Zen is the representative of Buddhism, which is understandable given the popularity of Zen in that age.   
257 Qian Mu 錢穆, ‘Chanzong yu Lixue 禪宗與理學 The School of Zen Buddhism and the school of the 
Principle’, in Zhongguo Xueshu Sixiangshi Luncong 中國學術思想史論叢 Essays on the Study of the 
Intellectual History of China (Taibei, 1976), 4,231. 
258 Qian Mu 錢穆: ‘我們若把宋學演進勉強擬之佛學，則初期宋學如小乘，濂溪橫渠如大乘空有二宗，二程如台禪諸
家，到南渡後的第三期宋學，便要到和會一切與掃蕩一切的時代。朱子是和會一切者，象山是掃蕩一切者，若謂朱子
如宗密，則象山是馬祖。’ ‘Zhuzi Xueshu Shuping 朱子學術述評 A Description of and Remark on the 
Scholarship of Zhu Xi’, in Zhongguo Xueshu Sixiangshi Luncong 中國學術思想史論叢 Essays on the Study 
of the Intellectual History of China (Taibei, 1976), 5,159. 
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Having clarified the main characteristics of the Song scholarship with reference to 
other forms of Confucian learning, we now come back to Zhu Xi, and discuss his 
specific contribution to the making of this paradigm. We will particularly look at 1) in 
what sense it is justified to say that Zhu Xi formally established a paradigm for the Song 
scholarship; and 2) what implications this paradigm may have presented still bear 
significance today.  
1.3.2.1 Setting Up a New Paradigm for the Song Scholarship 
In comparison with the massive secondary literature surrounding Da Xue Zhangju 大學
章句 (Commentary on The Great Learning), Daxue Huowen 大學或問 (Q&A concerning 
The Great Learning) seems to be relatively neglected by the current study of Zhu Xi.259 
This text is often conceived as a footnote or complementary to Commentary, as a result, 
the systematic, clear and precise expression of his philosophical thinking which is 
peculiar to Q&A has not been given much thought. Indeed the discursive, analytic style 
Zhu Xi particularly demonstrated in Q&A suggests his effort in searching for a new 
literary form, 260 which echoes the Song masters’ aspiration for system and structure. If 
we take Da Xue Zhangju 大學章句 Commentary on The Great Learning as a master piece 
of Zhu Xi’s exegetical composition, then Daxue Huowen 大學或問 Q&A concerning The 
Great Learning should be conceived as a master piece of his philosophical composition. 
Nowhere sees more clearly than in this text a systematic elucidation of the ideal pattern 
of learning Zhu Xi bears in mind, which implies the concrete standards Zhu Xi sets up 
for what he means by the orthodox Confucian learning.   
Unsurperisingly as in many other places Zhu Xi holds that the work of master Cheng 
exemplifies an ideal pattern of scholarship, which unfortunately has been deformed in 
various ways when being passed on to his disciples. By attributing the ideal to the work 
of his predecessor Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi spells out the criteria that he himself applies when 
judging the work of the preceding masters. The question of whether or not Zhu Xi’s 
remarks do justice to Cheng Yi and his disciples is another question; what we focus 
upon here is the academic standard that Zhu Xi has in mind; to be precise, what Zhu Xi 
means by a comprehensive and perfect system when attributing such an ideal pattern to 
                                                          
259 We have not seen an exclusive research on this text in the Chinese-speaking world, and despite the 
thriving of Confucianism over the last few decades in North America and in Europe, there is no English 
translation of this text so far.   
260 This question has been addressed by Chen Shaoming 陈少明 in his ‘Sishu Xitong de Lunshuo Jiegou
四书系统的论说结构 Structure of the Discourse as Presented in the System of The Four Books’, in Liu 




master Cheng. To clarify this, it is necessary to look closely at the original text and let 
Zhu Xi speak for himself.  
 ‘Master Cheng’s teaching is close to oneself without neglecting things; based 
upon the genuine capacity for praxis without forsaking the effect of the written 
words; reaches the mighty parts without ignoring the minor aspects; and probes 
into the refined without overlooking the crude.’261 
According to Zhu Xi’s observation, it is only in Cheng Yi’s system that such an ideal 
has been fully realised, because the massive structure of Cheng Yi’s thought allows 
room for ‘ji 己 self’ and ‘wu 物 things’, ‘xingshi zhishi 行事之實 capacity for praxis’ and 
‘wenzi zhigong 文字之功 the effect of the written words’, ‘da 大 the mighty’ and ‘xiao 小
the minor’, and ‘jing 精 the refined’ as well as ‘cu 粗 the crude’. In comparison, the 
doctrine of Zen Buddhism attaches too much importance to the so-called ‘self’, ‘the 
refined’ or ‘the mighty’, at the risk of neglecting the external things, of forsaking ‘the 
written words’ and of discarding ‘the minor’ or ‘the crude’.  
In his remark on Cheng Yi’s thought Zhu Xi highlights the theoretical construction 
of a system of thought as well as its significance in real life. He sums up the perfect 
nature of master Cheng’s work into four points, which are grammatically formulated in 
the same structure: ‘…without…’, and what comes before and after the word ‘without’ 
forms a contrast in meaning. The first line serves as an overall view on Cheng Yi’s 
philosophical thinking, followed in the next three sentences by some more specific 
observations. 
In the first sentence the phrase ‘qie yu ji 切於己 close to oneself’’ refers to Cheng Yi’s 
idea of ‘han yang 涵養’ (nourishing the self-nature), and ‘bu yi yu wu 不遺於物 without 
neglecting things’ pertains to the other line of his thought, ‘jin xue 进學’ (advancing the 
learning). Using the same logic, the contents of the next three sentences all refer to the 
two seemingly contrasted themes.  
The two main themes in Cheng Yi are often presented as running parallel to one 
another, but in Zhu Xi’s expression ‘qie yu ji er bu yi yu wu 切於己而不遺於物 close to 
oneself without neglecting things’ the two are fused into one. By summing up the 
outline of Cheng Yi’s thought in one sentence, Zhu Xi underlines the importance of the 
inter-dependence between the two. Seen in this light, the upholding of self-cultivation 
                                                          
261 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 49: ‘程子之說、切於己而不遺於物、本於行事之實而不廢文字之功、極其大而不畧其小、究
其精而不忽其粗。’ ZZQS, 6,529. 
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should not contradict the concern for the things in this world; likewise the achievement 
of self-realisation ought not to be based on the negation of external things. Contrariwise, 
the realisation of one’s own nature lies in probing the principles of things. So the central 
question here is how to integrate the investigation of things with the realisation of one’s 
own nature. To Zhu Xi the perfect nature of Cheng Yi’s system consists in the structure, 
which embraces both the obtaining of self-realisation and the acquisition of the 
knowledge of the things in the world.  
The two predominant themes in Cheng Yi’s thought -‘han yang 涵養’ (nourishing the 
self-nature) and ‘jin xue 进學’ (advancing the learning)- continue to occupy the centre 
of Zhu Xi’s system, but the meaning of each line has been broadened and deepened. 
More importantly Zhu Xi lays emphasis on the correlation between the two, so that they 
are presented as mutually complementing one another. Such a dialectical nature of Zhu 
Xi’s presentation characterises the originality of his thinking with reference Cheng Yi 
and other preceeding masters, and also holds the key to the sophisticated structure of 
his system.  
The complexity of Zhu Xi’s thought is mainly derived from his sustained attempt to 
overcome the idealistic stance represented by Zen Buddhism and partly shared by xin 
xue 心學 the school of mind, and in the meantime to transcend dualistic mode of thinking 
and expressing. With an intention to construct a more comprehensive system, Zhu Xi 
addresses both xin 心 mind and li 理 Principle. Although he declares that li 理 Principle 
can only be known by xin 心 mind, there seems to be an unavoidable dichotomy between 
the most fundamental concepts of his thought.262 For many the link between xin 心 mind 
                                                          
262 It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss at length Zhu Xi’s metaphysical thinking, of which the 
major part is his doctrine of li 理 Principle. A detailed elaboration on the meaning of li 理 Principle is 
found in Yu Lei 語類 Conversations Juan 1 and 2. According to what he says in this text, we may term 
his philosophy as a kind of realism with regard to his refutation of the Buddhist notion of xing kong 性空
nonsubstantiality. However, it should be noted that Zhu Xi has no intention to make li 理 a transcendent 
entity that admits of separate existence; his emphasis is rather on the commonality of it, which can be 
substantiated by his identifying li 理 Principle with xing 性 nature, so that li 理 is rooted in each particular 
thing and defines the existence of it. To apply this to the Confucian notion of human nature, Zhu Xi 
believes the four principal Confucian virtues - ren 仁 humaneness, yi 義 righteousness, li 禮 propriety and 
zhi 智 wisdom - are the embodiment of li 理 Principle in each of us. His subordinating xin 心 mind to li 理
Principle derives not from his lacking confidence in xin 心 mind, but rather from his recognition of the 
complexity involved in understanding human nature. For Zhu Xi the innate goodness of human nature 
that has been discovered by the ancient sages only indicates the ideal state; in reality the natural state of 
xin 心 mind does not always conform to li 理 Principle, hence the need to cultivate xin 心 mind. Only after 
the effort in the cultivation of xin 心 mind reaches perfection, will it be proper to identify xin 心 mind 
with li 理 Principle, or to claim the unification of the two.   
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and li 理 Principle, in practical terms xiu xin 修心 the cultivation of mind and qiong li 窮
理 the probing of Principle is problematic and needs to be substantiated.  
Zhu Xi’s solution to this problem is to quest for the dialectical relation between the 
concept of xin 心 mind and that of li 理 Principle, so as to rectify a dualistic 
understanding which simply refers xin 心 mind and li 理 Principle to the internal and 
external dimensions respectively of the Confucian learning. Question 47 sees Zhu Xi’s 
response to the typical challenge imposed upon the methodology of the Cheng-Zhu 
school.  
 Question: Your method of learning seems to be seeking truth in the visible 
traces rather than in your mind, resorting to the external instead of the internal. 
I am afraid the learning of the sages should by no means appear as superficial 
and fragmented as yours.  
Answer: What one seeks in his learning, is nothing but mind and Principle. 
Although the mind seems to serve as the commander of the body, its intelligence 
does possess the power to grasp all the principles under the Heaven in terms of 
its substance. Whereas Principle is pervading in ten thousands of things, its 
subtle and miraculous function consists in each individual mind. Thus 
fundamentally speaking, it is not appropriate to attribute the external to 
Principle and the internal to the mind, nor is it justified to classify one as the 
refined, the other as the crude. However, the one who is not aware of the 
intelligence of the mind, will under no circumstance probe the wonder of the 
principles due to the disordered and scattered condition of his mind. Should one 
fail to have a glimpse of the wonder of the principles and makes no attempt to 
probe it, one will remain stubborn and narrow-minded and the power of mind 
will never be fulfilled. Thus Principle and mind depend upon each other.  
Based on the above understanding, the sages, in establishing their teachings, 
always on the one hand lead one to be aware of the intelligence of mind, to 
preserve it in his civility, quietness, and concentration, and to take it as his 
substantial ability to probe the principles; on the other hand, lead one to believe 
the existence of the wonder of the principles, and then seek for it in intellectual 
inquiries and discussions so as to exhaust the function of the mind. In that sense, 
the explicit is contained in the implicit, the animated is nurtured in tranquillity, 
and vice versa. There is no need to initially distinguish the external from the 
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internal, or make a choice between the refined and the crude. After one 
gradually accumulates one’s efforts to a certain point, one will see the unity of 
mind and Principle and realise there is no such thing as the division between the 
internal and the external, between the refined and the crude.  
Should one insist to regard this method of learning as superficial and 
fragmented, and intend to advocate another kind of learning which is devoid of 
forms and shapes, and seems to be profound, sophisticated and inaccessible, the 
one who is to take up this kind of learning will be taught to dwell on the realm 
to which no human language can obtain access. Those who keep saying that 
‘you must seek for truth in this way so that you may get there one day’ are the 
followers of Buddhism nowadays. Such is the harm of their heretical doctrine 
that it will ruin the orthodox learning practised by the ancients whose purpose 
of learning lies only in the realisation of the enlightening virtue and in renewing 
the people. 263 
When accused of promoting a ‘qianjin 淺近 superficial’ and ‘zhili 支離 fragmented’ 
way of learning, Zhu Xi starts to disclose the subtle inter-dependence between xin 心
mind and li 理 Principle, whereby the method of the Cheng-Zhu school will be 
substantiated by the mutuality between the two, be it xin 心 mind and li 理 Principle, or 
the internal and the external. In his words, the ti 體 substance of xin 心 mind consists in 
li 理 Principle, and the yong 用 function of li 理 Principle lies in xin 心 mind. Through 
                                                          










Here Zhu Xi seems to have answered the question posed by Wang Yangming; the difference in the 
wording of the two thinkers suggests that the inter-dependence between xin zhi ti 心之體 the substance of 
the mind and li zhi yong 理之用 the function of the Principle as presented in Zhu Xi Q&A is not retained 
in Wang Yangming’s question, but is transformed into the relation between wu xin 吾心 my mind and wu 
li 物理 the principles of the particular things. This small change gives a clear indication that the subtlety 
and complexity of Zhu Xi’s discourse on xin 心 mind and li 理 Principle are not fully appreciated by a 
great Ming master like Wang Yangming.  
For the text regarding Wang Yangming’s disagreement with Zhu Xi, see Wang Yangming 王阳明, ‘Da 




二之弊。’ ‘Yaojiang Xuean 姚江學案 Anthology of Yaojiang’, in Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (ed.), Ming Ru Xue 
An 明儒學案 Anthology of the Ming Confucian Masters (2008), 1,193, Juan 10.  
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expounding the dialectical relation between the two, Zhu Xi makes it clear that the 
accusation is deeply rooted in a dualistic mentality in this regard. For those who are 
unable to outgrow a dualistic way of thinking, the methodology of the Cheng-Zhu 
school, which gives priority to the investigation of things, has diverted the attention 
from the internal to the external, hence in defiance of the Confucian tradition. So long 
as the dualistic perspective is overcome, the charge will automatically be reversed, and 
the approach advocated by the Cheng-Zhu school is thus substantiated by the dialectical 
thinking derived from Zhu Xi’s philosophy. 
In this respect the most original and innovative element of his philosophy lies in his 
redefinition of the two concepts in the formula of xin-li 心-理 mind-Principle, which 
makes it necessary to see the meaning of xin 心 mind in the light of li 理 Principle, and 
vice versa. This innovative understanding requires the effort of probing the principles 
of things to be an essential part of the cultivation of mind; likewise to probe the 
principles of things entails the necessity of cultivating the mind, and in the process of 
investigating things the faculty of the mind is revealed and polished. Thus the 
cultivation of mind and the probing of Principle ought to be integrated; in other words, 
the internal and external dimensions of the Confucian practice must be fused into one. 
That is what Zhu Xi means by the orthodox learning practised by the ancient sages 
which is in contrast to the heretical doctrine of Buddhism.   
    Apart from looking at the theoretical construction of a system of thought, Zhu Xi 
also takes into account the practical significance of a doctrine, to be precise, the 
methodology contained in a doctrine. He almost takes it for granted that so far as a 
mature and comprehensive doctrine is concerned, it will have no adverse impact upon 
the person who puts this theory into practice. On the contrary, it will serve as a perfect 
navigation in practical terms, which will lead the practitioner to perfect him or herself. 
It follows that if a certain doctrine exerts some damaging impact upon individuals or 
society, this should be deemed an embodiment of the flaw within the doctrine itself. In 
other words, the shortcoming of an imperfect theory will be brought to light once it is 
applied to reality.  
Once again Zhu Xi pushes Cheng Yi to the fore instead of directly proclaiming his 
own idea, he takes Cheng Yi’s system as an example of this kind of perfect doctrinal 
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teaching, and claim it has overcome the imperfections embedded in Zen,264 namely 
‘jingyue er liuyu kuangwang 徑約而流於狂妄 cling to simplicity and slip into arrogance 
and ignorance’, without falling into the trap of the opposite, namely ‘wubo er xianyu 
zhili 務博而陷於支離 focusing on erudition yet remaining stuck on fragmented 
opinions’.265 Therefore master Cheng’s thought is deemed the only system of thought 
that does not bring with it any detrimental effect. Unlike the two preceding forms, 
master Cheng has developed a new paradigm which, according to Zhu Xi, will liberate 
the mind of a learner from the aforementioned mistakes. In addition, Zhu Xi makes the 
point that master Cheng’s teaching envisages a perfect combination of the process of 
gradual accumulation with a sudden breakthrough, which allows one to go beyond the 
fragmented opinions of the specific parts and acquire an intuitive understanding of the 
whole picture.  
    By inserting the experience of a sudden breakthrough into the process of gradual 
accumulation, Zhu Xi once again affirms the orthodoxy of the kind of learning 
conducted by the Cheng-Zhu school and distinguishes it from learning for the sake of 
others. He clarifies this point in Q&A (No.50) where Zhu Xi intentionally differentiates 
what he means by being engaged in the investigation of things and extension of 
knowledge from the sheer pursuit of erudition. 266  It follows that the intellective 
                                                          
264 Zhu Xi’s criticism of Zen does not cover the whole picture of Zen Buddhism in China, which is much 
more complicated than Zhu’s work suggests. Basically, Zhu Xi maintains a focus on the negative stance 
towards language that some Zen masters stress in their teaching. One remarkable exception to this view 
is the movement of ‘wenzi chan 文字禪 text Zen’, which occurred in the Song from the early 11th century 
to the second half of the 12th century. This short-lived movement was followed by ‘kanhua chan 看話禪
meditation on a word or phrase’ and ‘mozhao chan 默照禪 meditation on silent illumination’; the former 
was established by Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲 (1089-1163) and the latter by Hongzhi Zhengjue 宏智正覺 
(1091-1157). Zhu Xi’s sympathetic understanding of Zen Buddhism is probably derived from his 
engagement with the line of ‘kanhua chan 看話禪 meditation on a word or phrase’, and what he loathes 
most may allude to the influence of ‘mozhao chan 默照禪 meditation on silent illumination’. Although 
Zhu Xi has made sufficient room for a positive view of language both in its nature and in its effects, 
unfortunately we fail to find a documentary testimony to his acknowledgement of the historical 
significance of ‘wenzi chan 文字禪 text Zen’. For an in-depth analysis of ‘wenzi chan 文字禪 text Zen’, see 
Gong Jun 龚隽, Chanshi Gouchen-yi Wenti wei Zhongxin de Sixiangshi Lunshu 禅史沟沉-以问题为中心的思
想史论述 Theses on the History of Ch’an/Zen Buddhism-a Question-Focused Interpretation and Analysis 
of its Intellectual Fabric (Beijing, 2006), 295-329. 
265 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 49, ZZQS, 6,529-32. 
266 Ibid. No. 50: ‘曰、然則所謂格物致知之學、與世之所謂博物洽聞者奚以異。曰、此以反身窮理爲主、而必究其本
末是非之極摯。彼以徇外誇多爲務、而不覈其表裏眞妄之實然。必究其極。是以知愈博而心愈明。不覈其實。是以識
愈多而心愈窒。此正爲己爲人之所以分、不可不察也。’ ZZQS, 6,532. 
Question: However what is the difference between an erudite who is highly knowledgeable about things 
and current affairs and the one who is engaged in the so-called investigation of things and extension of 
knowledge? 
Answer: One aims to reflect upon oneself and to exhaust the Principle, which entails the necessity of an 
inquiry into the root and the branches, the right and the wrong to the utmost. The other is exposing 
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operation of probing the principles of things should be classified as the genuine learning, 
namely learning for one’s own sake. In that sense, the whole enterprise of gewu zhizhi 
格物致知  the investigation of things and extension of knowledge is to be oriented 
towards enhancing the personal cultivation of the learner; thus learning leads to self-
realisation. 
To Zhu Xi this seemingly innovative conception of learning does not deviate from 
the Confucian tradition; on the contrary it is derived from the teaching of the sages and 
can be substantiated by it as quoted above in Question 47. To him the mutuality between 
xiu xin 修心 the cultivation of mind and qiong li 窮理 the probing of Principle has always 
been addressed by the ancient sages; he merely picks up this point and spells it out. He 
thus makes it clear that only by putting this methodology into practice will one be able 
to obtain a genuine knowledge as to the unity of xin 心 mind and li 理 Principle, the 
internal and the external. In that sense, the method that leads to a thorough 
understanding of the words of the ancient sages is of primary importance, because 
without following a proper method it is impossible to appropriate the meaning of 
scriptures, and without a personal appropriation the message of the ancient sages 
mediated by scriptures will remain a bare expression, an empty and abstract proposition 
of other people’s idea, and will hardly exert an impact on one’s life.  
 
1.3.2.2 Implications of Zhu Xi’s thought 
Based on the above analysis of Zhu Xi’s work on Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, we 
now come to the point of having an overall view of Zhu Xi’s intellectual heritage. For 
that purpose we will only focus on the peculiarity of his philosophy and see what 
implications can be drawn from it. On this regard two relevant issues come to the fore: 
the dialectical mode of thinking and expressing as presented in Q&A, and the crucial 
importance that Zhu Xi particularly attaches to his methodology. Put it simply, the 
dialectical way of thinking enables Zhu Xi to integrate both li 理 Principle and xin 心
mind in one system and even make them to be interdependent, in that sense Zhu Xi 
                                                          
himself to the external things and is occupied in boasting about his eruditeness, thus overlooks the effort 
in checking the authenticity of things he has learned, be it concerning the internal or the external, the 
truth or the illusion. If one takes it as necessary to carry out the investigation to the utmost, it will be the 
case that the more knowledge he obtains, the more illuminated his mind will become. If one fails to check 
the authenticity of what he has learned, he will be in the situation that the more he knows, the more 
narrow-minded he becomes. That is the distinction between the learning for one’s own sake and the 
learning for the sake of others, which one ought to be fully aware of.   
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refuses to speak of li 理 Principle as an entity of mind-free, nor does he find it 
appropriate to speak of xin 心 mind as being totally devoid of things. 267  Owing to the 
significant role that Zhu Xi allows for his methodology the concephs of li 理 Principle 
and xin 心 mind are then to be embedded in a more fundamental quest for the orthodox 
Confucian way of scriptural learning and self-cultivation, as thus formulated typically 
in his Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement, hence philosophical speculation serves practical 
purposes, and becomes an integral part of his methodology after all.   
    To disclose the typical mode of thinking and expressing of the Song literati as a 
whole, we need first to look at the basic vocabulary they share in their debate and 
discussion. The work of Zhu Xi, the most versatile writer of the time, provides us with 
an exemplar of the glossary pertaining to the scholarship of the Song masters. In Q&A 
this glossary is intensively unfolded, especially in Question 49 when Zhu Xi highlights 
the specific defective points in each of the prominent disciples of master Cheng. The 
glossary employed by Zhu Xi in formulating his critical comments suggests a kind of 
symmetry and balance, which is basic to the structure of the philosophical debate. In 
the context of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song the striving for such a symmetrical 
structure seems to be highly regarded. Zhu Xi’s reasoning on this account could 
possibly make sense even to those of his counterparts who fundamentally disagree with 
him over the methodology of scriptural learning and personal cultivation.  
A glance at the following glossary may help to illustrate the structure of Zhu Xi’s 
argument.  
 
yi 一 one  duo 多 many   
 tong 同 similarity    yi 異 difference 
 nei 內 internal  wai 外 external   
ji 己 self   wu 物 things 
jing 精 refined   cu 粗 crude 
ben 本 essential mo 末 incidental 
yue 約 simplicity   bo 博 complexity 
chijing 持敬 holding fast to 
conscientiousness 
guanli 觀理 observing the principles   
                                                          
267 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 47: ‘人之所以爲學、心與理而已矣。心雖主乎一身、而其體之虛靈足以管乎天下之理。理雖
散在萬物、而其用之微妙實不外乎一人之心、初不可以内外精粗而論也。’ ZZQS, 6,528. 
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zhizhi 致知 the extension of knowledge   gewu 格物 the  investigation of things  
Zhizhi 知至 the state when knowledge has 
been extended 
wuge 物格 the state when things have 
been investigated   
guantong 貫通 thorough comprehension jilei 積累 gradual accumulation 
 
The glossary listed above gives a sketch of Zhu Xi’s argument. With the aid of an 
intellectual grasp of the dialectical relation between each pair of the concepts as 
illustrated in the two columns, Zhu Xi presents an in-depth analysis of master Cheng’s 
revolutionary interpretation of gewu 格物 the investigation of things as qiongli 窮理
probing the Principle. In the course of refuting and criticising the widespread views of 
some eminent scholars who have enjoyed a high level of authority and publicity, Zhu 
Xi sharpens the respective questions and pinpoints some of those subtle and implicit 
fallacies which are not easily to be discerned.   
For instance, when referring to Lü Lantian,268 one of the most renowned disciples of 
Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi points out that Lü has failed to comprehend what master Cheng 
means by qiongli 窮理 probing of the Principle, as he mistakenly refers li 理 Principle 
to the external things; thus his understanding overlooks another dimension of this 
concept which lies in oneself, or put another way, in the person who carries out the 
conduct of qiongli 窮理 probing the Principle. He sums up the problem of Lü’s theory 
as follows: 
    Here when the necessity of probing the principles of the ten thousand things 
is stressed, it exclusively refers to the external things, thus the intrinsic principle 
lying in oneself is not being illuminated. It merely focuses on the analogical 
similarities of the multitude of things, yet fails to examine the distinctive nature 
and attribute of each individual thing, thus the delicacy and subtlety of the 
Principle is to be somehow neglected. It wants no difference yet cannot be free 
from the differences within the four theories 269 ; intends to drive all into 
similarity yet fails to attain the oneness of the same origin. Hence it is simply a 
futile attempt to forge farfetched interpretation without glimpsing the beauty of 
                                                          
268 For a brief introduction to Lü’s teaching, see ‘Lü Fan Zhu Ru Xue An 呂范諸儒學案 Anthology of Lü, 
Fan and Other Confucian Masters’, in Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 and Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (eds.), Song-Yuan 
Xue An 宋元學案 Anthology of Song-Yuan Confucianism (1986), 2,1105-13, Juan 31.  
269 These probably refer to the thoughts developed by the four renowned disciples of the Cheng brothers, 
among whom Lü is the last; the other three are Xie Shangcai 謝上蔡, You Cu 遊酢, and Yang Shi 楊時. 
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a thorough understanding of all. What do you think of it in comparison with 
master Cheng’s teaching? 270 
As li 理 Principle pertains both to the external (wu 物 things) and to the internal (ji 己
self), the manifestation of li 理 Principle ranges from the crudest to the most refined. So 
li 理 Principle stands for the same one source from which all things originate. If one 
embarks upon the philosophical quest for the similarities between the multitudes, this 
quest should never cease until it reaches the ultimate, undifferentiated one. In this 
respect, Lü clearly falls short of Zhu Xi’s expectations. On the other hand, Zhu Xi 
makes it clear that the pursuit of the state of oneness cannot take place without a 
thorough inquiry into the distinction of individual things; without knowing the 
difference and distinction, an expression of the oneness barely holds truth. This is 
another area in which Lü exhibits a profound deficiency in assimilating his master’s 
idea. 
In the same manner, Zhu Xi scrutinises the various systems developed by master 
Cheng’s disciples as regards Cheng’s innovative interpretation of gewu 格物 the 
investigation of things. Through logical inference Zhu Xi draws our attention to the 
subtle distance between a master and a disciple. In each case Zhu Xi manages to put his 
finger on the exact cause of the deviation. Although each of the disciples deviates from 
the original thinking of master Cheng at a specific point, they all miss the subtle balance, 
or the invisible symmetry, that exists in the structure of master Cheng’s system. The 
key to that perfect balance lies only in the ability of dialectical thinking, which cannot 
be easily passed on from a master to a disciple. On the contrary, it must stem from the 
self-realisation occurring within the innermost depth of each individual’s mind.  
It follows that the thought of a person is the very embodiment of his level of 
consciousness, or to put it in Confucian terms, the extent to which he has realised his 
innate heavenly nature. Conforming to this typical mentality of the Song Confucian 
learners, it is justified to deem the deficiency of a system of thought an indication of 
the author’s immaturity in self-realisation. When Zhu Xi applies this rule to each of 
master Cheng’s disciples, it becomes clear that none of them is capable of receiving the 
system of master Cheng’s thought in its entirety. In so doing, Zhu Xi unveils the simple 
fact that master Cheng’s idea has far exceeded what his disciples’ minds can possibly 
                                                          
270
 Zhu Xi, DXHW No. 49: ‘然其欲必窮萬物之理而專指外物、則於理之在己者有不明矣。但求衆物比類之同、而
不究一物性情之異、則於理之精微者有不察矣。不欲其異而不免乎四說之異、必欲其同而未極乎一原之同、則徒有牽
合之勞、而不睹貫通之妙矣。其於程子之說何如哉。’ ZZQS, 6,528. 
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allow for. Thus the ingenious solution offered by master Cheng is inevitably reduced 
and diluted in the hands of his disciples. 
To complete the task of understanding a great master like Cheng Yi, one must first 
prepare oneself to do so. In other words, one needs to possess the ability of discernment 
in order to appreciate his idea. But on the other hand, the ability to appreciate a work 
of art or to understand an idea cannot be developed without the act of understanding. 
Thus the inner capacity is to be nourished and expanded through applying it to the 
external objects, and clearly it will not grow on the basis of separating itself from the 
outside world.  
On that account, gewu格物 the investigation of things acquires a twofold significance: 
in the process of questing for the principle of a thing, the inner capacity of the person 
who performs the quest is evolving. The two dimensions form a circle that drives one 
to ceaselessly deepen and broaden one’s understanding of the world and oneself. It is 
this dialectical relation between the external and internal dimensions involved in gewu
格物 the investigation of things that constitutes the core of the methodology of the 
Cheng-Zhu school. 
    Focusing on an innovative interpretation of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, in 
particular of the key phrase ‘gewu 格物 the investigation of thing’, a new methodology 
comes into fashion within the circle of the Cheng-Zhu school. The central theme of this 
methodology is defined by both Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi as the way of qiongli 窮理 probing 
the Principle, which in the context of Cheng-Zhu means that the entire enterprise of 
scriptural learning and personal cultivation is aimed at acquiring a genuine knowledge 
of li 理 Principle. Thus the role of the concept of li 理 Principle is twofold: as a premise 
before one embarks upon the investigation of things and as an end after things are 
investigated. Philosophically speaking li 理 Principle constitutes an ontological ground 
for the operation of qiongli 窮理 probing the Principle; and the operation of qiongli 窮
理 probing the Principle in turn enriches the ontological ground from which it originates.  
Thus arises the question: how does the principle of a particular thing relate to the one 
Principle that embraces all? The answer consists in the doctrine of li yi fen shu 理一分
殊 one Principle with diverse manifestations. The relation of one to many had long been 
discussed by the two Chinese Buddhist schools, Hua Yan and Zen.271 The Confucian 
                                                          
271 In his early years Zhu Xi had learned Buddhism and was once fascinated by Zen, as seen in ZZYL, 
Juan 104. For a detailed exploration of this issue, see Chen Lai 陈来, Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu 朱子哲学研究 A 
Study of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy (2008), 28-35. 
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version of the question is seen first in Cheng Yi, who puts forward the proposition of li 
yi fen shu 理一分殊 one Principle with diverse manifestations when discussing Zhang 
Zai’s Ximing 西銘 The West Script with his disciple Yang Shi. 272  Evidently this 
philosophical question had captivated Zhu Xi, and seemed to have taken him years to 
think it through. Like Yangshi, Zhu Xi also brought this knotty question to his tutor Li 
Tong. In his short response, Li makes it clear that no Confucian learner can afford 
neglecting the diverse manifestations of li 理 Principle. 273 Thinking in the same line, 
Zhu Xi maintains that ‘all things are endowed with this li 理 Principle, and all the 
principles share one origin. Because each principle takes a distinctive status, thus each 
fulfils a different function.’274 The doctrine of gewu 格物 the investigation of things 
clearly gives priority to the pursuit of the diverse manifestations of the one li理Principle, 
instead of questing for the one li 理 Principle directly.  
Throughout his long intellectual career Zhu Xi does not seem to have concerned 
himself with a system of ontological inquiry around the concept of li 理 Principle; his 
focus is rather on formulating a new methodology through which the ontological truth 
will naturally be brought to light.  
The reason for his privileging a reform in methodology is worth pondering. Instead 
of deducing a system of ontology from the concept of li 理 Principle, Zhu Xi has 
developed a systematic methodology that leads to the apprehension of li 理 Principle. 
This is because, being bound together with the effort of gewu 格物 the investigation of 
things, the concept of li 理 Principle in Zhu Xi’s system will by no means indicate an 
abstract reality whose autonomous and absolute objectivity is beyond the realm of 
human understanding; on the contrary, the subjective condition of an intelligent being 
should always be taken into account as far as the truthful nature of li 理 Principle is 
concerned. In this way the methodology acquires a new significance in the sense that it 
becomes the very means to reveal the ontological meaning of li 理 Principle. Once the 
ontological meaning of li 理 Principle is realised in the Confucian text, this realisation 
will constitute an ontological foundation for the Confucian values and conventions. In 
providing classical Confucianism with an ontological basis, the master mind of the Neo-
                                                          
272 Cheng yi, ‘Henan Chengshi Wenji 河南程氏文集 Literary Work of the Two Cheng Masters’, Juan 9, Er 
Cheng Ji 二程集 Works of the Two Chengs (1981), 2,609. 
273 Zhu Xi, ‘Yanping Li Xiansheng Shidizi Dawen 延平李先生师弟子答问 Master Li Yanping’s 
Answers to the Questions of the Disciples’, ZZQS, 13,335-6.  




Confucian movement in the Song has accomplished the reconstruction project initiated 
by his predecessor.  
At the end of this chapter, we try to rephrase Zhu Xi’s philosophical idea in a 
language with which we may feel more at home.  
By the words ‘gewu 格物 the investigation of things’ Zhu Xi means the quest for the 
principles of particular things through an orderly, systematised, universally applicable 
procedure in a concrete personal life. He thereby assigns mankind the task of 
ascertaining truth by the virtue of the human intellect. Here truth does not refer to an 
abstract concept which is prior to the existence of the concrete things, and it by no 
means intermingles with them; nor does it imply a set of universals conjured up in the 
mind. To Zhu Xi truth is but li 理 Principle that runs through all, without discrimination, 
and the same li 理 Principle is to be manifested through the principle of every single 
particular thing, which is of intrinsic value and bears its own distinctive character.  
On that account, the quest for truth is the quest for li 理 Principle; the quest for the li
理 Principle must commence with the investigation of the particular things; and each 
particular thing has a distinctive existence whose principle awaits investigation 
stemming from its own merit.  
Although Zhu Xi’s doctrine is not grounded entirely on the subject-object dichotomy, 
for the sake of convenience we temporarily adopt the terms subject and object in order 
to paraphrase his thought in philosophical terms that are familiar to us. Generally 
speaking, the one who conducts the investigation is the subject and the thing that is 
investigated is the object. Presumably the distinction between subject and object is 
prerequisite to an operation whose objective is the intrinsic principle of a particular 
thing, which can only be grasped intellectually. The subject, in this case, seems to be 
reduced to a pure intellectual power which thrusts the principle of a thing out of its 
preceding dormant state and brings it to light. In the process of the principle in the 
object proceeding from an implicit substance to an explicit expression, the intellective 
power in the subject is also evolving from potentiality to reality. The object is 
influenced by the subject in the sense of being illuminated by the intellective light of 
the subject, while the subject is affected by the object to exactly the same extent, in the 
sense of exerting its intellective power in proportion to the complexity of the object. In 
other words, the subject opens itself up to the object just as much as the object is 
illuminated by the light of the subject. Thus the subject and the object, in the act of 
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knowing, are integrated into one; likewise the external is no longer alienated from the 
internal, and the self is not segregated from the things, irrespective of the distinction 
between one and another.  
When the things are thus investigated, the knowledge that embraces unity of the 
external and the internal will then be obtained. This is knowledge in the real sense, 
which is nothing like a gift granted by the divine but rather the fruit derived from a 
long-term accumulation of man’s persistent intellective operation. Therefore the 
acquisition of knowledge entails a process of gradual accumulation and a sudden 
breakthrough which serves as an end.  
Hence the idea of gradual accumulation implies not only a quantitative increase, but 
more importantly a qualitative leap which puts a halt to the succession. Undoubtedly 
there are gradations consisting in the development of knowledge, which commences 
from a general proposition concerning the unity of the external and the internal, through 
the differentiated phases that give rise to the distinctive expressions of the particulars, 
and finally culminates in a genuine understanding of the unity of all.  
Therefore the appropriation of a genuine knowledge as to the unity of the external 
and the internal embraces a conclusive result as well as the process through which this 
result is accomplished. Thus both the end and the means should be taken into account. 
A bare expression of the end does not make sense without a full exposition of the means; 
once the importance of the means comes to the fore, the requirement will arise for 
clarity and definition in thinking and expressing.   
To summarise, an internal realisation that does not integrate within itself the content 
of the external is no more than a bare esoteric doctrine, which will by no means be 





Chapter 2 The Notion of the Human Intellect and Intellectualism as 
Presented in Eckhart’s Hermeneutical Framework  
 
Introduction 
The notion of the human intellect lies at the heart of Eckhart’s philosophical and 
theological thought. His innovative and thorough exposition of this concept 
demonstrates a new way of thinking and expressing in the medieval scholastic tradition, 
which never fails to stimulate his reader and audience. As will be shown in more detail, 
to Eckhart the human intellect serves as the juncture of the two contrary spheres: the 
intellectual and the corporeal. Cosmologically speaking, it sits at the bottom of the 
intellectual domain, while also standing at the top of the corporeal world. The role of 
the human intellect, therefore, is twofold. On the one hand, it is open to and has power 
over the senses and desires, which are inferior to the intellect; on the other hand, it gazes 
upon the pure intellectual world, which is superior to man’s intellect. The former 
pertains to the intellective operations such as discursive reasoning and conceptualising, 
which are based on the data that the senses have collected in dealing with the particular 
things in the world. In its opening to the external world the human intellect exercises 
its faculty at the level of human cognition; in that sense, intellective operation is 
equivalent to cognitive conduct and the human intellect is another word for human 
reason. However, the ability to reason is far from exhausting the power of the human 
intellect. When it comes to the relation to its superior, namely the pure intellectual or 
the divine sphere, intellect has to exceed rationality and functions purely as a passive 
recipient.  
Clearly Eckhart allows human reasoning to be enclosed in man’s intellective 
operation, but reasoning is not the major function of the intellect.275 The main role of 
man’s intellect, according to Eckhart, lies in its potentiality for a perfect reception of 
the divine, in the sense that its incorporeality and formlessness allows all the ideas 
conceived in the divine mind to be received by the human mind in an undistorted 
                                                          
275 Boethius makes a distinction between reason and intellect (Consolation of Philosophy, iv, 6). He 
regards intellect as the power that is proper to eternity and reason as proper to time. ‘Philosophy explains 
that God's divine intelligence can view all things from its eternal mind, while human reason can only see 
them from a temporal point of view.’ Thomas refutes such a distinction in Summa Theol. I, q.79, a.8 and 
explains in a.10 that ‘Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the 
act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence 
alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.’ Eckhart’s 
stance seems to be closer to that of Boethius.  
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manner. In receiving the ideas conceived in the divine mind, the human intellect has 
grasped the being (esse) of the things in the world, as the idea in the divine is the being 
(esse) of the particular thing. In other words, the existence of this or that thing is always 
held in the divine. Eckhart does take account of Aristotelian empiricism, but shows no 
intention to depict man’s intellective operation on an empirical platform.276   
It is very clear that Eckhart focuses his attention on the receptive manner of man’s 
intellective faculty, which distinguishes his thought from that of Thomas Aquinas, who 
depicts man’s intellect mainly as an active agent.277  
As the human intellect is able to function at different levels and thus can be described 
in different terms, the approach to this issue spans from philosophy to theology in a 
broader sense that encompasses issues concerning cosmology, epistemology, ontology, 
psychology and spirituality. Despite the complexity of this topic, Eckhart’s inquiry into 
the human intellect centres on its relation to the divine. That allows him to graft his 
philosophical thinking onto the Christian theological tradition. His expounding of the 
human intellect gives rise to a type of intellectualism that is interwoven with theological 
and spiritual matters, as the receptive stance of the intellect shares common ground with 
the detached mind, and the perfect reception achieved by the intellect illustrates what 
Eckhart means by detachment. Eckhart believes that it is only on the ground of a 
detached mind that the Word will speak afresh and the Son be born anew. Hence the 
power of the human intellect runs deep into the spiritual world and fundamentally 
defines the meaning of spiritual practice.    
Eckhart allows himself to wrestle with the same idea persistently throughout his 
academic career. In that sense, it is justified to regard him as a systematic thinker.278 
However, he does not attempt to formulate his personal thought in the form of 
systematic discourse as a modern philosopher or theologian would normally do, nor 
                                                          
276 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.84, a.7. Thomas explains why, in us, the act of intellect is not separated 
from phantasm. ‘In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible 
for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.’ 
277 Thomas expounds his view of the human intellect in detail in Summa Theol., I, q. 79.  This question 
contains 13 articles; in article 3 Thomas argues: ‘On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 
5), that "it is necessary for these differences", namely, the passive and active intellect, "to be in the soul". 
The same argumentation appears in q.54, a.4 where Thomas reasserts the necessity for the distinction of 
the passive and active intellect in us.  
278 For example, Bernard McGinn highlights this aspect when he discusses Eckhart’s doctrine of God 
and its relation to Neoplatonism. McGinn writes: ‘Along with John the Scot and Nicholas of Cusa, 
Eckhart is arguably the most systematic of the Latin Neoplatonic dialecticians, and he is the one who 
suffered the most for it.’ See Bernard McGinn, ‘Meister Eckhart on God as Absolute Unity’, in Dominic 
J. O’Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, Studies in Neoplatonism 3 (Albany, 1982), 129.  
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does he complete a comprehensive systematic Summa as we find it in Thomas Aquinas 
for example, or even in the Sentences of Peter Lombard. He assigns himself a rather 
different task, which is to untie the most intriguing theoretical knots that continued to 
puzzle the most capable theologians of his day. His solution is fundamentally a 
systematic if not a circular one, which combines questions and commentaries with the 
propositions that serve as the hermeneutical key279 to any explanation of questions and 
any reading of scripture, while he adds that for him the propositions and questions ‘will 
be found to be clearly confirmed by the truth and authority of sacred scripture itself or 
some of the saints and illustrious masters’.280 This not only shows the inter-relation 
between his intellectual and hermeneutical approach, but also demonstrates that rational 
arguments of the propositions serve as the basis for solving problems and unravelling 
scriptural sense, while at the same time scripture and the learned tradition confirm what 
he has assumed in his propositions. The wording itself (basis–confirmation) indicates, 
however, that at least hermeneutically, Eckhart starts with the propositions. So, despite 
his methodological circularity, understanding in Eckhart has a clear direction from 
rationality to the reading of scripture and tradition. His personal thoughts are, therefore, 
both argumentative and unfolded entirely through a dialogue with the scriptural texts, 
of both the Old and New Testaments, and with intellectual masters of the philosophical 
and theological tradition. It is a process in which he poses his own intellectual questions 
first, and then brings them together with scripture and tradition, while at the same time 
he is pressed by questions arising from scripture itself and from the present and past 
masters and students. Clearly his thought is proceeding through a dialogue, not a 
monologue, and yet already the directed process of his hermeneutics shows that his own 
intellectual questioning forms the start of understanding.  
                                                          
279  Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum n.11 (LW I 1, 156,4-7): ‘Tertio et ultimo est 
praenotandum quod opus secundum, similiter et tertium sic dependet a primo opere, scilicet 
propositionum, quod sine ipso sunt parvae utilitatis, eo quod quaestionum declarationes et auctoritatum 
expositiones plerumque fundantur supra aliquam propositionum.’  
‘Finally, it should be noted beforehand that the second Book, and so too the third, are so dependent on 
the first, namely the Book of Propositions, that without it they are of little use, because the explanations 
of questions and the commentaries on [Scriptural] texts are usually based on one of the propositions.’ 
(Trans. Armand A. Maurer in Meister Eckhart:  Parisian Questions and Prologues, Toronto, 1974, 85; 
abridged as Parisian Questions and Prologues in the following footnotes.) 
280 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum, n.7 (LW I 1, 152,3-7): ‘Advertendum autem est 
quod nonnulla in sequentibus propositionibus, quaestionibus et expositionibus primo aspectu monstruosa, 
dubia aut falsa apparebunt, secus autem si sollerter et studiosius pertractentur. Luculenter enim invenietur 
dictis attestari veritas et auctoritas ipsius sacri canonis seu alicuius sanctorum aut doctorum famosorum.’ 
(Trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 82.) 
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Eckhart’s dialogue with the sacred texts takes various literary forms, mainly 
quaestiones, commentaries and homilies. These three constitute a hermeneutical 
framework within which Eckhart’s innovative or even provocative ideas are backed up 
by the scriptural text, and sometimes reinforced by further logical inference based on 
syllogisms. It seems to be a norm in the medieval scholastic context that one’s personal 
thought ought to be justified by the sacred scripture and further reinforced by the 
teachings of the saints and past masters. 281  With the overwhelmingly abundant 
philosophical influx from the Arabic world, 282  Aristotle and Neoplatonic writers 
become further sources of authority and inspiration. When the philosophical resources 
are at a Christian scholar’s disposal, his dialogue with the scripture will be refreshed. 
As a result, an original interpretation of scripture will emerge, in which Aristotelian and 
Neoplatonic ideas and Christian doctrines are fused. Eckhart’s scriptural commentaries 
and questions are written mainly in the typical scholastic Latin (Aristotelian and 
Neoplatonic vocabularies), and his homilies are delivered in both Latin and Middle 
High German.  
It is worth noting that as a scholastic theologian, Eckhart considers it an obligation 
to enrich the Christian faith with the newly discovered philosophical sources. This 
means that obscurity arising from the scriptural texts should be clarified, controversial 
and contradictory interpretations given by the previous masters should be questioned 
and discussed, and the Christian doctrines ought not to be treated as esoteric revelation, 
but demonstrated as verifiable truth. Despite the innovative feature of his thinking, it 
will do little justice to Eckhart if we take him as one who intends a free demonstration 
of his personal thought. What he attempts in his own scriptural interpretation is to 
present a sophisticated philosophical/theological dialogue with the sacred text and with 
previous masters’ commentaries, as well as with the exotic philosophy beyond 
Christian tradition.  
Taking both the thought and the expression into account, this chapter will proceed in 
the order of the three genres, quaestio, commentary and homily, to explore Eckhart’s 
way of understanding the human intellect in relation to his hermeneutics. 
 
 
                                                          
281 See Markus Vinzent, Meister Eckhart, On the Lord’s Prayer (Leuven, 2012), 81-97. 
282 See Kurt Flasch, Meister Eckhart: die Geburt der ‘Deutschen Mystik’ aus dem Geist der arabischen 
Philosophie (The Birth of the ‘German Mysticism’ in the Spirit of Arabic Philosophy) (München, 2006). 
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2.1 Eckhart the Philosopher: Prioritising the Intellect through Quaestiones  
Following the medieval scholastic tradition, Eckhart presents his thinking in the form 
of quaestiones. While others may have been lost, we have access to the few that have 
been preserved: his Parisian Questions (five published by Martin Grabmann and 
translated into English by Armand A. Maurer, four rediscovered and translated by 
Markus Vinzent, and one newly re-discovered by Professor Senner).283 In this series of 
Disputed Questions, Eckhart explicitly gives priority to intellect and knowing – the act 
of intellect. We will first look at the structure and function of a quaestio as a literary 
form in the context of medieval scholastic theology, and then explore Eckhart’s thought 
with regard to intellect.  
 
2.1.1 Quaestiones as the Trademark of Scholasticism 
From the hermeneutical point of view, the form of a quaestio – although itself an older 
literary genre (especially in the form of Questions and Answers literature) – marked a 
new approach to theology and became the typical expression of speculative theology at 
the culmination of the scholastic movement. 284  Despite the fact that theological 
questioning was intensively philosophised, the scholastic quaestiones were 
nevertheless closely tied up with scriptural learning of the day, in the sense that those 
quaestiones proposed by the masters of theology at the University of Paris were also 
derived from their long-term wrestling with the scriptural texts.  
Thus the quaestio, already known in patristic times,285 had come to the fore as one 
of the literary forms in which scholarship developed topics across the disciplines. It had 
become embedded in the longstanding scholarly tradition of Christian theology, the 
basis and foundation of which has always been the Holy Scripture upon which 
theological speculations have been built. Historically speaking, the form of the quaestio 
                                                          
283 For details, see Markus Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attibutes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian 
Questions of Meister Eckhart’, The Journal of Theological Studies 63 (April 2012), 156-86. 
284 Jacqueline Hamesse’s study offers a comprehensive account of quaestiones quodlibetales, which 
covers the origins, the characteristics, and the evolution and demise of the genre. For details, see 
Jacqueline Hamesse, ‘Theological Quaestiones Quodlibetales’, in: Christopher Schabel (ed.), 
Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century (Leiden and Boston, 2006), 17-48. 
285 For instance, with Philo of Alexandria, the question and answer genre is turned to the exegesis of the 
Bible. He composed two works of this kind: Questions and Answers on Genesis and Questions and 
Answers on Exodus. Following his example, Christian expositors of the Bible, both orthodox and 
heretical, produced similar works. There are for example The Antitheses of Marcion, The Syllogisms of 
Apelles, Gospel Questions and Solutions of Eusebius of Caesarea, Questions on the Old and New 
Testament of Ambrosiaster, Questions on the Hebrew Text of Genesis of St. Jerome, and Eighty-three 
Different Questions of St. Augustine.  
126 
 
was in direct liaison with the new method of teaching that thrived at the beginning of 
the 13th century in the recently established faculty of theology. The emergence of the 
university (universitas) brought about this new method, namely disputations, in addition 
to the traditional method of the lecture, which should be understood in its etymological 
meaning of ‘reading’. 286  Following the traditional way, a master of theology was 
expected literally to ‘read’ some prescribed texts before the students and then to give 
appropriate explanations. The theological training at the time was largely defined by 
the systematic approach demonstrated by Peter Lombard in his compilation of the Four 
Books of Sentences, which served for centuries as the textbook for the students in the 
faculty of theology. The originality of Lombard was mainly expressed through the 
orderly division and structure of the Sentences, in which the patristic doctrines are 
arranged into a coherent system. Overall Lombard’s Sentences provided the framework 
for the forthcoming theological and philosophical discussions, to be precise, 
disputations.   
The disputations can be divided into two types, according to the way they were 
performed. If a question was set up by the master himself and was thoroughly discussed 
in the class between the master and his students, the solution would result in a disputed 
question if written by the master himself, or the report of a disputed question if noted 
down by someone else. But the academic disputations were not necessarily confined to 
the classroom; they could also be performed in public. In the case of a public dispute 
anybody could submit a question on any subject, hence the name ‘quodlibetal  question’. 
The method of disputation pushed the activity of questioning to the very centre of 
theological study, and the quaestio became the genre proper to speculative theology. 
The quaestio structure, according to the observation made by William J. Courtenay, 
provided the means for pursuing intellectual interests through the theological problems 
posed by Lombard.287 The sophisticated treatment of the doctrinal controversy by a 
scholastic theologian is often preserved in his Quaestiones Disputatae, as typically seen 
in Thomas. 288  When a thesis concerning a controversial Christian doctrine was 
proposed in the form of a disputed question, theological study was inevitably 
                                                          
286 Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955), 246. 
287 William J. Courtenay, ‘The Bible in the Fourteenth Century: Some Observations’, Church History 54 
(1985) 176-87.  
288  Thomas composed a series of Quaestiones Disputatae including De spiritualibus creaturis, De 
Unione Verbi Incarnati, De veritate, De potentia, De anima, De malo, De virtutibus and Quodlibetales. 
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philosophised to a certain degree, or at least logically structured according to reason. In 
the second half of the 13th century – the golden age of scholasticism, which saw a 
systematic and comprehensive introduction of Aristotle’s work into the Latin world289 
– a noteworthy Neoplatonic element was also included in the Aristotelian influx.290 A 
belief developed that faith which was proclaimed in the church could and should be 
verified by natural reason. The call for a philosophical elucidation of Christian doctrine 
became louder than ever within Christendom, and this gave rise to a hybrid of 
philosophy and theology in the sense that a theological topic was heatedly debated in 
philosophical terms. The philosophising form of theology was often expressed through 
the structure of quaestio.291 
In the context of the medieval scholastic movement, the quaestio was widely adopted 
and became the favourite literary form of speculative theology. To a scholastic 
theologian, the quaestio offers a method to fulfil a fervent passion for knowledge and 
an aspiration for a rationalised expression of Christian faith. Furthermore, leaving aside 
the theological content of the disputed questions formulated in the Middle Ages, the 
‘question’ form itself deserves particular attention, as it holds the power to trigger 
original thinking, and in general lends itself to genuine thinking. It is impossible to rise 
above the conventional mode of thinking without the activity of questioning, while 
questioning often pushes the speaker to go beyond repetition of the old masters. From 
Gadamer’s point of view,292 in its openness to multiple solutions the question reveals a 
unique logical form. Whenever a question is asked, it automatically entails the kind of 
                                                          
289 According to the study of B.B. Price, from the early thirteenth century about 55 different books 
attributed to Aristotle were available for study in the Latin West. The logical works of Aristotle were 
circulated as the core of the ‘New Logic’ corpus. Aristotle’s works provided a collection of texts 
irresistible to the medieval university, such that their incorporation would permanently alter the scope of 
education. See B.B. Price, Medieval Thought: an introduction (Oxford and ambridge MA, 1992), 80-3.  
Price also gives a list of these books (80-1), quoted from Bernard G. Dod, ‘Aristoteles latinus’, in Norman 
Kretzmann (ed.), Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle 
to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600, (Cambridge, 1982), 51.  
290 David Knowles points out that a certain number of non-Aristotelian writings passed into Arabic under 
the name of the Philosopher. Among them, two have great influence: Theologia Aristotelis, made up of 
passages from Books IV-VI of the Enneads of Plotinus, and Liber de Causes by Proclus. See The 
Evolution of Medieval Thought (London, 1963), 194. 
291 For details concerning the structure of the scholastic quaestio, see Palémon Glorieux, La littérature 
quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320, Bibliothèque thomiste 5 (Paris, 1925), 11-58. 
292 Gadamer offers some insights into the structure of question in general which helps us to understand 
why the scholastic theologians in the Middle Ages were almost unanimously in favour of the form of 
quaestio. That is the only reason why Gadamer is particularly mentioned here; I have no intention to 
develop a parallel between Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and a medieval theologian’s 
philosophical exegesis of biblical texts.  
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negativity whose fulfilment is to be found ‘in a radical negativity: the knowledge of not 
knowing’.293 If a question is asked properly, the questioner himself must have already 
realised what he does not know; in other words, his raising of a question is conditioned 
by his awareness of his ignorance on a specific point. A typical illustration of this is 
seen in Plato’s account of the Socratic dialogue, the proceedings of which are explicitly 
dominated by the role of the questioner, Socrates. Through the case of Socrates, it 
becomes clear that asking a genuine question is far more difficult than finding an 
answer to it.294 In that sense, questioning is equivalent to thinking.  
Therefore, the question holds priority over the answer, even if some elements of the 
answer are always embedded in the question. The question is able to loosen one’s 
attachment to the conventional way of thinking and to preconceived opinions, and in 
the meantime points to a new direction where the answer ought to be found. Hence, the 
question implies both openness and limitation; to borrow Gadamer’s term, when a 
question is asked, the ‘horizon’ of the question is also defined. The question certainly 
opens up new directions, but this openness is not boundless; it indicates a horizon that 
is specifically proper to this question. A question that indicates no direction is a 
distorted one, as it leads nowhere.295   
A genuine question specifies a direction for further investigation and also defines a 
horizon in which the answer is expected to be found. It signifies a departure from the 
old system and also drops some hints as to the new solutions. Therefore, to question 
does not mean to break away from what has been conventionally accepted in a blind 
and radical manner, but to grow out of the existent framework and look for further 
development. A genuine question shows a link with the old and also entails an openness 
to the new.  
The question also possesses a profound affinity with knowledge, because the logical 
structure of a question entails both negative and positive judgements. This, Gadamer 
believes, is the basis of the essential relation between question and knowledge. ‘For it 
is the essence of knowledge not only to judge something correctly, but at the same time 
and for the same reason to exclude what is wrong.’296 Knowledge of something is not 
to be achieved exclusively by affirmation; it must go through the process of refuting 
                                                          
293 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. and ed. by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, 
(London, 1975), 325. 
294 Ibid. 326. 
295 Ibid. 327. 
296 Ibid. 328.  
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the counter-instance and revealing the incorrectness of the counter-argument. Question 
and knowledge share the same logical structure, the openness to both the negative and 
the positive. For that reason, the question cannot be separated from the acquisition of 
knowledge. In general the question serves to deepen and broaden knowledge; a question 
that makes no contribution to further knowledge cannot be deemed a genuine one. The 
activity of asking questions should be driven by the aspiration for knowledge. It is hard 
to believe that one who has no desire for knowledge is able to ask good questions. The 
ability to question something that has never been questioned belongs to an original mind; 
indeed, questioning constitutes the essential part of creative thinking.  
The universal structure of the ‘question’ can be embodied in various ways according 
to the specific context. In the medieval scholastic context, it acquired the form of 
quaestio. As a literary form peculiar to scholasticism, the quaestio remained, until the 
end of the medieval period, the favourite mode of exposition of personal thought for 
the masters of the university. Etienne Gilson points out that the quaestio was the living 
cell of school teaching.297 It was chosen for two reasons: it served to encapsulate the 
originality of a master’s personal thought; and it was employed as a teaching method 
in the classroom, for the purpose of stimulating the students. The form of quaestio 
explicitly diverted attention to the process through which a negative or positive answer 
is substantiated, so the validity of an answer lies entirely in the quality of its justification; 
it does not matter whether the answer one gives is negative or positive; rather, the depth 
of the thought and the technique of logical reasoning prevail. In comparison with other 
literary forms, the quaestio attached more importance to logical inference and 
philosophical speculation, thus made maximum allowance for unconventional personal 
thought. Under the form of quaestio, a philosophical argumentation within theology is 
allowed to run its course without being necessarily subject to either an apologetic or an 
edifying tone. In addition, the quality of one’s arguments can be appreciated on its own 
merit, irrespective of one’s personal stance.  
Prior to the emergence of the quaestio at the University of Paris, the quest for a new 
expression of theological thinking had already begun. The most outrageous attempt was 
made by Peter Abelard (1079-1142) in his Sic et non,298 which comprises a series of 
                                                          
297 Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1955), 248. 
298 Priscilla Throop (trans.), Yes and No: The Complete English Translation of Peter Abelard's Sic Et 
Non, second edition, (2008). 
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158 theological issues, each furnished with a set of patristic quotations that logically 
contradict one another.299 Abelard does not give his own theological speculation, he 
simply provides a list of contradictory statements made by authoritative writers. 
Through the format of Sic et non, Abelard makes the point that to the same question 
both positive and negative answers can be drawn from the patristic tradition.  
Unlike Sic et non, which allows both sides to be presented equally, the quaestio 
compels the author to take a position and narrow the scope of his answer to either 
negative or positive. After making that decision, he must give a consistent proof of his 
thesis. One is free to take a negative or positive stance, but that is as far as personal free 
choice can go on this issue. Once the stance is taken, one must adhere to it and justify 
it by all means. Having clarified his stance, the author normally lists the theses that are 
contrary to his own view, and then refutes them one by one; once the refutation is 
completed, the author’s stance will be justified. The justification requires many kinds 
of intellectual expertise, including textual scholarship in biblical studies, professional 
training in patristic theology, command of scholastic language, and skill in rhetoric and 
logic. In particular the quaestio calls for focused, in-depth, philosophical elucidation of 
one specific theological theme. 
The writing of theological quaestio appears little different from formulating a 
philosophical question, except that the topic under discussion is derived from a 
theological background, as will be shown in the next section. In terms of register, both 
the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic vocabularies can be employed; in terms of logical 
inference, Aristotle’s syllogism is taken for granted. Thus, during the Middle Ages, 
both the concepts and method of philosophy were being systematically grafted onto the 
theological setting, and largely dominated the proceedings of the theological discussion. 
The format of quaestio, with its openness to both negative and affirmative, suggests a 
kind of richness and diversity. It poses a challenging question on the tradition from 
which it arises, and in that sense it can be regarded as the self-reflection of the tradition 
itself. The form of quaestio allows the author to give full play to his sharpness of mind 
in justifying one statement and refuting its counterpart, and enables theologians to 
                                                          
299 Philipp W. Rosemann in particular highlights the mode of expressing in his study of Peter Lombard. 
He regards the Hughonian (Hugh of St. Victor 1096-1141) and the Abelardian (Peter Abelard c. 1079-
1142) as two main streams preceding Peter Lombard, with regard to the schemata for the structuring of 
the theological material, and he traces the history back to Augustine. See Rosemann, Peter Lombard 
(Oxford and New York, 2004), 15. 
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philosophise in the most sophisticated manner. Although biblical texts are sometimes 
quoted in the disputed questions, they serve to back up a certain proposition, and in 
many cases these scriptural texts have to be reinterpreted so that they fit well with the 
whole argumentation. We see some examples of this in Eckhart’s Parisian Question 1. 
Despite the fact that most scholastic questions are heavily loaded with philosophical 
categories and proceed according to logical rules, nevertheless they are embedded in 
the longstanding tradition of biblical studies. The form of quaestio develops over the 
history of the scholastic movement, to become the typical literary form of scholasticism. 
It makes room for one’s personal thought, especially for those who run against the 
prevailing trend, Eckhart probably among them. 
  
2.1.2 Parisian Questions:  a Theological Declaration  
Like many scholastic theologians, including his contemporary counterpart from the 
Franciscan school Duns Scotus (1250-1308), Eckhart conducted theological 
discussions in the form of quaestiones. Some of these he later published, others were 
preserved by opponents and readers. Only a few, so far, have been translated into 
English, as the Parisian Questions. As mentioned earlier, ten Parisian Questions have 
been proved to be from Eckhart’s hand, and it is possible that more may be discovered 
in the future. As what survive are all reportationes of these Questions, the texts only 
sketch out key points of Eckhart’s arguments, often presented in a strikingly concise 
and dense manner. Nonetheless, these Questions capture the most controversial topics 
of the day and give an indication of the heated debate going on at that time. Apart from 
the concise and innovative style, the arguments contained in these questions suggest an 
explicit continuation and the divergence between Eckhart and Thomas Aquinas. Almost 
without exception Eckhart begins, before presenting his unusual way or new proof, by 
giving a brief introduction to the groundwork done by Thomas. Based on the procedure 
of Eckhart’s arguments, we may conclude that the Thomistic views familiar to the 
theologians and students of the day constitute the preliminary step for Eckhart’s new 
way of thinking. The same controversial topics that had been dealt with by Thomas 
continually captivate Eckhart and press him to move one step further, applying the form 
of quaestio. Thus the continuity and the subtle difference or contrast between Thomas 
and Eckhart come to the fore in Eckhart’s disputed questions. When handling these 
heated topics Eckhart explicitly points out what he has learned from his Dominican 
brother and on precisely which point he disagrees with him.  
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In comparison with his biblical commentaries, these disputed quaestiones bear a 
more pointed and directed mark of Eckhart’s originality as a scholastic thinker, in the 
sense that here one sees the whole skeleton of his reformative thought. In other words, 
the outline of his speculative theology is clearly sketched out in the form of quaestio, 
and nearly all the main ideas are briefly touched upon in the book of Questions, which 
will find striking resonance in his commentaries and homilies. It is clear that in his 
composing of the very short disputed Questions, Eckhart’s thinking has stepped out of 
the Thomistic framework, and he has attempted a new approach, rising above the overly 
abundant sources at his disposal.300  
Overall the Parisian Questions set the tone of Eckhartian thought; through this series 
of questions Eckhart makes a theological declaration, while also distinguishing himself 
from earlier approaches, most specifically that of Thomas, despite the common ground 
between them. One theme that is persistently touched upon in the Parisian Questions 
is the notion of intellect. Not only does Eckhart initiate his speculative theology by 
affirming the primacy of knowing over being in Parisian Question 1, but he keeps on 
expounding the concept of intellect in the other Questions. This line of thought can be 
summarised into five points: 1) intellect and the superior terms; 2) intellect and being; 
3) intellect and will; 4) intellect and human knowledge of things; 5) divine intellect and 
human intellect as being one intellect.   
  
                                                          
300 In his introduction to his English translation of Parisian Questions and Prologues, Armand A. Maurer 
addresses the issue of the sources that have an explicit impact on Eckhart. See Parisian Questions and 
Prologues (1974), 12. 
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2.1.2.1 Intellect and the Superior Terms 
At the very beginning of his Prologue to the Opus Tripartitum, Eckhart calls attention 
to a radical distinction between the two types of terms in his work, namely the superior 
terms and the inferior terms. The former refers to the general terms such as unity, truth 
and goodness, which are ‘convertible with being’ and are prior to this or that being; 
whereas the latter refers to the terms that are restricted to a genus, species or nature of 
being.301 Following that rule Eckhart makes the preliminary point that general terms 
such as being or existence (esse), unity, truth, wisdom, and goodness should by no 
means be considered ‘after the manner and nature of accidents’.302 The relation between 
the two sorts of terms is that the superior terms influence and affect the inferior ones, 
but are in no way affected or contributed to by the latter. Therefore, the two sorts of 
terms should be thought of and spoken of differently. Notably, what Eckhart means by 
the superior or general terms such as being, unity, truth and goodness are actually the 
so-called transcendentals (transcendentia), which only serve to predicate the first cause 
of things or being as being. The term ‘transcendentia’ appears twice in Eckhart’s Latin 
works: in his commentary on Genesis, and in his commentary on John. In both cases 
Eckhart refers transcendentia to being, one, truth and good.303 It is no coincidence that 
these four general terms also constitute the subjects of the first four treatises (among 
fourteen) included in the book of Propositions, which are particularly addressed by 
Eckhart in the Prologue, as will be discussed later. 
It is worth noting that what Eckhart means by the superior terms such as being, one, 
truth, and good are not only prior to particular things, but are also prior to the perception 
of particular things; hence they hold priority over whatever notions are derived from 
the activity of natural reason, for instance, the universals obtained through abstraction. 
                                                          
301 Eckhart, Tabula Prologorum in Opus Tripartitum n.1 (LW I 1, 129,5-8) (trans. Armand A. Maurer, 
Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 77).  
302 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum n.8 (LW I 1, 152,8-11): ‘Primum est quod de 
terminis generalibus, puta esse, unitate, veritate, sapientia, bonitate et similibus nequaquam est 
imaginandum vel iudicandum secundum naturam et modum accidentium.’ (Trans. Armand A. Maurer, 
Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 82).  
303 Eckhart, In Gen. n.128 (LW I 1, 282,10-283,6): ‘Ubi tria sunt notanda. Primo, quod bonitas et eius 
ratio totaliter et se tota consistit in fine solo et est idem cum fine ipso convertibiliter. Propter quod deus, 
utpote finis omnium, est et dicitur Luc. 18 solus bonus. Ex fine ergo accipit bonitatem omnem quam 
habet ens quodlibet citra finem, sicut diaeta, medicina et urina nihil prorsus habent sanitatis in se 
formaliter plus quam lapis vel lignum, sed ab ipsa sola sanitate, quae in animali est formaliter, dicuntur 
sana secundum naturam analogiae, qua omnia huiusmodi transcendentia se habent ad creaturas, puta ens, 
unum, verum, bonum.’ 
And, Eckhart, Sermo XXXVII n.377 (LW IV 363,8-9): ‘Unus deus. Nota: unum est essentialis proprietas 
superioris sive prioris aut primi.’  
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By contrast the inferior terms pertain to the categories employed to describe the 
properties of a determinate being. In short, the superior terms should only be attributed 
to the pure substance or the first cause of all things, whereas the inferior terms can be 
properly applied to the accidents or the determinate, particular beings. Such a radical 
distinction between the two types of terms suggests a fundamental difference between 
the two different modes of thinking and expressing; in other words, God or the divine 
essence should be thought of and spoken of in a manner that is totally different from 
the way we approach the things that are derived from the first cause. Hence, the superior 
terms should be considered as the transcendentals, which hold priority over particular 
things in both ontological and epistemological senses. As a result, they should be 
differentiated from the inferior terms, which mainly refer to the categories that are 
proper to the accidents.  
The historical and doctrinal background of Eckhart’s treatment of the transcendentals 
can be traced back to what Kant called the ‘Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients’ 
in his Critique of Pure Reason (B113). In line with Kant’s classification, Jan A. Aertsen 
takes the medieval doctrine of the transcendental as a distinctive form within the 
longstanding tradition of transcendental philosophy.304 However, Aertsen points out 
that Kant misunderstood the scholastic thesis ‘quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum’, 
as he took this to be tautological. Aertsen explains that although transcendental terms 
are convertible, they are not synonyms on that account, because synonyms signify the 
same thing according to the same ratio.305 The doctrine of the transcendental in the 
Middle Ages is closely tied up with the reception of Aristotle’s works in the 13th century. 
Being confronted with a comprehensive philosophical explanation of reality as seen in 
Aristotle, the medieval thinkers in the Latin world felt for the first time the pressing 
need to account for the proper foundation of philosophy. The transcendental way of 
thought can be deemed the answer to this challenge. Even before the systematic 
exposition in Thomas Aquinas, inquiries into the transcendental are already seen in the 
works of Philip the Chancellor (d.1218), Alexander of Hales (d.1245) and Albert the 
                                                          
304 Jan A. Aertsen’s research offers a unique perpective in the current studies of medieval philosophy.  In 
his Introduction to the groundbreaking work Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, Aertsen 
gives an in-depth criticism of the three influential approaches represented by E. Gilson, N. Kretzmann 
and A. de Libera; finally he puts forward the thesis that medieval philosophy can be better received as a 
transcendental way of thought. See Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: the 
Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden, New York and Koln, 1996), 1-24. 
305 Ibid. 97. 
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Great (d.1280).306 Aertsen further clarifies the specific meaning of ‘transcendental’ in 
the scholastic sense: based on a close examination of the medieval texts, he puts forward 
the thesis that the medieval notion of transcendentality indicates what is opposed to and 
surpasses the categories, whereas in Kant the transcendental is concerned with the 
categories of reason. The emergence of the term transcendens in the thirteenth century 
bespeaks a philosophical reflection that is aware of its going further than the 
Aristotelian doctrine of the categories of being, as shown in Thomas’s De Veritate 1.1. 
Aertsen also highlights the point that the origin of the term transcendens is not the 
Platonic-Augustinian ascent to God, in the sense that it signifies a separate reality 
‘beyond’ the categories. On the contrary, transcendentals surpass the categories because 
they are common to the categories and run through all of them.307 
Aertsen’s reading of medieval philosophy in general and his study of Thomas in 
particular throw illuminating light on the thought of Eckhart, because Eckhart in a sense 
follows in the footsteps of his Dominican brother. Like Thomas, who begins 
expounding the transcendental terms such as ‘Being’, ‘good’, ‘one’, and ‘true’ in the 
early stages of his academic career, as for instance in his commentary on the first book 
of the Sentences (8.1.3), Eckhart deals with these terms in the first book of his Opus 
Tripartitum or Three-part Work, namely the book of Propositions. According to what 
Eckhart states in the Prologue, the book of Propositions contains a thousand 
propositions or more 308  and is divided into 14 treatises, which probably makes 
reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics in 14 books.309 These propositions, as Eckhart 
suggests in the Prologue, will provide hermeneutical keys to the understanding of the 
subsequent quaestiones, commentaries and even sermons or homilies.310 Therefore it is 
necessary to look first at the book of Propositions, before exploring Eckhart’s notion 
of intellect expressed in the book of Questions.  
                                                          
306 For a detailed textual study of this line of thought, see Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the 
Transcendentals (1996), 25-70. 
307 Ibid. 92-3. 
308 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum, n.3 (LW I 1, 149,6) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in  
Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 80).  
309 Markus Vinzent addresses this question and gives a range of references to the various expert views 
on this point. See Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (2011), footnote 125, 39.   
310 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum, n.11 (LW I 1, 156,4-7), ‘Tertio et ultimo est 
praenotandum quod opus secundum, similiter et tertium sic dependet a primo opere, scilicet 
propositionum, quod sine ipso sunt parvae utilitatis, eo quod quaestionum declarationes et auctoritatum 
expositiones plerumque fundantur supra aliquam propositionum.’ (Trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian 
Questions and Prologues, 1974, 85.) 
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The 14 treatises enclosed in the book of Propositions correspond to 14 general terms 
on which they focus. Eckhart allows each of the 14 terms to stand with its opposite, 
hence a list of 14 pairs as follows:   
1) being (esse) / nothing (nihil) 
2) unity or oneness (unitas, uno) / many (multum) 
3) truth or true (veritas, vero) / false (falsum)  
4) goodness (bonitas, bono) / evil (malo), 
5) love or charity/sin 
6) honour, virtue, right / wickedness, vice, oblique  
7) whole / parts  
8) indistinct / distinct 
9) superior / inferior  
10)  first / last  
11)  idea / unformed 
12)  that by which something is / that that is  
13)  existence (God) / non-existence  
14)  substance / accident311 
The four terms that are called transcendentia commence Eckhart’s 14 treatises. As 
Eckhart claims that general terms like being, unity, truth, and goodness, and others of 
this sort, are convertible with being, it follows that he deliberately extends the scope of 
the transcendentals from the traditionally accepted four (being, one, truth and good) to 
fourteen. The origin of the fourteen general terms can be traced back to three main 
                                                          
311 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum, n.4 (LW I 1, 150,1-151,1):  
‘Primus tractatus agit de esse et ente et eius opposito quod est nihil. 
Secundus de unitate et uno et eius opposito quod est multum. 
Tertius de veritate et vero et eius opposito quod est falsum. 
Quartus de bonitate et bono et eius opposito, malo. 
Quintus de amore et caritate et peccato, ei opposito. 
Sextus de honesto, virtute et recto et eorum oppositis, puta turpi, vitio et obliquo. 
Septimus de toto et parte, eius opposito. 
Octavus de communi et indistincto et horum oppositis, proprio et distincto. 
Nonus de natura superioris et inferioris, eius oppositi. 
Decimus de primo et novissimo. 
Undecimus de idea et ratione et horum oppositis, puta de informi et privatione. 
Duodecimus vero de quo est et quod est ei condiviso. 
Tertiusdecimus agit de ipso deo summo esse, quod »contrarium non habet nisi 
non esse«, ut ait Augustinus De immortalitate animae et De moribus Manichaeorum. 
Quartusdecimus de substantia et accidente.’  
(Trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 80-1. Maurer’s translation here is 
slightly altered.)  
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sources, namely the Aristotelian, Platonic/Neoplatonic and Christian traditions. Eckhart 
explicitly appropriates the Aristotelian metaphysical terms such as being/non-being, 
substance/accident, the Platonic notion of ‘idea’ and the Neoplatonic concept of 
oneness or unity; the Christian theological terms such as love or charity/sin, virtue/vice 
are also included.312 With the thirteenth term, Eckhart directly identifies God with the 
highest existence, in line with the thought of Augustine.313 
In the Prologue Eckhart continually reminds the reader of the appropriate way in 
which the general terms should be considered. To Eckhart general terms such as 
existence, unity, truth, good and so on are a priori; they should be considered as 
transcendentals as they are prior to every aspect of things and precede everything. 
Hence the aforementioned general terms should by no means be taken as accidents as 
if they were posterior to the subject and took on existence by inhering in it. Only when 
it comes to God do the transcendental terms function as a predicate (secundum 
adiacens).314 God alone is properly called being, one, true and good. In the case of this 
or that being, for instance, in the propositions such as ‘This is a man’ or ‘A rose is red’, 
the word ‘is’ serves solely as a copula to connect the predicate and the subject, it does 
not refer to the existence of ‘a man’ or ‘a rose’ or ‘redness’.  
Eckhart regards these general terms as superior terms and asserts that they are not 
subject to measures of time or number, nor are they restricted to genus or species. The 
fact that this is so clearly stressed in the introductory Prologue to Eckhart’s most 
important work tells us that it holds the key to a proper understanding of his entire 
system of thought. What Eckhart writes in the General Prologue is intended to provide 
the reader with a guideline for a proper comprehension of the forthcoming strange or 
even seemingly false ideas. Taking the fourteen so-called superior terms as 
transcendentals, we come to understand that in Eckhart the superior terms are strictly 
reserved for the divine; nothing other than God is entitled to ‘being, one, truth and good’.  
It follows that when it comes to the divine, we should at least temporarily leave the 
inferior terms aside and resort to the superior terms, and adjust our minds accordingly 
to the transcendental way of thinking and speaking. As the superior terms pertain only 
to the first cause of all things, it follows that they have their origin in the divine intellect, 
                                                          
312 For a detailed analysis, see Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (2011), 1-50. 
313 Augustine, De Immortalitate Animae, 12; De Moribus Ecclesiae et de Moribus Manichaeorum, II, 1. 
314 For the distinction between ‘is’ as a predicate and a copula, see Thomas In II Perihermenias, lect. 2 
(Rome, 1882) I, 79-80, nn.2-5; Aristotle, Peri Hermenias, 10, 19b 18-20.  
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and thus ontologically precede the human intellect. Nevertheless, once we start to 
consider the divine, and attempt to think and speak in the superior terms, the human 
intellect is indeed performing in the way that suits the nature of the divine and is 
demanded by the divine. That is to say, when we think of God in terms of existence, 
unity, truth and goodness, the human intellect is consciously conforming itself to the 
divine intellect so as to be brought back into the divine. 
By contrast, the inferior terms that are used to predicate the particular things, in 
particular the universals, are derived solely from the conduct of the human intellect. In 
the Parisian Questions Eckhart touches on this topic only briefly, without giving 
detailed elucidation. The point Eckhart intends to stress is that the existence of a 
universal can only be defined intellectually. The radical distinction between a universal 
in the intellect and a being in reality is particularly spelt out in Parisian Question 2.315 
Here Eckhart highlights the intellectual origin of the universals, and integrates a 
universal with the act of understanding through which the universal is produced. 
Eckhart allows a universal to enjoy its existence purely in the intellect. A universal, as 
the product of the act of knowing, only exists in the intellect. Eckhart seems to focus 
on the intellectual nature of the universals, despite the fact that he does not openly deny 
the link between the abstract universal terms and the real things to which the universals 
correspond. Here we see a subtle divergence from the Thomistic approach. Although 
Thomas also takes the universal as the object of our intellect, 316 the point he intends to 
stress is that the universal is produced through the conduct of human reason, namely 
abstracting a universal from the particulars. Thomas also explains how the intellect 
abstracts the universal from the particular or the intelligible species from the 
phantasm,317 whereas in Eckhart the focus of attention shifts to the independence of the 
mode of knowing in contrast to the mode of being. Eckhart highlights the point that a 
universal is generated by knowing and the act of knowing is performed in the intellect. 
Therefore the universals, like mathematical entities, are rooted in nowhere but the 
intellect.318  
                                                          
315 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. II  nn. 1-10 (LW V 49,4-54,6) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions 
and Prologues, 1974, 51-4).  
316 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.86, a.1-2. 
317 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.85, a.1. 
318 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. II  n.9 (LW V 53,14-5), (trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions and 
Prologues, 1974, 54). 
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Unlike Thomas, who holds fast to the Aristotelian principle and takes the universal 
as the result of abstraction and thus posterior to the particular things, Eckhart pays more 
attention to, or even shows preference for, Platonism, despite the fact that he does not 
openly dispute with Thomas on this point. This can be referred back to the 
aforementioned fourteen treatises, in particular the eleventh (idea/unformed), which 
evidently suggests an absolute superiority of idea and reason over the unformed. 
Through his Parisian Questions Eckhart keeps affirming his stance as to the primacy 
of knowing over being, of intellectual conception over the real existence of particular 
things, and this holds the key to his theological speculation. The priority of knowing 
over being is explicitly expressed in Parisian Question 1, as will be discussed in the 
following section, and this line of thought is extensively unfolded in Parisian Question 
2, in which Eckhart further expounds the difference between the intellect and being, 
between a being in the mind and a being in a real sense. A close examination of the five 
newly re-discovered Parisian Questions indicates that the same point is particularly 
addressed in the second and the fourth. In the second, ‘Is the essence of God more actual 
than the [personal] property?’ Eckhart draws attention to the difference between the act 
according to the thing and the act according to the mode of knowing. The latter, he says, 
‘is rather to be taken towards the part of the substance’. Likewise in the fourth, 
‘Whether the difference with regard to the intellect is prior to the difference with regard 
to the thing?’319 Eckhart takes the same stance, arguing that if the difference is taken in 
the sense of the real existence of particular things, then the difference with regard to the 
thing is prior to the difference with regard to the intellect, as is widely assumed. 
However, if the question is read in intellectual terms, we have to say that the 
differentiation performed in the intellect is prior to any difference in things.  
Overall Eckhart pays a great deal of attention to the superior terms, which we may 
deem the transcendental terms in comparison with the categories that serve to predicate 
particular things or the accidents. His intensive emphasis on this aspect suggests a new 
way of doing theology, which is to think and talk about God in the superior terms and 
make sense of the world in accordance with these terms. Despite the fact that we employ 
the inferior terms in real life and that human reason also starts from perceiving the 
properties of particular things through the power of the senses, when it comes to the 
                                                          
319 Eckhart, the fourth rediscovered Parisian Question, Quaestio Par. Nov. IV (Dondaine 42-4): ‘Utrum 
differentia secundum rationem sit prior quam differentia secundum rem?’ in Magistri Eckhardi: 
Quaestiones Parisienses Supplementum, Herausgegeben von Loris Sturlese (Stuttgart, 2011), 469. 
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divine, Eckhart forcefully suggests, we should switch to a different mode of thinking 
and speaking, which in most cases means to be mentally detached from the knowledge 
of things we have possessed and accumulated. Put more straightforwardly, we should 
start from the viewpoint of the divine, thus see things through God and in God, not 
otherwise.  
 
2.1.2.2 Intellect and Being 
Eckhart’s contemplation of the divine is, to a great extent, based on his thorough 
reflection on the ontological thinking of Thomas. Following Thomas’s thesis that God’s 
knowing is the substance/essence of the divine, Eckhart pushes the question of God’s 
knowing and being one step further, shifting the ontological ground from God’s being 
to his knowing. In contrast to the traditional Thomistic solution, which gives priority to 
the being of God, in his Parisian Question 1 Eckhart pushes to the fore God’s knowing. 
His penetrating argument starts with the six proofs provided by Thomas in his Summa 
contra Gentiles (I, q.45) and Summa Theologica (I, q.14, a.4). After giving a list of 
Thomas’s points, Eckhart concludes that God does everything through his existence, 
both internally in the Godhead and externally in creatures; in other words, God acts and 
knows through his existence. This, clearly, is what he has learned from Thomas. Whilst 
introducing the Thomistic viewpoints, Eckhart runs briefly through their logical 
inferences, which makes it explicit that Eckhart understands perfectly the logical 
proceedings behind Thomas’s metaphysical proofs. Based on a thorough study of 
Thomas’s work, Eckhart comes to his own view, which forms a contrast to that of 
Thomas, as shown above. This leads to the crucial part of this disputed question, where 
Eckhart openly declares: ‘It is not my present opinion that God understands because he 
exists, but rather that he exists because he understands.’320  
Following that declaration, Eckhart puts forward his own thesis: God is an intellect 
and understanding, and his understanding itself is the ground of his existence (my 
italics). Eckhart deliberately avoids the metaphysical registers that Thomas employs in 
his De Ente et Essentia, Summa Theologica and Summa contra Gentiles, in which God 
is depicted as the one and only being in which esse is identical with essence, or as the 
                                                          
320 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n.4 (LW V 40,5-7), (trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions and 
Prologues, 1974, 45). 
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first cause or the first immobile mover, based on Aristotle’s Physics.321 In contrast to 
Thomas’s lengthy exposition of God’s existence, Eckhart shifts the focus from 
‘existence’ to ‘understanding’ and picks the word ‘ground’322 to describe the priority 
of ‘understanding’ over ‘existence’ in God. This is seen again at the end of this disputed 
question, where Eckhart maintains that God as an intellect is the cause of all existence 
and the ‘ground’ of all things.  
It is notable that the problem of infinite regress is not even touched upon in Eckhart’s 
arguments, despite its significance to Thomas’s proof of God’s existence. Instead 
Eckhart resorts to the Neoplatonic source the Book of Causes (Liber de Causis),323 and 
takes from it one proposition, ‘The first of created things is existence’324 to back up his 
unconventional reading of scripture. Eckhart gives two particular examples to illustrate 
this point. He first picks up a verse from John 1:3 ‘All things were made through him’, 
and points out that it should be read in a different way: ‘All things that were made 
through him, exist.’325 After the gospel of John, he turns to the Old Testament and 
highlights the verse in Ecclesiasticus 24: ‘From the beginning and before all ages I 
have been created.’ As in the first case, Eckhart offers an alternative to the conventional 
way; thus the verse is to be read as ‘From the beginning and before created ages, I 
am.’326 By simply changing the position of the pause of the verses, without changing 
the order of the words, Eckhart manages to insert his thought grammatically into the 
scriptural texts. This kind of skilful wordplay paves the way for an entirely new 
reception of the scriptural texts. In the light of his creative reading of scripture, it 
becomes explicit that Eckhart’s daring and innovative claim has scriptural support from 
                                                          
321 For a detailed analysis of Thomas’s exposition of God’s being, see John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical 
Thought of Thomas Aquinas - from finite being to uncreated being (Washington, D.C., 2000), 400-41. 
322 It is hard to define the meaning of ‘ground’ in the context of Eckhart, because the word ‘grunt’ is 
employed in a rich variety of ways. As pointed out by McGinn and other scholars such as Susanne Köbele, 
the ground-language in Eckhart aims primarily to predicate indistinct identity of God and human, hence 
‘grunt’ is not a state or condition, but is rather ‘grounding’- the event of being in a fused relation. See 
Bernard McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300-1500) (New York, 2005), 121.  
323 This book was initially attributed to Aristotle; with the development of the translation project in the 
13th century, it was proved to be extracted from Proclus’s Element of Theology.  
324 Pseudo-Aristotle, Liber de Causis, IV 37: ‘Prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsum 
creatum aliud.’   
325 Eckhart, Quaest.  Par. I  n.4 (LW V 41,4-6): ‘Et sequitur post verbum assumptum Ioh. 1: “omnia per 
ipsum facta sunt”, ut sic legatur: “omnia per ipsum facta sunt”, ut ipsis factis ipsum esse post conveniat.’ 
(Trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 45.) 
326 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n.4 (LW V 41,11-2): ‘Et si dicatur quod immo, quia Eccli. 24: “ab initio et 
ante saecula creata sum”, potest exponi “create”, id est genita. Sedaliter dico sic: “ab initio et ante saecula 
create” “sum”.’ (Trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 46.) 
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both the New and Old Testaments. Hence it is justified by the holy scriptures that 
existence does not hold ontological priority, but falls into the category of what is created; 
God as creator is the divine intellect.  
According to Eckhart, the reason for the superiority/priority of intellect over 
existence consists precisely in its purity of existence. He starts with the Neoplatonic 
notion that takes existence as the first creation of intelligence, and treats it as a self-
evident principle throughout his argument. When, at the end of the discussion, he 
identifies intellect as purity of existence, Eckhart clearly turns to Aristotle’s De Anima. 
Aristotle’s definition is decisive to Eckhart’s notion of intellect; in his De Anima 
Aristotle points out the resemblance between intellect and the sense 327 of sight: just as 
the power of sight must be colourless so that it can perceive all colours, the intellect, 
because it possesses no natural form of its own, holds the capacity for all forms.328 In 
other words, it is the purity of forms that gives intellect the power to know all forms.  
The concept of intellect, when transplanted from the Aristotelian philosophical 
framework into the medieval Christian setting, is bound to assume a theological colour. 
Eckhart’s understanding of the divine intellect is tinted with both Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian influences. Although the Neoplatonic doctrine that intellect is 
superior/prior to existence was familiar to many theologians of the time, and Aristotle’s 
De Anima aroused immense interest, it is Eckhart who formally redefines God as an 
intellect which is not existence but the purity of existence.329  
  
2.1.2.3 Intellect and Will  
The question concerning the relation of intellect and will marks the fundamental 
disagreement between the two dominant schools of the day. The debate between 
Eckhart and Gonsalvo of Spain in Parisian Question 3 330  reveals the doctrinal 
divergence between the Dominicans and the Franciscans. In this disputed question 
                                                          
327 Reiner Manstetten stresses the point that in the Christian context the Aristotelian theory of senses, in 
particular the structure of recognition, has been applied to the knowledge of God. See Reiner Manstetten, 
Esse est Deus: Meister Eckharts christologische Versöhnung von Philosophie und Religion und ihre 
Ursprünge in der Tradition des Abendlandes (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1993), 385. 
328 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 7, 418b 26-27; III, 4, 429a 24. 
Particularly important is De Anima III 5, in which Aristotle depicts mind (intellect) as capable of being 
all things and of making all things; in a sense mind is immortal. 
329 This does not necessarily contradict what he says in Commentary on Exodus. This question will be 
dealt with in the next section of this chapter.  
330 This is a disputed question of master Gonsalvo of Spain, which contains the arguments of Eckhart. 
Eckhart, Quaestio Par. III nn.5-20 (LW V 58,16-64,4), (trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions 
and Prologues, 1974, 58-67).  
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Eckhart’s thought concerning the superiority of intellect over will gains a focused 
expression. Eckhart, in line with his Dominican brother Thomas, takes an affirmative 
stance towards the superiority of intellect over will, whereas the opposite stance is 
maintained by Gonsalvo.  
In this question we see that Eckhart carefully adjusts his tone along with the 
proceeding of the argument. As elsewhere, Eckhart opens the debate with what he has 
learned from Thomas rather than starting with his own ideas:  
Against this position some authors present the following arguments to show that 
the intellect, its act, and its habit are more excellent than the will, its act, and its 
habit.331 
Here ‘some authors’ refers to Thomas Aquinas, whose arguments on this topic are 
found in Summa Theologica I q.82. This opening sentence gives the impression that 
Eckhart would simply present Thomas’s view in his debate with Gonsalvo. But the 
development of the argument gradually makes plain a disagreement between Eckhart 
and Thomas. Certainly Eckhart follows his Dominican brother in some points, but just 
as surely he diverges from him on others. Take Parisian Question 3 as an example: 
among the 11 points included in his reasoning, the first and the final two proceed in the 
vein of Thomas, while those posited in the middle reflect Eckhart’s own original 
thinking, which marks a separation from the authoritative arguments presented in 
Summa Theologica.   
Characteristic of the reasoning in this question is the application of Aristotle’s 
syllogism, namely inferring a conclusion from two premises. Eckhart often starts with 
a principle that is accepted by both the Dominicans and the Franciscans, and which is 
treated as the major premise. That is then followed by a Dominican doctrine whose 
validity may not be recognised by the Franciscans. On the basis of the two premises the 
conclusion will finally be proved. The same logic of argument is followed by Gonsalvo 
in his refutation of Eckhart, but he takes the opposite stance and builds his conclusion 
upon the adversary premise. By refuting the major or the minor premise included in 
Eckhart’s arguments, Gonsalvo comes to a conclusion in sheer opposition to what has 
been proved by Eckhart. The situation is that each side adheres to a different principle 
and takes their own principle as the premise, despite following the same logic in debate. 
                                                          
331 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. III nn. 5-6 (LW V 59,12-4) (trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions and 
Prologues,1974, 58).  
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For instance, Eckhart begins with the principle that the power, act, or habit whose object 
is simpler, higher, and prior, is more excellent, to which Gonsalvo expresses his 
disagreement and asserts that the contrary is true in creatures, because something that 
is prior and simpler is not necessarily more perfect, as is shown in the case of the 
universals. Gonsalvo takes it for granted that a universal is preceded by particular things, 
but to Eckhart that is not necessarily the case.  
Leaving aside the fundamental disagreement between Eckhart and Gonsalvo or the 
Dominicans and the Franciscans that is manifest in the debate, we come back to the 
subtle difference between Eckhart and Thomas, as revealed in this question. Following 
the aforementioned principle which serves as the major premise, Eckhart brings in a 
well-known Thomistic view and allows it to be the minor premise of his argument. He 
rephrases it as ‘the object of the intellect and its habit and act, which is being, is more 
primary, simpler, and loftier than the object of the will which is the good, for the whole 
nature of the good is existence itself’. 332  In Thomas a different technical term is 
employed for the object of intellect, the idea of appetible good. Before claiming the 
superiority of intellect over will, Thomas first defines the two different ways – 
absolutely and relatively – in which ‘superiority’ is to be considered. Thomas claims 
that when a thing is considered in itself it is being considered to be such absolutely; but 
with regard to something else it will be considered to be such relatively. What Thomas 
has cautiously put forward here, to be precise, is that when intellect and will are 
considered with regard to themselves it is justified to take intellect as superior to will. 
Nevertheless, relatively speaking, when intellect and will are both to be considered in 
relation to a third thing, it is possible that the power of will holds superiority due to the 
superiority of its object. For instance, when the object of will is God, will is more noble 
than intellect because the object itself is above intellect.333  
Clearly, such a distinction between the absolute sense and the relative sense is 
essential in Thomas’s exposition, but it is totally omitted from Eckhart’s arguments. 
The reason for this is probably to be found in the profound implication of the above 
distinction. Had Eckhart taken the relative sense into account, he would have had to 
reverse the order between will and intellect so far as the divine is concerned. That 
                                                          
332 Eckhart, Quaestio Par. III n.6 (LW V 59,15-7) (trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions and 
Prologues, 1974, 58-9). 
333 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.82, a.3.  
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compromise does not seem to be what Eckhart intends, as we see that his reasoning 
takes on an uncompromising tone as the arguments proceed.  
Having first presented Thomas’s view, Eckhart starts to demonstrate his own 
perspective in the middle part of the discussion. For that purpose seven points are 
briefly addressed (Nos.3-9).334 A close examination of the seven points suggests that 
Eckhart goes further than repeating the conventional view of love or charity as it is 
articulated by Thomas in Summa Theologica. For Thomas, despite stressing the 
superiority of intellect over will, still maintains that the love of God is superior to the 
knowledge of God. A good example is that when confronted with the scriptural text ‘If 
I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am 
nothing’ (1 Cor. 13:2), Thomas replies: ‘This reason is verified of the will as compared 
with what is above the soul.  For charity is the virtue by which we love God.’335 
Different from his Dominican brother, Eckhart removes the condition or limitation that 
Thomas sets up for the superiority of the intellect over will, whereby it is only in the 
absolute sense that intellect is superior to will. To Eckhart the superiority of intellect 
should by no means be compromised. By stressing the purification of the intellective 
operation, Eckhart extends the superiority of intellect over will to the realm of the divine. 
Based on the thesis he has proposed in Parisian Question 1, that God is understanding 
itself and not existence, Eckhart puts forward another unconventional view in this 
question, that one is pleasing to God precisely because he understands; if knowledge is 
taken away absolutely nothing is left.336 This claim obviously transgresses the line 
carefully drawn by Thomas, and sounds ‘strange’ to his counterpart Gonsalvo. The 
latter’s refutation is based upon the axiom that knowledge cannot be separated from 
love. Gonsalvo deems it utterly absurd to state that one is pleasing to God precisely 
because he understands. He retorts that if that is the case, every knower would be 
pleasing to God and one who knows most would be more pleasing to God, which is 
plainly false because there are many ordinary men and women more pleasing to God 
that the well educated. Gonsalvo’s counterargument is logical in itself; however his 
                                                          
334 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. III nn.8-14 (LW V 60,5-62,2) (trans. Armand A. Maurer, Parisian Questions 
and Prologues, 1974, 59-60). 
335 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.82, a.3. 
336 Maurer makes the point (footnote 11) that according to Eckhart sanctifying grace is in the intellect as 
in a subject, as shown in his commentary on the Book of Wisdom (In Sap.); see Armand A. Maurer (trans.), 
Parisian Questions and Prologues (1974), 59. 
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refutation misses the point, because what Eckhart means by understanding or knowing 
refers to the mode of purifying, which has nothing to do with increase in quantity.  
In addition, Eckhart attributes freedom to intellect rather than will. To justify this 
unconventional view he addresses two points in particular: 1) Intellect is unencumbered 
by matter, hence is the most reflexive, for the power of reflection resides in 
understanding, not in being; 2) The ground of freedom is in the intellect, for a choice is 
a conclusion following upon deliberation; therefore it holds true that freedom resides 
primarily and originally in the intellect, although it is formally in the will. In response 
to the first point, Gonsalvo first refutes Eckhart’s assertion that immateriality is the 
cause of freedom, and then points out that, given that what is free is immaterial, 
immateriality alone does not suffice for freedom; furthermore, both the intellect and 
will are immaterial. To the second, Gonsalvo responds that only when ‘rational’ 
expresses the definition of an essence and not of a power, will it hold true that man has 
free will because he is rational. Intellect and will, insofar as both are defined as powers 
of the soul whose operations are free from bodily organs, should be attributed to the 
same level of freedom. According to Gonsalvo, that is precisely how far one can go in 
this matter; by attempting to push it one step further Eckhart is bound to fall into fallacy. 
The unique reflexive nature of understanding stressed by Eckhart is not touched upon 
in Gonsalvo’s refutation. According to Thomas, both intellect and will are capable of 
self-reflection, but Eckhart seems to attribute the reflexive power only to the intellect.337               
Eckhart comes back to the groundwork of Thomas at the end of the discussion. In 
Summa Theologica, Thomas has already expounded one fundamental difference 
between the action of the intellect and that of the will. He writes ‘the action of the 
intellect consists in this – that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who 
understands; while the act of the will consists in this – that the will is inclined to the 
thing itself as existing in itself’.338 It follows that ‘good and evil’, as objects of the will, 
are in things; whereas ‘truth and error’, as objects of the intellect, are in the mind.339 
On the basis of Thomas’s exposition, Eckhart concludes that the nature of truth is in the 
intellect, as the nature of truth is the nature of the best, hence the nature of the best 
resides in intellect rather than in will. In respect to this statement Gonsalvo’s refutation 
                                                          
337 See Thomas, De Veritate q.22, a.12. ‘The higher powers of the soul, because immaterial, are capable 
of reflecting upon themselves. Both the will and the intellect, therefore, reflect upon themselves, upon 
each other, upon the essence of the soul, and upon all its powers.’  
338 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.82, a.3.  
339 Aristotle, Metaphysics, vi.  
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only serves to disqualify Eckhart’s view; it does not entail proof of the opposite stance. 
Gonsalvo states that it is fallacious to take truth as the cause of the best, nor is it true 
that something has the nature of the best because it is known. It is true only when truth 
and the best are thought to go together, because one cannot exist without the other.  
Finally, Eckhart closes his argument by reasserting Thomas’s insightful view with 
regard to the question of whether the will moves the intellect or not.340 Thinking in the 
same vein as Thomas, Eckhart makes the point that intellect moves as an end, whereas 
will moves as an efficient cause. Intellect with its objects moves as the reason for 
moving, while will moves as a mover. Based on Thomas’s exposition, Eckhart draws 
the conclusion that intellect is more excellent than will as it moves in a nobler way. 
That obviously goes beyond what Thomas says in De Veritate and Summa Theologica. 
In both works Thomas provides in-depth and detailed expositions, but he never claims 
the superiority of intellect over will on this ground. Rather, Thomas allows the 
possibility of a reversed order between intellect and will; he makes it clear that will 
could surpass intellect by virtue of the distinctive nature of its object.341 Yet despite this 
subtle difference between Thomas and Eckhart, they do share the principle that intellect 
moves as an end, which cannot be accepted by the Franciscan master Gonsalvo.342 
Overall Eckhart follows Thomas closely with regard to the relation of intellect and 
will; in his debate with Gonsalvo, Eckhart bases almost all of his arguments on 
Thomas’s expositions. However, it is equally significant that Eckhart is not merely 
repeating what has been said by Thomas; by paraphrasing the Thomistic viewpoints 
Eckhart manages to bring forward his own thesis, which goes beyond the confines of 
Thomas’s thinking. This can be proved by the aforementioned fact that Eckhart remains 
oblivious to the absolute/relative distinction made by Thomas, and forcefully pushes 
the superiority of intellect over will to the realm of the divine. Reviewing the whole 
discussion we come to see that Eckhart deliberately ignores such a significant 
distinction between the absolute sense and the relative sense with regard to the meaning 
of superiority, so that he does not have to circumscribe the superiority of the intellect 
as Thomas does. It is not appropriate to depict Eckhart as one who is at open defiance 
with the authoritative view of Thomas. However, a subtle difference does reveal a vital 
                                                          
340 See Thomas, De Veritate q.22, a.12; Summa Theol., I, q.82, a. 4. 
341 See Thomas, De Veritate q.22, a.12. 
342 It is beyond the scope of this book to tackle the debate between the two schools as to intellect and 
will; suffice it to say that Eckhart takes the Dominican stance fully into account and intends to push it 
further beyond Thomas’s exposition in this disputed question.  
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divergence between the Thomistic and Eckhartian ways of thinking. Eckhart 
conscientiously integrates Thomas’s thoughts into his reasoning, but not without 
making subtle changes in some areas, which often results in a concise, coherent and 
focused argument. His intention, in Eckhart’s own words, is to put forward some ‘novel, 
brief, and easy explanations of various questions’.343 And the quaestio, as the typical 
literary form of theological speculation, allows Eckhart to speak his mind in a relatively 
free tone. By and large the novelty and unconventionality that characterise Eckhart’s 
thinking come to the fore in his quaestiones, as illustrated by the above analysis. 
Confronting the topic that is vitally important to both the Franciscans and the 
Dominicans, namely the relation of intellect to will, Eckhart clearly takes the 
Dominican stance and affirms the superiority of intellect over will. On top of that 
Eckhart makes his own contribution to the discussion of this matter; his unique voice 
is not overwhelmed by the systematic expositions provided by Thomas. In both 
Parisian Questions 1 and 3 Eckhart skilfully drops hints as to his divergence from 
Thomas and makes his uncompromising stance manifest. The superiority of intellect 
over existence constitutes the core of Parisian Question 1, and the superiority of 
intellect over will is fully unfolded in Parisian Question 3. Both indicate a new type of 
intellectualism that differs considerably from Thomas’s. That difference is further 
elaborated in his commentary on the sacred scriptures, as will be seen in the following 
section.  
 
2.1.2.4 Intellect and Human Knowledge of Things  
Throughout the Parisian Questions Eckhart clarifies a fundamental difference between 
the human intellect and human knowledge of things. The former indicates the noble 
nature of human beings and in that sense is identical with the divine intellect,344 whereas 
the latter refers to man’s intellectual grasp of things, which is caused by things and is 
heavily dependent on the operation of the senses. The question concerning the nature 
of intellect and its relevance to human knowledge of things is briefly touched on in the 
middle part of Parisian Question 1 and also at the end of Parisian Question 2. In 
Question 1 Eckhart attributes intellect to God the creator after clarifying the creaturely 
                                                          
343 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum n.2 (LW I, 148,10) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in 
Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 80). 
344 This will be discussed in the following section. 
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nature of existence.345 That claim is further elaborated from the following three aspects: 
1) understanding is superior to existence and belongs to a different order; 2) 
understanding itself and whatever has to do with intellect such as truth, belongs to a 
different order than existence and whatever has to do with existence such as being and 
goodness; and 3) our knowledge is fundamentally differentiated from God’s as his 
knowledge is the cause of things whereas our knowledge is caused by things.346  
The first two statements intend to clarify or reinforce the distinction between intellect 
and existence, on the ground of one axiom – intellect is superior and prior to existence; 
whereas the third is suggesting a radical difference between the divine knowledge 
which holds the ontological priority over things as the very cause of them, and the 
knowledge generated in the human mind which is caused by things, hence is 
ontologically posterior to them. Here Eckhart shows no interest in developing a parallel 
or any resemblance between man’s knowledge (of things) and the knowledge conceived 
by the divine; on the contrary, he sets them in two different orders on account of the 
mode of causality. As God’s knowledge stands in a different order than ours, it follows 
that we cannot attain to the divine realm by means of accumulating our knowledge of 
things. Hence the kind of approach which intends to seek the divine through things 
should be refuted, and this refutation is suggesting a new approach to God, which we 
may call the way of purification, alluding to the message Eckhart conveys in Parisian 
Question 1. That message can be summarised thus: God is an intellect which is not 
mixed with existence yet contains everything in purity, fullness, and perfection, as 
intellect is the cause of being.347 
Eckhart’s formulation concerning God as shown above entails both negation and 
affirmation.  He begins by negating what does not belong to God, which is existence, 
and then affirms that God, as purity of existence, stands for ‘the cause of all existence 
                                                          
345 Eckhart does not seem clearly to differentiate ens from esse as Thomas does; both ens and esse are 
employed in his arguments. 
346 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n.8 (LW V 44,10-4): ‘Differt enim nostra scientia a scientia dei, quia scientia 
dei est causa rerum et scientia nostra est causata a rebus. Et ideo cum scientia nostra cadat sub ente, a 
quo causatur, et ipsum ens pari ratione cadit sub scientia dei; et ideo, quidquid est in deo, est super ipsum 
esse et est totum intelligere.’ (Trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 48.) 
This topic reappears in Eckhart’s commentary on Exodus; further discussion will be developed in the 
following section.  
347 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n.10 (LW V 46,2-6), ‘Cum igitur deus sit universalis causa entis, nihil quod 
est in deo, habet rationem entis, sed habet rationem intellectus et ipsius intelligere, de cuius ratione non 
est, quod caausam habeat, sicut est de ratione entis quod sit causatum; et in ipso intelligere omnia 
continentur in virtute sicut in causa suprema omnium.’ (Trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions 
and Prologues, 1974, 49.) 
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and pre-contains everything’; moreover: ‘God pre-contains everything in purity, 
fullness and perfection, more abundantly and extensively.’348 Hence the initial act of 
negating is finally incorporated into that of affirming; in other words, negation results 
in affirmation. In Eckhart, the mode of negation in the sense of clearing away from God 
what does not belong to God never ends up with negation per se or nothing whatsoever, 
as he makes it clear that: ‘I deny existence itself and suchlike of God so that he may be 
the cause of all existence and pre-contains all things.’349    
Eckhart’s negation of existence in God suggests that God ought not to be regarded 
as the climax of a hierarchical cosmos or the aggregate of the existence of the creaturely 
beings. Following that notion of God, it holds true that our knowledge of things does 
not lead to the knowledge of God, as they stand in two different orders. It is the 
purification rather than the accumulation of the knowledge of things that leads to the 
divine. Referring this line of argument to the propositions Eckhart lists in the General 
Prologue, in particular the relation of the superior to the inferior, we may conclude that 
human knowledge of things which sits in the inferior cannot add anything to the 
superior, which is the knowledge of God.  
In Parisian Question 1 Eckhart indirectly refutes the typical Thomistic approach, 
namely proceeding from effects to cause, or put another way, from knowledge of things 
to a ‘proportioned’ knowledge of God. The point Eckhart makes in Parisian Question 
1 forms a clear contrast to what Thomas says in Summa Theologica, I, q.12-‘How is 
God known by us?’ This lengthy question comprises 13 articles, and Thomas puts 
forward his notion of ‘proportion’ in the first article – ‘Whether any created intellect 
can see the essence of God?’ It reads as follows: 
Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to 
another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In 
another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in 
this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is 
related to him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this 
way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.350 
                                                          
348 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n.12 (LW V 48,6-8): ‘Dico enim quod deus omnia praehabet in puritate, 
plenitudine, perfectione, amplius et latius, exsistens radix et causa omnium.’ (Trans. Armand A. Maurer 
in Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 50.)  
349 Ibid. 
350 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.12, a.1.  
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Here Thomas clarifies the two senses in which ‘proportion’ is to be considered, and 
claims that, in the second sense, ‘proportion’ pertains to the relation of the creature to 
God the creator, which is regarded as that of ‘the effect to its cause’ or ‘potentiality to 
its act’. This line of thought is particularly challenged by Eckhart in the third newly re-
discovered Parisian Question: ‘Whether diversity is a real or an intellectual 
relation?’351 Eckhart refutes the view that a real relation could not be grounded in 
substance; instead he asserts that ‘such is a relation that it sets something real and has 
a distinct end’, and ‘such is God’s relation to the creature’. 352 Eckhart distinguishes 
‘relation’ from the first three categories (substance, quality and quantity) which refer to 
a thing, and also from the last six categories (place, time, position, state, action, or 
affection), 353 which predicate a thing under a condition. Eckhart’s new understanding 
of ‘relation’ is tied up with the notion of ‘ground’. He claims: ‘A relation can neither 
be conceptualised nor exist without ground’; it follows that the ground ‘belongs to the 
essence of a relation’. This claim is further backed up from three aspects: 1) a relation 
is according to its what-it-is an accident, but that it is an accident derives from the 
ground; 2) a relation differs according to species from another on account of its ground; 
and 3) a relation insofar as it is a relation is not distinguished from another relation 
according to its species. Therefore, a relation is distinguished from another relation 
insofar as it is such a relation. But that it is such [a relation], derives from ground and 
end. 354 
According to Eckhart’s notion of ‘relation’, God is related to the creature in the sense 
of ground to end, rather than cause to effect or potentiality to act as Thomas puts it. In 
that sense a relation is brought into reality by both extremes, namely one as the ground 
and the other as the end. Following his redefinition of ‘relation’, Eckhart modifies the 
                                                          
351 In his commentary on Exodus Eckhart further ponders upon the concept of relation and the question 
concerning the two categories – substance and relation in the Godhead. See Eckhart, In Ex. nn.62-72 
(LW II 66,14-75,15) (trans. Bernard McGinn in trans. Bernard McGinn in Meister Eckhart: Teacher and 
Preacher, New Jersey, 1986, 64-7. It will be abridged as Teacher and Preacher).  
352 It is beyond the scope of this study to develop a full discussion of Eckhart’s notion of ‘relation’. Here 
I simply mention the difference between Thomas’s ‘proportion’ and Eckhart’s ‘relation’, so as to reveal 
the mode of thinking underlying the two different approaches to God in Thomas and in Eckhart. Clearly 
Eckhart’s notion of ‘relation’ holds the key to his revolutionary understanding of the divine Trinity and 
creation. Markus Vinzent, following his discovery of the four new Parisian Questions, tackles the 
intriguing question surrounding Eckhart’s unconventional understanding of ‘relation’ and his thought 
regarding the transcendental essence in Trinity. For details, see Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment 
(2011), 5-27. 
353 Aristotle, Categories I, vi.   
354 Eckhart, the third newly rediscovered Parisian Question, Quaestio Par. Nov. III: ‘Utrum diversitas 
esset realis vel rationis’, in Magistri Eckhardi: Quaestiones Parisienses Supplementum (2011), 466-8. 
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meaning of ‘dependence’ or ‘coexistence’, which is usually employed to explain the 
relation of creator to creature and the relation of the divine persons in the Godhead. 
Eckhart affirms his impression that a real relation must be grounded in substance; if we 
take dependence as a kind of relation, yet treat it in the way an effect is linked with its 
cause, it follows that there would be no real relation in the Godhead, nor will there be 
a real relation between God and the world. This is because a real relation follows the 
nature of a thing, not an intellectual order; although identity of something with itself is 
a rational one, the identity between two substances is something else.355 
On the basis of a relation that is grounded in substance, Eckhart allows an essential 
similarity and reversibility between God and the world, since the divine intellect and 
the created world form a real relation. So far as a real relation is concerned, the divine 
essence and the world as two extremes of the same relation can be found in each other. 
Hence the divine intellect is in every thing in the sense of the superior in the inferior, 
not in terms of proportion or degree, but in terms of fullness and entirety. Through his 
nuanced expounding of relation, Eckhart replaces the kind of hierarchical and 
proportioned resemblance between God and the world as stated in Thomas.   
Cross-reading between Parisian Question 1 and the third newly re-discovered 
Question, one will find that in Eckhart our knowledge of things, irrespective of having 
a fundamental difference from the knowledge of God, is nevertheless an understanding 
of the divine, because the created things are not deprived of the divine nature, as the 
above technical proof has demonstrated. Eckhart maintains that ‘knowledge entails two 
real [aspects], quality and real relatedness’.356 It follows that human knowledge of 
things, so long as it takes both quality and real relatedness into consideration, should 
be credited with a divine nature; hence the unity of the divine essence is seen in the 
diversity of things, and the divine intellect is discovered in every thing. In his Prologue 
to the Book of Propositions Eckhart clarifies the first and universal cause of all things 
which give rise to existence from the secondary causes which give rise to this 
existence.357 In his commentary on the Book of Wisdom, Eckhart claims everything 
created is in some way one, equal and indistinct, because God the Creator affects 
everything created by his unity, his equality and his indistinction.358    
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357 Eckhart, Prologus in Opus Propositionum n.11 (LW I 1, 171,11-172,1) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in 
Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 97).  
358 Eckhart,In Sap. n.39 (LW II 360) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 155).  
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2.1.2.5 Divine Intellect and Human Intellect as Being One Intellect 
By refuting Thomas’s view concerning a proportion of the creature to God, Eckhart 
also puts into question the Thomistic impression as to the circumscription of the human 
intellect and our knowledge of the divine in this life. In Summa Theologica, I, q.12, a.4, 
Thomas explains a fundamental difference between sense and intellect. According to 
Thomas, sense and intellect as two cognitive powers in human soul, align with two 
different modes of knowing: sense is the act of a corporeal organ and only knows the 
singular, whereas intellect can abstract the universals from the particular objects. 
Although intellect in us does not function on account of a particular corporeal organ, it 
still differs from the angelic intellect as the latter naturally knows natures that are not 
in matter. Thomas makes it clear that the capacity of the angelic intellect is ‘beyond the 
power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the 
body’. 359  
In Thomas the divine intellect is differentiated from the created intellect, which 
includes the angelic intellect and the human intellect. He affirms the point that to know 
self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone, which is beyond the natural 
power of any created intellect.360 Following the scriptural reference ‘Who makes his 
angels spirits’, Thomas defines angels as incorporeal creatures (Ps. 103:4), in the sense 
that angels are incorporeal beings in nature, but nevertheless they are confined to the 
sphere of creatures. He also calls them the infinite creature in the sense that an angel is 
not to be received in any matter, thus is infinite from below; and receives its being from 
above, hence remains finite from above.361 As for the nature of the angelic intellect, 
Thomas holds that angels, as the created incorporeal beings, are endowed with the 
ability to first and principally understand immaterial things. Knowledge is not 
generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence the distinction between an active 
and a passive intellect is not seen in angels.362 As angels do not have physical body as 
we do, it follows that the angelic intellect, unlike the human intellect, does not form a 
direct linkage with the power of senses.  
                                                          
359 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.12, a.4.  
360 Ibid. 
361 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.50, a.2.  In q.50, a.5 Thomas asserts that the angels are incorruptible by 
their nature, as a result of their immateriality. A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from their 
intellectual operation. 
362 Thomas Summa Theol., I, q.54, a.4. 
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Thomas makes a distinction between the passive intellect and the active intellect in 
us and also expounds the necessity for such a distinction. According to Thomas, the 
reason for admitting a passive intellect in us lies in the fact that we understand 
sometimes only in potentiality, not actually. And the necessity for admitting an active 
intellect is due to the potential intelligibility of the material things. Thomas argues that 
since the material things known by us are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they 
are outside the soul, it follows that there should be some power capable of rendering to 
such natures actual intelligibility, and this power in us is called the active intellect.363 
Admittedly, throughout his Parisian Questions Eckhart shows little interest in 
differentiating the divine intellect from the created intellect, nor does he pay much 
attention to the difference between the angelic intellect and the human intellect. Eckhart 
focuses on the nature of intellect per se, as he sees the divine intellect and the human 
intellect as being one intellect. A relatively more explicit and systematic expounding of 
the concept of intellect is seen in Parisian Question 2,364 in which Eckhart provides a 
scholastic proof rendered in purely philosophical terms. After a brief introduction to 
Thomas’s view, he moves on to his eleven ‘other ways’ to support his answer, which 
can be summarised into five points as follows.  
First, Eckhart defines intellect as a natural power of the soul. Insofar as it is a natural 
power, it is neither here, nor now, nor some definite thing, thus does not fall into a 
definite species and genus. Because every being or existence is in a definite genus and 
species, it follows that intellect is not a being, nor does it have an existence. 
Second, power and action have their existence from their object. Both intellect as a 
natural power of the soul, and understanding as the action of the intellect, have their 
existence from their object. 
Third, a cognitive likeness, as the principle of the operation of the senses and intellect, 
is in no sense a being. Eckhart expounds this from three aspects: 1) a cognitive likeness 
is no more than a being in the mind, but a being in the mind is not a being in the proper 
sense, according to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, for a being in the mind is contrary to the 
being divided into the ten categories, and also to substance and accident; 2) a cognitive 
likeness has an object but not a subject; for the soul, or more precisely, the intellective 
part of the soul, is the place not the subject in which a cognitive likeness resides; 3) a 
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364 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. II nn.1-10 (LW V 49,5-54,6), (trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions 
and Prologues, 1974, 51-4). 
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cognitive likeness serves the purpose of representing something to the intellect; it would 
be distracted from its representative function if it were a being.  
Fourth, a being is some definite thing. Both a universal and the act of understanding 
through which a universal is produced are something indeterminate; hence neither a 
universal nor the act of understanding is a being.    
Finally, Eckhart recalls the last point he makes in Parisian Question 1, that the nature 
of being is on a lower level than its cause, which is God, but is on a higher level than 
what is caused by being, which is human knowledge. In accordance with the principle 
of causality, what is caused is not the same as cause per se, therefore God is not the 
same as existence because he is the cause of it; likewise existence or being is not the 
same as our knowledge because the latter is caused by the former. Hence our knowledge 
does not have existence, it tends toward non-being.  
Eckhart allows himself to fall back on Aristotle to the extent that Aristotle is treated 
as the exclusive authority in his reasoning; no one but Aristotle is repeatedly quoted, in 
particular his Metaphysics and De Anima. The metaphysical categories in Aristotle are 
widely employed by Eckhart in Parisian Question 2; the philosophical presentation 
runs on its own account without being interrupted or reinforced by a single quotation 
of the scriptural texts. Throughout all the arguments presented here, Eckhart shows no 
intention to give a separate treatment of the angelic intellect, nor does he endeavour to 
establish a definition of angels different from that of Thomas in Summa Theologica (I, 
q.50). The reason may lie in the fact that Eckhart sees no fundamental difference 
between a human being and an angel so far as intellect is concerned; probably he 
follows Gregory and believes that ‘man senses in common with the brutes, and 
understands with the angels’.365 
     A cross-reading of Eckhart’s and Thomas’s expositions on this topic suggests that 
Eckhart does not concern himself with the difference between the divine intellect and 
the created intellect, nor does he admit the distinction between the passive and active 
intellect in us. Moreover, the superiority of the angelic intellect over the human intellect 
is not even mentioned in a disputed question like Parisian Question 2, which concerns 
precisely the existence and knowing of the angels. The focus of Eckhart’s arguments is 
persistently fixed on the nature of intellect, which can be applied to both the human and 
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the angelic intellect. He is far more concerned with the nature of intellect in general 
than with the characteristics that are peculiar to the angelic intellect. 
It becomes clear that despite the fact that, in Parisian Questions 1 and 2, Eckhart 
admits a radical difference between human knowledge of things and the knowledge of 
God on account of the mode of causality, in the sense that the divine knowledge is prior 
to things and is the cause of things whereas our knowledge (of things) is posterior to 
things and is caused by things, with his innovative notion of relation he seems to open 
up to the possibility that the divine nature can be possessed by the created things. Just 
as he sees the divine essence as the ground that holds God and the world together as 
two extremes in one relation, Eckhart takes the divine intellect and the human intellect 
as being fundamentally one intellect, and this is the very point where he deviates from 
Thomas. So far as the topic of intellect is concerned, the core of his arguments as 
unfolded in the scholastic Quaestiones lies in the nature of intellect, which gives a hint 
as to the unity of the human intellect and the divine intellect. Evidently Eckhart’s 
exposition of the intellect does not end with a clear distinction between the divine 
intellect and the created intellect, nor is the superiority of the angelic intellect over the 
human intellect stressed. On the contrary, he seems to have deliberately omitted the 
discussion over the distinction between the three, and persistently fixes the attention on 
the universal nature of intellect, be it possessed by the divine, an angel or a human being. 
Nevertheless, this does not contradict an acknowledgement of the difference between 
the three, as touched upon in his scriptural commentaries.   
 
 
2.2 Eckhart the Theologian: Probing the Concept of the Human Intellect through 
Scriptural Commentaries  
In comparison with the quaestiones, where scripture is quoted only infrequently, 
Eckhart’s commentaries entail a closer dialogue with the scriptural texts. His 
commentary writing covers both the Old and the New Testaments,366 comprising his 
Commentary on Genesis (two), and Commentaries on Exodus, Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom 
and John. Instead of writing a line-by-line commentary, he picks certain parts from 
                                                          
366 Eckhart is among those who conduct speculative theology and also engage in composing biblical 
commentaries, according to the observation of William J. Courtenay, see note 286. 
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each of these scriptural texts, and among the chosen texts some verses are treated 
separately, which gives rise to his Book of Sermons in Latin.367  
In contrast to Thomas’s encyclopaedic style, Eckhart deliberately refrains from 
writing long-winged commentary. He starts his Opus Tripartitum with the General 
Prologue, in which he particularly defines the scope and purpose that apply to all his 
three works, namely propositions, questions and commentaries. Eckhart makes it clear 
that all of these compositions are intended to meet the demands of certain zealous 
brethren. Having been deeply stimulated and inspired, they have urged Eckhart to put 
down in writing what they have heard from him, for in their view what Eckhart has said 
is rarely heard elsewhere. In response to their request, Eckhart narrows his commentary 
down to those unusual statements which his zealous brethren do not recall having read 
or heard elsewhere. Throughout the Opus Tripartitum Eckhart maintains his focus on 
the novel and unusual topics, because he, like those curious brethren, believes that the 
novel and unusual topics will do a better job than the ordinary ones in stimulating the 
mind, although the latter could be more valuable and important.368 
Clearly the novel and unusual topics that Eckhart intends to bring forward can only 
be appreciated by those who have received professional training in the ordinary topics 
and have also acquired familiarity with the conventional ways in which these topics are 
being discussed. In other words, Eckhart’s commentary is intended to stimulate an 
inquisitive mind and to deepen his or her understanding of a familiar topic. Eckhart’s 
commentary is not fitting for an amateur, nor is it a textbook for one to commence 
theological speculation. He is fully aware that his unconventional style will not be 
easily accepted; what he says may appear ‘strange, doubtful or false’ at first sight. 
However, those seemingly ‘strange, doubtful or false’ items from his propositions, 
questions and commentaries will be judged otherwise if they are examined ‘in a more 
learned and intelligent way’. In his commentary Eckhart attempts to demonstrate how 
these statements are fully substantiated by sacred scripture itself, and also supported by 
the words of the past saints and illustrious masters.369  
                                                          
367 In his General Prologue, Eckhart restricts his commentary on certain texts of the two Testaments, 
among which he gives more detailed treatment to some verses, as it seems proper to him to comment on 
them separately, and to call this the Book of Sermons (n.6 [LW I 1, 151,7-10], trans. Armand A. Maurer 
in Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 81-2). 
368 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum n.2 (LW I 1, 149,1-2) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in 
Parisian Questions and Prologues,1974, 80). 
369 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum n.7 (LW I 1, 152,5-7) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in 
Parisian Questions and Prologues,1974, 82). 
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In addition to the General Prologue to all his works, Eckhart writes a prologue to 
each specific scriptural text before making comment on it. These prologues echo each 
other, and from them we may elicit some hermeneutical rules that Eckhart follows in 
his commentary writing. We will look first at the hermeneutical rules that are essential 
for a proper understanding of Eckhart, and then examine the detailed expositions that 
he puts forward in the form of commentary with respect to the notion of intellect, in 
particular, the human intellect. 
  
2.2.1 The Genre of Commentary and the Hermeneutical Rules Followed by Eckhart 
Before looking at the specific rules that Eckhart set for his commentary writing, it is 
necessary to glimpse the scholastic background against which his commentary stands. 
  
2.2.1.1 The Scholastic Background  
It is almost impossible to overestimate the importance of scriptures to the formation 
and development of a tradition. Indeed, one may even consider that a tradition is 
nothing but the history of the interpretation of a foundational text or a set of 
foundational texts, because traditions actually develop around texts that have acquired 
such authoritative status as to become foundational. This statement can be historically 
backed up by various world traditions. For instance, the tradition in ancient Greece 
developed around Homer; that in Judaism around the Torah; in Christianity around the 
Bible; in Islam around the Qur’an. Even the political tradition of modern America is, 
in many ways, centred on the Constitution.370  
These fundamental texts, especially the sacred scriptures of different religions, did 
not initially appear in the form of systematic discourse.  They usually took a narrative 
form; in other words, the religious texts that are today deemed sacred scriptures 
emerged as stories rather than systems. Of course, as has been shown by scholarship, 
the narrative form of the two Testaments does not exclude elements of teaching or 
doctrine; for example the Ten Commandments in the Old Testament and the Gospel 
according to John in the New Testament, which already sees a theological reflection 
on the Saviour. Nonetheless, neither Testament constitutes anything like a theological 
‘system’ or synthesis. Yet while the sacred scripture itself is fundamentally narrative in 
                                                          
370 Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford and New York, 2004), 8.  
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structure, that narrative form actually encourages theological reflection, which is to 
penetrate faith by means of reason.  
This kind of intellectual penetration of the faith had started early in Christianity, and 
the legitimacy of using non-Christian concepts and ideas was formally established by 
Augustine. In his On Christian Doctrine Augustine makes it clear that it is perfectly 
justified for a Christian scholar to apply the pagan philosophy to his study of the 
scriptures.371 The Christian tradition, as other religious traditions, is based upon its 
fundamental texts, the Old and New Testaments, and from the initial narrative form of 
the original texts arise a wide range of interpretations as systematic theological 
reflection upon the faith proclaimed by the divinely inspired scriptures. That process 
indicates an intellectual development from story to system. In fact, the kind of 
intellectual penetration of the faith, systematisation of the scriptural texts and dialogue 
with non-Christian thought had been attempted by Christian fathers in antiquity, 
showing that the seeds of what Martin Grabmann called the scholastic method,372 which 
is usually associated with the name of Thomas Aquinas, had been planted long before 
the Middle Ages.373  
The evolution from story to system begins when a narrative is reflected and 
interpreted; this interpretation of a divinely inspired text gives rise to a system, namely 
theology.374 The holy scriptures may possess the power to determine the fundamental 
character of Christianity, but it is the continuing interpretation of them that allows the 
Christian tradition to be preserved and developed. A direct interpretation of the original 
scriptural texts gives rise to a commentary, which serves mainly to clarify the meaning 
of the words contained in the scriptures.375 In that sense commentary acquires more 
                                                          
371 See St. Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 2. 144-8. This line of thought was well received in the 
context of medieval scholastic theology. 
372 Martin Grabmann in 1909 defined scholasticism as follows: ‘the scholastic method intends to gain as 
much insight as possible into the contents of the faith through the application of reason and philosophy 
to the truths of revelation, so as to bring supernatural truth closer to the human mind which reflects on it, 
to make possible a systematic, organically structured general presentation of the truth about salvation, 
and to be able to answer reasonably the objections raised against the contents of revelation’ (Grabmann, 
Geschichte 1:36-37; see also Quinto, Scholastica, 339-49). Quoted from Ulrich G Leinsle, Introduction 
to Scholastic Theology, trans. by Michael J. Miller (Washington, D.C., 2010), 5.  
373 For a detailed exposition, see Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (2004), 8-33. 
374 The development from a story or even a myth to a systematic interpretation has been explored from 
a modern hermeneutical perspective, as illustrated in Paul Ricoeur’s study of psychoanalysis and 
structuralism, which culminated in a collection of his essays: The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in 
Hermeneutics (Evanston, 1974). 
375 James M. Robinson offers a concise and clear introduction to the development of hermeneutics in 
Christian tradition alongside biblical studies; see James M. Robinson and John B Cobb (eds.), The New 
Hermeneutic (New York, Evanston and London, 1964), ch. 1, ‘Hermeneutic since Barth’, 1-77. 
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significance than other literary forms in shaping a religious tradition, due to its direct 
connection to the fundamental texts. 
The form of commentary entails an individual’s unique dialogue with a scripture.  
Hence the practice of commentary writing lies at the heart of biblical studies, as it 
suggests the means by which a religious tradition is to be received and conceived anew 
in an individual mind. As a text is always open to new understanding and thus to new 
interpretation, different commentaries based on the same text can arise at the same time 
and possibly be justified according to the same standard.  
Hermeneutics as the art of interpretation or understanding has occupied the minds of 
Christian scholars since the very beginning of Christian history. As early as the third 
century four possible modes of scriptural exegesis were proposed, namely the literal; 
moral; allegorical or mystical, in which the Old Testament is interpreted as a 
prefiguring of the New Testament; and the anagogical or revelatory mode. These 
became the four guidelines for commentary writing throughout the medieval period.376 
By the twelfth century students of biblical exegesis usually resorted to the Glossa 
Ordinaria, which became the standard medieval corpus of biblical glosses, providing 
commentaries on a high proportion of verses in the Vulgate Bible. The authors of the 
glosses include Origen, Augustine, John Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, and Gregory 
the Great, among whom the most frequently quoted is Augustine. It is worth noting that 
most of the commentaries dwell on only one of the four levels of figurative meaning of 
a word, phrase, or verse.377  
In addition to Augustine, Boethius represents another important influence on the 
medieval intellectual activity. In his On the Consolation of Philosophy (De 
Consolatione Philosophiae) Boethius regards Philosophia as the ‘guide of reason’, and 
maintains that this unemotional intellectual guide should be followed by all. In his view, 
faith should rest with reason. Emotion is depicted as a distraction whose dominance 
must be suppressed, so as to allow reason to achieve a level of control in the individual. 
In his On the Trinity (De Trinitate), Boethius claims that ‘it is the mark of an educated 
person to attempt to grasp each thing as it is, and thus to hold a belief about it’.378 On 
this account he makes the three speculative divisions, namely physics, mathematics and 
theology. Each deals with different objects. Physics is proper to that which is in motion 
                                                          
376 B.B. Price, Medieval Thought: An Introduction, (Oxford and Cambridge MA, 1992), 60. 
377 B.B. Price, Medieval Thought: An Introduction (1992), 229-30. 
378 Boethius, On the Trinity, II, 168.60. 
161 
 
and not abstract; mathematics to that which is not in motion and not abstract; theology 
alone deals with the abstract, which is not in motion and is separable, in other words, 
the subject of theology is the substance of God, which lacks both motion and matter. 
Consequently each of the three divisions calls for a specific approach suitable to the 
nature of the relevant subject. For instance, one should engage in physics rationally, in 
mathematics in a disciplined manner, and in the study of the divine matter in an 
intellectual manner.379 Boethius also made an ambitious attempt to translate the work 
of the Greek philosophers into Latin, although that plan did not come to fruition. His 
unique contribution to the education of the liberal arts is particularly worth mentioning 
here. Boethius embarked upon an immensely stimulating project of writing textbooks 
for each of the arts of the quadrivium: On Arithmetic (De arithmetica); On Geometry 
(De geometrica); On Music (De musica) and On Astronomy (De astronomia). His 
textbooks proved to be pedagogical milestones and formed the core of the liberal arts 
curriculum throughout the twelfth century.380 
The systematic introduction of Aristotle’s works to the Latin world in the 12th and 
13th centuries, partly through the Arabic scholars’ commentaries and translations of the 
Greek philosophy, finally triggered the rise of the scholastic movement in Christian 
theology that culminated in Thomas. Thomas defines theology as the divine science 
whose truth is to be demonstrated by natural reason. In the first question of his Summa 
Theologica Thomas claims that ‘there is a God needs proof’.381 In other words, faith 
seeks understanding, and revelation is open to reasoning. This fundamental axiom of 
the scholastic theology represents a striking contrast to that kind of esotericism 
according to which human language and reason is ultimately a perversion of the Word 
of God. It was taken for granted by the medieval mind that the revelatory truth contained 
in the holy scriptures does not prohibit, but in fact calls for, a clear, logical and orderly 
demonstration in the light of the natural reason. Thus despite the differences and 
disagreements between theologians of diverse backgrounds, a common understanding 
was shared by all the masters and students in the Middle Ages, one that is expressed 
through a persistent zeal and a profound sense of respect for clarity and order. The 
                                                          
379 Following the three methods appropriate to the three different subjects, Boethius continues, ‘it is also 
fitting not to be drawn aside towards images, but rather to contemplate that form which is truly form and 
not image, and which is being itself as well as that from which being it’ (Boethius, On the Trinity, II. 
169.80). 
380 B.B. Price particularly addresses this point in his Medieval Thought: An Introduction (1992), 63-5.  
381 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.1.  
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emphasis on clarity of expression and orderly procedure reveals the mould of the 
scholastic mind, one in full accordance with the notion that it is a theologian’s duty to 
strive for clarity of thought and expression regardless of one’s spiritual achievement. 
Generally speaking, the task of scholastic theology is fixed on demonstrating a set of 
logically sound ‘proofs’ for the Christian faith.  The scholastic authors set up a rigid 
academic standard that calls for a command of Aristotelian and Platonic (including 
Neoplatonic) concepts of grammar and logic, in particular Aristotle’s syllogism; and of 
the works of the antecedent Greek and Latin fathers. This standard can be universally 
applied to all sorts of theological compositions, and is taken up most seriously in the 
writing of commentary, especially the commentary on scriptures. Therefore, the 
privilege of writing commentary on the sacred texts was strictly reserved for a qualified 
master in his maturity.382  
The scholastic commentary shows a marked distinction from the patristic and 
monastic commentaries. We cannot probe here into the details concerning the 
differences among these three; for the present study it is necessary to say only that 
scholastic commentary fixes itself upon the rational demonstration of the divine truth 
contained in the sacred texts, and on that basis the expression of personal piety is 
superseded by a rigorous logical demonstration of the divine truth. A glimpse of the 
academic training in the medieval universities, in particular Paris and Oxford, may help 
to illustrate this. All students, before being admitted to the faculty of theology, were 
required to receive the preparatory training in the liberal arts, the trivium (grammar, 
rhetoric and logic) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy). 
Evidently only one who had been well trained in grammar and logic would be 
considered qualified to take up the study of theology, an indication that the learning of 
scripture would inevitably be loaded with grammatical analysis and logical 
                                                          
382 Academic training in theology was a long process in the Middle Ages. Theology students usually 
started with the Sentences of Peter Lombard (d. 1160), the official theological handbook at that time. 
Having listened to others for some years, they were allowed to comment on the Sentences and thus 
obtained the degree of bachelor, to be precise, ‘bachalarius Sententiarum’ (‘Bachelor of the Sentences’). 
Lombard’s Sentences was chosen as the appropriate first textbook for all theology students, as it provided 
a systematic collection of the Patristic teachings of the Greek and Latin fathers, arranged in four books 
following the order of the Apostles’ Creed. Through this training, a student would acquire the ability to 
appreciate the technique employed by a master in his scholastic works. A table showing a student’s career 
at university is given in John Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350): An Introduction 
(London and New York, 1987), 21-2.  
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inference.383 In fact, so essential was the study of grammar and logic to scholastic 
learning, that textbooks such as the Grammar of Priscian and the Summulae Logicales 
of Peter of Spain were treated as canonical texts, thoroughly studied and widely 
commented by medieval scholars. Sitting in the scholastic tradition, the knowledge of 
grammar and logic provided one with efficient instruments for biblical studies in terms 
of reading and interpreting scriptures.  
Following on from the continuous translation of Aristotle’s works into Latin, the so-
called Logica nova (new logic) emerged around the middle of the 13th century, in 
addition to the existing Logica vetus (old logic).384 Meanwhile Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
and Libri Naturales were introduced into the universities. As a result Greek philosophy 
was embraced and known in depth and detail by arts masters and theologians alike, and 
metaphysical questioning was thus integrated into theological speculation.      
Overall the crucial role of grammar, logic and philosophy in scholastic learning 
brought about an unprecedented rigorous standard for academic research 385  at the 
medieval universities. Aristotle’s definition of science was adopted by all the subjects 
taught at university; thus theology was crowned as the science of the divine, and the 
study of theology was not to be exempt from the normative standard for scientific 
research. As a result, logical demonstration and syllogistic argumentation formed the 
core of scholastic theology, which was expressed chiefly through quaestiones. It is 
worth mentioning that from the middle of the 12th century onwards Aristotle’s De 
Sophisticis Elenchis was thoroughly studied and enjoyed increasing popularity. This 
treatise on fallacies certainly met the demands of the quaestio technique, as it provided 
the students and masters at the faculty of theology with the method for detecting and 
refuting fallacious arguments. It is also notable that the quaestio technique gave impetus 
                                                          
383 Thomas expounds the four senses a word in the Holy Scripture may have.  First and foremost is the 
literal sense; on the basis of the literal sense arises the spiritual sense, which is threefold: moral, 
allegorical and anagogical. Thomas also touches on a further, parabolical, sense, but he gives no further 
exposition on this.  See Summa Theol., I, q.1, a.10.  
384 The so-called ‘new logic’ comprises Aristotle’s four logical works: Prior Analytics, De Sophisticis 
Elenchis, Topics and Posterior Analytics, while the ‘old logic’ refers to the texts previously available to 
the Latin world, including Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Porphyry’s Isagoge, as well as 
Boethius’s Commentaries on Isagoge, Categories and De Interpretatione and his treatise on topical 
argumentation De topicis differentiis. 
385 Medieval scholars’ expertise in linguistic analysis has not been fully realised by contemporary studies 
in logic and philosophy. Desmond Paul Henry sharply points out that the cognate techniques such as 
linguistically analytic philosophising, which has been pronounced a characteristic product of twentieth-
century bourgeois society, and the grammar of ‘deep structure’, which has been deemed a novelty 
originating in the seventeenth century, were perfectly familiar to medieval scholars. See Desmond Paul 
Henry, That Most Subtle Question (Quaestio Subtillissima: The Metaphysical Bearing of Medieval and 
Contemporary Linguistic Disciplines) (Manchester, 1984), vii.      
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to the commentary writing of a scholastic theologian like Eckhart. Although scriptural 
commentaries appear never to be as argumentative as disputed quaestiones, a scholastic 
commentator implicitly encloses a debate within his commentary by alluding to the 
opinion that he intends to refute. Similarly, the technique of syllogistic reasoning, which 
plays a predominant role in the writing of quaestiones, is not excluded from the writing 
of scriptural commentary.          
Of course, the techniques involved in formulating the scholastic quaestiones also 
penetrate the writing of scholastic commentaries. Commentary on scriptures is 
expected to attain to the level of scientific research, hence the striving for objectivity 
and universality is manifest in theology as it is in secular studies. In that sense the Holy 
Bible should be studied as it is, and the commentary on a scriptural text ought to clarify 
and disclose the objective, literal meaning of scripture itself. It is understandable that a 
scholastic commentator would no longer be content with an unproven claim charged 
with personal emotion and apologetic enthusiasm. Instead, he will conscientiously 
concentrate on the literal meaning of the sacred texts. The exclusive task of the 
scholastic commentary is to reveal, as clearly as possible, what the authors of the 
scriptures intend to say. Thus the more objective and invisible the commentator is, the 
better his commentary will become. Considering the biblical education occurring in the 
schools of Paris and elsewhere, the main purpose of the scholastic commentary is to 
sharpen the minds of the students by providing them with the objective meaning of the 
scriptural texts. It aims to deepen the reader’s understanding of the sacred texts, rather 
than to arouse piety in him. The scholastic approach to scripture in general differs from 
the principle Augustine advocates in his On Christian Doctrine, in which he forcefully 
emphasises the priority of faith and takes faith as the ground for a proper understanding 
of scripture. To Augustine the pursuit of knowledge is prone to arousing arrogance in 
the knower if his mind is not firmly rooted in faith. He thus lays down a rule concerning 
scriptural reading: ‘When he [the reader] is meek and lowly of heart, subject to the easy 
yoke of Christ, and loaded with his light burden, rooted and grounded and built up in 
faith, so that knowledge cannot puff him up, let him then approach the consideration 
and discussion of ambiguous signs in scripture.’386 Augustine’s deep concern about the 
potentially detrimental effect of knowledge is not necessarily shared by a medieval 
                                                          




scholastic, and neither is his optative or even imperative tone. In contrast to the 
homiletic and pastoral style of the patristic and monastic commentaries, scholastic 
commentary makes more room for rational demonstration, using a language often 
dominated by the propositional form, and whatever tends towards unction, 
colloquialism or informality will be skilfully withdrawn from consideration.  
In that sense, the scholastic commentator is more cautious about his personal 
interference with the literal meaning of the scriptures. Indeed, a commentator must shed 
some personal light on a transmitted text whilst composing a commentary on it, that 
personal light only shines out when the commentator delves into the depth of the 
scripture and brings out the best of it. Therefore, commentary is fundamentally an 
expression of the commentator’s discovery of what has been hidden deep within the 
sacred texts; his intellectual output is strictly confined to the domain of such objective 
‘discovery’, and should never become a manifestation of his free ‘creation’.  
Clearly this sort of scholastic analysis of the scriptural texts attaches most importance 
to the literal meaning of scripture, which refers to the intention of the author of the Holy 
Scripture – God. Although the literal sense points directly towards what is intended by 
the author, this does not mean that the words in the holy scripture can be taken only in 
the literal sense. Because God, unlike the human author of a secular text, comprehends 
all things by his intellect in one act, it follows that even according to the literal meaning, 
it is not unfitting to recognise that one word in a scripture may be understood in several 
senses. In Summa Theologica (I, q.1, a.10) Thomas resorts to Augustine (Confession 
12.31.42) to justify the multiple senses of the words in the scriptures. On that basis 
Thomas makes a distinction between the literal sense and the spiritual sense, and insists 
that the literal sense is one, a word signifies one thing, and that thing could have further 
signification if God so intended. Thomas gives a full exposition of the relation between 
the literal sense and the spiritual sense. From his perspective, the spiritual sense must 
be entirely based on and derived from the literal sense. He further explains the 
fundamental difference between the divine author and the human author, claiming that: 
‘The author of Holy Scripture is God, in whose power it is to signify his meaning, not 
by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves.’387 On this ground, 
Thomas points out the distinctive character which distinguishes theology from every 
other science with regard to the word and its signification. According to Thomas, the 




spiritual sense that is deemed the enlargement or extension of the literal sense ought to 
be strictly reserved for the words contained in the holy scripture; the co-existence of 
the spiritual and literal senses applies only to the divine, and no other science apart from 
theology – the science of the divine – is proper to this hermeneutical principle. God 
alone, as the author of the Holy Bible and the creator of all things, is entitled to make 
one thing serve as the symbol that signifies another reality. In other words, only the 
Bible enjoys the spiritual sense, and as the reader we can never take one thing as the 
symbol of another unless we are so informed in the literal sense. The spiritual sense is 
threefold, namely the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical.  
Such a scholastic stance as expressed by Thomas clearly gives priority to the literal 
meaning and conscientiously redefines the scope of it. Although both Thomas and 
Augustine take the literal meaning of a word as what is intended by the author, in 
Augustine the term ‘literal’ is taken in a broader sense; when the author is God, who in 
his intellect comprehends all things, the literal sense of a word could become multiple. 
To Thomas one word has only one literal meaning, the stance as to the multiplicity of 
literal senses is to be abandoned entirely. After Thomas, Eckhart seems to stand closer 
to Augustine when he attempts to unite the literal sense with the spiritual sense, as will 
be discussed later. 
Thomas’s scholastic works cover a wide spectrum.  In addition to De Veritate and 
Summa Theologica, which are formulated in the form of quaestiones, Thomas also 
composed a series of scriptural commentaries; for example his Catena Aurea or Golden 
Chain provides a continuous gloss on the four gospels, in which the Latin and Greek 
Fathers are collocated. Taking Thomas’s Golden Chain as an example, it is plain that 
the scholastic commentary, despite an unprecedented emphasis on the literal meaning 
of scripture, still fulfils the duty of preserving the continuity of Christian tradition, as it 
is seen that at least in Thomas the patristic thinking forms an integral part of his 
scholastic commentary. While it is hard to discern to what extent Thomas’s Golden 
Chain has influenced Eckhart’s commentary writing, it is clear that at least some of 
Eckhart’s commentaries, such as his Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer as shown by 
recently published studies,388 are closely based on this work. To that extent, we may 
conclude that Eckhart follows in the footsteps of Thomas and the church fathers in his 
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commentary writing, and deliberately merges his thought into the longstanding 
tradition of biblical study. In comparison with his Parisian Questions, Eckhart’s 
scriptural commentaries entail a broader horizon, partly due to the objective criterion 
of the form of commentary, and more importantly due to his own attempt to incorporate 
the whole tradition into his rich and exhaustive exegeses on some of the most well-
known scriptural texts or verses.       
 
2.2.1.2 The Specific Hermeneutical Rules Followed by Eckhart’s Commentary 
The unique contribution of Eckhart’s commentary to the scholastic tradition would be 
almost incomprehensible, were the continuity between Eckhart and Thomas to be 
neglected. Just as the Book of Questions accords with the order of content in the Summa 
Theologica,389 so Eckhart bears in mind the words of the illustrious and venerable friar 
Thomas of Aquino whilst composing the Book of Commentaries, which constitutes the 
third book of the Opus Tripartitum. Once again Eckhart reminds the reader that the 
works of the venerable teachers, and particularly Thomas, are not to be neglected.  
It is beyond the scope of this research to explore the details regarding the 
continuation from Thomas to Eckhart, but this issue must be addressed at least briefly 
before moving on to the specific rules that Eckhart set for his own commentary. Without 
a general understanding of Thomas, it will be impossible to appreciate Eckhart. What 
Eckhart means by the ‘unusual’ or ‘novel’ bears a particular reference to the Thomistic 
way of thinking and expressing that seems ‘usual’ to the masters and students of the 
day. It is precisely on the basis of a thorough understanding of Thomas that Eckhart 
manages to find the specific area in which his unique contribution to Christian tradition 
is to be made.  
In order to allow prominence to the most valuable thoughts, Eckhart pays a great deal 
of attention to economy of language. In each of the prologues to his commentaries 
Eckhart addresses the importance of brevity. In contrast to the encyclopaedic style of 
Summa, Eckhart narrows his topics down to those that cannot be found elsewhere, so 
that only the rarest ones are to be preserved.390 For the sake of brevity he omits a 
considerable amount of the material from the notes he had written down whilst going 
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390 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum n.7 (LW I 1, 151,15) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in 
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through the Old and the New Testaments. Clearly, Eckhart subjected his work to a 
thorough process of screening. After initially putting down whatever occurred to him 
whilst reading the scriptures, including his own interpretations of the scriptural texts on 
different occasions and the relevant expositions given by the earlier saints and masters, 
he took great care to filter out whatever seemed unnecessary or repetitive, so that finally 
only the most valuable interpretations remain to be passed on to the reader.391   
In the Prologue to the Book of Commentaries Eckhart makes five points as general 
guidelines for reading. As a commentator Eckhart conscientiously makes room for the 
reader to participate in the dialogue with the scriptural texts. Instead of delivering a 
certain interpretation, Eckhart provides a good variety of expositions concerning the 
same text, and leaves it to the reader to decide, to judge, and to harmonise them.392 
Eckhart also invites the reader to cross-examine the different passages of the scriptures. 
In his commentaries it often happens that when one text is to be expounded, many other 
texts are being cited, so that one passage can be explained by many others and vice 
versa. For instance, Eckhart’s comments on the verse ‘In the beginning God created 
heaven and earth’ (Genesis 1:1) parallel his comments on the verse ‘In the beginning 
was the Word’ (John 1:1). If the reader wishes to know more about one cited item, he 
may find a full exposition in its proper place. In addition, Eckhart emphasises the fact 
that these passages are often cited with a meaning that goes beyond (my italics) the 
primary meaning of the text. That, however, can be justified by the true and proper 
sense of the words following the procedure demonstrated by Augustine in his 
Confession XII.393  
Although Eckhart agrees with Thomas as to the primacy of the literal sense, and 
insists that the text should always be interpreted literally first, he nevertheless does not 
follow Thomas so closely with regard to the distinction between the literal and spiritual 
                                                          
391 Eckhart, Prologus in Opus Expositionum I (LW I 1, 183,3-9) (trans. defense 82. It will be abridged 
as Essential Eckhart in the following footnotes). 
392 For instance, his treatment of the term ‘darkness’ appeared in Verse 5 ‘The Light shines in the darkness, 
the darkness did not comprehend it’ in Commentary on John; here we find the connotations of ‘darkness’ 
vary from ‘everything that is created’ (nn.72-3), to what Thomas and Maimonides mean by ’fire’ in the 
sense that fire does not give light in itself save in foreign material (n.74), with reference to ‘Darkness 
was over the face of the earth’ (Gn. 1:2). Eckhart also includes the moral implication of ‘darkness’, which 
refers to evil that exists in something good (n.75). See Eckhart, In Ioh. nn.72-5 (LW III 60,8-63,15), 
(trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart,1981, 148-50). 
393 Eckhart resorts to Augustine in his Prologue to the Book of Commentaries; see Eckhart, Prologus in 
Opus Expositionum II n.3 (LW I 1, 184,6-11) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions and 
Prologues, 1974, 104-5). 
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senses. Eckhart seems to take an Augustinian stance with regard to the multiplicity of 
literal senses, which shows a subtle divergence from Thomas.394  In line with Augustine, 
Eckhart addresses the same hermeneutic rule in his Prologue to the Book of the 
Parables of Genesis, 395   namely, that the meaning that goes beyond the primary 
meaning of the text ought to be justified. He wrote two different versions of 
Commentary on Genesis. The first concentrates on the noteworthy points so far as the 
‘more evident sense’ of the book is concerned. In the second, the Book of the Parables 
of Genesis, Eckhart shifts the focus of attention to the ‘more hidden sense’ of the 
scriptural texts396 in order to reveal or disclose what is hidden beneath the surface of 
the literal sense. According to Eckhart, it is absolutely necessary to explore the hidden 
sense of the words when they are expressed in a parable fashion. 397  This kind of 
exploration will be intellectually and spiritually rewarding; in his own words: ‘When 
we can dig out some mystical understanding from what is read it is like bringing honey 
forth from the hidden depths of the honeycomb.’398 
By laying more emphasis on the richness of the parables contained in the holy canon, 
Eckhart somehow loosens the Thomistic definition of the literal sense of a word and 
blurs the line that Thomas intended to distinguish the literal sense from the spiritual 
sense. At this point Eckhart is more likely to think in the vein of Augustine on the 
Platonic ground, in accordance with the axiom that every truth comes from nowhere 
but the Truth itself.  
Based on the Platonic principle, Eckhart puts forward the proposition that every true 
sense is a literal sense. His arguments proceed as follows: The holy men spoke when 
being driven by the Holy Spirit (2 P. 1:21) and the Holy Spirit teaches all truth (Jn. 
16:13); as the literal sense is what the author intends and God is the author of the holy 
scriptures, it follows that every true sense is a literal sense. As well as citing the 
                                                          
394 Bernard McGinn briefly addresses this issue in his translation; see Essential Eckhart (1981), note 66, 
320.  
395 It is open to dispute whether Eckhart made a radical change in his hermeneutical concerns.  
396 Thomas only mentions the parabolical sense in his arguments; he does not give further explanation as 
to a proper approach to the parables contained in the scriptures. The parabolic sense is not included in 
what he means by the threefold spiritual sense: moral, allegorical and anagogical. See Summa Theol., I, 
q.1, a. 10. 
397 As pointed out by McGinn, the influence of Maimonides on Eckhart is manifest with regard to the 
inner meaning of scripture. Studies on Eckhart’s hermeneutics have been done by a number of scholars, 
in particular, E. Winkler, Exegetische Methoden bei Meister Eckhart (Tübingen, 1965) and K. Weiss, 
‘Meister Eckharts Biblische Hermeneutik’, in La mystique rhénane (Paris, 1963), 107-8. 
398  Eckhart, Prologus in Librum Parabolarum Genesis n.1 (LW I 1, 448,17-449,1) (trans. Bernard 
McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 93). 
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scriptural texts, Eckhart also falls back on the authority of Augustine, whom he lets 
speak for him: 
As long as anyone in reading the holy scriptures is trying to understand what 
their author meant to say, what harm is there if he lays hold of something that 
you, the light of all truthful minds, shows him to be true, even if the author he 
is reading did not grasp it – though the author did grasp a truth, just not this 
one?... What harm does it do to me that different meanings can be taken from 
the same words as long as they are true?399  
After quoting Augustine’s rhetorical question, Eckhart adds one sentence to make it 
complete:  
And true in the single truth of Light? 
Here we see a unification of ‘the different meanings’ of the same words with the ‘single 
truth of Light’. To Eckhart the legitimacy of the multiple meanings of a word can be 
established in One Truth which is God himself. The words of God can be understood 
differently so long as the reader is inspired by the divine intellect. The validity of one’s 
understanding of the scripture lies in its conformity to the divine thought, rather than in 
its conformity to the things.400 Eckhart’s focus is on the source or origin of the truth, 
which can be nothing but the divine intellect. In that sense Eckhart makes the point that 
God, who is the real author of the scripture, never fails to renew the meaning of his own 
words in the intellect of the reader whilst the scripture is assimilated anew. Not only 
does God allow the Word to be spoken in human language, but he also comprehends, 
inspires and intends all truth at one time in his intellect.401 ‘This is why Augustine says 
that he made scripture fruitful in such a way that everything that any intellect could 
draw from it has been sown in it and sealed upon it.’402  
Thus the renewal or growth of the meaning of the scripture does not contradict the 
Truth; on the contrary, it is derived from and rooted in the divine intellect. Eckhart, in 
line with Augustine, allows the growth of the meaning of the scriptural texts to be 
                                                          
399 Augustine, Confession 12.18.27, quoted by Eckhart in Prologus in Librum Parabolarum Genesis n.2 
(LW I 1, 450,1-6) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart,1981, 93). 
400 Thomas, De Veritate, q.1, a.2: ‘Truth is “the conformity of thing and intellect”. But since this 
conformity can be only in the intellect, truth is only in the intellect.’ 
401 Eckhart quotes only this verse from Thomas’s Summa Theol. I. q.1, a.10, rather than referring to 
Thomas’s full exposition concerning truth, intellect and things in De Veritate, q.1. Eckhart is not so much 
concerned with the empirical approach as is Thomas. Thomas gives a lengthy discussion on the 
conformity of things to the intellect; from the conformity between things and intellect arises the question 
of truth.   
402 Eckhart resorts to Augustine to affirm his view. For Augustine’s words, see Christ. Doct. 3.27.28. 
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justified on the intellectual ground. Such a hermeneutic rule encourages the reader to 
rise above the literal meaning and delve further into the spiritual meaning of the 
scripture, especially when it comes to the parables.  
Insofar as the divine is concerned, the literal sense is no other than the spiritual sense, 
because whatever is intended by God or preconceived in the divine intellect is always 
the spiritual truth, be it in the form of natural law, ethical doctrine or parabolical image. 
Hence a parable speaks the spiritual truth concerning God, nature and ethics to the same 
extent as other forms of expression. From the viewpoint of the divine, there is no 
hierarchical distinction between the natural, ethical, and spiritual truths. They all 
intimately agree with the divine truth so long as they are properly understood. Here 
Eckhart seems to be in open defiance against the Thomistic view, which stresses the 
distinction between the literal and the spiritual sense. But a closer scrutiny will show 
that Eckhart is not simply identifying the literal sense with the spiritual sense, nor does 
he intend to dissolve the scholastic ground established by Thomas. On the contrary, he 
is trying to push the scholastic perspective one step further so as to demonstrate that 
literal sense is fundamentally spiritual sense. But this proposition is based strictly on 
the scholastic ground in the sense that the identification of the literal and spiritual senses 
is derived from understanding rather than from faith alone, and can be clearly 
demonstrated with the aid of the natural reason.  
As particularly seen in his Prologue to the Book of the Parables of Genesis, Eckhart 
explicitly articulates the necessity to reinstate the spiritual sense at the centre of 
scriptural learning. But he does so on the basis of the scholastic principle, and his 
emphasis on the significance of parabolic expressions is mainly due to an intellectual 
consideration. Eckhart’s commentary is intended to arouse deeper understanding of the 
scripture in the mind of the skilled reader. Using all available means, Eckhart attempts 
to prove in a sophisticated scholastic manner that it is not idle to say that the Spirit 
would teach the disciple all truth (Jn. 16:13).403  
Based on the scripture itself, following the Aristotelian theory that truth lies in the 
intellect rather than in things, and in agreement with both Augustine and Thomas on 
the point that the true sense of the words of scripture consists in the divine intellect, 
Eckhart asserts that the divine truth can only be taught by the Holy Spirit, and the truth 
                                                          
403 Eckhart, Prologus in Librum Parabolarum Genesis n.2 (LW I 1, 452,9-11) (trans. Bernard McGinn 
in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 94). 
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that God intends to convey by the scripture would be received and conceived nowhere 
but in the intellect of the reader with the aid of the Holy Spirit. Hence the reader’s 
understanding of the scripture entails his or her intellective operation as well as the 
performance of the Holy Spirit, and on that account the hermeneutical, the intellectual 
and the spiritual issues become one. This is a significant insight on the part of Eckhart, 
which has some profound implications: the scripture should be understood rather than 
merely believed, thus understanding rather than faith is at stake; to understand the 
scripture means to receive the divine truth in the intellect, thus truth rather than charity, 
intellect rather than will is to be focused on; and the divine truth is taught by the Holy 
Spirit, thus the acquisition of truth is no less than the reception of the Spirit. To Eckhart 
the spiritual issue is radically an intellectual or even hermeneutical matter, and vice 
versa.   
Sitting in the scholastic tradition, Eckhart never gives himself free rein to promote 
any unproved claim. Despite his identification of the spiritual sense with the literal 
sense, the intellectual issue with the spiritual issue, Eckhart persistently adheres to the 
scholastic standard in his practice of commentary writing. That scholastic concern is 
particularly illustrated in his treatment of the parables in Genesis. In his second 
commentary on Genesis, where the significance of the parabolical expression is 
particularly highlighted, Eckhart insists that his commentary is to be unfolded  in a 
logical procedure, which comprises three steps: 1) The text itself will always be literally 
interpreted; 2) The things that seem to be hidden in parabolical fashion under the words 
of each text will be treated in a summary and succinct way; and 3) The nature and 
properties of the divine, natural or ethical truths contained under the parable or surface 
of the letter will be explained in a more extensive way. 404  The same principle of 
exegesis is addressed in his commentary on Exodus, where Eckhart claims that ‘sacred 
scripture frequently tells a story in such a way that it also contains and suggests 
mysteries, teaches about the nature of things, and directs and orders moral actions’.405 
This oft-repeated hermeneutical rule makes plain Eckhart’s attempt to ground the 
natural, moral and theological truths on scripture itself, and on that basis to reveal the 
agreement between three types of truths. This position has its root in the longstanding 
tradition of biblical exegesis, as McGinn has pointed out in his summary of Eckhart’s 
                                                          
404 Eckhart, Prologus in Librum Parabolarum Genesis n.7 (LW I 1, 456-1-5) (trans. Bernard McGinn in 
Essential Eckhart, 1981, 95). 
405 Eckhart, In Ex. n.211 (LW II 178,5-7) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 110). 
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theology, whereby the division of the inner meaning of scripture into three, namely 
theological, natural and moral, is nothing innovative, but is a traditional position first 
seen in Jerome. This relates extensively to the division of science into theological, 
natural, and moral truth, which probably derives from both the Aristotelian and the 
Platonic-Stoic traditions, as we see in the former a division of speculative philosophy 
into physics, mathematics, and theology (Metaphysics. 6.1), and in the latter a division 
among physics, logic and ethics.406      
Eckhart usually starts his comments with the literal meaning of a scriptural text, and 
then moves on to the moral, natural and theological implications of it. Throughout his 
commentaries on both the New and the Old Testaments, Eckhart shows an intention to 
demonstrate the unity, coherence or even mutual complement between the three layers 
of truth hidden in scripture. It is worth noting that in his commentaries Eckhart seems 
deliberately to allow more room for the moral dimension in comparison with the 
argumentation unfolded in Parisian Questions. For instance, in his Commentary on 
John, nn.104-5, Eckhart first expounds the literal meaning of the verse ‘he came to his 
own’ (Jn. 1:11), then turns to the moral meaning of it.407  
Overall Eckhart ensures that all of the ‘unusual’ or ‘novel’ statements in his works 
will gain a logical and rational demonstration in accordance with the scholastic standard. 
This ‘unusual’ or ‘novel’ character of Eckhart’s thinking cannot be understood without 
referring to the authoritative expositions provided by earlier masters, in particular 
Thomas, as the theological questions that used to puzzle Thomas continue to preoccupy 
Eckhart. The continuity between Eckhart and Thomas in both speculative theology and 
biblical commentary makes it absolutely necessary to cross-read between the two 
thinkers, if we are to grasp the characteristic of Eckhart’s theological thinking and his 
unique approach to scripture. We are pressed at some points to form a brief comparison 
of the two, as shown above concerning the literal meaning of scripture,408 without which 
it is hard to comprehend the academic trend in which Eckhart lived and the theological 
background against which his thought was established. It goes without saying that 
Eckhart was familiar with the works of Thomas and always bore them in mind whilst 
                                                          
406 Bernard McGinn, ‘Theological Summary’, Essential Eckhart (1981), 29 and note 26, 299-300. 
407 Eckhart, In Ioh. nn.104-5 (LW III 89,12-90,5) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 
162). 
408 For a discussion over some radical differences between Thomas and Eckhart, see Andreas Speer, ‘Are 
There One or Two Theologies? - A Fundamental Disagreement between Thomas Aquinas and Meister 
Eckhart’, Medieval Mystical Theology 22 (2013), 139-54. 
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composing his commentary. But it is equally certain that Eckhart has something new to 
contribute to the same tradition; he is offering a new approach, a new answer to the 
same question that Thomas had wrestled with in his works, in particular his 
encyclopaedic Summa.  
Admittedly an attentive reader may spot elements of arbitrariness in Eckhart, but 
those seemingly arbitrary judgements and interpretations are derived solely from a 
creative dialogue with scripture which, in turn, can be justified by Eckhart’s broader 
view of the literal meaning of scripture. Apart from his implicit admission of the 
multiplicity of the literal sense, Eckhart’s theory of predication plays another crucial 
part in his exegetical works, which indicates a distinctive mark of Neoplatonic influence, 
mainly from the Jewish scholar Maimonides, and also suggests a divergence between 
the Eckhartian and the Thomistic ways of thinking and speaking.  
The quest for the most appropriate way to predicate the ineffable God can be traced 
back to a longstanding tradition extending from Judaism to Christianity, as Eckhart 
explores in his Commentary on Exodus. Like many other great thinkers in the Christian 
tradition, Eckhart is deeply captivated by that irresolvable linguistic puzzle: how can 
we talk about the ineffable God in human language? Given the Christian belief that God 
has revealed himself through the incarnated Word and that the Holy Bible contains the 
words of God, a Christian theologian is still confronted with the question: in what 
manner can God be properly conceived and predicated? This question must be 
considered first, before one commences any sort of theological speculation. Evidently 
Eckhart has paid a great deal of attention to this sophisticated question, and his thinking 
in this regard is not formulated in the form of philosophical treatise; instead Eckhart 
locates it in his scriptural commentary, to be precise, his solution to this knotty question 
is embedded in his comments on two specific verses drawn from Exodus, ‘Almighty is 
his name’ (Ex. 15:3) and ‘You shall not take the name of your God in vain’ (Ex. 20:7), 
as will be discussed below. 
In his remarks on the scriptural text ‘Almighty is his name’ (Ex. 15:3), Eckhart 
addresses the issue of the name of God and the proper way to address the divine. As in 
many other places Eckhart particularly calls attention to the relevant works of Thomas; 
here he mentions Thomas’s treatment of the names of God in Summa Theologica I, 
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q.13,409 before rendering his own perspective on this topic. Clearly Eckhart develops 
his thesis from the groundwork accomplished by Thomas, and in this case he goes even 
further. He looks back to Greek philosophy410 and Jewish tradition,411 taking both as 
sources of inspiration for the Catholic writers, from the prominent church fathers such 
as Augustine and Boethius up to the scholastic thinkers like Thomas and himself in the 
late Middle Ages. Eckhart resorts to a wide range of scholarly studies and frequently 
quotes the preceding masters, in particular Maimonides, while hardly employing the 
ego-statement. The proceedings of his exploration are divided into four steps; thus we 
have four main points neatly formulated as follows: first, what some philosophers and 
Jewish authors think of this question and of the attributes which name God, such as 
when God is called substance, or good; second, what Catholic writers think of these 
predications or names; third, why do Boethius and the theologians generally teach that 
only two kinds of categories, substance and relation, can be used of divinity? And fourth, 
about the name more proper and especially particular to God, that is the 
‘Tetragrammaton’, in his exposition of the verse ‘You shall not take the name of your 
God in vain’ (Ex. 20:7).412  
The arrangement of the four points allows Eckhart to unfold his survey of the 
intellectual development surrounding this topic through the different traditions, and in 
the process of summarising the thoughts of the previous masters Eckhart weaves his 
own perspectives into the longstanding scholarly tradition. Here is seen more clearly 
than elsewhere Eckhart’s preference for the apophatic way of predication.413 Eckhart 
relies heavily on Maimonides, to the extent that he goes through the detailed technical 
proof that Maimonides has provided in his Guide for the Perplexed. In nn.37-8 Eckhart 
lists the five ways in which an affirmative proposition of God comes about, and here 
we find a summary of what Maimonides has written in Guide 1:52, which leads to the 
conclusion that all the denominations attributed to God name only his work rather than 
his substance (n.43), and all the perfections in us are no longer so in God, hence it is 
clear that nothing can be positively attributed to God. Eckhart then resorts to the Greek 
                                                          
409 Thomas, Summa Theol. I, q.13. Q13 includes 12 articles; the disagreement between Eckhart and 
Thomas is manifest in a.2 and a.12. In the two articles Thomas holds to the stance that the names applied 
to God can be predicated of Him substantially, and affirmative propositions can be formed about God. 
410 In particular Aristotle’s ten categories in Metaphysics.  
411 Eckhart maintains his focus on Maimonides’s The Guide for the Perplexed.  
412 Eckhart, In Ex. n.34 (LW II 40,3-41,5), (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 53).  
413  For a detailed study of Eckhart’s negative theology, see V. Lossky, Théologie négative et 
connaissance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart (Paris, 1960), 251-337. 
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and Arabic philosophers and the Jewish sages, and gives eight proofs (nn.46-52) of the 
insufficiency involved in a positive proposition of God. Having dealt with the 
affirmatives, Eckhart turns to the negative names spoken about God and explains why 
these negative predications serve to bring us closer to God. Here again he quotes at 
length from Maimonides: ‘Whatever you add by way of negative names with respect to 
the Creator, you come nearer to grasping him and will be closer to him than the person 
who does not how to remove from God the perfections and attributes that have been 
proven to be far from him.’414 Through the words of Maimonides Eckhart spells out 
what he intends to say on this issue. The citation of Maimonides is followed by an 
example through which the constructive role of the negative predications is illustrated.  
It thus becomes explicit that Eckhart, in line with Maimonides, openly repudiates the 
way of attributing affirmative names and propositions to God, and in that sense the so-
called cataphatic theology is marginalised if not ruled out from his thought. To Eckhart 
the apophatic way holds the key to knowledge of God, because it is only through 
removing from God the attributes that do not belong to him that we may advance in the 
divine knowledge.415 This forms a clear contrast to the Thomistic stance as stated in 
Summa Theol. (I, q.13, a.12), where it is confirmed that affirmative propositions about 
God can be justified. Precisely on this point Eckhart distances himself from Thomas 
and plays down the role of affirmatives. His theory of predication is marked by the 
apophatic approach, which entails the so-called paradoxical416 or dialectical way of 
thinking and speaking, namely to know the unknown and to speak the unspoken. 
In his comments Eckhart also refers to Socrates’s claim that ‘I know that I do not 
know’ 417 to justify the paradoxical way of speaking. 418 In a paradoxical expression, 
                                                          
414 Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, 1:58, the quotation found in Eckhart, In Ex. n.183 (LW 
II 156,13-157,2) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 101). 
415 Ibid.  
416 To those who take Eckhart as a spiritual master, the word ‘paradox’ seems to possess the power to 
convey the dynamic and lively character of his spiritual legacy. For instance, Cyprian Smith summarises 
Eckhart’s spiritual approach as ‘the way of paradox’, ‘because he [Eckhart] sees the Reality of God as 
something that can be grasped only within the tension and clash of opposites. This tension has to be 
experienced in our daily life; this is the practice of detachment. But it also has to be experienced in our 
thinking and talking about God; and this involves paradox.’ See Cyprian Smith, The Way of Paradox: 
spiritual life as thought by Meister Eckhart (London, 1987), 24.  
417 Eckhart, In Ex. n.184 (LW II 158,14) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 101). 
418 McGinn calls attention to this issue repeatedly in a number of his works on Eckhart. Most noteworthy 
in his discussion on Eckhart’s dialectical way of predication is his excellent summary of Eckhart’s 
theology in Essential Eckhart, and his paper ‘Meister Eckhart on God as Absolute Unity’, in Dominic J. 




the two contradictory propositions 419 such as ‘I know’ and ‘I do not know’, are fused 
into one, and are simultaneously true. This kind of paradoxical structure is distinctive 
of Eckhartian style. A good example is seen in his Commentary on Exodus, where we 
read: ‘You should know that nothing is as dissimilar as the Creator and any creature. In 
the second place, nothing is as similar as the Creator and any creature. And in the third 
place, nothing is as equally dissimilar and similar in the same degree.’420 The dialectical 
or paradoxical way is indicative of Eckhart’s attempt to find a better way of speaking 
of God, which seems to suggest a kind of self-contradiction, an open defiance of the 
fundamental principle of logical demonstration.  
Eckhart’s adoption of the paradoxical structure is rooted in his thinking on the 
relation in the Godhead, alluding to the third point as mentioned above, where Eckhart 
poses the question: ‘Why do Boethius and the theologians generally teach that only two 
kinds of categories, substance and relation, can be used of divinity?’ 421  Eckhart 
highlights the point that although relation is accident, it does not predicate in the manner 
of the eight categories such as quality, quantity, and so on, because relation is not 
absorbed into substance or subject, nor does it say that anything exists or inheres. On 
the contrary, the category of relation posits the opposite of something; in other words, 
it states that ‘the thing that exists comes from another and is directed to another’.422 It 
follows that relation in the Godhead does not predicate the essence or substance of the 
Father, but of the mutually opposed Trinitarian persons. To apply the category of 
relation to a concrete subject, e.g. Martin, it is plain that Martin would know and be 
white through substance, nonetheless he would not be related or referred to anything 
through substance, but rather through relation according to the idea and property of the 
genus relation.423    
                                                          
In this paper McGinn particularly turns to Gadamer’s formulation to clarify the meaning of dialectical 
thinking, which can be further traced back to Hegel and the ancient philosophers. He briefly points out 
the three elements essential to dialectical thinking: 1) thinking of determinations by themselves; 2) 
simultaneously thinking of contradictory determinations; and 3) the positive content of the higher unity 
of contradictory determinations. All of these were present in ancient philosophy by the time of Plato. 
136-7. 
419 For the definition of contraries, see Aristotle, On Interpretation, VI and VII.  
420 Eckhart, In Ex. n.112 (LW II 110,3-6) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher,1986, 81). 
421 Eckhart addresses this question in In Ex. n.34 (LW II 40,14-42,2) and n.62 (LW II 67,3-5), (trans. 
Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 53 and 64). 
422 Eckhart, In Ex. n.64 (LW II 68,8-10) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 64). 
423 Eckhart, In Ex. n.72 (LW II 75,4-14) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 67). 
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Taking the category of relation into account, Eckhart often addresses the two 
opposing ends in one relation, for example God and the world. In Eckhart the divine is 
most likely to be predicated in terms of relation. Unlike substance, the category of 
relation always implies the formal opposition between the two ends. Thus we have the 
relational predication of God and the world in various versions, for instance, in Parisian 
Question 1 God is predicated as the divine intellect versus the world as being or 
existence; whereas in the Commentary on Exodus, God is taken as existence or being 
versus the world as the opposite, which is non-being.424   
 
2.2.2 Eckhart’s Notion of the Human Intellect Unfolded in his Commentaries 
As revealed in the Parisian Questions Eckhart does not particularly differentiate the 
human intellect from the angelic intellect and the divine intellect; what he intends to 
demonstrate is rather the universal nature of intellect per se, which can be applied to all 
three. The outline he sketches in the scholastic quaestiones gains fuller exposition in 
his scriptural commentaries,425 in which one sees a nuanced distinction between the 
human and the angelic intellect, and the difference between the created intellect (which 
includes the angelic and the human intellect) and the divine intellect. Although in 
Eckhart the divine and the human intellect are treated as being fundamentally one 
intellect, that does not mean the divine can be simply identified with the human or vice 
versa. His elucidation of this line of thought is unfolded through some focused and 
exhaustive commentaries on a number of selected scriptural texts, in particular, his 
commentaries on John and Exodus. For the sake of clarity in expression, we will first 
examine in what sense Eckhart takes into consideration a distinction between the human, 
the angelic and the divine intellect, and then look separately at Eckhart’s expositions of 
the divine intellect and of the human intellect. On that basis we will discuss precisely 
how Eckhart addresses the identification of the two. 
  
                                                          
424  Bernard McGinn addresses the theme raised by Eckhart during the Cologne proceedings, the 
distinction between the ‘absolute existence’ of God and the ‘formally inherent existence’ of creature. 
Following this pattern, it holds true that if esse is properly affirmed of God, it must be denied to creature; 
likewise if esse is properly affirmed of creature, then it must be denied of God. See Bernard McGinn, 
‘Theological Summary’, Essential Eckhart (1981), 33. 
425 Eckhart is one of the few who composed both scholastic quaestiones and biblical commentaries. 




2.2.2.1 Distinction between the Three: the Divine, the Angelic and the Human Intellect  
The argumentation Eckhart develops in his Parisian Questions mainly focuses on his 
own contribution to a knotty question that had puzzled the scholastic theologians for a 
long time. Eckhart engages in a lengthy discussion of the distinction between the three 
types of intellect, which had been fully expounded by Thomas.426 The focus of his 
reasoning in the Parisian Questions is on the new ways of proof, and in that sense his 
approach is distinct from that of Thomas. Nevertheless, in his commentary writing, 
Eckhart makes more room for the thoughts of the antecedent church fathers, masters 
and saints, among whom the illustrious brother Thomas is prominent. Other authors, 
such as Augustine, Boethius, Rabbi Moses and Avicenna, are also frequently mentioned 
and quoted. Unlike disputed questions, commentary as a literary form is intended to 
integrate the intellectual achievement of the previous masters, and in that sense 
commentary writing entails a systematic approach to the biblical scholarship developed 
over centuries. That probably explains why Eckhart incorporates into his commentary 
a distinction made by Thomas between the divine intellect, the angelic intellect and the 
human intellect which, as mentioned earlier, does not appear at all in Eckhart’s disputed 
questions.  
The distinction between the three types of intellect as seen in Eckhart’s commentaries 
is chiefly grounded on two relevant doctrines: 1) Eckhart’s teaching with regard to the 
essential order of the creatures, which consists of the three modes of existence: to be, 
to live and to know. This line of thought underpins Eckhart’s understanding of the 
cosmological structure as a whole. 2) Corresponding to the distinction between being, 
living and knowing, Eckhart addresses the diversity in the way things are enlightened 
by God, which points to his notion of an ordered and directed omnipotent power in God.  
The doctrine concerning the essential order is briefly touched on in Parisian 
Question 1, where we read: ‘Some say that existence, life and intelligence can be 
viewed in two ways: 1) in themselves, and then existence is first, life second, and 
intelligence third; 2) in relation to that which participates in them, then intelligence is 
first, life second, and existence third. But I believe the exact opposite to be true.’427 
What Eckhart says here alludes to the view expressed by Dionysius in his De Divinis 
Nominibus (5.3), which is confirmed by Thomas in Summa Theologica (I, q.4, a.2), that 
                                                          
426 See Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.54, 79, 84 and 85.  
427 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n.6 (LW V 42,8-43,3) (trans. Armand A. Maurer in Parisian Questions and 
Prologues, 1974, 46-7). 
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God’s existence includes in itself life and wisdom. Unlike Thomas and Dionysius, 
Eckhart maintains that among the perfections attributed to God, the perfection of 
knowing is prior to the perfection of being. A fuller exposition of this theme is seen in 
Eckhart’s commentaries, most explicitly in Commentary on John with reference to the 
verse ‘What was made in him was life’ (Jn. 1.3-4). Eckhart’s extensive comments on 
this verse include five points. Before addressing the order concerning the three levels – 
to be, to live and to understand – Eckhart first points out that in God the three 
perfections are in each other, for example, ‘to be and to live in understanding is simply 
understanding and to understand, to be and to understand in life, simply is to live and 
life’.428 He then underlines that ‘God alone, insofar as he is Final End and First Mover, 
lives and is life’.429 Because to be alive means to be moved by itself or by a principle 
within itself, in that sense nothing but God can properly be called life. Having clarified 
the meaning of life and the inter-inclusive nature of the three perfections in God, 
Eckhart turns to the realm below the divine and starts to discuss the three distinct levels 
– to be, to live and to understand. These levels, Eckhart believes, complete the totality 
of being, and their order can be reversed when considered differently; for example, in 
terms of the abstract, to be is the most perfect, followed by to live and to understand; 
however, taken in terms of the concrete, the mode of being holds the lowest place, the 
mode of living is higher than that of being, and the mode of knowing is higher than that 
of living, thus to know ranks the highest.  
The reason for making this distinction lies in the fact that the concrete refers to the 
participated beings. What Eckhart means by participated being is the being that is empty 
and imperfect on its own, and thus shares in a more perfect level of participation. 
Following this logic, the lower level of being is included in the next higher level, so 
that a mere being is included in a living being, and a living being is included in an 
intelligent being. Eckhart makes the point that the level or degree of perfection that a 
being possesses is dependent on what kind of existence it includes, rather than on its 
own existence. According to the essential order of existence, Eckhart concludes that 
what is inferior is not only included in the next higher level, but more importantly it 
exists in a more noble fashion and a more perfect way in its superior.430 He even claims 
                                                          
428 Eckhart, In Ioh. n.61 (LW III 51,3-4) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 144, altered). 
429 Ibid. n.62 (LW III 51,11-2) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 144). 
430 Ibid. n.63 (LW III 52,4-5), (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 144).  
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that man’s intellect is the nearest superior intellective power to a living thing because 
it is the lowest intellective power, which explicitly references Thomas’s lengthy 
explanation unfolded in Summa Theologica.431 
The distinction between the human intellect and the angelic intellect is seen in 
Eckhart’s comments on the next verse, ‘The Light shines in the darkness, and the 
darkness did not comprehend it’ (Jn. 1.5). Here Eckhart differentiates the human 
intellect from the angelic intellect, thus the aforementioned three levels become four 
grades, and beings in the universe can be divided into four degrees or types: mere beings, 
living beings, the human intellect, and the angelic intellect, as well as any other that 
might be separated, free from matter and image. Furthermore, Eckhart associates each 
grade with a relevant verse in the sacred scriptures. For instance, the first grade, mere 
beings, refers to ‘What was made’; the second grade, living beings, to ‘in him was life’; 
the third grade, the human intellect, to ‘life was the light of men’; and the fourth grade, 
the angelic intellect, to ‘the light shines in the darkness’.432 By ‘the darkness’ Eckhart 
means the highest in the realm of intellect which is invisible to us; he then uses the 
metaphor of fire to elucidate this point. Just as the highest and finest element, fire, is 
invisible in its proper matter and sphere, the highest and finest in the realm of intellect 
appears to be invisible and unknown to us, thus is called ‘darkness’. Based on this 
interpretation, the passage ‘And the darkness did not comprehend it’ is regarded as well 
put, on which Eckhart comments: ‘If the highest intellects denoted by “darkness” 
cannot comprehend the light that is God, then it is clear that he is absolutely 
“incomprehensible to thought”.’433 The essential order is also addressed in The Book of 
the Parables of Genesis, as will be discussed later.  
In relation to the four grades of the created beings, Eckhart spells out the five ways 
in which things are enlightened by the divine light.  The details of this line of thought 
are unfolded in his comments on the verse ‘He enlightens every man who comes into 
this world’ (Jn. 1.9), which causes difficulty in comprehension: how is it that many still 
walk in darkness if God really enlightens every man in the world? Before Eckhart this 
question had been attentively treated by the church fathers, especially Origen, 
                                                          
431 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.79, a.2. In q.79, a.1, Thomas affirms his position that intellect is a power 
of the soul, not the very essence of the soul. In God alone is His intellect His essence, while in other 
intellectual creatures, the intellect is power. In q.79, a.2, Thomas gives lengthy exposition on the 
difference between the divine intellect, the angelic intellect and the human intellect.  
432 Eckhart,  In Ioh. nn. 83-4 (LW III 71,4-72,2) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 153). 
433 Ibid. n. 84 (LW III 72,10-2) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 153).  
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Chrysostom and Augustine, whose views are clearly summarised by Thomas and are 
integrated in his Gloss on John. Based on the works of the church fathers, Thomas 
extends the means of enlightenment from the traditional understanding, which takes 
enlightenment as exclusively the work of grace, to a broader view which allows the 
light of natural knowledge to be included.434  Unlike these three prominent church 
fathers who focus their attention on grace, Thomas expounds two ways in which God 
enlightens the world, namely as the light of natural knowledge and as the light of 
grace.435   
Despite Thomas’s elucidation, Eckhart observes that many continue to be puzzled by 
this difficult passage. Eckhart attributes the difficulty to a so-called ‘twofold false 
mental image’: 1) They imagine that things are not present equally and immediately to 
God at the same time; 2) They think that grace is an illumination alone, whereas 
existence itself is an illumination and a source of all enlightening perfections.436 Both 
issues had been addressed by Thomas: the first particularly in Summa Theologica (I, 
q.22, a.3) and Summa contra Gentiles (III, q.76), and the second in his comments on 
this verse (Gloss on John 1:9). Parallels between Thomas and Eckhart’s commentary 
on the same text suggest that Thomas’s Gloss on John collected in his Catena aurea 
has had a great impact on Eckhart’s Commentary on John: the same question runs 
through both Thomas’s and Eckhart’s commentaries, despite a difference in wording or 
even in solution.  
Following Thomas’s clarification of a distinction between the light of natural 
knowledge and the light of grace, Eckhart spells out the diversity in the way things are 
enlightened by the divine light:  
It is indeed true that he enlightens and influences different people and different 
things in different ways, some by light according to the property (this is the way 
he enlightens every being in the universe); others in more restricted numbers by 
light as life (this is the case with living beings). He enlightens other more perfect 
beings fewer in number insofar as he is ‘the light of men’, according to the 
Psalm text. ‘The light of your countenance, Lord, is shined upon us’ (Ps. 4:7), 
that is, reason, which points to and shows what is good. In the fourth way, he 
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436 Eckhart, In Ioh. n.94 (LW III 81,5-12) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 158). 
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enlightens beings that are more perfect than men by illuminating them himself 
without shadow of phantasms. In the fifth way, he enlightens others by grace, 
the supernatural light.437 
Among the five ways, the fifth refers to the supernatural light of grace,438 which is the 
new effect specifically brought about by the incarnation of the Word, hence the light of 
grace is no other than the light of salvation. In contrast to the sanctifying effect of the 
incarnate Word expressed in the fifth way, the other four ways clearly correspond to 
the aforementioned four grades of creature. Thus it becomes clear that God enlightens 
all, whether mere beings, living beings, human beings or angelic beings, to the extent 
that the nature of that being allows. The whole universe is preserved by the presence of 
God; should the divine light withdraw, nothing will be able to exist. Despite the fact 
that no creature is excluded from the illumination of the divine light, it is still necessary 
for the Word to be incarnated into this world, because those in the world do not know 
God unless through the Son – the incarnate Word. Thus we have the fifth way, the 
highest way of illumination, which pertains to the supernatural grace or the sanctifying 
power of God.   
Here arises the question: Who is the receiver of the supernatural grace or the 
sanctifying power? Put another way, towards whom is the sanctifying grace directed? 
In the aforequoted passage Eckhart uses the term ‘others’ to distinguish the receiver of 
the sanctifying grace from the created beings that exist according to the essential order 
and are subject to the light of natural knowledge, which also participates in the divine 
light. To understand what Eckhart means by ‘others’, we must refer to another text, 
where we find a fuller exposition of grace. In his Commentary on Wisdom Eckhart 
expounds the two types of grace: 1) the grace that is freely given to all, which pertains 
to God’s creation and preservation of the world, whereby the presence of God is seen 
in every creature; and 2) the sanctifying grace, which entails a directed power that only 
works on the essence of the soul in a purely spiritual manner.439 It follows that the 
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sanctifying grace, as the essence of the divine, ‘falls on the ground of the intellect’ due 
to the nature of the intellect.440 Thus it is clear that the term ‘others’ alludes to the 
intellect that is proper to the sanctifying power of the incarnate Word.  
All of the five ways articulated here follow the same principle Eckhart repeatedly 
addresses in many of his works; that is, the superior only influences its inferior, thus 
the divine light only enlightens what is subject to him. In other words, the enlightening 
power entails a direction, from the superior to the inferior, and only works on what is 
within its remit. This gives resonance to Eckhart’s discussion over the omnipotent 
power of the divine in the first newly re-discovered Parisian Question, to which his 
answer is that the omnipotence in God needs to be considered as absolute power; in 
other words, God has power over all things that exist, except nothing, which is non-
existence.441 
Thus, in Eckhart, the essential order of the created things echoes the ordered almighty 
power of God directed from the superior to the inferior. In that sense God truly 
enlightens or influences different things in different ways.  
Having expounded the different ways in which things are enlightened, Eckhart comes 
to the point that despite the aforesaid diversity, God nevertheless regards all things 
equally, uniformly and immediately, and is present to all before anything else.442 To 
illustrate this point Eckhart gives an example concerning the relation of the soul to the 
body. He says the way God enlightens all is similar to the way the soul, as the 
substantial form of the body, is immediately and totally present to and influences 
differently each part of the body, in the sense of giving existence and life to them. This 
is different from other perfections of the soul, such as sight and hearing, which cannot 
communicate to every part of the body.443 A more scholastic expression is found in 
Eckhart’s comments on the verse ‘Almighty is his name’ (Exodus 15:3). In his 
Commentary on Exodus Eckhart formulates a more technical proof: ‘Every agent has 
natural power over those things (and through itself only over those things) which are 
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contained under the form which is the principle of agent’s action. But existence is the 
principle of every divine action. Therefore, God has power over everything that is or 
can be.’444 God cannot influence those that fall out of the realm of existence, just as fire 
only acts upon things that can be heated, and through itself on nothing that is not subject 
to heat and fire’s form. Similarly, in his Commentary on Wisdom Eckhart affirms the 
point that the sanctifying grace of the divine falls on the ground of the intellect as shown 
above, insofar as the intellect partakes in the divine nature, is wise and is the image of 
God or conforming to the image of God.445  
Viewing the human intellect in the light of the essential order of the creature, we 
come to the conclusion that human beings are embedded in a hierarchical order of the 
universe in which the human intellect is to be differentiated from the angelic intellect. 
Similarly, with reference to the five ways in which things can be enlightened by the 
divine, it becomes clear that the human intellect receives the divine illumination in a 
way that differs from the manner in which an angelic being is enlightened by the divine. 
Overall we can see that in his commentaries Eckhart pays a great deal of attention to 
the hierarchical distinction written in the order of nature, which is very much in line 
with Thomas. Like Thomas, Eckhart takes both the natural and supernatural aspects 
into account when considering the divine illumination, and in that sense the scholastic 
commentaries such as Thomas’s Gloss on John and Eckhart’s Commentary on John 
enrich the longstanding tradition of biblical scholarship by offering a more inclusive 
reading of the evangelist’s message, one in which ‘God enlightens all’ with respect to 
the light of natural knowledge does not contradict the fact that some are still in darkness 
with respect to the light of grace. 
With the two sets of the divine illumination in mind, we come to see that Eckhart’s 
thinking with regard to the human intellect contains a message of twofold meaning.  
When it is the order of nature that is being considered, a clear distinction is seen 
between the human intellect and the angelic intellect; both fall into the category of the 
created intellect, which forms a contrast to the divine intellect.  Nevertheless, should 
the supernatural light of the divine grace be taken into consideration, the division 
preserved in the natural order of the universe between the human intellect, the angelic 
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intellect and the divine intellect can be overcome, due to the incarnation of the Word in 
this world. 
      
2.2.2.2 The Divine Intellect  
 
a) Intellect as the key to the emanation of the Son and the creation of the world  
In the very first Parisian Question Eckhart calls attention to the divine intellect and 
claims that in God knowing is prior to being.  He turns to John’s gospel for scriptural 
support and justifies his thesis by the opening sentence ‘In the beginning446 was the 
Word’. Indeed, John’s gospel becomes the main scriptural source for Eckhart to 
develop his thinking of the divine intellect. Looking back down the long tradition of 
biblical exegesis, we can see that long before Eckhart undertook the task of 
commentary writing, the evangelist’s message had been expounded by many Christian 
thinkers, including Thomas, Augustine, John Chrysostom and Origen. Therefore, 
Eckhart must have had various versions of commentary on this transmitted text at his 
disposal whilst composing his own Commentary on John.  
This is illustrated particularly in his commentaries on John 1:1 and Genesis 1:1. 
Eckhart’s expositions of these two passages mutually illuminate each other, and the 
core of his exegesis lies in the divine intellect and its internal connection with the 
emanation of the Trinitarian persons and the creation of the world. As well as his 
exegesis of the two verses ‘In the beginning was the Word’ (Jn. 1:1) and ‘In the 
beginning, God created heaven and earth’ (Gn.1:1), Eckhart’s thinking on creation is 
also unfolded in his Commentary on Wisdom, in particular his comments on the verse 
‘He created all things that they might be’ (Ws. 1:14).  
Based on the selected biblical texts, Eckhart weaves his theory of creation into his 
commentary. Here and there he makes the point that the New and the Old Testaments 
convey the same message.  Not only does he intend to make clear that the emanation 
of the persons in the Godhead is hinted at by the authors of the Old Testament, he also 
attempts to prove that the emanation of the persons in the Godhead is the prior ground 
of creation,447 although he admits that in the Old Testament there is no open reference 
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to the emanation of the Trinitarian persons, whereas John’s gospel speaks directly of 
the emanation of the Son in the Godhead.448 
Eckhart seems to focus his attention on the inner connection between the emanation 
of the Son from the Father in the Godhead and the creation of the world which falls out 
of the divine realm. In both cases Eckhart takes intellect as the principle: in accordance 
with the same principle the Son proceeds from the Father and the world proceeds from 
virtual existence to formal reality. As ‘principium’ has the meaning of ‘beginning’ and 
‘principle’, Eckhart’s expositions entail both aspects, one to do with the concept of 
time, the other the concept of ‘Idea’. In his commentary on Genesis, Eckhart interprets 
‘In the beginning’ as in ‘the first simple now of eternity’,449 so that creation is to be 
fixed in the everlasting now. Similarly, in his commentary on the prologue to John 
Eckhart first takes away time, so that the Son has always been co-existing with the 
Father in the Godhead. It follows that the Son, the Word, or the Idea is always being 
conceived in the divine intellect, and it is precisely according to the Idea that the world 
was created. So the emanation of the Trinitarian persons in the Godhead and the 
creation of the world are a simultaneous one, rather than two different processes. In 
Eckhart’s own words: ‘In the one and the same time in which he was God and in which 
he begot his coeternal Son as God equal to himself in all things, he also created the 
world.’450  
Hence the Word as the archetypical Idea is only logically prior to the world. Eckhart 
repeatedly addresses the point that before the world’s foundation there was the Word; 
the world in pre-creation is not regarded as mere nothing, but rather as the effect in its 
primordial, essential and original cause, or a seed in its principle. That points to another 
beginning of things which is rooted in the divine intellect and is thus higher than nature, 
as the intellect orders each natural thing to its established end. Therefore the ‘principle’ 
(principio) in which God created heaven and earth is the nature of intellect, which is in 
opposition to the necessitarianism proclaimed by the Arabic philosophers such as 
Avicenna.451  
In both his Commentary on Genesis and Commentary on John, the divine intellect is 
tied up with the two aspects: the emanation of the persons in the Godhead and the 
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creation of the world. With regard to the former Eckhart attributes intellect to the Son, 
and maintains that the Son in the Godhead ‘proceeds from the Father according to 
intellect, just as the Holy Spirit proceeds according to love’.452 Intellect is deemed the 
principle or fashion in which the Son is begotten by the Father in the Godhead. The 
emanation of the divine persons in the Trinity, that is the emanation of the Son from 
the Father and that of the Holy Spirit from both the Son and the Father, should be 
considered in spiritual terms. The spiritual emanation of the Trinitarian persons in the 
divine realm is prior to the creation of the world, in which process the material is 
involved. 
The development from the pure spiritual realm to the material world involves the 
conjunction of the spiritual and the material, which gives rise to the composition of 
matter and form. There is a subtle difference between the substantial form of something 
and the idea of it in the creator’s mind. The idea of a thing never leaves the creator even 
after that thing is created according to the idea, nor will the idea disappear when that 
thing is destroyed. Thus the idea of a thing is capable of separate existence; it pertains 
to the extrinsic causes, as for example the creating agent and the goal. 453 But the 
substantial form of a thing exists only in that thing and no longer exists once that thing 
is destroyed, and the substantial form is the intrinsic cause of the thing. Eckhart makes 
this more explicit in his Commentary on Exodus, where he states that the forms of 
things which give things names and species are formally in things and in no way in 
God, while the ideas of things are in God, but are given neither names nor species.454 
When commenting on the verse ‘He created all things that they might be’ (Ws.1:14), 
Eckhart employs a different vocabulary, and the focus seems to shift from intellect to 
existence, whereby God is the source of existence, and creation is the conferring of 
‘existence after nonexistence’. 455  Eckhart addresses in particular the point that all 
things including those made by art or nature derive their existence from God. It follows 
that the existence or esse of things looks to an outside cause: for instance, that a man 
or an animal exists comes from another, but that a man is an animal or substance, comes 
from nothing but himself. In a proposition such as ‘man is an animal’, the word ‘is’ 
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does not involve the existence of things, it serves only to connect terms. The statement 
‘man is an animal’ would not be less true even if no man existed.456  
In his commentary on this passage, Eckhart also treats existence as the first and final 
cause.  In other words, existence is the goal of creation.  If someone asks why God 
created all things, the answer would be ‘that they might be’. 457  Here Eckhart 
distinguishes the virtual existence from the formal existence. A house virtually existing 
in the mind of the architect is not a real house. A house receives its formal existence 
insofar as it is produced through its efficient cause. Similarly, all things are in God as 
effect is in its cause or the idea is in the mind of the maker; things do not have their 
formal existence until they are formally created. If we take the formal existence of 
something as real existence, then what exists virtually in the intellect should be deemed 
nonexistence; hence ‘creation is conferring of existence after nonexistence’.458 The 
divine intellect is the cause of existence and the source of creation.  
To summarise, in opposition to those who believe things are created from the 
necessity of nature, Eckhart argues that ‘God’s nature is intellect’459 and ‘intellect is the 
principle of the whole nature’.460 It is ‘the intellect that orders each natural thing to its 
established end’,461 which ushers in ‘another beginning of things that is higher than 
nature’.462 Seen in the light of the intellect, Eckhart pictures the whole universe as a 
fine piece of work, a rational creation of the divine power. Such is the significance of 
intellect that it runs through the emanation of the Son from the Father as well as the 
creation of the world through the Son.     
 
b)  Intellect and Idea 
In his Commentary on John, Eckhart quotes Augustine and expounds the Greek term 
logos from two aspects: logos as ‘idea’ and as ‘word’. He then gives an extensive 
exposition of the Latin ‘idea’ and ‘word’, and attributes logic – the science that teaches 
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how to construct arguments – to ‘idea’, and connects ‘word’ with linguistic 
expression.463 This alludes to Thomas’s exposition of Plato’s idea in Summa Theol. I, 
q.15, a.3, in which Thomas holds that the meaning of Plato’s idea is twofold: 1) as the 
principle of making things which pertains to practical knowledge; in this case idea 
means ‘exemplar’; and 2) as the principle of knowledge; in this case, idea is properly 
called ‘type’ and also belongs to speculative knowledge. When Eckhart addresses the 
link between logic and idea, he clearly takes ‘idea’ as the principle of knowledge. But 
with regard to the issue of creation as shown above, ‘idea’ is more to do with the 
principle of making things. Thus the notion of ‘idea’ pertains not only to creating, but 
more importantly to understanding. In Eckhart these two lines are often intertwined.   
From Eckhart’s exposition as unfolded in his commentaries, we have the impression 
that he frequently brings creation, art and nature together, and uses one to exemplify 
the other, for he believes the three proceed in like manner. In order to understand how 
God created the world, we can take the production of a house as an example. Like an 
architect who builds a house according to the idea of the house in his mind, God created 
the world through the Son who is the ideal image of God and the Idea of the whole 
world. God created the world according to his own image, the Son, without which 
neither the creation of the world nor the intelligibility of it would be possible. God could 
not create the world without having preconceived the Idea or Form of it, and we would 
not be able to understand the world without knowing the Idea or Form of it, namely the 
Son. Hence the Idea is essential to God’s creating of the world and to our understanding 
of it.  
Undoubtedly creating differs from understanding: the former is to impose the idea 
conceived in the creator or producer’s mind upon a substance so that a thing comes into 
being as a result; whereas the latter is to grasp the idea of a thing that is inherent in a 
substance, and is usually carried out by another intelligent being rather than the 
producer himself. Nevertheless, as far as the idea is concerned, the producer, the 
product and the one who understands the product are one. This is because the idea is 
preconceived in the producer’s mind, exists formally in the product, and is also virtually 
assimilated in the knower’s mind. Both the conceiving and the receiving of the idea are 
conducted by the same faculty, namely the intellect. 
                                                          
463 Eckhart, In Ioh.  n. 28 (LW III 22,9-12) (trans. Bernard McGinn, in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 131). 
Eckhart quotes this passage from Augustine’s Book of Eighty-Three Questions, 63. 
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The power of understanding is proper to the intellect, and the intellect receives its 
object, namely the intelligible, not in itself, insofar as it is complete and perfect, but in 
its principle.464 The corporeal beings by nature do not distinguish the thing from the 
idea, which can only be grasped by a rational or intellectual being.465 In other words, 
the idea of a thing which is prior to the thing is to be taken in by the intellect. In the act 
of understanding, the intellect and the idea are fused into one. On that account Eckhart 
identifies the idea with the intellect: ‘the idea is in the intellect, it is formed by 
understanding and is nothing else than understanding’, and ‘it is equal in time with the 
intellect’.466 So long as the operation of the intellect is proceeding in the domain of 
ideas, it is necessary that the intellect and the idea become one, and the separation 
between the knower and what is known will then be overcome. In this case, the intellect 
grasps the idea in the way that it grasps something in its principle, root and cause.   
Eckhart acknowledges that there is another way in which the idea is grasped by the 
intellect.467 This occurs when the intellect abstracts the idea from things, and the idea 
that is obtained from external things is naturally posterior to the things.468 In that case, 
the exercise of intellect pertains to sense perception as well as the activity of the mind, 
which is to order the perceptual data and to generalise the universal element subsisting 
in the particular things. Although he does not rule out the empirical approach to 
knowledge, Eckhart concerns himself with the kind of knowledge concerning the idea 
that is prior to things, capable of separate existence and not intermingled with things. 
Clearly, idea in that sense is to be received in the intrinsic principles rather than being 
abstracted from things. Consequently intellective conduct becomes independent of 
things and deals exclusively with the ideas rather than things.  
                                                          
464 Eckhart, In Ioh. n.9 (LW III 10,1-3): ‘Decimo notandum quod proprium intellectus est obiectum suum, 
intelligibile scilicet, accipere non in se, ut totum quoddam, perfectum et bonum est, sed accipere in suis 
principiis.’ (trans. Bernard McGinn, in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 125.) 
465 Ibid. n.31 (LW III 24): ‘Natura enim corporalis ut sic non distinguit inter rem et rationem, quia non 
novit rationem, quam solum accipit et novit rationale sive intellectivum.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn, in 
Essential Eckhart, 1981, 132.) 
466 Ibid. n.38 (LW III 33,10-2): ‘Iterum et ratio in intellectu est, intelligendo formatur, nihil praeter 
intelligere est. Iterum etiam coaeva est intellectui, cum sit ipsum intelligere et ipse intellectus.’ (Trans. 
Bernard McGinn, in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 135.) 
467 Reiner Schürmann tackles this issue under the title ‘exterior and interior knowledge’. See Reiner 
Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (Bloomington and London, 1978), 144-8. 
468 Ibid. n.29 (LW III 22,13-23,2): ‘Secundo notandum quod ratio dupliciter accipitur: est enim ratio a 
rebus accepta sive abstracta per intellectum, et haec est rebus posterior a quibus abstrahitur; est et ratio 
rebus prior, causa rerum et ratio, quam diffinitio indicat et intellectus accipit in ipsis principiis intrinsecis.’ 
(Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 131.) 
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The ideas of things are derived from the Idea, which is the Son or the Word of God, 
and God himself is the First Intellect. On the basis of the above reasoning, Eckhart 
affirms that ‘the Idea in the proper sense is certainly in the First Intellect’. Just as ‘in 
the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God’, so the Idea is in the First 
Intellect and is also with God ‘in every neighbouring intellectual being that is its image, 




2.2.2.3 The Human Intellect  
 
a) The nature of the human intellect 
The concept of the human intellect is specifically treated in Eckhart’s second 
commentary on Genesis, the Book of the Parables of Genesis.470 His interpretation 
predominantly conforms to a parabolic reading of the scripture; as a result the three 
characters in Eden, ‘serpent, woman and man’, are seen as the symbols of man’s 
sensitive faculty, the inferior rational faculty and the superior rational faculty that is 
intellect. Eckhart holds that intellect is the highest faculty in man, and is the image of 
God in which man is made, thus stands for the substantial being of the human creature.  
Moreover, the communication between ‘serpent’, ‘woman’ and ‘man’ indicates the 
natural constitution of our soul and the correlation between the three faculties within 
us. Eckhart makes the point that by reading scripture in parabolic fashion it is evident 
that this story of Genesis holds truth even in the literal sense, because the sensitive 
faculty truly and literally speaks to the inferior reason, the inferior rational faculty 
speaks to the superior reason, and the highest faculty speaks to God.471 Likewise, the 
conversation between man and God, woman and man, and serpent and woman is an 
illustration of how God relates himself to creaturely beings. The sequence – God speaks 
                                                          
469 Eckhart, In Ioh.  n.31 (LW III 24,16-25,1): ‘In ipso enim intellectu primo utique est ratio proprie; et 
est apud deum, in omni scilicet intellectivo proximo sibi, quod est imago sive ad imaginem suam, genus 
dei est, Act. 17.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 132.) 
470 Eckhart wrote two different commentaries on Genesis: Expositio libri Genesis and Liber parabolarum 
Genesis. 
471 Eckhart, Par. Gen. n.137 (LW I 1, 603,10-5): ‘Praeterea quarto apparebit quod in his verbis: serpens, 
mulier et vir exprimitur consistentia et natura humanae conditionis in sua constitutione quantum ad 
principia sua et eorum naturales proprietates, et quomodo serpens, sensitivum scilicet, verissime et ad 
litteram loquitur mulieri, inferiori scilicet rationalis, et quomodo illud inferius rationale loquitur suo 
superiori, et hoc supremum loquitur deo, et quomodo deus loquitur cum praemissis tribus.’ (Trans. 
Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 109.) 
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to man, man to woman, and woman to serpent – implies that God only addresses man’s 
intellect in a direct manner, and whatever stands lower than intellective faculty can 
receive the word of God only through an intermediate. 
The intellect in us conjoins man with God, in the sense that man, on the basis of the 
intellective faculty, is able to form an innermost communication with God. However, 
man’s intellective conduct cannot do without the involvement of the sensitive faculty, 
because ‘we cannot understand without phantasms’ and our imagination is ‘a 
movement produced by sensation’.472 The sensitive faculty provides man’s intellect 
with phantasm, so it is by nature subject to the intellective faculty. Eckhart maintains 
that possessing the sensitive faculty is proper to man for the sake of the integrity of 
human beings. By and large man is an intellectual being who lives with an innate 
sensitive faculty, which means that man ranks at the top in the order of corporeal and 
on the bottom in the order of intellectual beings.473 The nature of the human intellect, 
therefore, indicates the border line between the corporeal beings, which are unable to 
distinguish things from the ideas, and the intellectual beings, which are totally free from 
matter and image.  
Eckhart sometimes defines man by intellect rather than reason, especially with regard 
to the glory of God.  He claims: ‘Man is man through the intellect, to have an intellect 
is part of him and is proper to him, and the property of the intellect is to see the glory 
of God.’474 Eckhart forsakes all other faculties and takes intellect alone as the recipient 
of God’s glory.  
 
b)  Intellect as pure receptive power 
To Eckhart intellect functions as pure receptive power, and knowing or understanding 
is radically reception. The mode of intellect’s reception is particularly expounded in his 
commentary on Exodus, where he explains why the intellect does not receive things 
themselves, but their ideas or the likenesses of things. His explanation is unfolded 
                                                          
472 Eckhart, Par. Gen. n.138 (LW I 1, 604,7-9): ‘Item nobis etiam »non« contingit »intelligere sine 
phantasmate«, sicut nec »texere vel aedificare« sine instrumentis corporalibus. »Phantasia autem est 
motus a sensu factus«.’  (Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 109.) 
473 Eckhart, In Ioh. n.83 (LW III 71,4-8): ‘Quantum vero ad ens creatum distinguit quattuor gradus entium 
in universo. Sunt enim in entibus primo gradu quae sunt tantum entia, secundo gradu sunt viventia, tertio 
gradu est intellectus humanus, quarto gradu est intellectus angelicus, et si quis sit alius a materia et 
phantasmate liber, separatus.’  (Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 153.) 
474 Eckhart, In Ex. n.277 (LW II 223,4-6) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 128). 
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through an innovative exposition of the verse ‘Come up to me on the mountain, and be 
there’ (Ex. 24:12). Eckhart calls attention to the preposition ‘on’. ‘There, follows, “on 
the mountain”. Note that he does not say “to the mountain”. The reason seems to be 
that love and the will look to the thing itself, and they take their stand and are at peace 
in it. But the intellect does not take its stand in the reality of the thing itself, but 
according to its name of “intellect”, it enters into the principle of the things and there 
receives the thing in its principles, in its root and origin.’475 To receive something in its 
principle, root and origin is to receive the idea of that thing which is precontained in 
the creator’s mind before the thing comes into existence. Eckhart clarifies the meaning 
of knowledge, and takes the idea of the thing as the exclusive source of knowledge, as 
he claims that nothing brings about knowledge other than the ‘what-it-is’ definition and 
idea of the thing itself.476   
By fixing intellect to the principles of things, Eckhart pushes knowing to the same 
level as being, and to know something means to share the same being with something, 
as the Son knows the Father, or the image knows the exemplar, and vice versa. Eckhart 
affirms this rule by referring to the verse ‘No one knows the Son except the Father, nor 
does anyone know the Father except the Son’ (Mt. 11:27). The reason, Eckhart claims, 
is that the Father and Son are one in what they are, and nothing is known through what 
is alien to this oneness, thus the principles of knowing and of being are identified.477 
This echoes another oft-repeated rule, that only those who are in oneness with God will 
be able to know God. Eckhart gives the example of the just man and justice to illustrate 
this point: just as justice is known to itself alone and to the just man that has been taken 
up by justice, God is known to himself alone and to the man who is taken up in the 
divine. To be taken up in the divine means to receive God’s being, hence the scriptural 
text ‘No one knows who does not receive’ (Rv. 2:17).478  
Just as the matter is to receive its proper form in nature, the operation of the intellect 
is to receive idea or form intrinsically. It is believed that in nature things come into 
being when matter receives form. In that process form as an active agent comes to its 
proper matter, and matter takes on its form and is thus informed. In that sense matter 
                                                          
475 Eckhart, In Ex. n.265 (LW II 213,11-4): ‘Sequitur: in montem. Nota: non ait ad montem. Ratio videtur: 
amor enim et voluntas ad rem ipsam respiciunt et in ipsa sistunt et quiescunt. Intellectus vero non sistit 
in re ipsa in se ipsa, sed iuxta nomen intellectus intrat ad ipsa rei principia et ibi rem accipit in principiis 
suis in radice et origine.’ (trans. Bernard McGinn inTeacher and Preacher, 1986, 125). 
476 Eckhart, In Ioh.  n.11 (LW III 11,12-3) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 126). 
477 Ibid.  n.26 (LW III 21,3-5) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 130). 
478 Ibid. n.15 (LW III 13,8-12) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart [1981, 126-7). 
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always functions as a passive recipient. And the purer, the better. Because the extent to 
which the substantial form is to be received depends on how pure the receptive power 
can be. So long as the recipient possesses something of its own, it is stained and thus 
cannot receive the substantial form itself. Only the pure receptive power is entitled to 
receive the substantial form itself, and that is precisely what it takes for the intellect to 
understand, to take in the idea of a substance. The distinctive power of intellect lies in 
its nature of formlessness; in other words, because intellect does not possess this or that 
form, therefore it has the capacity to receive all forms; because it ‘has nothing of its 
own’ therefore it ‘understands all things’.479 According to Eckhart, the fundamental 
operation of the intellect is nothing but to serve as a pure receptive power that alone is 
proper to the substantial form itself. Fundamentally, the work of intellect or the process 
of understanding is to receive, not to pursue.480   
Eckhart frequently mentions the limitedness of human knowledge, and he probes into 
the fundamental differences between God’s knowledge and human knowledge of things. 
This line of thought gains a focused expression in his lengthy exposition of the biblical 
verse ‘Almighty is his name’ (Ex. 15:3). He holds that knowledge in the Godhead is 
substance, whereas in man it is a quality. It belongs to God to denominate a thing 
according to its completed work, and in God existence and knowledge are the same. 
Our knowledge, in contrast, arises from the senses, and we name things according to 
the manner in which we know them. Therefore ‘the distinction of divine attributes such 
as power, wisdom, goodness and the like, is totally within our intellect’s way of 
grasping, or on the side of the intellect that receives and draws knowledge of such things 
from and through creatures.’481 On this point Eckhart disagrees with Thomas, because 
to Thomas the perfections we attribute to God still have ground in the divine.482 It 
follows that anyone who would see God himself through himself would see a single 
perfection and would see all perfections in it and through it rather than it through them. 
As to God’s way of knowing, Eckhart particularly mentions Thomas’s wonderful 
                                                          
479 Eckhart, In Ioh. n.100 (LW III 86,14-5) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 160). 
480 Eckhart mentions that all the work of the active intellect serves the purpose of preparing itself for God. 
Once God takes over, man’s intellect must become passive. See Walshe, Sermon 3, The Complete 
Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. and ed. by Maurite O’C Walshe (New York, 2009), 46-54.  
481  Eckhart, In Ex. nn. 58 (LW II 64,1-3): ‘Constat enim quod distinctio attributorum divinorum, 
potentiae scilicet, sapientiae, bonitatis et huiusmodi, totaliter est ex parte intellectus accipientis et 
colligentis cognitionem talium ex creaturis et per creaturas.’ (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and 
Preacher, 1986, 63). 
482 Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q.13, a.4. 
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saying about the ‘knowledge of vision’.483 Eckhart notices that Thomas usually takes 
‘the ‘knowledge of vision’ (scientia visionis) as knowledge of finite things, meaning 
that it concerns only those really existing things and does not pertain to things in 
potency. By contrast, the ‘knowledge of simple understanding’ (scientia simplicis 
intelligentiae) embraces all that is possible. That is the explanation Thomas gives in 
Summa Contra Gentiles I, q.69 and elsewhere. Only in Summa Theol. I, q.14, a.12 does 
Thomas present a daring exposition of the ‘knowledge of vision’, one that he never 
repeated. There Thomas claims that if we consider more attentively, God knows infinite 
things even by the ‘knowledge of vision’. What he means is that if we take into 
consideration the thoughts and affections of hearts which are invisible to us but can be 
known by God, it follows that the ‘knowledge of vision’ is no more confined to the 
finite, because the thoughts and affections ‘will be multiplied to infinity as rational 
creatures go on for ever’. This statement, which implies that even things in act are 
infinite, is highly regarded by Eckhart.  Such a daring claim puts the Catholic faith in 
jeopardy.484  
Despite his inclination to treat creatures as infinite, Eckhart addresses the limitedness 
of man’s knowledge.  This leads us to the so-called mystic side of Eckhart, who 
repeatedly resorts to Maimonides and Dionysius and asserts the principle that man 
ascends to knowledge of God through removal: what God is remains hidden and 
covered at the end. When commenting on ‘Moses went into the darkness, wherein God 
was’ (Ex. 20:21), Eckhart employs terms such as ‘perfect ignorance’ and ‘splendent 
darkness’; he admits that when our intellect strives to apprehend the creator, it finds a 
great wall dividing him from us. God is truly hidden from us in cloud and darkness. 485    
 
c)  The mutual glance between man’s intellect and God  
To Eckhart it is only through intellect that the divine communication with God is to be 
formed in man. In his Commentary on Exodus, Eckhart draws a conclusion that the 
essential vision of God is impossible for a created intellect on the basis of its natural 
powers, and becomes possible only by supernatural aid. Thus when Moses begs, ‘Show 
me your face’, it is significant that he prefixes it with ‘If I have found grace in your 
                                                          
483 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 86 (LW II 89,9-10) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 73). 
484 See Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (2011), 3.  




sight’ (Ex. 33:13).486 Eckhart asserts that the ‘mutual glance between God and the 
height of the soul is completely natural, full of truth and delight’, because it is founded 
‘in the root and source of all good, namely order’. 487  That natural order, Eckhart 
assumes, ‘is one in which the highest point of what is inferior touches the lowest point 
of its superior’,488 and by that mutual touch the superior illuminates the inferior and 
manifests everything it has to the inferior.489 That is the way God beholds the intellect 
and unfolds himself to us. This opening up indicates God’s speaking to us, which, 
according to Eckhart, is nothing else ‘but God’s becoming known to us through his 
gifts’.490  
Although God speaks to all things and he speaks all things, his word is not to be 
understood by all. Some beings receive it in and through existence, some in and through 
life; only the highest beings hear God in and through existence, life and understanding. 
491 Eckhart stresses the hierarchical state of the three: to be, to live, and to know. He 
claims that these three exhaust the totality of being. Despite the most fundamental status 
                                                          
486 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 281 (LW II 226,5-6) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 129). 
487 Eckhart, Par. Gen.  n.139 (LW I 1, 606,11-607,2): ‘Iste autem ordo et respectus mutuus dei et supremi 
animae naturalissimus est, verissimus est et dulcissimus est, utpote convenientissimus et fundatus in 
radice et fonte omnis boni, qui est ordo.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 110.) 
488 Ibid. n.139 (LW I 1, 605,12-606,1): ‘Ordo enim ipse est qui facit bonum, adeo quod impossibile est 
esse bonum sine ordine, et e converso impossibile est esse malum, ubi ordo est. Ordo autem naturalis est, 
ut supremum inferioris attingat infimum sui superioris. Supremum autem animae in nobis intellectus est.’ 
(Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 109-10.) 
489 Ibid. n.146 (LW I 1, 615,5-616,3): ‘Is est ipse attactus mutuus, quo superius aspicit inferius et e 
converso. In hoc autem attactu et occurs mutuo se osculantur et amplexantur naturali et essentiali amore 
superius et inferius. Quin immo ipse attactus mutuus, quo superius aspicit inferius et e converso ipsum 
inferius respicit ad aspectum superioris, vox est et verbum, locutio et dictio et nomen, quo innotescit 
superius inferiori et se illi pandit, aperit et manifestat; manifestat, inquam, omnia quae in se sunt, Ioh. 
16: “omnia, quae habet pater, mea sunt”; et Ioh. 15: “omnia, quaecumque audivi a patre meo, nota feci 
vobis”. Manifestat autem se ipso et se ipsum. Et hoc est quod doctores dicunt angelos superiores 
illuminare inferiores quantum ad omnia, quae cognoscunt naturaliter.’ 
‘This is the mutual touch in which the superior gazes on the inferior and vice versa. They kiss and 
embrace each other in this touch and encounter with a love that is natural and essential. Indeed, the shared 
touch by which the superior beholds the inferior and the inferior returns the superior’s gaze is the voice 
and word, utterance and speech and name, by which the superior recognizes the inferior and unfolds, 
opens and manifests itself to it. I say that it manifests everything that it has. “All the things that the Father 
has are mine.” (Jn.16:15); “All the things I have heard from my Father I have made known to you” (Jn. 
15:15). It manifests itself by itself, and this is what the doctors say about the higher angels illuminating 
the lower regarding everything they know in natural fashion.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential 
Eckhart, 1981, 113.) 
490 Ibid. n.150 (LW I 1, 619,6-9): ‘His igitur diffuse praemissis colligendo breviter dicendum quod deum 
nobis loqui non est aliud prorsus quam donis suis nobis innotescere, donis suis et inspirationibus, sive 
naturalibus sive gratuitis, nos excitare et mentes nostras suo lumine irradiare.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn 
in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 114-5.) 
491 Ibid. n.151 (LW I 1, 621,9-11): ‘Suprema vero in entibus ipsum audiunt deum non solum per esse et 
in esse, aut per vivere et in vivere, sed per intelligere et in ipso intelligere.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn in 
Essential Eckhart, 1981, 115.) 
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of ‘to be’ in the abstract sense, the situation is reversed in the concrete, where being 
holds the lowest place, living being the second place, and intelligent being the third or 
highest place. A mere being is less perfect than a living being because the former is 
included in the latter. On the same account, an intelligent being is deemed more perfect 
and noble than a living being. Eckhart specifically points out that the reason for the 
superiority of one over another lies in the kind of existence the superior includes, rather 
than its own existence. In addition, the inferior ‘exists in a more noble fashion and a 
more perfect way in what is its superior by essential order’.492 Man undoubtedly falls 
into the category of the highest beings, which hold the capacity to receive God by means 
of understanding. Thus the word of God is heard on the ground of intellect, meaning 
God becomes known to man. 
But God’s becoming known to us is not based solely on man’s intellective power; it 
also entails the role of grace. By the aid of the natural gifts and divine intervention, man 
gains some knowledge of God. It is through the gifts either of nature or of grace that 
we are raised up and our minds are illuminated by the light from on high. ‘For us to 
speak to God is nothing else but to hear and obey him and his inspiration, to turn away 
from other things and turn toward him and his likeness.’493 Moreover Eckhart claims 
that it is through grace that man is redirected to God after sin. The correct condition of 
man lies in his conformance with the natural order in creation, in the sense that man 
adheres to God by the intellect, the inferior reason in turn cleaves to the superior reason, 
and the sensitive faculty to the inferior reason.494 In that way God draws all the three to 
himself. The more the intellect adheres to God himself, the more submissive the 
sensitive faculty and the inferior rational faculty become.495 So long as the intellect 
holds fast to God, what is below the intellective faculty will naturally obey and adhere 
to what is superior to itself.  
                                                          
492 Eckhart, In Ioh. n.63 (LW III 53,4-5): ‘Tertio notandum quod inferius nobilius et perfectiori modo 
est in suo superiori ordine essentiali.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 144.) 
493 Eckhart, Par. Gen., n.150 (LW I 1, 619,11-620,2), ‘Nos autem deo loqui non est aliud quam ipsum et 
eius inspirationem audire et oboedire, ab aliis autem averti et ad ipsum et ipsius assimilationem converti, 
quomodo montes aliqui et loca respondent et loquuntur sibi loquentibus, sicut patet in sono.’ (Trans. 
Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 115.) 
494 Ibid. n.143 (LW I 1, 612,1-3): ‘»Haec fuit« et est »rectitudo hominis«, quando sensitivum oboedit 
rationi inferiori et ad ipsam respicit et ordinatur et illa subhaeret et adhaeret rationi superiori et ipsa deo.’ 
(Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 112.) 
495 Ibid. n.145 (LW I 1, 613,7-8): ‘Tunc enim, quo magis adhaeret supremum animae ipsi deo, tanto 




The mutual glance and communication between the superior and the inferior are 
utterance, speech and word in the most proper and pleasing sense, to which the exterior 
utterance, speech and word do not compare.496 This is because the exterior discourse or 
speech is no more than a trace, an analogous assimilation of that true utterance 
occurring in the innermost depth of all beings.  
 
2.3 Eckhart the Friar:  Expounding the Role of the Intellect in Spiritual Practice 
through Sermons  
Eckhart’s enduring legacy to Christian spirituality is preserved chiefly in his sermons, 
of which some are delivered in scholastic Latin and others in Middle High German, the 
vernacular of the time. His Latin sermons are hardly differentiated from his biblical 
commentaries, being scholastic in style and exegetical in nature. For that reason Eckhart 
integrates them into the third book of his Opus Tripartitum, namely the Book of 
Commentaries. As a result, the third book of Opus Tripartitum is divided into two 
equally important portions, commentaries and sermons, and in both we see Eckhart’s 
detailed expositions of scripture.497 
Meanwhile, it is through his vernacular homilies that Eckhart has been remembered 
as a powerful preacher, down through the history of Christian theology. It is noteworthy 
that even when preaching in the vernacular Eckhart never seems to have neglected the 
exegetical framework that he intends to establish in his Opus Tripartitum. Rather, he 
conscientiously seeks the scriptural ground for his words: the topic of each of the 
vernacular homilies is derived from a well-known scriptural verse, which usually forms 
the opening sentence of the respective sermon. On the basis of the above observations 
we come to the conclusion that Eckhart’s Latin and vernacular sermons are both 
fundamentally exegetical in nature, despite the differences in language and style. 
Overall the level of technical complexity demonstrated in his commentaries is 
thoroughly maintained in his Latin sermons, whereas in his German homilies poetic 
images and metaphors such as ‘spark’, ‘ground’, ‘seed’ and ‘the birth of the son’ start 
to play a predominant role. Nonetheless, in both Eckhart calls upon the reader and the 
                                                          
496 Eckhart, Par. Gen. n.150 (LW I 1, 619,9-10): ‘Et haec est propriissima et dulcissima locutio, sermo 
vel verbum, cuius exterior locutio, sermo et verbum ignobile est.’ (Trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential 
Eckhart, 1981, 115.) 
497 Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus Tripartitum n.6 (LW I 1, 151,7-12) (trans. Armand A. Maurer 
in Parisian Questions and Prologues, 1974, 81-2). 
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audience to focus on the issues concerning Christian life and spiritual practice as stated 
in the sacred scripture. In the case of Eckhart, if we take the sermon as the typical form 
of preaching to the public, we ought probably to put those scholastic Latin sermons 
aside and concentrate instead on the vernacular homilies, which were originally 
delivered by Eckhart himself and later on transcribed by another hand. Although the 
authenticity of these vernacular sermons has been established by the collective work of 
scholars over the last five decades or more,498 the accuracy of the transcripts will still 
be open to question. This issue was initially addressed by Eckhart himself in his Defense 
to the Bull of condemnation, where he pointed out that ‘even learned and studious 
clerics take down what they hear frequently and indiscriminately in a false and 
abbreviated way’,499 and firmly refused to be held responsible for the sixteen articles 
ascribed to him, all of which were derived from his German sermons.   
Compared with the quaestiones and commentaries and those equally sophisticated 
Latin sermons enclosed in Opus Tripartitum, the vernacular homilies ascribed to 
Eckhart have wider appeal, especially to those who hold spiritual aspirations and thus 
always give priority to spiritual progress. The main purpose of delivering a sermon is 
to grip the mind of the audience in a straightforward manner so that they can be instantly 
touched and inspired. For that reason the efficiency or the force of the language must 
be taken into full consideration; naturally metaphors and imagery are to be embraced, 
and elements of discursive and analytical style to be reduced. In fulfilling his pastoral 
duties such as preaching to the public, a friar such as Eckhart does not necessarily 
deliver a new message; what he intends is rather the renewal of an old message that 
may have been continuously transmitted within the same tradition. Indeed, a closer 
examination of these seemingly outspoken sermons makes it clear that, with regard to 
spiritual practice, for example grace and the divine life within us, Eckhart is not saying 
something radically new; his message is very close to that of other scholastics of his 
age, for instance, Dietrich von Freiberg.500 Recent studies which give more thought to 
                                                          
498 See Bernard McGinn’s Foreword to Maurite O’C Walshe’s translation and edition of The Complete 
Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart (New York, 2009), xvi. 
499 Eckhart, Responsio n.127 (LW V 293,17-20), (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 74).  
500 Oliver Davies highlights the intellectual legacy that Meister Eckhart received from the German 
Dominican school. He briefly goes through Dietrich von Freiberg’s thought on the human intellect, and 
points out that in Meister Dietrich we see an explicit identification of the Augustinian abditum mentis 
(the secret interior of the mind) with the Aristotelian agent intellect; thus intellect becomes the essential 
soul itself. On that basis Davies makes the point that Eckhart’s understanding of the human intellect is 
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the mystic501 side of Eckhart, such as that of Oliver Davies, are inclined to demonstrate 
that the appealing power of Eckhart’s sermons consists in his verbal and imagistic 
expressivity. And these free-floating dynamic images employed in his sermons, in turn, 
convey the sense of a personal spiritual vision of immense energy.502   
Admittedly, Eckhart’s sermons are charged with his personal insights into Christian 
spirituality, which may invoke the need to look particularly into his personal spiritual 
vision or even his so-called mystical experience. But we should not forget that Eckhart 
is by no means the sort of mystic who lends himself to the uncontrollable ecstasy,503 
nor does he ever intend to promote something personal. On the contrary Eckhart urges 
everyone, including himself, to break away from personhood, meaning to stop being 
this or that person so as to let the personal identity perish completely in God. In Eckhart 
the focus is always on the divine ground which speaks of the utmost commonality, and 
personhood or personal identity indicates only a hindrance to knowing God, thus should 
be overcome by all means, because the death of one’s personhood, like a seed perishing 
in the soil, will usher in a new life in God, as stated in scripture (Jn. 12:24).504 
Viewing from a hermeneutical perspective, it is not hard to see that Eckhart never 
disputes the divine origin and the holy nature of scripture. For him scripture is the 
                                                          
heavily indebted to the Albertian school, in particular Albert the Great and Dietrich von Freiberg. For 
details, see Oliver Davies, Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian (London, 1991), 85-99. 
501 It is still open to question whether it is appropriate to call Eckhart a mystic.  Some scholars, such as 
Heribert Fischer and Kurt Flasch, refuse to attach the epithet ‘mystic’ to Eckhart. Disagreement on this 
issue derives partly from the different approaches to Eckhart’s work, and is also related to the ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of mystic. Bernard McGinn defines mystic in terms of consciousness rather 
than experience; from his perspective a mystic is one who attains the consciousness of God’s presence. 
See The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (New York, 2001), 132; The Foundation of Mysticism 
(London, 1992), General Introduction, xi-xx; The Essential Writings of Christian Mysticism (New York, 
2006), Introduction, xvi.  
Reiner Schürmann is not satisfied with those definitions of mysticism that derive the mystical experience 
from the arrival at consciousness of an all-encompassing being. In his study of Eckhart, Schürmann offers 
a different approach, which is to define mysticism as the reciprocity between existence and thought; in 
other words, a genuine understanding of detachment/releasement is convertible with a detached/released 
existence. It is worth noting that Schürmann takes ‘releasement’ as the most appropriate translation of 
‘Gelassenheit’, based on an examination of that key term in both Eckhart and Heidegger. See Reiner 
Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (Bloomington & London, 1978), Introduction xii- 
xv. 
502 Oliver Davies, Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian (1991), 156. 
503 Eckhart’s detachment includes detaching from internal images.  This point has been particularly 
stressed by the Korean scholar H. S. Keel in his comparative study of Eckhart’s thinking with Zen 
Buddhism. See H. S. Keel, Meister Eckhart: an Asian perspective (Louvain, 2007). Eckhart is also 
distinct from Augustine with regard to spiritual itinerary. For detailed comparison of Eckhart’s seven 
stages with Augustine’s six stages, see Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (2011), 138-91. 
504 This sermon focuses on a typically Eckhartian theme – the three deaths of the soul. It was first edited 
by Josef Jostes (1895) as no. 82, but somehow not included in the edition and translation of Walshe 
(2009). The second part was translated by Oliver Davies as no. 30 in Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings 
(London, 1994), 244-5. 
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concrete manifestation of the divine presence, thus serves as the measure of our 
personal viewpoints as well as religious experience. Eckhart explicitly orients his 
thoughts towards scripture, in the sense that he bases both his academic output 
(propositions, quaestiones and commentaries, including his Latin sermons) and his oral 
presentation (vernacular sermons) on a solid scriptural ground, in both cases drawing 
heavily on passages selected from the two Testaments.  
It is noteworthy that among the selected scriptural texts, the proportion of the two 
Testaments is reversed in the commentaries and the sermons. According to the  
manuscripts discovered to date, we have only one piece of Eckhart’s commentary on 
the New Testament, his Commentary on John; all of the rest are on the Old Testament.  
In his sermons, we see a much larger portion of texts drawn from the New Testament, 
especially the three gospels according to Matthew, John and Luke and the Pauline 
Epistles. Therefore at least in terms of scriptural sources, in his sermons Eckhart shifts 
the focus of attention to the New Testament. Consequently questions concerning 
Christology or Christian spirituality are brought to the centre, and topics such as how 
God gives birth to the Son in the soul and how the soul achieves union with God come 
to the fore.  
To summarise, it is chiefly through his sermons that Eckhart gives his insights into 
the spiritual journey as revealed in scripture. Nevertheless, the practical elements 
contained in his sermons do not stand alone, but rather resonate with the theoretical 
discussions unfolded in his sophisticated quaestiones and commentaries. The parallels 
we find between his quaestiones, commentaries and sermons underline that a versatile 
master like Eckhart is perfectly capable of expressing the same idea in discursive 
argumentation and through metaphoric images. What the Dominican friar505 preaches 
from the pulpit echoes what he has taught at the University of Paris and elsewhere as a 
scholastic theologian.  
With a focus on the intellect, we will look at how the Eckhartian notion of intellect 
is unfolded in his sermonic corpus.  For that purpose two aspects will be addressed: 1) 
intellect as the temple of God; and 2) intellect as the key to detachment. 
                                                          
505 C. H. Lawrence explores the social economic context of the 12th century and points out that the orders 
of mendicant friars that appeared in the early years of the thirteenth century represented a new departure, 
a radical break away from the monastic tradition of the past. Preaching and ministering to the people thus 
became the duty of the friars. They abandoned the seclusion and enclosure of the cloister so as to engage 
in an active pastoral mission to the society of their time. For details, see C. H. Lawrence, Medieval 




2.3.1 Intellect as the Temple of God 
The notion of intellect remains one of the major themes running through Eckhart’s 
sermons. The thesis ‘intellect is the temple of God’, which he puts forward particularly 
in Sermon 9 (W67)506 strikingly parallels what is stated in Parisian Question 1 and 
Commentary on John. In his Parisian Question 1 Eckhart reverses the Thomistic order 
and insists that God is the intellect and knowing is prior to being in the divine. Similarly, 
in his Commentary on John Eckhart identifies intellect with the Principle, in which 
nothing but the eternal Word dwells. 507  In line with Parisian Question 1 and 
Commentary on John, Sermon 9 (W67) speaks of the intellect and is rendered in the 
same top-down order. Eckhart starts with a definition of God ‘as an intellect that lives 
solely by understanding itself’,508 and then moves on to the discussion of the soul where 
the human intellect is located.  
As in his Latin works, Eckhart maintains the logic of proceeding from the divine 
intellect to the human intellect. But in his sermons Eckhart renders his thought in poetic 
language.  In this one he states that the soul ‘has a tiny drop of intellect, a little spark, a 
twig’.509 Unlike other powers of the soul,510 this little spark holds the capacity to take 
God stripped of goodness and being, to dwell in his temple, namely in the divine 
intellect, in which ‘His own knowing knows himself in himself’.511 Hence beatitude 
lies in intellect rather than will.  This Dominican stance, which Eckhart has affirmed in 
Parisian Question 3, reverberates in many of his sermons, and is often uttered more 
bluntly.  Here in Sermon 9 (W67) Eckhart expresses it straightforwardly in an ego-
statement: ‘I am blessed only because God is intellectual and I know it.’512  
To properly understand this statement, we need to take into account the reduplicating 
formula in quantum or ‘insofar as’. In his Defense Eckhart urges the investigators to 
keep this formula in mind, and clarifies what he means by it. The expression ‘insofar 
                                                          
506 Eckhart’s German sermons are numbered in various ways; I will adopt Quint’s numbering and gives 
its order in Walshe’s translation in brackets. For details concerning the different ways of ordering, see 
the Table of Concordance in Walshe (ed., trans.), The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart 
(2009), 591-3. It will be abridged as Mystical Eckhart in the following footnotes.  
507 Eckhart, In Ioh.  n.38 (LW III 32) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 135).    
508 Eckhart, Pr. 9 (DW I 142,6-7) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 341). 
509 Eckhart, Pr. 9 (DW I 151,1-2) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 343). 
510 Thomas deals with this issue in his Summa Theol. I, q.77. 
511 Eckhart, Pr. 9 (DW I 150,7) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 343). 
512 Eckhart, Pr. 9 (DW I 153,11-2) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 344). 
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as’, Eckhart explains, is radically a reduplication that serves to exclude from the 
respective term everything that is foreign to it.513 Admittedly the typical Eckhartian 
formula in quantum is not always employed literally in the vernacular sermons as in his 
Latin works; nevertheless, by applying the formula to these sermons, their depth and 
richness will be brought to light. To take the aforementioned ego-statement, ‘I am 
blessed only because God is intellectual and I know it’ as an example, in accordance 
with the reduplicating formula we may paraphrase as follows: ‘I am blessed only 
because God is intellectual and I know it, insofar as the intellect is concerned, insofar 
as I am no other than the intellect which is a power in the soul that touches neither time 
nor flesh.’ With the aid of his in quantum formula, we come to see that by the term ‘I’ 
Eckhart means to speak of the incorporeal power of the human intellect. Thus it 
becomes clear that in preaching these sermons Eckhart is actually talking about the 
divine, spiritual things in terms of the intellectual concept; if one takes his words in 
material terms, their subtlety will be missed.  This point is precisely what his opponents 
fail to grasp.514  
Following the principle that beatitude lies in knowing, 515  Eckhart gives a vivid 
account of how God works in the soul, or more precisely, in the intellective power of 
the soul.  Thus arises his doctrine of the birth of the Son in the soul. Through this 
doctrine Eckhart brings the creation back into the soul, presenting an entirely 
interiorised version of creation. This theme runs throughout his sermons. We will not 
survey all of them here, but we take one example to illustrate this point. Let us look at 
the oft-mentioned Sermon 2 (W8), in which Eckhart freely renders the Latin mulier 
(woman) as ‘virgin and wife’, and plays upon the German word enpfangen, which can 
mean both ‘received’ and ‘conceived’.516 By means of such free-rendering of words 
Eckhart makes the point that the good gifts that are received in virginity should be 
reborn back into God in wifely fruitfulness. Not only is the eternal Father ever begetting 
his eternal Son without pause in this power of the soul, namely the intellect, but this 
power of the soul ‘jointly begets the Father’s Son and itself, this self-same Son, in the 
                                                          
513 Eckhart, Responsio n.81 (LW V 277,7-8) (trans Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 72). 
514 Eckhart, Responsio n.125 (LW V 293,5-9) (trans Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981,74). 
515 Eckhart gives different expression in Sermon 52, as will be discussed later. In this sermon Eckhart 
mentions the ground from which intellect and will derive. It follows that beatitude lies in neither knowing 
nor loving, but in the source of knowledge and love.    
516 As pointed out by Walshe, Eckhart’s rendering is very free, as the Latin says nothing about a virgin. 
See footnotes 1 and 2, in Mystical Eckhart (2009), 81.  
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sole power of the Father’.517 Thus we have a circular rather than a one-way track. On 
the one hand, God is begetting his Only-Begotten Son in this power (intellect) of the 
soul; on the other hand, this power (intellect) of the soul gives birth to the same Only-
Begotten Son and itself with the Father and in the power of the Father. This circular 
way of presentation will make sense only to one who is able to grasp the logic that 
underpins Eckhart’s sermons, which can be summed up as follows: intellect is the light 
of spirit, thus the intellectual is no less than the spiritual, and the spiritual or the divine 
things can be best spoken of in intellectual terms. Following the identification of the 
spiritual with the intellectual, it becomes easier to understand that in the spiritual realm, 
to receive means to conceive, reception is conception. In other words, the knowing 
power (intellect of the soul) is one with what is known (which is God himself); it is also 
conformed to what is known, and in turn, gives rise to new knowledge. Hence the 
receiver does not remain a receiver, but is developed into a giver and brings what it has 
received back to the First giver with all thanks and gratitude. What Eckhart means by 
‘virgin’ is the receiver, and by ‘wife’ the giver; the logic of his expression ‘the virgin 
who is a wife’ is that in spiritual journey we proceed from being a receiver to being a 
giver, and we must first become a perfect receiver so as to reach maturity and become 
a giver ourselves. The more we give, the better we receive, and vice versa.   
The mature giver, which is indicative of the virtue of wifely fruitfulness in Sermon 
2, resonates with what Eckhart says in the Latin Sermon VI: ‘God’s nature, existence, 
and life consist in sharing himself and giving himself totally.’518 Through the two words 
‘himself’ and ‘totally’ Eckhart makes it clear that what God gives us is not something 
less or other than God; he gives himself totally in the sense that God made the soul 
according to himself and gives birth to the Only-Begotten Son in the soul. In Sermon 
24 (W92) Eckhart mentions a fundamental difference between the soul and other things 
created by God. He explains that God generally made all things according to an image 
of all things that he has in himself, but the soul was not made according to an image in 
himself, nor according to something coming forth from him, but according to himself, 
that is to say, according to all that he is in his nature, his being, his activity which flows 
forth yet remains within.519 Of course God is in all things, but nowhere is God present, 
                                                          
517 Eckhart, Pr. 2 (DW I 32, 6-8), (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart [2009], 79). 
518 Eckhart, Sermo VI, n. 55 (LW IV 55), (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher [1986], 213).  
519 Eckhart, Pr. 24 (DW I 415,11-7) (trans. Frank Tobin in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 284-5).  
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as divine and intelligent just as he is in himself, so intensively as in the soul; to be 
precise, in the innermost and the highest part of the soul, and the innermost is the 
highest.520  Since God made the soul in accordance with this out-flowing, inward-
remaining work, it follows that the soul shares one ground, one spirit, and one being 
with God.  
Based on the principle of oneness between the soul and God, Eckhart affirms the 
controversial doctrine he often preaches to the public: ‘There is something above the 
created nature of the soul.’ In addition, he claims there is no such thing as truth so far 
as the soul’s created nature is concerned.521 Evidently Eckhart admits the created nature 
of the soul,522 but he refuses to take createdness as the whole nature of the soul. His 
doctrine of the soul lays emphasis rather on that ‘something’ which is higher than 
createdness and creatableness. The uncreated nature of this ‘something’ is not a result 
of creation, but is derived from the union of the soul with God. On the ground of this 
union or oneness, Eckhart claims the likeness of the soul to the divine. The soul is so 
related to God and one with God that it is really like God, which means that like God 
the soul has nothing in common with anything, as it is God’s property and nature that 
he is dissimilar and is like no one.523 And the soul’s likeness to God can only be fully 
realised through the Word incarnate. 
The subtlety of this Eckhartian doctrine is not easily to be grasped; as Eckhart tells 
us in the sermons, many priests of his time fail to see the truthfulness of his teaching. 
In order to articulate and justify this seemingly heretical saying, Eckhart resorts to 
John’s gospel for scriptural support. He picks the verse ‘Everything that I have heard 
from my father I have revealed it to you’ (Jn.15:15), and overtly challenges the 
interpretation given by some priests, ‘who are certainly very learned and want to be 
important, but are so easily satisfied and let themselves be fooled in how they take these 
words’ of our Lord.524 According to them, the verse ‘Everything that I have heard from 
my father I have revealed it to you’ means that God has revealed to us on the earth as 
much as is necessary for attaining eternal happiness, an interpretation that is firmly 
refuted by Eckhart. In order to resolve this sort of misunderstanding and 
                                                          
520 Eckhart, Pr. 30 (DW II 95,3-5) (trans. Frank Tobin in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 292).  
521 Ibid. Pr. 29 (DW II 88,3-5) (trans. Frank Tobin in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 290). 
522 In his Responsio (Defense) Eckhart expounds at length what he means by the uncreated nature of the 
soul. See Raymond Bernard Blakney, Meister Eckhart: a modern translation (New York, 1941), 269. 
523 Eckhart, Pr. 29 (DW II 89,6-7) (trans. Frank Tobin in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 290). 
524 Eckhart, Pr. 29 (DW II 83,4-7) (trans. Frank Tobin in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 289). 
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misinterpretation, he poses the question: Why did God become man? To which Eckhart 
gives his answer: ‘So that I might be born the same. God died so that I might die to the 
whole world and to all created things.’ 525 It is in this way that one should understand 
our Lord’s words: ‘Everything that I have heard from my father I have revealed it to 
you.’ If one asks what the Son hears from his Father, the answer will be: to be born like 
the Father, because the Father can do nothing but give birth, and the Son can do nothing 
but be born. Thus we see the logical proceeding Eckhart follows in this doctrine: first 
the Father brings forth in his Only-Begotten Son completely what he has and is; and in 
the same manner the Son reveals to us all he has heard from the Father. Therefore we 
are the same Only-Begotten Son, no less.526 To push this one step further, Eckhart urges 
us to see that the intellect, the light of spirit which enables us to receive God as he is in 
himself, does not remain as the Son, but joins the Father to give birth to the same Only-
Begotten Son and to itself. 
To Eckhart the birth of the Son in the soul is followed by the penetration of the soul 
into the divine ground.  This kind of spiritual break-through calls for a perfect, thorough 
and radical indistinction, whereby whatever concept might preserve a distinction ought 
to be removed, hence the daring statement: ‘I pray to God to make me free of God’, so 
long as God is taken as the origin of creature.527 On this point Eckhart’s thinking goes 
beyond creation and extends to precreation, where the essence of God is to be 
considered above causality. By removing the distinction of cause and effect, God is not 
taken as the cause of myself. On this basis, Eckhart declares: ‘I am my own cause 
according to my essence, which is eternal, and not according to my becoming, which is 
temporal.’528 To speak in terms of eternity and according to the unborn mode, Eckhart 
confronts us with the almost incomprehensible thesis: my mortal existence by virtue of 
birth must die and perish with time; in my birth all things were born, hence I was the 
cause of myself and all things, and even the cause of God’s being God.529 This brings 
us back to Sermon 2 (W8), where Eckhart talks about the Solitary One, or the citadel in 
the soul from which proceeds the powers of the soul such as intellect and will and the 
Trinitarian persons. In Sermon 2 (W8) Eckhart manages to formulate this message in a 
                                                          
525 Eckhart, Pr. 29 (DW II 84, 1-3) (trans. Frank Tobin in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 289). 
526 Eckhart, Pr. 29 (DW II 84, 6-9) (trans. Frank Tobin in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 289). 
527 Eckhart, Pr. 52 (DW II 493,7-9) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 422). 
528 Eckhart, Pr. 52 (DW II 502,9-503,1-2) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 424). 
529 Eckhart, Pr. 52 (DW II 504,2-3) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 424). 
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poetic language; we read: ‘So truly one and simple is this citadel, so mode-and power-
transcending is this solitary One, that neither power nor mode can gaze into it, nor even 
God himself!’530 That is to say, insofar as God exists in modes and in the properties of 
his persons, he stays outside this One. To see inside God must rid himself of the divine 
names and personal properties. Only insofar as he is one and indivisible, without mode 
or properties, can he have a glance of this Solitary One.  In that sense God is neither 
Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost, and yet is a Something which is neither this nor that.531 
So far as this Solitary One is concerned, beatitude lies in neither intellect nor will, but 
in the ground from which knowing and love derive.  
 
2.3.2 Intellect as the Key to Detachment 
Detachment is undoubtedly one of the themes that are typically Eckhartian. Generally 
speaking this radical detachment is regarded as the condition for the soul’s returning to 
the Godhead. Bernard McGinn takes detaching as one of the three activities –detaching, 
birthing and breaking-through – involved in this spiritual journey, and detaching and 
birthing as the two sides of one coin, rather than two subsequent stages. As for the 
breaking-through into the ground of the divine, McGinn highlights the role of the 
intellect as Eckhart frequently preached in the vernacular sermons, for instance, Sermon 
48 (W60), where Eckhart declares the intellect is not content with the divine being in 
terms of Father Son and Spirit, but has to penetrate into the simple ground, the desert, 
or the cause of this God.532 Having clarified this point, McGinn makes two points with 
regard to an oversimplified intellectualist view. First, Eckhart’s view of the intellectual 
act that makes us one with God involves an unmediated and direct vision of God and 
the soul as one with God. It is not the kind of reflexive act of understanding that we are 
accustomed to in knowing something and being able to reflect on what we know. As 
Eckhart declares at the end of the Sermon On the Nobleman, the ultimate blessedness 
of heaven (and by extension our direct knowing of God in this life) does not consist in 
a reflex act of knowing by which we know that we know God. The true beatitude is 
derived from God himself rather than our knowledge of God, and the awareness of this 
truth is fundamentally an effect of beatitude rather than being constitutive of it. Second, 
we do find certain passages where Eckhart, contrary to his usual preference for intellect, 
                                                          
530 Eckhart, Pr. 2 (DW I 42,6-43,1-3) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 81). 
531 Eckhart, Pr. 2 (DW I 44,1-2) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 81). 
532 Eckhart, Pr. 48 (DW II 420,3-10) (trans. Walshe in Mystical Eckhart, 2009, 310-11). 
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regards love as the means by which the union with God is fulfilled. Sermon 60 (W45) 
is a good example of this. It is basically a homily on the cosmic eros, which shows 
affinities with Dionysius without actually quoting him. Based on the two points, 
McGinn comes to the conclusion that the Dominican’s views on union are more 
complex than often thought. On the one hand, both knowing and loving unite in one 
way; but from another perspective, neither unites in the ultimate sense insofar as they 
are conceived of as powers of the soul.533 
Sharing the same concern with McGinn, Reiner Schürmann tackles this problem 
from a different angle. Instead of talking about the union of the soul with God as 
McGinn does, Schürmann draws our attention to the interplay between God, man and 
the world. The symbolic identity of the three suggests a playful presence in which God, 
man and the world are joined together due to the play of this identity. This threefold 
identity as described by Schürmann is far more complicated than a metaphysical 
identity, whose focus remains on the transcendence and immanence. In addition it 
marks a dramatic difference from the kind of pantheistic identity which speaks of 
universal ontic homogeneity. Based on the structure of this threefold interplay 
Schürmann puts forward his innovative interpretation as to the detached or released 
mind534 in Eckhart. According to Schürmann’s reading of Eckhart, the released mind 
that is totally devoid of all eigenschaft becomes the ‘there’, the very locus, where the 
energetic identity of God, of man and of the world restores itself.535 Thus the released 
mind is no longer the created human mind or soul, but becomes the uncreated ground, 
the ‘un-intellectual’ basis of intellect that sustains the endless interplay of God, man 
and the world. This insight undoubtedly helps us to understand the subtle linkage 
between intellect and detachment/releasement, the two typically Eckhartian themes that 
persist throughout his Latin and German corpus.  Schürmann certainly gives serious 
thought to this question, and his thinking on the Eckhartian intellectualism is basically 
unfolded through a detailed expounding of the word gemüete in Sermon 76 (W7). 
Schürmann claims: 
                                                          
533 Bernard McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (2005), 186-7. 
534 Unlike many Eckhartian scholars, Schürmann translates Eckhart’s Gelassenheit as ‘releasement’, and 
sêle as ‘mind’ rather than ‘soul’. From his perspective sêle in Eckhart mostly stands for Augustine’s 
mens or animus, which signify the mind. Only in the cases where sêle is used in the sense of anima, 
alluding to the animating principle of the body, it is proper to translate it as ‘soul’. See Reiner Schürmann, 
Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (1978), Introduction, xiv.  
535 Reiner Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (1978), 109. 
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The gemüete contains in itself the whole of the spiritual activities, from the 
ramifications buried in the sensible up to the peak that touches the One. Meister 
Eckhart distinguishes, as we know, the divaricate capillaries of gemüete turned 
towards the multiple from its unified and unalloyed summit or core. In this he 
adopts the ancient theory of the two faces of the mind…. The difficult question 
which separates Augustinians and Thomists in this matter [the division of the 
mind into exterior knowledge by abstraction and interior knowledge by 
intuition], the knowledge of the soul by itself and especially the role of the 
phantasms in it, does not seem to have retained the attention of Eckhart. The 
interior eye that sees God without images or any mediation knows a universal 
in the ground of the mind: the common perfection of humankind. A detached 
man possesses simultaneously, in a unique act of intellection, God, things, and 
himself.536 
Through the above analysis we can see that Schürmann concentrates on the totality of 
the spectrum covered by the German word gemüete. As gemüete pertains to the spiritual 
activities as a whole, it follows that the act of intellection is essential to the 
aforementioned symbolic identity of God, things and man. Unsurprisingly, the union 
of the soul with God, or the birth of the Son in us, according to Schürmann’s observation, 
is not essentially intended by Eckhart. To those who read Eckhart’s gemüete in the 
Augustinian or Neoplatonic light, Schürmann brings forward the following question: If 
that is the case, why should Eckhart link the spark to the cognitive faculty of man? Put 
more frankly, why this intellectualism in Eckhart? The answer to this question, 
Schürmann suggests, should be sought in the intellect that is destined to become all 
things, which is obviously a doctrine that Eckhart has learned from Aristotle and his 
Arabic commentators, in particular Avicenna. Overall Schürmann’s solution 
rehabilitates the central role of the intellect in Eckhart’s theological framework; the link 
of the unlimited power of the intellect with Eckhart’s anthropology is well explained, 
however it remains unclear how this line of anthropological concern fits into his 
theology.  
The lack of clarity in Schürmann’s exposition probably derives from his 
understanding of Eckhart’s detachment/releasement. As can be seen in McGinn and 
                                                          
536 Reiner Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (1978), 145.  
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Schürmann, the Eckhartian notion of detachment/releasement is taken mainly as the 
self-denial of the soul/mind, which speaks of the soul/mind’s stripping of its createdness, 
or to borrow Simone Weil’s concept, ‘decreation’. 537  By taking Eckhart’s 
detachment/releasement essentially as the sort of spiritual practice that only applies to 
the human soul/mind, we seem to have reduced ‘detachment’ to an imperative or norm 
that the divine imposes upon mankind. That cannot be what Eckhart intends to say; in 
fact, the word ‘detachment’ in the Eckhartian context primarily concerns the divine 
rather than human, as he overtly declares in Sermon VI: ‘God’s nature, existence, and 
life consist in sharing himself and giving himself totally.’ 538  Seen in this light, 
‘detachment’ in the full sense can only be applied to God; no creature is perfectly 
capable of self-giving.  
Unlike McGinn and Schürmann, Markus Vinzent shifts the focus of attention from 
the human mind/soul to the divine, in the sense that human detachment is considered 
as a reflection of God’s own detachment. At the very beginning of his The Art of 
Detachment Vinzent directly defines God as detachment; 539  in addition he places 
detachment in a position that is substantially prior to the aforementioned transcendental 
terms such as oneness, truth, being and good. In his own words: ‘In contrast to 
detachment, all other transcendentals and perfections apply to the divine essence only 
secondarily.’540 This is because these transcendentals are applied to divine essence 
according to the way in which its detachment is realised, for instance, oneness and being 
speak of divine essence in relation to what it generates as God, such as the Trinity and 
the creation, the multitude and beings. Hence a formal opposition is incurred between 
the transcendentals and the discrete things, for example oneness and multitude, being 
and beings. By contrast detachment is the very predication of the ground itself, a 
negative description, yet more than negative, precisely the negation of negation. Put 
briefly: ‘Detachment condenses concisely Eckhart’s notion of negating the negation, 
and therefore the resolutely positive self-description of the Divine.’541  
                                                          
537 Simone Weil, The Need for Roots (London, Henley and Boston, 1978). 
538 Eckhart, Sermo VI,1 n.55 (LW IV 55,1-2) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 
213). 
539 We read: ‘Detachment is the very definition of God’s essence. It expresses the Divine’s radical 
kenosis to create this universe and be its very core. Only by being detached from itself is the Divine 
what-it-is, namely divine. The very nature of the Divine is creative origin and salvific incarnation. The 
results of what the Divine creates are not in the slightest less than their origIn’ See Markus Vinzent, The 
Art of Detachment (2011), 1. 




Vinzent’s insightful exposition of divine detachment as shown above sheds new light 
on Eckhart’s notion of the divine intellect, which impels us to rethink Eckhart’s 
declaration in Parisian Question 1 that God is intellect, and his being depends on his 
knowing, not the other way around. This leads to the question: How do the divine 
intellect and divine detachment relate to each other? In other words, how does God’s 
knowing relate to his self-detaching? In what sense is knowledge associated with 
detachment? Vinzent comes up with an innovative solution: knowledge is a notion for 
encapsulating detachment. The reason is explained as follows. Knowledge indicates 
self-projection; it is radically a form of being only through reflecting and going out of 
oneself; thus being intellect itself is only through knowing as intellect. It follows that 
the ground as knowledge is source of its own existence, oneness, truth and goodness. 
In that sense we have to recognise that God is by his nature ratio (ratio intellectus) 
rather than being (ratio entis), hence the statement typical of Eckhart: not because God 
is, is he rational, but otherwise. To translate this in terms of detachment, we may say 
that because God is self-projecting, he is, his being depends on his self-projecting.542 
Therefore God, as rational intellect, is the universal cause of being – his own being and 
the being of everything; while as rational intellect he is, as already proposed by Plotinus, 
above being.543 As the principle or ground of being, intellect denotes kenosis in the 
sense that the act of intellect consists in emptying itself and virtually receiving 
something other than itself. Knowing, therefore, inevitably involves self-eradication, 
and vice versa. 
Thus in Eckhart we find two terms that are used to describe the ground: intellect as 
seen in Parisian Question 1 and detachment in his Latin Sermon VI, although literally 
he puts it as ‘sharing and giving himself totally’. A cross-reading of the two texts brings 
us to the point that both intellect and detachment are intended to formulate a predication 
of the ground of the divine in an apophatic manner: intellect as the purity of being which 
gives rise to all beings, and detachment as the nothingness which leads to unlimited, 
infinite potentialities and possibilities. In accordance with the notion of God as intellect 
or detachment, the spiritual practice in the context of Eckhart is no longer exempt from 
stretching the human intellect to the extreme, in the sense that we should always try our 
best to reinforce our self-detachment and to enlarge our open-mindedness by means of 
                                                          
542 Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (2011), 35. 
543 Werner Beierwaltes, ‘Deus est Esse – Esse est Deus’, in Platonismus und Idealismus (Frankfurt, 2004), 
2nd edition, 17f.  
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understanding others. In that sense the kind of sentimental approach to God that is 
driven purely by the power of personal will falls short, because the will or the intention 
to be one with God should be detached according to Eckhart’s art of detachment. As a 
matter of fact, our attachment to God, a sort of spiritual attachment, represents a 
deceiving hindrance to our spiritual progress, to the extent that we often end up with 
our desire for God, or with a God that is wrapped by our intention and will instead of 
God himself, the naked, bare God as he is in himself. The act of intellect offers one way 
to overcome the dominance of personal will: by knowing others and understanding 
things as they are, sometimes we are forced to step out of the old habits and are pushed 
out of the comfort zone created by self-will. The ceaseless effort in performing 
intellective exercise serves to remove the deep-rooted self-attachment, in particular the 
personal will, the inner disposition or inclination to this or that. The logic is that if we 
cling to anything at all, we will definitely miss the chance of becoming God which is 
neither this nor that, but all. Again, the conduct of self-detachment or our effort in 
stretching the intellect cannot be performed without the help of grace of the divine: as 
aforementioned, our detachment is fundamentally a reflection of the divine detachment. 
God detaches himself so that we are able to detach ourselves, and God became man so 
that man can become God.  
Despite his lack of interest in discussing the so-called mystical experience, such as 
rapture, ecstasy or transport of mind, Eckhart does give us his viewpoint on this issue. 
Following Thomas’s exposition in De Veritate, q.13, a.1-2,544 in Sermo XXII, when 
expounding what is meant by ‘I know a man in Christ’ (2 Corinthians 12:2), Eckhart 
sums up the ecstatic experience into four types. The first type of ecstasy is achieved 
through intensive love driven by intentions, which refers to the Dionysian ecstasy of 
love.545 The second is achieved through the vision of the imagination or spirit due to 
the intervention of some supernatural power, as happened to John the Evangelist in 
Revelation 1 and to Peter in Acts 11. The third occurs when the mind is abstracted from 
the senses and imagination and is carried off to the intellectual, when one is allowed to 
                                                          
544 Thomas expounds this topic at length in Q13.  He starts with the question ‘What is rapture?’ in article 
1, which is followed by article 2, ‘Did Paul see God through his essence when he was enraptured?’ In 
this sermon Eckhart draws heavily on Thomas, but he disagrees with Thomas on the view that man is 
unable to rise to the knowledge of God in this life, which, according toThomas, can only be achieved in 
heaven.  
545 Following Dionysius, Eckhart recognises the immense power of love, which is able to push the lover 
into the beloved, see Eckhart, Sermo XXII n.216 (LW IV 203,4-5). 
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see God through the intelligible, particularly alluding to the kind of sleep or ecstasy 
Adam experienced in Genesis 2. The fourth happens when the mind itself sees God in 
himself in his essence, which refers to what Paul experienced when being caught up to 
the third heaven.546 In line with Thomas, Eckhart takes the variety of approaches to God 
into consideration, and like Thomas he makes a distinction between one and another. 
Nevertheless, he does not follow Thomas to stress the limited capacity of the human 
intelligence in this life.547 Instead Eckhart draws our attention to the feasibility of 
achieving an intellectual ecstasy or the ecstasy of mind in this life, here and now, which 
is a foretaste of the divine sweetness as Augustine describes in the Seventh Book of his 
Confession. In his homily on Augustine, Vas auri solidum ornatum omni lapide 
pretioso (Eccl. 50:10), Eckhart mentions the three ways in which the divine knowledge 
or an experience of God can be obtained: 1) the foreknowledge of hidden or future 
things by prophecy; 2) a free habit that leads towards action and fruition; and 3) the 
foretasting of divine bliss, the ecstasy of the mind which takes place in the fruit. This 
foretaste of the divine bliss is derived from the intensive and excessive activity of the 
intellect, such as immersing oneself in the cognition of science and wisdom or, as 
Eckhart calls it, pursuing a wise science.548 
Probably due to his twofold role as a scholastic theologian and a Dominican friar, 
Eckhart associates intellectual activities with an uplifting experience of God.  What he 
means by the ecstasy of mind, at least in the above context, suggests a subtle divergence 
from both Augustinian and Thomistic stances, as it is not based on the will and love as 
seen in Augustine, nor does it discount the possibility of the human intelligence 
reaching the knowledge of God in this life as seen in Thomas.  
Given the inquisitorial pursuit of the heresy of the Free Spirit 549 in the 13th and 14th 
centuries, and Eckhart’s affinity with the Rhineland mystics, in particular the parallels 
found between his teaching and that of the prominent female mystics such as Mechthild 
of Magdeburg and Marguerite Porete,550 it is hard to believe that Eckhart is incautious 
                                                          
546 Ibid.  
547 See Thomas, De Veritate, q.13, a.1. 
548 See Eckhart, Sermo die b. Augustini Parisius habitus (28.8.1303), n.6 (LW V 94,14-95,2) (trans. 
Markus Vinzent in The Art of  Detachment, 2011, 76).  
549 See Bernard McGinn’s account of mysticism and heresy, in The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval 
Germany (2005), 48-79.    
550 Among the recent studies of Eckhart and mysticism, Amy Hollywood’s approach deserves more 
attention.  Her work offers a sound comparison of Meister Eckhart with both Mechthild of Magdeburg 
and Marguerite Porete, on the basis of a detailed textual analysis of Eckhart’s sermons, Mechtild’s The 
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with his wording when it comes to the grey area concerning an individual’s personal 
experience of God. As shown above, by resorting to scripture and the authority of 
Thomas and Augustine, Eckhart seems to suggest an all-embracing path to God. A 
closer scrutiny of the two sermons indicates that he not only makes room for love and 
imagination, but also allows cognitive activities to be included. Spiritual practice as 
thus presented does not exclude the work of daily routine, hence it does not make much 
sense to draw a thick line between clergy and layman, between the cloister and the 
mundane world, a conclusion that is strikingly reminiscent of the meister’s final words: 
‘We should accept God equally in all ways and in all things….If you take one way, 
such and such, that is not God. If you take this or that, you are not taking God, for God 
is in all ways and equal in all ways, for anyone who can take him so.’551  
Thus Eckhart makes it clear that the best way to glorify God in human life is to take 
him equally in all things and in all ways. The problem is how to achieve this sense of 
equality? How can we be totally free from discrimination and overcome completely our 
inborn preference, our inclination and disposition to this or that? One may wonder 
whether Eckhart has overlooked the weakness and limitedness of human beings and 
overestimated the capacity of human nature. It may appear so at first glance, but if we 
posit his final words into his theological framework, and connect them with the 
pervasive themes in his thought such as detachment and intellect, we will see that the 
meister actually gives us some clue as to how this can be done. Based on his own life 
experience as a scholar and a friar, in his Latin sermon Eckhart lays stress on the ecstasy 
of mind, and particularly makes the point that it takes place in the fruit. It is worth 
noting that in stressing the practical work of the intellect, Eckhart is not promoting an 
Aristotelian intellectualism that invites us to investigate the world for the sake of 
curiosity. What he intends to highlight is that the ecstatic, elevating experience derived 
from intellective operation is the fruitful effect of the detached soul in which God 
dwells, and it is indeed a taste of God’s sweetness; one may call it a foretaste of the 
bliss in heaven. Like detachment, intellect is apophatic by nature, and paradoxically 
                                                          
Flowing Light of the Godhead, and Porete’s The Mirror of Simple Souls. See Amy Hollywood, The Soul 
as Virgin Wife: Mechthild of Magdeburg, Marguerite Porete, and Meister Eckhart (Notre Dame and 
London, 1995).  
On the forgotten spiritual heroes in the Rhine Valley, see Rufus M. Jones, The Flowering of Mysticism: 
The Friends of God in the Fourteenth Century (New York, 1940). 
551 This piece is not included in DW; it was first seen in Pfeiffer’s edition (685-6) and was then treated 




this apophatic nature makes a total reception of God possible, which in turn, leads to 
unlimited creativity. As the metaphor of virgin/wife shows, the virginity of the 
receptive intellect leads to the productivity of an active intellect. According to Eckhart, 
only when the soul is able to fulfil the twofold task of being a virgin and wife, will it 
reach maturity. Precisely on this point, Eckhart claims that God’s ratio is my ratio, no 
more, no less. 
 
 
Chapter 3  A Comparison between Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart  
 
As the two chapters above have delineated, the profiles of both Zhu Xi and Meister 
Eckhart are intricately embedded in their own historical and cultural contexts. Sitting 
in the longstanding tradition of scriptural learning, one in Confucianism and the other 
in Christianity, both Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart demonstrate remarkable originality in 
their works. The element of creative thinking is highly recognisable, even in the 
medieval sense of scholarship, which in both traditions is indisputably based upon the 
authority of scriptures as well as the influential exegeses of the past commentators. 
With mastery of scriptural learning as well as expertise in discursive language and 
philosophical debate, both Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart manage to fit their innovative 
perspectives into their own exegetical traditions. In that sense the hermeneutical 
framework into which each thinker conscientiously chooses to shape his idea is no less 
important than the creative idea itself. Each enriches his own intellectual tradition, due 
to the new light he sheds upon the sacred texts before him: the Four Books in the case 
of Zhu Xi and the two Testaments in that of Eckhart.  
Clearly, what shines through in their work is a sophisticated integration of intellectual 
rigour, religious faith and spiritual aspiration, rather than a piecemeal performance of 
the three. In the context of Zhu Xi and in that of Meister Eckhart, academic research is 
conducted mainly through scriptural learning, which could be developed into a life-
long dialogue with the scriptural texts. Unsurprisingly, it is through intensive study of 
scriptures that their thought takes shape and reaches maturity. Nevertheless, the 
intellectual brilliance of the two thinkers is not entirely confined to the conventional 
framework, but at some points breaks through and goes beyond that framework.  
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Thus, when exploring the world of a sophisticated and original thinker like Zhu Xi 
or Eckhart, we are confronted with a paradox. On the one hand, the uniqueness of their 
thinking disqualifies any type of reading that is not performed strictly on their own 
terms.  In that sense even an attempt to mirror them through their contemporary 
counterparts in the same tradition will run the risk of missing the crucial point of their 
thought and resulting in a diluted or distorted version of it, let alone any venture to 
embark upon a comparative study of the two. Seen in that light, such endeavours 
become unnecessary and insignificant, if not utterly nonsensical. Yet on the other hand, 
the very non-comparability of the two thinkers paradoxically calls for a broader horizon, 
which will allow the brilliance of their unconventional thoughts to be better recognised 
and appreciated, given the historical facts that the intellectual rigour of Zhu Xi and of 
Meister Eckhart suffered similar fates in their own traditions. In the case of Zhu Xi, 
despite his dominance of Chinese academia for nearly six centuries, his intellectual 
attempt at a systematic reconstruction of Confucianism was long downplayed by many 
of the Qing literati due to a change in research interest;552 and in the last century, thanks 
to many New-Confucian scholars, in particular Mou Zongsan and his adherents, Zhu 
Xi’s theoretical reconstruction was classified as a side-branch of Confucianism, in 
contrast to the so-called authentic mainstream represented by his counterpart, the school 
of mind.553 In Eckhart’s case, the power of his original thinking formed a decisive factor 
contributing to the posthumous condemnation of some of his views in 1329, and ever 
since then the label of heretic has cast its enduring shadow over the reception of 
Eckhart’s thought within the Christian tradition. Such similar scenarios occurring in the 
two different traditions invite the reader to rethink the potential of comparative study, 
in the hope of finding parallels that may throw new light on the distinctive features of 
the two intellectual profiles. 
Given the complexity of each thinker, as set out in detail in Chapters 1 and 2, in this 
comparative chapter we will highlight two points in particular: their intellectual rigour 
in conceptualising ‘intellect’; and the problematique of ‘hermeneutics’, which concerns 
the way in which this intellect understands itself and its world. From a comparative 
perspective, we will place Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart together so as to form a cross-
                                                          
552 This paradigm shift can be summarised in one phrase, ‘from philosophy to philology’. See Benjamin 
A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Social and Intellectual Aspects of Change in late Imperial 
China (Cambridge MA, 1984). 
553 Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu Xingti 心體與性體 Constitutive Mind and Constitutive Nature (Hong Kong, 
1968), 1, 49. 
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reading of them.  On that basis some parallels will be drawn between the works of the 
two thinkers, and hence the similarities and differences between them. Before moving 
on to the details, it is worth noting that the real picture is so complex that it is almost 
impossible to keep the differences and the similarities apart, because the apparent 
similarities between the two thinkers are often underpinned by a fundamental 
divergence, and an essential agreement is sometimes seen underneath a seemingly 
radical contrast. For that reason, the comparison will not be divided squarely into 
similarities and differences; instead it aims to reveal how the elements of similarities 
and differences are subtly blended under the common themes that are particularly 
addressed by both thinkers. 
 
3.1   The Concept of the Human Intellect in Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart   
With a focus on the subject of intellect, a number of parallels can be seen between Zhu 
Xi and Meister Eckhart, which can be summarised as follows. 
  
 The Threefold Meaning of Intellect  
As the details unfolded in Chapters 1 and 2 suggest, in both Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart, 
knowing is not really taken in an epistemological sense, although the question of 
epistemology is not completely ruled out. What is meant by knowing is mainly 
expounded in metaphysical and spiritual terms. As focused textual or documentary 
proof we can point to Zhu Xi’s Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement and Eckhart’s Parisian 
Question 1, in each of which the priority of knowing is solemnly declared, in a way that 
is appropriate to each thinker’s own scholarly tradition.  
Zhu Xi starts by performing editorial work on Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning.  
After rearranging the old text, he inserts his Supplement into the newly structured 
scriptural text, so as to form a complete piece of work in terms of structure and content. 
By means of writing a Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement to Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning, 
Zhu Xi manages to integrate master Cheng’s philosophy into that scriptural text. 
Accordingly, Zhu Xi’s interpretation of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things 
and the extension of knowledge is turned into an integral part of Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning; thus the old Confucian doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 gains new life and 
acquires new meaning through Zhu Xi’s philosophical interpretation. Hence, to 
investigate things means to probe li 理 the Principle, and to probe the principles of things 
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simultaneously activates the intellective power of xin 心 the mind or mind-heart. Clearly, 
in Zhu Xi’s context, gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and the extension 
of knowledge do not have an end in knowledge of particular things, but intend to 
penetrate into the ultimate truth in which li 理 the Principle and xin 心 the mind or mind-
heart are unified as one. By addressing the essential importance of the investigation of 
things, Zhu Xi allows the element of knowing to pervade the whole process of 
Confucian self-cultivation; thus in Zhu Xi’s system, the meaning of Confucian 
sageliness and the approach to such an ideal state are thoroughly redefined.  
In Eckhart’s Parisian Question 1 we find a similar revolutionary declaration, which 
aims to redefine the concept of God. Unlike Zhu Xi, who has to go through the editorial 
preparations before composing his Supplement, Eckhart presents his metaphysical 
thought directly in the form of quaestio, the genre typical of scholasticism. Based on a 
systematic study of Thomas, Eckhart brings forth a thesis which forms a contrast to the 
Thomistic stance, namely that knowing is prior to being in the divine. He thus defines 
God as intellect, and takes the divine intellect as the source of being, which is purity of 
being yet gives rise to all beings. This line of thought is expounded at length in 
Eckhart’s scholastic commentaries and continues to resonate in his sermons. 
Thus is seen in Zhu Xi and Eckhart a remarkable parallel with regard to knowing. 
Both prioritise knowing and take knowing as an activity that concerns things in the 
world, the knower and the ultimate truth, be it li 理 the Principle or God, and 
simultaneously brings light to all three. In addition, both speak of an intellectual 
unification of the three, be that in terms of li 理 the Principle and xin 心 the mind or 
mind-heart as seen in Zhu Xi, or in terms of the divine and human, the creator and 
creature as seen in Eckhart. In both Zhu Xi and Eckhart, knowing the world, knowing 
oneself and knowing the ultimate truth are not to be kept apart, but are fused into one 
in the sense that the three are to be simultaneously carried out in one action.554 It follows 
                                                          
554 Both Zhu Xi and Eckhart show an inclination to bridge the gulf between this world and the world 
beyond, and in so doing neither intends to play down the role of metaphysical thinking, but pushes it one 
step further in their own tradition. But in both Zhu Xi and Eckhart the philosophical speculation is 
fundamentally embedded in a framework that is religious and spiritual in nature. The spiritual aspiration 
on personal ground together with the religious concern expressed in social and political terms forms a 
basis peculiar to the medieval scholastic thinkers in the West and East, which can hardly be shared by an 
existentialist living in a post-Kantian age. Therefore I hesitate to refer this line of thought in Zhu Xi and 
Eckhart to the existentially defined Dasein as presented in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. Although 
parallels can be seen between Heidegger’s delineation of the inner-worldly structure of Dasein and the 
kind of this-worldliness in Zhu Xi and Eckhart, there are still serious impediments to form a comparison 
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that the dividing lines that are normally drawn between cognition, self-reflection and 
contemplation of the transcendent divine no longer make sense, so far as knowing is 
considered as the very act that pertains to li 理 the Principle or God the divine truth, 
even in its dealing with the particular things in the world.555 Despite the different 
terminologies as presented in Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart, in both contexts knowing is 
meant to denote the crux through which human, things and li 理 the Principle or God 
are unified.  
Given this similarity between Zhu Xi and Eckhart with regard to the definition of 
knowing, it becomes clear that in both contexts, the human intellect as the faculty of 
knowing in us is treated as the ground on which such a unification takes place. In that 
sense, the concept of the human intellect more or less serves to define human nature. 
As the details concerning this question vary immensely between the two different 
contexts, we will discuss them in separate paragraphs below. 
What is distinctive of Zhu Xi’s thinking in this regard is that the human intellect is 
not treated merely as a miraculous function of qi 氣 the cosmic matter, but is more 
importantly to be considered in the light of li 理 the Principle. Given the axiom of the 
Cheng-Zhu school, ‘xing ji li 性即理 Principle is nature’,556 it is not hard to see that in 
Zhu Xi’s system the element of knowing has been integrated into the Neo-Confucian 
notion of human nature;557 consequently the human intellect is to be conceptualised as 
an innate faculty rooted in human nature. In his works there are at least three terms 
referring to the concept of the human intellect, namely ‘zhi 知’, ‘jue 覺’or ‘zhijue 知覺’. 
They are treated as almost interchangeable, although literally ‘zhi 知’ means knowing 
or understanding, ‘jue 覺’ sensing, and ‘zhijue 知覺’ being aware or conscious of 
something. In Zhu Xi the three terms speak of the intellective faculty of mind which 
                                                          
or connection with Heidegger’s existentialism. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan 
Stambaugh (Albany, 2010). 
555  As summarised by Rudolf Otto, Eckhart’s mysticism has an intellectual rather than emotional 
character. See Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West, trans. by Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda C. Payne 
(New York, 1970), 48. 
556 Zhu Xi’s interpretation of nature or the original nature of human being proceeds in the same vein as 
Cheng Yi, who first came up with the phrase- xing ji Li 性即理 nature is principle. See ZZYL, Juan 4, 
ZZQS, Vol.14, 182-214. 
557 This point has been indirectly touched on by Chong-ying Cheng, and is given relatively clearer 
explanation by A. C. Graham. Graham maintains that the decisive novelty in the new conceptual scheme 
of the Cheng-Zhu school is the equation of knowledge with permeation of the qi-氣 by Li-理. See Chong-
ying Cheng, ‘Chu Hsi’s Methodology and Theory of Understanding’; A. C. Graham, ‘What Was New in 
the Cheng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?’ Both in Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism 
(1986), respectively 169-96, 138-57.   
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constitutes the innate capacity for the principles of things. Thus the overarching 
function of ‘zhi 知’ has a much broader horizon than man’s innate sense of right and 
wrong as seen in the context of Mencius; in other words, it goes beyond the traditional 
understanding of man’s moral instinct rooted in human nature. Moreover, Zhu Xi’s 
notion of ‘zhi 知’ as presented in his Supplement blurs the division between dexing 
zhizhi 德性之知 innate knowledge and wenjian zhizhi 聞見之知 knowledge acquired 
through senses. 558 Taking his Supplement as an example, when in his gewu zhizhi 格物
致知 interpretation of the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge he 
particularly stresses the link between the intellective function of human mind and the 
principles of things, he is evidently seeing zhi 知 in the light of li 理 the Principle rather 
than qi-氣 the cosmic matter. To Zhu Xi the principles that inhere in things and the 
human intellect that is meant to probe the principles of things are ontologically as one 
being. Overall, as seen in his Bu Zhuan 補傳 Supplement, Yu Lei 語類 Conversations and 
other texts, Zhu Xi persistently stresses the link between zhi 知 and li 理; his exposition 
of the concept of zhi 知 the human intellect is mainly unfolded on a xing er shang 形而
上 metaphysical ground, which is his theory of li 理 the Principle. In the context of Neo-
Confucianism as represented by the Cheng-Zhu school in particular, li 理 the Principle 
is the very concept that serves to define the original nature or tiandi zhi xing 天地之性
the heavenly nature of mankind.  So far as the axiom ‘xing ji Li 性即理 Principle is 
nature’ is concerned, to acquire the knowledge of li 理 the Principle constitutes the 
essential part of Confucian learning, the aim of which, according to Cheng Yi and Zhu 
Xi, is to become a sage. As the knowledge of li 理 the Principle can only be obtained 
through the act of zhi 知 the human intellect in its gewu 格物 investigation of things, it 
follows that a sagely character’s spiritual achievement in terms of self-realisation 
cannot do without his effort in the investigation of things. Thus it becomes clear that 
mainly due to his exposition of li 理 the Principle, the question of zhi 知 the human 
intellect comes to the fore. It is through the act of knowing that the unification of xin 心
mind or mind-heart and li 理 the Principle is possible. His emphasis on knowing and on 
man’s capacity for knowledge elevates the concept of zhi 知 the human intellect from 
the function of xin 心 human mind in terms of a miraculous function of qi 氣 the cosmic 
matter, to xing er shang 形而上 the metaphysical level. Thus the concept of zhi 知 the 
                                                          
558 In conversing with his students Zhu Xi strongly refutes Zhang Zai’s view concerning the radical 
difference between dexing zhizhi 德性之知 innate knowledge and wen jian zhizhi 聞見之知 knowledge 
acquired through senses.
 
See ZZYL, Juan 99, ZZQS, 17, 3334.  
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human intellect is bridged primarily to li 理 the Principle, and extensively to another 
principal Confucian concept, that of xing 性 nature. In that sense Zhu Xi’s effort in 
conceptualising zhi 知 the human intellect suggests a new understanding of human 
nature, one that has modified or even redefined the classical Confucian theory of human 
nature which is based primarily on the concept of ren 仁 humaneness. Accordingly, the 
element of knowing is incorporated into the program of personal cultivation, and 
becomes essential to one’s moral and spiritual growth in terms of self-realisation.  
A similar phenomenon is seen in the context of Eckhart. The theological declaration 
made by Eckhart in Parisian Question 1 obviously shifts the focus from being to 
knowing, which sets the tone for his theological thinking as a whole. The argument 
presented in Parisian Question 1 is predicated on the radical difference between 
intellectual being and formal being, or being in the intellect and being in reality, and 
the former holds priority over the latter in terms of cause and effect. In addition Eckhart 
addresses the principle of formal opposition, meaning that formal existence can not be 
held in both cause and effect. Therefore, if we take God as cause and the world as effect, 
it follows that if the world is called being, God cannot be being, but the purity of being 
which is intellect; similarly, if God is called being or existence as seen in Eckhart’s 
Commentary on Exodus, then the world cannot be being or existence, but non-existence 
or nothing. Based on the principle of formal opposition, Eckhart predicates God as the 
divine intellect in some places, such as in Parisian Question 1, but in other places he 
predicates God as being, as in his Commentary on Exodus; the two different 
predications do not really contradict each other, because both reveal the same relation 
between God and the world.  
Due to a nuanced articulation of the concept of relation, as seen in the third newly 
rediscovered Parisian Question, Eckhart posits the two opposites, God and the world,  
into one relation, one as ground and the other as end. Thus God and the world are no 
longer related in terms of proportion and hierarchy as in Thomas, but are mutually 
defined and are inter-dependent so long as the two opposites form one relation. In line 
with his definition of the divine intellect and his insightful exposition of relation 
unfolded in the Parisian Questions, Eckhart employs Neoplatonic teaching in 
commenting on scriptures, especially on John’s gospel. For instance, Eckhart maintains 
the stance that the idea of a thing, which exists eternally in the divine intellect, holds 
ontological priority over the created thing in the world. But Eckhart speaks of the 
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Platonic theory of idea in paradoxical terms; he maintains that God, as the idea of the 
world, is totally in and totally out of the world, hence God is most similar and most 
dissimilar to the world.559 As shown in his scriptural commentaries, the paradoxical 
relation of God to the world depicted by Eckhart is built on a Platonic ground, although 
the whole discussion is not unfolded in a solely Platonic framework. The themes 
running through his scholastic commentaries and quaestiones maintain an essential role 
in his Latin sermons; they gain a vernacular expression when preached in Middle High 
German, and give rise to his doctrines such as those concerning detachment, and the 
birth of the Son in the soul. The line of thought in his homilies concerning the divine 
detachment brings us back to Parisian Question 1, where God is defined as intellect. 
Eckhart’s expositions of intellect and detachment both proceed from the divine to 
human, and both indicate an emphasis on the apophatic way of predication. As shown 
in Parisian Questions 1, 2 and 3, intellect is apophatic by nature. With regard to intellect, 
be it the divine or the human intellect, it is open to all forms and all being, because 
intellect does not possess a form of its own. In other words, because intellect is by 
nature free from being and form, it holds the potential to receive all forms and to be all 
things. Thus the apophatic, detached, and receptive nature of intellect allows it to have 
knowledge of things and knowledge of God at the same time, as God and the world are 
mutually defined in one relation. Hence, intellect speaks of the divine origin of human 
nature and suggests the link between human and divine; it even breaks through into the 
ground that is beyond distinction.     
Therefore, in both contexts intellect serves to define the heavenly or divine element 
that is treated as an innate faculty rooted in human nature; hence the act of intellect 
constitutes the essential part of spiritual growth in each individual life, and determines 
the means to achieve the unification of xin 心 mind and li 理 Principle in Zhu Xi, or of 
man and God in Eckhart. To both thinkers intellect holds the key to the sacred teaching 
that underlies the words of scriptures, be it the universal truth that rules nature and the 
human world in Zhu Xi, or the divine law that consists in the natural order and beyond 
in Eckhart. Indeed, both are promoting a kind of spirituality that allows an essential role 
for man’s intellect; moreover it is to be spelt out in a highly scholastic manner, which 
means that the practical importance does not contradict metaphysical consideration of 
the thing. The whole potential power inherent in human body, mind and spirit is 
                                                          
559 Eckhart, In Ex. n.112 (LW II 110,3-6) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Teacher and Preacher, 1986, 81). 
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believed to be released through the act of intellect, and only through the operation of 
intellect will the power inherent in man be released to the utmost. In the case of Zhu Xi, 
man’s intellect corresponds to li 理 the Principle, and intellectual grasp of li 理 the 
Principle constitutes the approach to sagehood. In the case of Eckhart, intellect forms 
the direct link between man and God.  
 
 The Priority of Intellect over Will 
In addition, both Zhu Xi and Eckhart maintain the stance that intellect has priority over 
will.  As a result, the issue of man’s will power is marginalised in both contexts, 
although to a different extent and for different reasons. As shown in Chapter 1 (1.2.3.1 
and 1.2.3.2), Zhu Xi endeavours to prove that knowledge holds the power to determine 
action; knowing is prior to willing and also determines the act of will. In Eckhart the 
Dominican stance concerning the priority of intellect over will has been pushed one 
step further and indeed seems to be radicalised. Zhu Xi takes the act of probing principle 
of things as the initial step of Confucian learning. Naturally therefore, knowing 
becomes essential to moral practice: as he expounds in Q&A Concerning Da Xue Huo 
Wen 大學或問 The Great Learning, without understanding the reasons for moral norms, 
it is impossible to apply them properly to the ever-changing situations in real life, and 
blind adherence to moral norms often ends in catastrophic consequences. In Zhu Xi, 
the issue of morality is transformed into the issue of questing for moral principles; the 
focus of attention is no longer on the external moral action. Similarly, in his Parisian 
Question 3, Eckhart makes it clear that even when it concerns God, knowledge holds 
priority over love, and intellect has superiority over will (2.1.2.3). In his sermons, 
Eckhart regards intellect as the temple of God and insists that even the intention of 
being one with God ought to be detached (2.3). Put simply, the thinking of intellect 
seems to have catapulted both Zhu Xi and Eckhart out of the conventional perspectives 
of their own traditions. In Zhu Xi, his emphasis on the priority and superiority of 
knowing over will has thoroughly redefined Confucian morality and the way of self-
realisation, and in that sense he has reconstructed Confucianism. In Eckhart, his 
radically uncompromising tone with regard to the superiority of intellect over will 
compels one to go beyond a God as defined by a theistic framework or a religious 
tradition. In both Zhu Xi and Eckhart the originality of their thinking gains a focused 
and systematic expression in their expounding of man’s intellective faculty, which 
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allows both to break through some conventional perspectives in their own traditions, 
but in different ways.  
In Zhu Xi’s system, the role of intellect is largely spelt out in terms of function rather 
than the definition of human species. In other words, his stress on man’s intellective 
capacity must be compatible with the Confucian definition of man, which shows a focus 
on the moral consciousness rather than the intellective faculty. Zhu Xi finds no 
difficulty in affiliating himself with such an ethically oriented tradition; what he 
attempts is to reconstruct the whole system so that Confucianism as a whole will 
outstrip both Daoism and Buddhism in all aspects, namely personal spiritual awareness, 
social accountability and transcendent significance. That is the circumstance under 
which the concept of li 理 the Principle is proposed. By li 理 the Principle Zhu Xi means 
the origin of the universe and the eternal truth that outlives the corporeal. He certainly 
attaches transcendent significance to the concept of li 理 the Principle in the sense that 
he gives li 理 the Principle a logical priority over the concrete and the particular, but he 
does not locate it in the realm of an abstract reality that exists separately from the 
concrete and the particular things. His exposition of li 理 the Principle gives rise to the 
question of the human intellect. Nonetheless, in the context of Zhu Xi, the internal 
intellective faculty that is proper to the principle of external things does not directly 
indicate the highest existence of human being.  Rather, the importance of man’s 
intellective faculty lies in the fact that it formally initiates the process of Confucian 
personal cultivation, and in that sense it has enriched Confucian ethics by providing the 
traditional moral norms with epistemological back up, as well as a metaphysical ground. 
So long as it remains within the boundary of Confucianism, the power of man’s intellect 
is tied up with Confucian moral concerns and theoretically serves as the means rather 
than the end. But in terms of praxis, the means can bear more performative significance 
than the ultimate goal, which enables Zhu Xi to bring the role of intellect to the core of 
the Confucian moral and spiritual practice. In short, Zhu Xi’s version of Confucianism 
does not lack the element of man’s intellectual approach to the eternal or transcendent 
truth, but this kind of philosophical speculation must be combined with the 
conventional Confucian concern for contextual appropriateness and social 
accountability. He never allows himself free rein in interpreting scriptures; his mode of 
thinking and expressing is characterised by a reconciliation of the intellectual approach 
with the Confucian moral and social concerns. 
226 
 
By contrast, Eckhart’s treatment of the human intellect within the Christian tradition 
is a rather straightforward logical inference. In Christian tradition man is indisputably 
deemed a rational being and intellect stands for the image of God in man. What Eckhart 
stresses is not only the intellectual nature of human being, but also the same intellectual 
nature of God. Reasoning from God’s point of view, Eckhart makes it very clear that 
God’s nature is intellect and that for God understanding is existence.560 Based on this 
premise, Eckhart gives his interpretation concerning the topic of creation and that of 
God’s relation to his creature, in particular mankind. With regard to creation, Eckhart 
holds that God creates things through intellect.  Just as there is no contradiction between 
the simplicity of his existence and his understanding many things, there is no 
contradiction in the case of God’s creating the whole universe at once.561 God simply 
holds the whole universe in his understanding. As for God’s relation to man, Eckhart 
maintains that God speaks to man in his innermost being, which is intellect, and man is 
to receive the word of God on the ground of his intellect. He furthers this view by 
shifting the focus of attention to the characteristic of man’s communication with the 
divine, which is thorough and mutual. God speaks all things to all things, meaning that 
God unfolds himself entirely and indiscriminately to all beings; and man’s intellect 
should become pure receptive power so as to receive the whole, not part, of the divine 
word. In order to become a pure recipient, man needs to remove any attachment to the 
exterior work or meritorious deeds, and most of all, to his own selfhood and even his 
conception of God and his desire for God. In that case, God himself comes to man and 
is fully present in man; and man, by having nothing of his own, becomes nothing but 
God. The traditional perspective as to the dichotomy between God and human, between 
the creator and creature, has been overcome in Eckhart.   
 
 Extension/Penetration in Contrast to Illumination 
Another fundamental divergence between the systems of Zhu Xi and Eckhart concerns 
the specific way in which man’s intellective power is to be directed in the act of 
knowing. In each case the exercise of intellect is to be carried out in different directions, 
which can be summed up as the difference between extension/penetration and 
illumination. Zhu Xi shows little interest in being illuminated or elevated by the power 
                                                          
560 Eckhart, In Gen. n.11 (LW I 1, 194,9-195,3) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 86). 
561 Eckhart, In Gen. n.7 (LW I 1, 190,11-191,6) (trans. Bernard McGinn in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 84). 
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from on high; he insists that man’s comprehension of li 理 the Principle is not a gift, but 
the natural result of a long-term accumulation of knowledge concerning the exterior 
and the interior. In Eckhart’s expounding of the nature of man’s intellect, illumination 
plays an essential role. From his perspective, the exercise of man’s intellect is to be 
unfolded in the mutual communication between the superior and the inferior, and 
understanding indicates one’s being illuminated by the light from the superior, thus 
being elevated to the next higher level in which one’s proper existence is to be resumed. 
In the order of creation the human intellect is located within a twofold relationship, 
namely its relation to God and to the corporeal things. Eckhart believes human 
understanding of the world is obtained from adherence to God, which means knowing 
the world through God, not vice versa.  
In Zhu Xi, the correlation between intellect, things and li 理 the Principle is touched 
upon, but not fully illustrated. Although he makes the point that the proper function of 
man’s intellect is to grasp the principles of things, there is no clear distinction between 
the principle that is logically prior to things and the principle that is abstracted by 
intellect, which is posterior to things. Likewise he does not distinguish the way to 
understand the principle of the concrete and the means to apprehend li 理 the Principle 
in the abstract sense; to him understanding in either sense should start with the 
investigation of particular things. The practice of the investigation of things is 
performed in the sense of extending what one has known to what one is yet to know; 
when the knowledge of the particular things is accumulated to a certain degree, the 
understanding of the knower will naturally become comprehensive, so that it will be 
able to penetrate the concrete and have a glimpse of the abstract, and the transcendent 
character of li 理 Principle will then be personally appropriated. According to Zhu Xi, 
man’s understanding or knowing is a process of proceeding from the particular to the 
general. Man’s self-realisation parallels his comprehension of li 理 the Principle and 
proceeds along the same line. Therefore an individual’s personal progress in the moral 
and spiritual senses must be rooted in a social context, which means that one should 
proceed from personal cultivation to inter-personal communication. In short, the 
knowledge of the principle of things as well as of the transcendent li 理 Principle is to 
be acquired through extension and penetration; the notion of being illuminated by the 




 Accumulation in Contrast to Purification 
Related to the contrast between extension and illumination as shown above, another 
fundamental difference between Zhu Xi and Eckhart with regard to the notion of 
intellect is the contrast between accumulation and purification. Zhu Xi’s doctrine of the 
investigation of things and gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the extension of knowledge indicates a 
long progress of accumulation, whereas in Eckhart, knowing is to a great extent 
indicative of purifying, of removing the excessive so as to disclose the truth. The 
apophatic nature of Eckhart’s notion of intellect is a controversial issue in Zhu Xi. 
Following his method of accumulation, Zhu Xi takes the end of knowing as an 
extremely positive expression, such as ‘zhizhi 知至 ultimate knowledge’ or ‘guantong 
貫通 thorough comprehension’; as seen in Chapter 1 (1.2.3.3), he deliberately avoids 
the apophatic expression found in Zhou Dun-yi, so as to keep a distance from the 
doctrine of jing 静 quietism and wu 無  nothingness that is distinctive of Daoism. 
Accordingly Zhu Xi is not greatly concerned with the limitedness of human knowledge; 
his emphasis is rather on the unlimited openness and potential of knowing. The 
cataphatic predication such as ‘zhizhi 知至 ultimate knowledge’ or ‘guantong 貫通
thorough comprehension’ suggests the ideal state as the result of a long-term 
accumulation. Following the method of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things 
and the extension of knowledge, Zhu Xi stresses the active nature of the intellective 
exercise, and insists that one should start from probing the principles of the particular 
things, and end in a comprehensive knowledge that overarches the internal and the 
external. Although he does mention the importance of xuji 虛己 emptying oneself in 
reading scriptures, the act of the intellect is largely portrayed in an active manner, and 
the element of passivity is basically expressed as a faithful attitude towards scriptures. 
By contrast, in Eckhart knowing is radically a reception, intellect is regarded as a pure 
receptive power (see 2.2.2.3). The power of the human intellect consists in its capacity 
to receive, in particular the grace of the divine, which ensures the mutual glance 
between the human intellect and the divine. In his sermons Eckhart repeatedly addresses 
the point that it is not of will that God loves us, but of necessity, for it is God’s nature 
to love and to give himself completely. Therefore the human stands in a position to 
receive; what really matters to us is how to receive the gift of the divine. Only by 
becoming a perfect receiver will one be able to give what has been received back to 
God (2.3.2). The theological concerns in Eckhart’s expounding of the human intellect 
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are alien to Zhu Xi’s notion of zhi 知 knowing.  Although his doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格
物致知 the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge does entail a 
transcendent dimension in terms of the unification between mind and li 理 the Principle, 
the transcendent dimension remains as an ideal end which does not play the part of 
divine intervention; the whole process is thoroughly depicted as the way of 
accumulation.  Furthermore, Zhu Xi endorses his method with a bottom-up structure, 
and firmly warns his pupils against the top-down type of scheme (1.2.1). To conclude, 
in Zhu Xi the act of knowing indicates a process of accumulating the knowledge of 
things, which results in an ideal state, namely the ultimate knowledge of xin 心 the mind 
or mind-heart and a comprehensive understanding of li 理 the Principle. Zhu Xi lays 
emphasis on the active fashion of man’s intellective operation, and likewise gives more 
attention to the positive way of expression. Unsurprisingly, in the context of Zhu Xi 
knowing is hardly associated with purification, nor is intellect a receptive power, which 
is contrary to what we find in Eckhart.  
 
 Intellect, Life and Creation 
As mentioned above, the notion of knowing in both Zhu Xi and Eckhart is not unfolded 
entirely within an epistemological framework in terms of the object-subject dichotomy, 
but concerns one’s metaphysical and spiritual questioning. To know something, in Zhu 
Xi’s term, is to quest for the principle of that thing which also exists virtually in the 
mind.  Thus the pursuit of the principle of an external thing does not end in the thing 
that is known, but reflexively brings light to the intellective function of the mind. Put 
more bluntly, one comes to realise one’s own power of knowing by knowing something 
outside. The activity of knowing is nothing like a mechanical logical inference on the 
ground of instrumental rationality; rather, knowing always pertains to the knower’s 
self-realisation and li 理 the Principle. Therefore, in the context of Zhu Xi knowing is 
not a lifeless, heartless activity, but forms a link with one’s being and life. Nonetheless 
it is plain that the hierarchical order of creature – to be, to live, to know – that Eckhart 
takes for granted is foreign to Confucian tradition.  Despite the fact that what Zhu Xi 
means by li 理 the Principle has a cosmological implication, we cannot find in Zhu Xi’s 
thought a direct link between intellect, life and creation as seen in Eckhart (2.2.2.2, a & 
b). The notion of the divine intellect that is essential to Eckhart’s thinking of creation 
is entirely absent in Zhu Xi; as is the connection and division between the divine and 
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human intellect, because in Confucian tradition the cosmological thinking which 
intends to explain the formation of the world and the movement of the universe is more 
closely tied up with concepts such as qi 氣 the cosmic matter, yinyang 阴阳 the negative 
and positive force, and wuxing 五行 the five elements. Although Zhu Xi attempts to 
integrate the concept of li 理 the Principle into the traditional cosmological framework, 
so that in his system both li 理 the Principle and qi 氣 the cosmic matter play an essential 
role in forming and the sustaining the whole universe,562 his expounding of li 理 the 
Principle does not form a comparison with the Eckhartian notion of the divine intellect. 
In his commentaries, especially the Commentary on John, Eckhart reads a great deal of 
Platonic teaching into the scriptural text, and clearly interprets God as the divine 
intellect which has contained the Idea of the world and instantly created the whole 
world by the Idea of it.  That Idea of course is identified with Christ, the Son or the 
Word in Christian tradition. In Eckhart the concept of intellect is often accompanied by 
the Platonic notion of idea, which pertains to creation and comprehension; hence 
intellect is not only in charge of understanding, but also entails the power to generate, 
or is the source of life.  Hence is seen in Eckhart the direct link between intellect, life 
and creation. The situation is rather different in Zhu Xi and in Confucian tradition, 
where the generative power is most often attributed to qi 氣 the cosmic matter in 
cosmological terms, and to the virtue of ren 仁 humaneness in moral terms. So long as 
Zhu Xi stands in the Confucian tradition, his concept of li 理 the Principle and his 
emphasis on zhi 知 knowing cannot theoretically fuse comprehension and 
generation/creation into one, to the extent that Eckhart has done on a Platonic platform.   
 
3.2 The Problematique of Hermeneutics in Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart  
As seen in Chapters 1 and 2, the concept of the human intellect in both Zhu Xi and 
Eckhart involves a highly complicated hermeneutical framework. Indeed, the 
expression of their thinking and the thinking itself cannot be separated; the 
hermeneutical framework in which the notion of the human intellect is unfolded 
deserves no less attention than the notion itself.   
                                                          
562 As pointed out by John H. Berthrong, distinctive of Zhu Xi’s account of creativity is that he modifies 
the classical sources through a pair of concepts – li 理 and qi 氣. Zhu discovers creativity in the dynamic 
side of his speculative system, with the primordial power of qi 氣 when linked to the axiological power 
of li 理. It follows that in Zhu Xi li 理 Principle does not create by itself, but actually functions as the 
model of things. Hence it is the restless qi 氣 that gives birth to the universe of things when it is informed 
by Principle. See John H. Berthrong, Concerning Creativity: A Comparison of Chu Hsi, Whitehead, and 




 Hermeneutical Rules in Zhu Xi and Eckhart 
Clearly the issue of hermeneutics is at stake in both contexts. To both Zhu Xi and 
Eckhart, the problem of hermeneutics is not the art of understanding in general, but 
precisely the art of understanding and interpreting scriptures. In both Zhu Xi and 
Eckhart the hermeneutical issue is closely entangled with scriptural learning, and the 
hermeneutical concern is almost solely derived from their exegetical practice. In neither 
context do the expositions of hermeneutical rules appear separately, but they always 
accompany and are accompanied by scriptural commentaries. Neither thinker shows an 
interest in formulating a theory about the art of understanding in the modern sense. 
Since in both contexts the hermeneutical issues are tied up with scriptural exegesis, the 
problem of hermeneutics in Zhu Xi and Eckhart is largely subject to the task of 
commentary writing, and the hermeneutical rules given by both thinkers are meant to 
provide the reader with general guidelines in order that their philosophical 
interpretations will be properly understood. On the other hand, these rules also serve to 
justify their own interpretations, in particular the innovative ideas they put forward in 
their commentaries. Zhu Xi and Eckhart have much in common with regard to the link 
between hermeneutical issues and scriptural exegesis. In other words, the hermeneutical 
problem concerns the two thinkers in a very similar way.  Since in both contexts the 
scope of hermeneutics is confined to the study of scriptures, accordingly the 
hermeneutical rules prescribed by both thinkers serve the same purpose, namely to 
enhance the understanding of the sacred scriptural texts.    
Despite such common ground, some fundamental differences are found between Zhu 
Xi and Eckhart in terms of the detailed contents of the hermeneutical rules. As the study 
of scriptures is conducted in different ways in the two traditions, accordingly different 
questions are raised with regard to the proper way to understand and interpret a 
scriptural text. Based on the details presented in Chapter 1 (1.2.1) and Chapter 2 (2.2.1), 
we will make some observations upon the hermeneutical rules in Zhu Xi and Eckhart, 
so that the differences between the two will be brought to light.  
Zhu Xi lays more emphasis on the kind of submissive and receptive mentality in 
scriptural learning, and repeatedly warns his students against the subjective stance to 
scriptural texts. His criticism of the subjective attitude towards scripture is partly driven 
by a pedagogical concern; indeed, overall the hermeneutical rules in Zhu Xi are 
prescribed mainly for educational purposes, and to a great extent reflect his life-long 
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insistence on xiaxue shangda 下學上达 the bottom-up procedure. It is not hard to see that 
these hermeneutical rules are meant to be practical and concrete, and will become 
incomprehensible once disassociated from Zhu Xi’s own teaching experience and 
exegetical practice. The hermeneutical rules as seen in Zhu Xi’s Yulei 語 類
Conversations and Huowen或問Q&A are no more than detailed instructions concerning 
how to understand and interpret scripture; as a whole they speak of the practical method 
for scriptural learning, and hardly touch on anything abstract.  
In comparison with Zhu Xi, Eckhart seems to be more concerned with general 
discussions over the problem of hermeneutics in his time, such as the source of truth, 
the possible growth of the meaning of a scriptural text, the spiritual and literal meaning 
of words, and the compatibility between what is seen in nature, what is found in 
philosophy and what is revealed in scripture. Living in the age of scholasticism, Eckhart 
cannot be oblivious to the controversial questions as to the relation between faith and 
reason, theology and philosophy, the illuminating light of the divine and the light of 
natural reason. He evidently keeps them in mind whilst composing commentaries on 
the holy scriptures, as is seen from the fact that Eckhart attaches a prologue to each of 
his commentaries, and a General Prologue to his Opus Tripartitum, each of which 
contains some hermeneutical rules that are designed to account for the style of the 
forthcoming commentary and the innovative ideas contained in it. Overall these rules, 
although they are to be applied specifically to Eckhart’s biblical commentaries, actually 
reflect his solution to the aforementioned hermeneutical difficulties, typically arising 
from the academic standard of scholasticism.  
 
 Scriptural Ground for Philosophical Speculation  
A cross-reading of Zhu Xi and Eckhart makes it clear that the medieval Christian 
theologians and the Confucian masters shared a very similar academic goal, to embed 
independent thinking into the scriptural ground. Both thinkers blend philosophical ideas 
into a commentary on scriptural text. Thus, in both contexts we find a tension between 
original thinking and traditional doctrines, as well as the conscientious effort to ease 
and resolve such an unavoidable tension. Under such an intellectual circumstance 
philosophical thinking is not to be dissociated from scriptural learning; philosophical 
speculation is developed almost exclusively into a philosophical reading of a 
transmitted text, and in that sense philosophical questioning is merged into the 
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longstanding tradition of scriptural learning. In both contexts, philosophical speculation 
does not stand on its own; even in Eckhart’s scholastic quaestiones the philosophical 
discussions and debates are conducted under a theological title, which is undoubtedly 
rooted in the Holy Bible. To a medieval Christian theologian like Meister Eckhart and 
a medieval Confucian master like Zhu Xi, it is almost a norm that one ought to think 
through scriptures, and philosophical thinking should be provided with a scriptural 
ground; as a result, in both the medieval Latin and the medieval Chinese world, 
philosophical glosses are incorporated in scriptural exegeses, and philosophical 
interpretation of scriptures is in vogue. 
It must be noted that to form a scriptural commentary with the aid of philosophical 
terms is much more demanding and complicated than simply constructing a systematic 
philosophical or theological discourse, because the former entails persistent striving for 
a balance between the passive assimilation of the scriptural meaning and the subjective 
personal appropriation of scriptures, which requires original thinking and one’s unique 
experiential approach. Thus in both traditions the genre of commentary calls for 
mastery of scriptural knowledge as well as maturity in philosophical thinking. 
Unsurprisingly, the task of commentary writing is exclusively assigned to the most 
prominent thinkers of the day. Both Zhu Xi and Eckhart seem to have lived up to that 
standard in delivering their own scriptural interpretation. Both accomplished this 
enormous task, Zhu Xi with his Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentary on the 
Four Books, and Eckhart with the Commentary on John, Commentary on Genesis and 
Commentary on Exodus.    
As seen in their commentaries, both Zhu Xi and Eckhart treat scripture as the primary 
authority, and also take the scholarly tradition of scriptural exegesis into account. This 
is most clearly illustrated by the fact that both Zhu Xi and Eckhart refer to the expert 
views of the past and present before proposing a new idea; they both skilfully 
summarise the exegetical sources at their disposal, and further integrate them into their 
own commentaries. Although both Zhu Xi and Eckhart often resort to more than one 
preceding commentator and master, their work does suggest a remarkable affinity with 
the one predecessor from whom they have learned most. In the case of Zhu Xi the most 
important predecessor is obviously Cheng Yi; distinctive of Zhu Xi’s commentary as a 
whole is his blending of Cheng Yi’s philosophy into a concise line-by-line commentary 
on the ancient scriptures, in particular the text of The Great Learning. Zhu Xi repeatedly 
mentions the groundwork achieved by Cheng Yi and takes what he puts in the 
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Supplement as no more than paraphrasing master Cheng’s thought. It seems that in his 
commentaries Zhu Xi tries to play down the originality of his thinking, and always lets 
his predecessors speak for him. In Eckhart it is difficult to spot which previous master 
he is most indebted to when reading his commentaries, but in a number of prologues 
Eckhart reminds the reader that the work of his Dominican brother Thomas deserves 
particular attention. Like Zhu Xi, Eckhart rarely draws attention to his own original 
thought. Only in Parisian Questions does he make it clear where he disagrees with or 
even surpasses Thomas. The continuity between Thomas and Eckhart is most clearly 
displayed in Eckhart’s disputed questions, where Eckhart’s scholastic debate always 
starts with a Thomistic view, which is followed by his own thought.  
Through the means of writing scriptural commentaries both Zhu Xi and Eckhart 
demonstrate a strong affinity with the thinking of the previous commentators in the 
same tradition.  Their own perspectives hardly come to the fore, and the originality of 
their thinking is often implicitly expressed by quoting the past and present scholars. 
Through the form of commentary Zhu Xi and Eckhart make it clear how strongly they 
are affiliated with their own intellectual tradition, and how much contribution they have 
made. To both Zhu Xi and Eckhart the scriptural texts upon which their commentaries 
are built are sacred, in the sense that these texts have a divine origin. In both contexts 
it is seen that scripture serves to gauge personal thinking, and a thoroughly intellectual 
penetration of scripture is grounded on a firm faith in that scripture. In both traditions 
commentary writing effectively fulfils the role of preserving and promoting the 
traditional values and fundamental doctrines, hence inevitably it serves pedagogical 
purposes in the long run.  
Despite the importance of the genre of scriptural commentary in both contexts, a 
difference is found between Zhu Xi and Eckhart with regard to its rank. As presented 
in Chapter 1 (1.3), scriptural commentary in the Confucian tradition carries much more 
weight than a philosophical treatise. Zhu Xi’s Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 
Commentary on the Four Books is followed by Sishu Huowen 四書或問 Questions and 
Answers Concerning The Four Books, and the latter is intended to expound at length 
what is only briefly touched upon in the former. As Zhu Xi tells his pupils, the 
philosophical expositions presented in Q&A are subordinate to the Commentary; one 
should start with the Commentary and read Q&A afterwards.  In Eckhart, the order is 
reversed. In his Opus Tripartitum Eckhart allows the Book of Propositions to open the 
whole corpus, and particularly points out that these propositions hold the key to 
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understanding the following quaestiones and commentaries (2.1.2, 1). Unlike Zhu Xi, 
Eckhart asks the reader to proceed from the propositions to quaestiones and 
commentaries.  
The main reason for such a difference probably lies in another role of Zhu Xi’s 
commentaries, namely to rehabilitate the divine lineage of Confucianism. That seems 
to be irrelevant to Eckhart’s purpose of commentary writing. Zhu Xi’s reconstruction 
project largely depends on his Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentary on the 
Four Books; the intellectual development as presented in his commentaries also 
implicitly delineates the transmission of the divine lineage (1.1.1). Therefore his 
academic attempt to restore the scholarly tradition also serves the purpose of enhancing 
one’s faith in the sacred nature of Confucian scriptures which, in turn, determines the 
spiritual identity of Confucian adherents. Although Zhu Xi’s commentary writing is not 
explicitly homiletic in nature, it does entail a strong sense of mission, which contributes 
to his downplaying of the philosophical speculations as seen in Huowen 或問 Q&A. 
From a homiletic point of view, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentary on the 
Four Books is far more important than Sishu Huowen 四書或問 Questions and Answers 
Concerning The Four Books, hence the latter is deemed a footnote to the former, and 
by extension a footnote to a footnote in relation to the scriptural text itself.  
By comparison, philosophical speculation has a more significant role to play in 
Eckhart’s work, especially in his quaestiones, where philosophical debate is judged on 
its own merit and is allowed to run its course without being interrupted by scriptural 
authority. Overall, living during the prime of medieval scholasticism Eckhart enjoyed 
the freedom to develop speculative theology in the form of quaestio; even in his biblical 
commentaries, he can still find sufficient room for philosophical discussion. Moreover, 
Eckhart does not set restrictions on the length of his commentaries, hence we have the 
extensive commentaries in which Eckhart tries to exhaust the possible interpretations 
of a selected verse, in order to deepen and broaden one’s understanding of scripture to 
the utmost. To a scholastic theologian like Eckhart, the pagan philosophers are no less 
important than the prominent church fathers; not only was Aristotle’s work treated as 
canonical,563 but the works of his Arabic commentators were also well received in the 
                                                          
563  According to Jacqueline Hamesse’s observation, numerous theologians reacted against the new 
methods employed to treat theological questions; from the end of the twelfth century their criticism of 
and opposition to Aristotelianism was extensive. Nevertheless, by the second half of the thirteenth 
century we are far from the first quarrels and spirited reactions that had taken place against philosophy 
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Latin world. From Augustine to Boethius philosophy had long been deemed an essential 
aid to scriptural reading; although anti-intellectualism figures like Tertullian had their 
voices heard, overall philosophical thinking continued to have a remarkable bearing on 
both scriptural interpretation and speculative theology within the Christian tradition. 
With the thriving of the scholastic movement in the 12th and 13th centuries, the vital 
importance of philosophy was dramatically displayed in the form of quaestiones.  
Compared with their Christian counterparts, Neo-Confucian masters like Zhu Xi and 
his predecessor Cheng Yi seem to be more dubious about the role of philosophical 
speculation, despite the fact that they have already engaged in philosophical debate 
when trying to prove theoretically the superiority of Confucian doctrines over the 
teaching of Buddhism and Daoism. There seems always to be an effort to maintain the 
purity of Confucian doctrine, and philosophical concepts originated from other schools 
of thought are treated with particular caution. Philosophical speculation does not stand 
on its own; nor is it to be judged on its own merit. Indeed, philosophical thinking must 
be carried out on the ground of scriptures and must be expressed in the form of scriptural 
interpretation; original thinking will not be appreciated unless it has a foothold in 
scripture and finds a way to merge into the current of the whole tradition. Otherwise it 
remains at the level of personal interest and has little to contribute to the Confucian 
tradition. Accordingly, in Confucian tradition a philosophical reading of scripture does 
not gain legitimacy due to its structural or logical beauty; the conformity between the 
philosophical interpretation and the original meaning of the scriptural text will be 
ceaselessly questioned: indeed, the legitimacy of Zhu Xi’s commentary is still being 
questioned by many Confucian scholars today. The sort of systematic intellectual 
penetration of scripture represented by Zhu Xi’s treatment of Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning is an extraordinary conduct within Confucian tradition. Despite the heated 
discussions over some philosophical questions within the circle of Neo-Confucian 
intellectuals, in particular the historical debate between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan 
which speaks of the fundamental divergence between Li Xue理學 the school of Principle 
and Xin Xue 心學 the school of mind within the Neo-Confucian context, it is plain that 
                                                          
and in particular against Aristotelianism. If resistance still cropped up, the context in which it arose had 
changed. The majority of writings by theologians made room for philosophical arguments and also 
treated speculative problems. The role of Aristotelianism in the apprenticeship of reason was no longer 
disputed. For details, see Jacqueline Hamesse, ‘Theological Quaestiones Quodlibetales’, in Christopher 





the debate between Zhu Xi and his contemporary peers is not conducted according to 
the syllogistic rules that a scholastic theologian like Eckhart must follow in his work, 
whether through disputed questions or scriptural commentaries.           
 
 Opening up New Directions: Zhu Xi’s Q&A and Eckhart’s MHG Sermons 
The style of Zhu Xi’s Q&A invites comparison with that of Eckhart’s sermons in 
Middle High German, because both represent a new way of expression which exceeds 
the conventional standard to which most of their contemporaries aspire.  
Zhu Xi is probably the first thinker in the Neo-Confucian movement to develop a 
systematic philosophical discourse to spell out his own idea, which is only slightly 
hinted at in his scriptural commentary. Thus we have a sophisticated and well-
structured Sishu Huowen 四書或問 Questions and Answers Concerning the Four Books 
(1.3.1.2), which is closely bound up with his masterpiece Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句
集註  Commentaries on the Four Books. Zhu Xi’s Q&A fulfils two different roles: 
internally it serves to expound what he has written in the commentaries; while 
externally Q&A as a whole is no less than a systematic philosophical apology for 
Confucian values, which distinguishes theoretically the Confucian stance and 
perspective from those of Buddhism and Daoism. Zhu Xi’s Q&A represents a new 
apologetic attempt in the scholarly tradition within Confucianism, and is indicative of 
Zhu Xi’s awareness of the categorical gap between a faithful stance towards scriptural 
texts and the striving for creative, independent thinking. It is through Q&A that Zhu Xi 
openly integrates philosophical argument into scriptural learning. As an attachment to 
the commentary, Q&A forms an indirect link with the scriptural texts, which obviously 
creates a new platform for in-depth discussion over the controversial issues arising from 
the commentary, so that the need of an inquisitive and erudite reader will be met. The 
genre of Q&A and the quality of the debate unfolded in this work suggest a new 
approach, which calls for thorough intellectual penetration of the transmitted scriptural 
texts.   
The same sort of pioneering work that Zhu Xi accomplishes in his Q&A, we may say 
that Eckhart achieves in his MHG sermons, noticeably in a much more straightforward 
manner. Unlike many of his contemporary scholastic theologians, who believe that 
lofty ideas can only be taught to the well educated, Eckhart adopts the vernacular 
language and allows it to transmit the same message he has put forward in his scholastic 
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Latin work. When preaching in MHG, Eckhart is not content with delivering a diluted 
version of his thought to his audience, but always attempts to get the message across in 
its entirety.  For that purpose he often plays with words and stretches the use of language 
to the limit. The depth of his vernacular sermons makes it clear that Eckhart has 
thoroughly exposed to the taught and untaught his profound theological thinking and 
spiritual insights, which are supposed to be exclusively reserved for the well-trained 
mature mind. Unsurprisingly, the power of his vernacular sermons was soon felt by 
many; the seemingly daring and provocative tone aroused shock and misunderstanding 
in the clerics and laity alike, and as a result Eckhart’s teaching was scrutinised by the 
inquisitors on suspicion of heresy. Confronted with misjudgement and 
misunderstanding, Eckhart does not hold back his view. He argues that even Saint John 
begins his holy gospel with the most exalted thoughts that any man could utter about 
God, and allows these thoughts to be open to all believers and unbelievers, so that they 
might believe. Surely it is our duty to teach the untaught, so that they may be changed 
from uninstructed to instructed. 564  To those who misunderstand him, Eckhart’s 
response remains the same: ‘It is enough for me that what I say and write be true in me 
and in God.’565 To Eckhart, the truth of his words is a matter that concerns only himself 
and God; the element of truth in his teaching will not be diminished or affected by the 
misconceptions of his rivals.     
Despite the contextual differences, both Zhu Xi and Eckhart manage to open up new 
directions in their own traditions. Although both are trying to promote something 
unconventional, Zhu Xi seems to be more concerned with the effect of his teaching.  In 
order to prevent misunderstanding and confusion, he allowed Q&A to be circulated only 
among a small circle of pupils and friends.  In his view, the argumentative style of Q&A 
may have done more harm than good to someone who was not yet ready to take it on 
board, and therefore it was not meant for wide publication, but was to be reserved for 
the few who could understand the depth of his questions and share his interest in 
philosophical speculation. Similarly, Zhu Xi is much more cautious about giving 
philosophical interpretation of scripture.  In his system, philosophical thinking is 
always treated as the means to enhance scriptural learning. On the one hand, Zhu Xi 
                                                          
564 Eckhart, Liber Benedictus I (DW V 60,28-61,8) (trans. Edmund Colledge in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 
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employs a set of philosophical glosses in the commentaries so as to systematise 
Confucian doctrine; on the other hand, he maintains a submissive stance towards 
scripture, to ensure that the philosophical terms in his commentary will never 
overshadow the scripture itself. Thus, throughout his academic career, the following 
order of priority of his works is strongly recommended: Sishu 四書 The Four Books, 
then Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books, and finally 
Sishu Huowen 四書或問 Questions and Answers Concerning the Four Books.   
To understand this priority order, we have to take into account the goal of the Neo-
Confucian movement, which is to reconstruct Confucianism. This reconstruction, 
occurring in the Song Dynasty (960-1279), is a revival of Confucian scriptural learning, 
and is associated with commentaries on Confucian classics. Given the fundamental 
importance of scriptural learning to the reconstruction project, it is understandable why 
Zhu Xi continually calls on the reader to focus on the scripture, and tries so hard to 
integrate his philosophical thinking, namely Li Xue 理學 the doctrine of the Principle, 
into the longstanding tradition of Jing Xue 经學 scriptural learning.   
But if we shift our attention to the structure of Zhu Xi’s system itself, and concentrate 
on the formation of his thought, the priority order among scripture, commentary and 
Q&A will be reversed. Noticeably it is his philosophical thinking,   Li Xue 理學 the 
doctrine of the Principle, that distinguishes his commentaries from the previous ones. 
His reading of scripture bears a clear rationalistic mark and the concept of Li 理 the 
Principle is applied to interpreting nearly all the cardinal concepts in the Confucian 
classics. Furthermore, the variation in the meaning of those concepts is explicit. Taking 
the word ‘tian 天 Heaven’ as an example, ‘tian 天’ literally means the natural ‘sky’; in 
religious texts it normally refers to the universal force acting as an invisible deity whose 
pervasive power could form a divine intervention in social affairs and private life, and 
in that sense it serves as the object of veneration to which personal prayers are addressed. 
Zhu Xi’s interpretation of ‘tian 天 Heaven’ is stunningly different and concise: ‘tian, ji 
li ye 天，即理也 Heaven, meaning Principle’.566 Here the status of ‘Heaven’ is simply 
substituted by that of ‘Principle’. Another fundamental Confucian concept, ‘xing 性
nature’ is treated in the same fashion: ‘xing ji tianli 性即天理 nature means the heavenly 
                                                          




Principle’ . 567  Similarly, the central concept in Confucius’ Analects, ‘ren 仁
humaneness’, is interpreted as ‘renzhe, aizhili, xinzhide ye 仁者，爱之理，心之德也 the 
Principle of love and the property of mind’.568 Suffice it to say that Zhu Xi’s scriptural 
interpretation relies heavily on the concept of li 理 the Principle, which characterises the 
whole project of his intellectual reconstruction of Confucianism. Certainly one cannot 
understand Zhu Xi’s commentary without first grasping his philosophy; for that 
purpose, one has to read his Q&A as Zhu Xi’s own ideas are condensed into this 
work.569  
    To sum up, both Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart regard scriptures as the inexhaustible 
source of truth and inspiration, thus dialoguing with scriptural texts becomes essential 
to philosophical speculation and spiritual contemplation. In both contexts language is 
not deemed an obstacle to spiritual progress, nor is discursive reasoning to be 
abandoned or despised. The power of knowing located in the human soul or mind holds 
the key to the ultimate truth. Truth, scripture, spiritual contemplation and religious 
praxis are dominated by the power of knowing which is no longer confined to empirical 
approach to the world, hence the human intellect should be considered in spiritual, 
transcendental or eternal terms. In Eckhart, the apophatic nature makes intellect the 
path leading to detachment; in Zhu Xi, knowing is rooted in human nature, hence 
constitutes the ground for Confucian learning and personal cultivation. 
In short, both Zhu Xi and Meister Eckhart highlight the primacy of knowing and both 
intend to justify this innovative thesis by resorting to the sacred scriptures. The natural 
bond between the holy nature of scriptural texts and the knowing power in us as 
presented in both Zhu Xi and Eckhart, makes it clear that in both contexts knowing 
indicates the immersive potential which is open to religious praxis, spiritual 
contemplation, philosophical discussion, scientific observation and even moral 
cultivation. When Eckhart defines God as intellect rather than being, he is also shifting 
the attention to the knowing power in us; similarly in Zhu Xi, when the massive project 
of reconstruction is built upon the doctrine of the investigation of things and extension 
of knowledge, the same message can be derived, which is to probe the Principle by 
                                                          
567 Zhu Xi, MZJZ, Juan 11, in Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 
325.  
568 Zhu Xi, LYJZ, Juan 1, in Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四書章句集註 Commentaries on the Four Books (1983), 
48.  
569 Qian Mu suggests that one should read Huowen 或問 Questions & Answers first, then Yulei 語類
Conversations, see Qian Mu 錢穆, Zhuzi Xin Xue An 朱子新學案 A New Anthology of Zhu Xi, in Qian Binsi  
Xianshen Quanji  錢賓四先生全集 Complete Works of Qian Mu (1998), 14, 257. 
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bringing the power of knowing into action, thus we are open to the whole universe and 
have the potential to know and to be everything. Let this be an inspiration from both 













Conclusion:  A Radical Difference – Intent for Orthodoxy in Zhu Xi and 
Openness to Diversity in Meister Eckhart 
 
The difference in the reception of Zhu Xi and Eckhart is immediately apparent when 
considered from a historical perspective. While Zhu Xi was canonised as a national 
icon and dominated Chinese academia for six centuries, Eckhart was condemned as a 
heretic not long after his death. Such posthumous glory and condemnation urge us to 
seek out the decisive factors that contributed to these different receptions. However, to 
do so would require a thorough exploration of the respective historical facts, which is 
obviously beyond the scope of this study. What we intend to point out are the internal 
reasons deriving from the characteristics of their thinking, which can be deemed 
complementary to the historical observation that focuses on the external factors 
affecting the reception of the two systems of thought. Unsurprisingly, we have a great 
deal to investigate in order to understand the influence that Zhu Xi’s thought has exerted 
on the society of China, Japan and Korea, and have relatively much less to say on the 
impact of Eckhart, due to the condemnation imposed upon his thought and the 
consequent ban on his academic work that lasted for several centuries.     
Leaving aside all the external factors,570 we are confronted with the question: ‘What 
are the internal reasons for Zhu Xi’s posthumous glory and Eckhart’s condemnation?’ 
Put more bluntly, what made Zhu Xi’s thought so appealing to an existing political 
regime, and what made Eckhart’s ideas so threatening to the Catholic Church of which 
he was a part?  
Let us start with Zhu Xi. As pointed out by Tillman, Zhu Xi’s posthumous success 
cannot be separated from the deliberate, long-term preparation made by his disciples 
and by Zhu Xi himself. Tillman provides historical evidence that in his last twenty years 
Zhu Xi demonstrated an increasingly strong intent towards orthodoxy, or even to 
uphold his own exclusive authority among the circle of Neo-Confucians, to elevate his 
scriptural commentary to the level of authentic, orthodox Confucian learning, and to 
present himself as the legitimate, authoritative commentator of Confucian classics. This 
is typically seen in Zhu Xi’s three consecutive texts: Dao Lü Bogong Wen 悼呂伯恭文
Eulogy for Lü ZuQian (1181), Zhong Yong Xu《中庸》序 Preface to the Doctrine of the 
                                                          
570 Wing-Tsit Chan particularly highlights the significant role played by Zhu Xi’s disciples in publicising 
Zhu’s teaching after his death. As a group they made systematic preparations for the canonisation of Zhu 
Xi and the domination of his thought. See Wing-Tsit Chan 陈荣捷, Zhuzi Menren 朱子门人 The Disciples 
of Zhu Xi (Shanghai, 2007).  
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Mean (1189), and Cangzhou Jingshe Gao Xianshen Wen 滄州精舍告先聖文 Prayer to 
the Spirit of Confucius at the Temple of Cangzhou (1194), in which he coins the 
terminology wudang 吾黨 our party, and openly issues a personal claim to daotong 道
統 the transmission of the Way after the death of the three eminent masters, Zhang Shi 
張栻 (1133-1180), Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 (1137-1181) and Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139-
1193). On that account Tillman comes to the conclusion that in his last twenty years 
Zhu Xi deliberately set out to redefine the meaning of daoxue 道學 the school of Dao, 
and gradually to narrow down the circle of Neo-Confucian scholars; as a result the four 
coexisting groups within the Song Neo-Confucian context were transformed into one 
school of thought according to the criterion set up by Zhu Xi for the so-called ‘chun ru 
純儒 authentic Confucianism’.571 Thanks to his long-term plan and preparation, the 
diversity of the Song Neo-Confucianism was eventually replaced by the authority of 
Zhu Xi.  
In addition, Tillman makes the point that religious activity, as shown in Zhu Xi’s 
Prayer to the Spirit of Confucius, played a significant part in the daily routine of the 
academic world he led. With whatever intentions in mind, Zhu Xi began to push himself 
to the centre of attention, almost as a mediator between the spirit of Confucius and those 
Confucian learners. Meanwhile, he embarked upon the academic project of establishing 
an orthodox line of Confucian learning, so that the meaning of orthodoxy was narrowed 
down to his own interpretation of scriptures, and Si Shu 四書 The Four Books, edited 
and commented by Zhu Xi, became canonical to his followers even before it was 
formally authorised by the throne.572 
Tillman’s historical observation is partly confirmed by Yu Yingshi’s much more 
complicated account of Zhu Xi’s political involvement in his last twenty years, although 
Yu seems not to resonate with Tillman’s point of view. What Yu has accomplished in 
his research amounts to a ground-breaking discovery that compels us to rethink the 
meaning of neisheng waiwang 內聖外王 inner sage and outer king in the Neo-Confucian 
                                                          
571 Hoyt Tillman 田浩, ‘Zhu Xi yu Daoxue de Fazhan Bianhua 朱熹与道学的发展变化 Zhu Xi and the 
Development and Changes of Neo-Confucianism’, in Wang Zhen 王震 (ed.), Songdai Xin Ruxue de 
Jingshen Shijie-yi Zhuzi Xue we Zhongxin 宋代新儒学的精神世界 : 以朱子学为中心 The Spiritual and 
Intellectual World of Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty-with a focus on the study of Master Zhu 
(2009), 16-22. 
For more detailed research on the making of Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty, see 陈来 Chen Lai 
(ed.), Zaoqi Daoxue Huayu de Xingcheng yu Yanbian 早期道学话语的形成与演变 The Formation and 
Development of the Early Neo-Confucian Discourse (Hefei, 2007). 
572 See Hoyt Tillman, ‘Prayers to the Spirit of Confucius and Claim to the Transmission of the Way’, 
Philosophy East and West 54 (October 2004), 489-513. 
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context, especially the correlation between the two sides - neisheng 內聖 inner sage, and 
waiwang 外王 outer king. To his surprise, Yu discovers that during the period of the 
Southern Song Neo-Confucianism led by Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi, Lü Zuqian and Lu 
Xiangshan gradually replaced the prevailing role of jingxue 經學 scriptural learning 
represented by Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086), and became the intellectual force that 
shaped the ideology of the Southern Song. Although the Neo-Confucian masters of the 
Song unanimously agree that the goal of Neo-Confucianism is to attain sagehood, and 
that neisheng 內聖 inner sage is absolutely a prerequisite for waiwang 外王 outer king, 
they collectively call for the restoration of the social and political order in reality, so 
that the function of neisheng 內聖 inner sage lies in the achievement of waiwang 外王 
outer king after all.573  
Under this circumstance, the political concern of Zhu Xi did not diminish but actually 
gained momentum in his last twenty years. Like Lu Xiangshan and Zhang Shi, Zhu Xi 
never gave up the hope of forming a party made up of like-minded Confucian scholar-
officials, so as to influence or even guide the emperor to wield political power in the 
right way. Taking into account the humiliating situation of the Southern Song regime, 
it is plain that the group of Confucian scholar-officials earnestly called for a change in 
the national direction, meaning to scrap the policy of compromising with the invaders, 
and to set up plans for resuming the sovereignty of the Song and regaining the lost land. 
Overall the Confucian masters’ ambition to reconstruct the political order in a chaotic 
society coincides with their sense of mission to make the Way manifest in this world, 
and the means to achieve the political goal is no other than de jun xingdao 得君行道 to 
carry out the Way with the aid of the monarch, which explains why Confucian masters 
such as Zhang Shi and Lu Xiangshan expressed such deep affection for the emperor, 
who favoured that political ideal. This kind of emotion arising from the Confucian sense 
of minister-emperor relationship is so infectious that once caught up in it, one is never 
able to shake it off. Indeed, none of the Neo-Confucian masters in question are free 
from this deeply-rooted psychological complex.574  
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Seen in this light, Zhu Xi’s deliberate bid for authority and self-proclamation of 
orthodoxy as depicted by Tillman should not be deemed testimony to his personal 
interest in self-glorification, but rather an expression of the typical sense of mission 
cultivated by a Confucian master. Surely, the sort of intent for orthodoxy or bid for 
exclusive authority so clearly demonstrated in Zhu Xi’s intellectual output is an attempt 
to consolidate the group identity of the Neo-Confucian scholar-officials at the court of 
the Southern Song? Would self-denial have been a better solution for Zhu Xi when 
confronting their common political adversaries - a group of sophisticated, corrupt 
bureaucrats? Did he really have a choice after the death of the other three eminent 
leaders of the Neo-Confucian group? Here we see a circle whereby Zhu Xi’s spiritual 
and intellectual affiliation with Confucianism does not allow him to walk away from 
his obligations to the state and to the emperor, and this political concern in turn has an 
immense impact on his intellectual enterprise, in particular, his work on Da Xue 大學
The Great Learning.  
It is clear that among Si Shu 四書 The Four Books, Zhu Xi gives far more weight to 
Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning than to the other three. He was still polishing his 
commentary on the section of chengyi 誠意 sincerity of the will three days before his 
death;575 indeed, Zhu Xi confessed that he devoted most of his energies to Da Xue 大學
The Great Learning.576 Why was Zhu Xi so deeply captivated by this short text? What 
makes it so important that it requires Zhu Xi’s life-long dedication? Is it merely the 
difficulty arising from the structure that makes Zhu Xi spend decades on this text? To 
answer these questions, we have to consider the historical context, especially the 
sophisticated political game played out at the court of the Southern Song, in which he 
had wholeheartedly participated. As Yu Yingshi has hinted, once we place the Neo-
Confucian masters back into the mainstream culture of the Song, and think in their 
terms, the importance of Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning immediately becomes clear, 
because this is the only classical text that provides us with a dual carriageway between 
neisheng 內聖 inner sage, and waiwang 外王 outer king.577  
This insightful observation sheds new light on the uniqueness of Da Xue 大學 The 
Great Learning, and reveals the long-term deliberation and hesitation that Zhu Xi might 
                                                          
575 Wang Maohong 王懋竑, Zhu Xi Nianpu 朱熹年譜 A Chronology of Zhu Xi (Beijing, 1998), 407. 
576 Zhu Xi, ZZYL Juan 14:  “某於大學用工甚多。溫公作通鑑，言：臣平生精力，盡在此書。某於大學亦然。論孟
中庸，卻不費力。友仁 錄” ZZQS(2002), 14, 430. 




have experienced in mapping out the two texts Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning and 
Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean; both were singled out by the Song Neo-
Confucians from Li Ji 禮記 The Book of Rites as scriptural basis for their reconstruction 
project. On the one hand, in Zhong Yong Xu《中庸》序 Preface to the Doctrine of the 
Mean, Zhu Xi solemnly declares his theory of daotong 道統 the transmission of the Way, 
which makes Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean the canon that retains the 
spiritual lineage of Confucian tradition. On the other hand, Zhu Xi ranks Da Xue 大學
The Great Learning the first among the four, and insists that this is the text that will 
initiate one into Confucian learning. Does he regard Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning 
as one essential step towards Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean, so that his 
doctrine of gewu zhizhi 格物致知 the investigation of things and the extension of 
knowledge is to be incorporated into his theory of xin 心 mind? Or, conversely, does he 
take Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning as containing the most comprehensive structure 
or framework of Confucianism, in which Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean is 
to be included? Zhu Xi does not seem to state categorically which text should be 
considered most important with regard to Confucian spirituality. Reading between the 
lines we come to see that Zhu Xi is trying to make Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning the 
corner stone of Neo-Confucianism, so as to transform the classical Confucianism into 
a theoretically sound system in intellectual, spiritual and political terms.  
As pointed out by Yu Yingshi, the political activities of Zhu Xi and his 
contemporaries compel us to rethink the political implications of Neo-Confucianism, 
and an overwhelming amount of historical evidence drives it home that the Neo-
Confucian masters of the Song never confine themselves to the realm of neisheng 內聖
inner sage: rather than being content with personal spiritual progress, they all make 
efforts to proceed from neisheng 內聖 inner sage to waiwang 外王 outer king. Seen in 
this light Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning should be given priority over Zhong Yong 中
庸 The Doctrine of the Mean, because the political thought concerning the notion of 
waiwang 外王 outer king is clearly spelt out only in the former.  
Along with the deepening political divergence between the professional bureaucrats 
and the Neo-Confucian scholar-officials, arose the need to formulate the theory of 
daotong 道統 the transmission of the Way, which adds enormous weight to Zhong Yong
中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean. Likewise, the necessity to justify daoxue 道學 the 
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learning of Dao pushed the Cheng-Zhu school to the fore, and the status of Da Xue 大
學 The Great Learning was raised to an unprecedented height as a result of that.578  
Suffice it to say that Zhu Xi’s emphasis on Da Xue 大學 The Great Learning is 
entangled with his political concern, if not politically motivated. His last twenty years 
saw a series of intellectual activities to redefine daotong 道統 the transmission of the 
Way and daoxue 道學 the learning of Dao, with an intention to establish the orthodox 
line of thought within the Song Neo-Confucianism, to consolidate the group identity of 
the Song Neo-Confucians. As a response to the accusation against his thought Zhu Xi 
coined the term zhengxue 正學 the authentic learning to describe the school of the 
Principle represented by Cheng Yi and himself. Although at the time he died he was 
accused of promoting weixue 伪學 false learning, he had probably foreseen the political 
potential of his thought, namely to become the ideology of a political regime. In that 
sense the intent for orthodoxy expressed in intellectual terms can easily be transformed 
into an ideological tool to verify the legitimacy of a political authority, hence is more 
likely to serve a regime rather than to criticise it. 
Given the moral implication and edificatory value of his philosophical thinking, Zhu 
Xi’s concept of li 理 Principle allows the social and moral norms to be internalised, in 
the sense that Confucian moral norms are to be deemed the manifestation of li 理 
Principle in human nature. Despite the originality of Zhu Xi’s thinking, so long as he 
allows social order to be almost internalised as part of human nature, the power to 
criticise the existing society will inevitably be undermined. Zhu Xi’s success in 
establishing the line of orthodoxy makes little room for independent thinking; as a result, 
the followers of this great master are prone to repeating what he has said rather than 
developing their own ideas.   
By contrast, Eckhart has no intention regarding orthodoxy, let alone making his 
thought the exclusive orthodox teaching. Eckhart concentrates on what is stimulating 
to the mind, as seen in his disputed questions and scholastic commentaries. He does not 
undertake the apologetic task assumed by Zhu Xi, to make his Catholic doctrine the one 
and only orthodoxy; nor does he strive to make his own thinking prominent. Indeed, in 
contrast to Zhu Xi, in Eckhart we hardly see a concern for the posthumous 
                                                          
578 Despite the different roles of these texts, we still detect a subtle tension between them. The relation 
of the two texts is undoubtedly an interesting and complex topic that requires thorough exploration, 
which will be the task of another monograph on Zhu Xi.  
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dissemination of his teaching. As Oliver Davies puts it, peculiar to Eckhart’s works is 
a sense of presence of God, which makes the reader feel that Eckhart himself ‘bears a 
burden of truth’. 579 The word ‘burden’ vividly conveys the intimacy with God that 
Eckhart has to live with and live for. In mental and spiritual terms Eckhart is obsessed 
with this sweet burden of the divine presence, which compels him to write and to preach 
for the sake of the truth of eternity, regardless of all other considerations. As a result he 
was misunderstood by his simple-minded audience, as reported by Suso,580 while at the 
same time being accused by the well-educated leaders of his church, in particular the 
archbishop of Cologne Henry of Virneburg, who initiated an inquisitorial charge 
against Eckhart in 1326. By quoting Augustine Eckhart pinpoints the problem of his 
adversaries, whom he sees as representative of the typical weakness of mankind, that 
of self-love. He sees very clearly that such self-love involves the desire to blind others 
so as to make one’s own blindness hidden.581  He pities those who have failed to 
understand his teaching, because ‘their hearts are still fluttering around yesterday and 
tomorrow’, despite their desire ‘to contemplate and taste eternal things and the works 
of God, and to stand in the light of eternity’.582  
It seems to be Eckhart’s calling to speak the unspeakable and to articulate the 
incomprehensible; it is the nature of this task that determines his uncompromising 
stance and guarantees a radical difference between Eckhart and the free-spirited mystics. 
His thinking is theologically grounded to the extent that it always starts from God’s 
point of view, and then proceeds from God to man. Probably for that reason Eckhart 
refuses to predicate God in ethical terms, which are derived from human life and human 
society. Likewise, virtues arising from human religious and spiritual life bear no eternal 
truth, and could become a hindrance to God should one believe otherwise. What 
Eckhart is preaching makes sense only to those who are capable of perceiving within 
themselves what no external vision has presented; otherwise, his teaching will be 
treated as erroneous if not heretical. For those who are not used to or are unable to go 
beyond images and bodily likeness and to conceive God as he is in himself, what 
                                                          
579 Oliver Davies (trans.), Meister Eckhart: selected writings (1994), XX.  
580 Suso in his Little Book of Truth explains how Eckhart’s thought was misunderstood and misused by 
the heretical Free Spirits under the title ‘the nameless wild one’. See Bernard McGinn, The Harvest of 
Mysticism in Medieval Germany (2005), 200. 
581 Eckhart, Liber Benedictus I (DW V 60,11-3) (trans. Edmund Colledge in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 
239). 




Eckhart has said and written would be theologically wrong. Eckhart knows precisely 
where his audience may fall short in relation to the exalted matters he touches upon in 
his sermons and commentaries. Having made it clear that he cannot be accountable for 
other people’s misunderstanding of his thought, Eckhart insists this kind of great and 
exalted teaching should be made available to the untaught, so that they may progress 
from uninstructed to instructed. It will be enough, Eckhart affirms, if what he has said 
and written is true in himself and in God. 583   
For Eckhart, the soul and God remain central and deeply rooted; everything else has 
to fade into the background. The message he is trying to deliver has little to do with 
piety or charity, meritorious deeds or practices of asceticism, but focuses on one theme: 
how God lives, gives birth and is also born in the soul. Eckhart clearly intends to 
enhance the meaning of Christian spirituality and to intensify the spiritual life of his 
audience; he constantly urges men and women under his pastoral care to go deeper than 
imitating Christ, and to be the sons or daughters of God. He is talking about something 
higher than the kind of customary religious life with which people are so content; he 
means to push them out of the comfort zone to explore further, but the depth of his 
message does not seem to be matched by the capacity of his unsophisticated audience, 
nor does it conform to the conventional doctrines of the Catholic Church. Therefore, 
his words can easily be interpreted as a form of heresy584 that plays down the role of 
ethics and of church.  
In many aspects Eckhart is unique; he is open to all the resources at his disposal yet 
remains at a noticeable distance from his intellectual predecessors. In addition to the 
Christian saints and church fathers, Eckhart had developed a strong affinity with the 
Jewish philosopher Maimonides, due to whose influence Eckhart forcefully enhances 
the way of negation, his apophatic theology, which serves better than Thomas’s 
cataphatic theology to stimulate the mind of the audience or the reader. In that sense 
Eckhart’s theology tends to destruct rather than construct, and helps to break away from 
an existing system of thought rather than to sustain it.  
All in all, Eckhart’s thought possesses the power to challenge rather than consolidate 
authority of any form, be it political, religious or spiritual; the dynamic nature of his 
                                                          
583 Eckhart, Liber Benedictus I (DW V 60,13-4) (trans. Edmund Colledge in Essential Eckhart, 1981, 
239). 
584 For the historical background to the pursuit of heresy in the fourteenth century, see Bernard McGinn, 
The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (2005), 64-73. 
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thinking is intended to stimulate the well-educated and to inspire or instruct the ignorant 
masses, which calls for innovativeness and suggests an unlimited openness to diversity. 
Eckhart’s theological and philosophical thinking enables each individual soul to 
override the direct control of a religious organisation; to a great extent it also defies 
proclamation of religious orthodoxy as well as attachment to an orthodox line of 
thought. Not surprisingly this was deemed a persistent threat to a long-standing 
religious institution that claims absolute truth and demands unfailing faith. Even 
without the instigation of the archbishop of Cologne,585 in all likelihood there would 
have been a tension between Eckhart’s message and the dogmatics of the Catholic 
Church. Although the doctrine of the birth of the Son in the soul had been propounded 
prior to Eckhart, nowhere do we find a more vivid description of the intimacy between 
God and the soul, delivered in the vernacular Middle High German, or a more 
sophisticated philosophical explication, given in the scholastic Latin. In either form of 
expression the issue at stake is the inner life of individuals, without obligation to church, 
which implicitly narrows the sphere of religion down to the private zone, hence calling 
into question the necessity of the church’s very existence.  
To sum up, irrespective of the element of contingency in history, the contrast between 
Zhu Xi’s striving for orthodoxy and Eckhart’s openness to diversity explains why one 
was canonised and the other was condemned; the moral and political implications of 
their thought have, to a great extent, determined the striking difference in the 
posthumous dissemination of their works. Notwithstanding the striking differences 
regarding the historical fate of the two thinkers, points of resemblance are detected in 
their exegetical works, especially in their approach to the scriptural texts and their 
respective scholarly traditions. Both demonstrate in their works a high degree of 
intellectual brilliance and academic rigour, expressed through their expertise in 
scriptural learning, philosophical speculation and spiritual practice. If we may term Zhu 
Xi’s doctrine of zhi 知 as a kind of intellectual spirituality, and Eckhart’s thinking of 
the human intellect as a kind of intellectual mysticism, then we will be constantly 
reminded of the level of subtlety and complexity involved in their thought, which 
always challenges our intellectual capacity and refuses any form of vulgar interpretation.  
What these two thinkers have achieved not only defies modern distinctions among 
philosophy, theology and spirituality, but compels us to probe the primary sources and 
                                                          
585 Oliver Davies (trans.), Meister Eckhart：selected writings (1994), xiv-xvii.  
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to seek for new angles and new language to accommodate the richness of their ideas 
and, one would hope, to bridge the two long-standing intellectual traditions by cross-
reading of their works. By adopting a comparative model and focusing on the issue of 
the human intellect this book is intended as an attempt in that direction, as a comparative 
perspective not only allows us to read their works in their own contexts, but more 
importantly calls for a mutual enlightenment between the two thinkers, which makes it 










Appendix 1  
 
A Comparison of the Four Editions of The Great Learning 
 
The original texts in Chinese: 586 



















































































































                                                          
586 A brief note on the colours used in the table: 1) passages with background colour indicate the 
differences among each other; 2) passages without background colour and with fore colour are meant to 
show the differences in the order of the relevant texts among the four editions. 
587 The Chinese characters printed in smaller size represent the editor’s own words. In editing a text of a 
scripture, an editor rarely amends the original words even if he considers there to be an obvious mistake. 
Instead, he usually leaves the text unchanged and adds his correction or comment in a smaller size script, 
so that the reader is able to see both the original text and the editor’s work on it. Both Cheng Yi and Zhu 
Xi follow this rule. In order to show the difference, I put the translation of the editors’ words in brackets. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Zheng Xuan Cheng Hao Cheng Yi Zhu Xi 
What the great 
learning teaches, is 
to resume the 
enlightening 
virtue; to love the 
people; and to 







The point where to 
rest being known, 
the object of 
pursuit is then 
determined; and, 
that being 
determined, a calm 
unperturbedness 
may be attained to. 
To that calmness 
there will succeed 
a tranquil repose. 
In that repose there 
may be careful 
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persons, they first 
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states were rightly 
governed. Their 
states being rightly 
governed, the 
whole kingdom 
was made tranquil 
and happy. 
 
From the Son of 
Heaven down to 
the mass of the 
people, all must 
consider the 
cultivation of the 
person the root of 
everything besides. 
 
It cannot be, when 
the root is 
neglected, that 
what should spring 
from it will be well 
ordered. It never 
has been the case 
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has been slightly 
cared for, and, at 
the same time, that 
what was of slight 
importance has 
been greatly cared 
for. 
 
The Master said, 
“In hearing 
litigations, I am 
like any other 
body. What is 
necessary is to 
cause the people to 
have no 
litigations.” So, 
those who are 
devoid of principle 
find it impossible 
to carry out their 
speeches, and a 
great awe would 
be struck into 
men’s minds;-this 
is called knowing 
the root. These 
four words are 
superfluous. 
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Above is the text 
of Scripture which 
contains the words 
of Confucius being 
scribed by Zengzi. 
(two hundred and 
five words 
altogether). 




retains the ideas of 
Zengzi being 
recorded by the 
disciples of him.  
 
The old edition 
[Zheng Xuan’s 
edition] is faulty in 
many ways. Based 
on Cheng’s 
version and also 
referring to the 
text of the 
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knowing to the 
utmost. 
 
What is meant by 
“making the wills 
sincere.” is the 
allowing no self-
deception, as when 
we hate a bad 
smell, and as when 
we love what is 




superior man must 
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alone. 
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Scripture I am now 
reorganising it as 
follows.  There are 
one thousand five 































beholds him, as if 
he saw his heart 
and reins;-of what 
use is his disguise? 
This is an instance 
of the saying 
—”What truly is 
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be watchful over 
himself when he is 
alone. 
 
The disciple Tsang 
said, “What ten 
eyes behold, what 
ten hands point to, 
is to be regarded 
with reverence!” 
Riches adorn a 
house, and virtue 
adorns the person. 
The mind is 
expanded, and the 
body is at ease. 
Therefore, the 
gentle man must 








































































































In the Book of 
Poetry, it is said, 
“Look at that 
winding course of 
the Ch’i, with the 
green bamboos so 
luxuriant! Here is 
our elegant and 
accomplished 
prince! As we cut 
and then file; as 
we chisel and then 
grind: so has he 
cultivated himself. 
How grave is he 
and dignified! 




prince never can 
be forgotten.” That 
expression-”As we 
cut and then file,” 
the work of 
learning. “As we 
chisel and then 
grind,” indicates 
that of self-culture. 
“How grave is he 
and dignified!” 
indicates the 














































































































prince never can 
be forgotten,” 
indicates how, 







In the Book of 
Poetry, it is said, 
“Ah! the former 
kings are not 
forgotten.” Future 
princes deem 
worthy what they 
deemed worthy, 
and love what they 
loved. The 
common people 
delight in what 
delighted them, 
and are benefited 






































































































arrangements. It is 
on this account 
that the former 
kings, after they 
have quitted the 
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on a corner of the 
mound.” The 
Master said, 
“When it rests, it 
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rest. Is it possible 
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bird?” 
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the Commentary 
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In the Book of 
Poetry, it is said, 
“Profound was 
King Wen. With 
how bright and 
unceasing a feeling 
of reverence did he 
regard his resting 
places!” As a 
sovereign, he 
rested in 
benevolence. As a 
minister, he rested 
in reverence. As a 
son, he rested in 
filial piety. As a 
father, he rested in 
kindness. In 
communication 
with his subjects, 
he rested in good 
faith. 
 
The Master said, 
“In hearing 
litigations, I am 
like any other 
body. What is 
necessary is to 
cause the people to 
have no 
litigations.” So, 
those who are 
of reverence did he 
regard his resting 
places!” As a 
sovereign, he 
rested in 
benevolence. As a 
minister, he rested 
in reverence. As a 
son, he rested in 
filial piety. As a 
father, he rested in 
kindness. In 
communication 
with his subjects, 
he rested in good 
faith. 
 
The ancients who 




ordered well their 
own states. 
Wishing to order 
well their states, 
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cultivated their 
persons. Wishing 
how bright and 
unceasing a feeling 
of reverence did he 
regard his resting 
places!” As a 
sovereign, he 
rested in 
benevolence. As a 
minister, he rested 
in reverence. As a 
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filial piety. As a 
father, he rested in 
kindness. In 
communication 
with his subjects, 
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devoid of principle 
find it impossible 
to carry out their 
speeches, and a 
great awe would 
be struck into 
men’s minds;-this 
is called knowing 
the root. 
 
to cultivate their 
persons, they first 
rectified their 
minds. Wishing to 
rectify their minds, 
they first sought to 
be sincere in their 
wills. Wishing to 
be sincere in their 
wills, they first 




knowledge lay in 








wills were sincere. 
Their wills being 
sincere, their 
















































































states were rightly 
governed. Their 
states being rightly 
governed, the 
whole kingdom 
was made tranquil 
and happy. 
 
From the Son of 
Heaven down to 
the mass of the 
people, all must 
consider the 
cultivation of the 
person the root of 
everything besides. 
 
It cannot be, when 
the root is 
neglected, that 
what should spring 
from it will be well 
ordered. It never 
has been the case 
that what was of 
great importance 
has been slightly 





































































the same time, that 
what was of slight 
importance has 
been greatly cared 
for. 
 
This is called 
knowing the root. 
This is called 
knowing to the 
utmost. 
 
What is meant by 
“making the wills 
sincere.” is the 
allowing no self-
deception, as when 
we hate a bad 
smell, and as when 
we love what is 




gentle man must 
be watchful over 
himself when he is 
alone. 
 
There is no evil to 
which the mean 
man, dwelling 













What is meant by 
“making the 
thoughts sincere.” 
is the allowing no 
self-deception, as 
when we hate a 
bad smell, and as 
when we love 
what is beautiful. 
This is called self-
enjoyment. 
Therefore, the 
gentle man must 
be watchful over 
himself when he is 
alone. 
 
There is no evil to 
which the mean 
man, dwelling 




































proceed, but when 
he sees a gentle 
man, he instantly 




displaying what is 
good. The other 
beholds him, as if 
he saw his heart 
and reins;-of what 
use is his disguise? 
This is an instance 
of the saying 
—”What truly is 




gentle man must 
be watchful over 
himself when he is 
alone. 
 
The disciple Tseng 
said, “What ten 
eyes behold, what 
ten hands point to, 
is to be regarded 
with reverence!” 
Riches adorn a 
house, and virtue 
proceed, but when 
he sees a gentle 
man, he instantly 
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adorns the person. 
The mind is 
expanded, and the 
body is at ease. 
Therefore, the 
gentleman must 




quotes fall within 
the section of 
governing the state 
and pacifying the 
world] 
 
In the Book of 
Poetry, it is said, 
“Look at that 
winding course of 
the Ch’i, with the 
green bamboos so 
luxuriant! Here is 
our elegant and 
accomplished 
prince! As we cut 
and then file; as 
we chisel and then 
grind: so has he 
cultivated himself. 
How grave is he 
and dignified! 
How majestic and 
adorns the person. 
The mind is 
expanded, and the 
body is at ease. 
Therefore, the 
gentleman must 
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governing the state 
and pacifying the 
world] 
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“Look at that 
winding course of 
the Ch’i, with the 
green bamboos so 
luxuriant! Here is 
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accomplished 
prince! As we cut 
and then file; as 
we chisel and then 
grind: so has he 
cultivated himself. 
How grave is he 
and dignified! 




















In the Book of 
Poetry, it is said, 
“Look at that 
winding course of 
the Ch’i, with the 
green bamboos so 
luxuriant! Here is 
our elegant and 
accomplished 
prince! As we cut 
and then file; as 
we chisel and then 







prince never can 
be forgotten.” That 
expression-”As we 
cut and then file,” 
the work of 
learning. “As we 
chisel and then 
grind,” indicates 
that of self-culture. 
“How grave is he 
and dignified!” 
indicates the 
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prince never can 
be forgotten,” 
indicates how, 






In the Book of 
Poetry, it is said, 
“Ah! the former 
kings are not 
forgotten.” Future 
princes deem 
worthy what they 
deemed worthy, 
and love what they 
loved. The 
common people 
delight in what 
delighted them, 
and are benefited 
by their beneficial 
arrangements. It is 
on this account 
that the former 
kings, after they 
have quitted the 












In the Book of 
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kings are not 
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princes deem 
worthy what they 
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In the Book of 
Poetry, it is said, 
“Ah! the former 
kings are not 
forgotten.” Future 
princes deem 
worthy what they 
deemed worthy, 
and love what they 
loved. The 
common people 
delight in what 
delighted them, 
and are benefited 
by their beneficial 
arrangements. It is 
on this account 
that the former 
kings, after they 
have quitted the 
world, are not 
forgotten. 
 
Above is the third 
chapter of the 
Commentary 
which explains the 
meaning of 
‘reposing in the 
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The Master said, 
“In hearing 
litigations, I am 
like any other 
body. What is 
necessary is to 
cause the people to 
have no 
litigations.” So, 
those who are 
devoid of principle 
find it impossible 
to carry out their 
speeches, and a 
great awe would 
be struck into 
men’s minds;-this 






The Master said, 
“In hearing 
litigations, I am 
like any other 
body. What is 
necessary is to 
cause the people to 
have no 
litigations.” So, 
those who are 
devoid of principle 
find it impossible 
to carry out their 
speeches, and a 
great awe would 
be struck into 
men’s minds;-this 




Above is the 
fourth chapter of 
the Commentary 
which explains the 
meaning of ‘root 
and branches. 
 
This is called 
knowing the root. 
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Master Cheng says 
this is superfluous. 
This is called 
knowing to the 
utmost. There 
should be some 
text preceded to 
this which has 
been omitted, this 
is the concluding 
sentence of it. 
Above is the fifth 
section of the 
Commentary 
which explains the 
meaning of ‘the 
investigation of 





omitted. In the old 
edition both of this 
chapter and the 
following one are 
mistakenly located 
after the text of the 
Scripture. So I 
provide a 
Supplement to it 
according to the 
teaching of master 
279 
 
Cheng, which goes 
as “The Words, 
‘the extension of 
knowledge lies in 
the investigation of 
things,’ mean that 
we should apply 
ourselves to things 
so as to gain an 
exhaustive 
knowledge of their 
Principles. This is 
because there is no 
human intelligence 
utterly devoid of 
knowledge, and no 
single thing in the 
world without 
Principle. So long 
as the investigation 
of these Principles 
is not exhaustive, 
the knowledge of 
them will by no 
means be 
comprehensive. 
That is why The 
Great Learning 
primarily 
commands all the 
students to seek 
the knowledge of 





things in the 
world, namely to 
proceed from the 
Principles already 




the ultimate. After 
having exerted 




be made and the 
complete 
understanding will 
dawn on one. 
Thereby brings 
about a thorough 
comprehension of 
all the multitude of 
things, be it 
external or 
internal, fine or 
coarse; and the 
whole entity and 
the great function 
of one’s own mind 
will be fully 
realised, which, [as 
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a whole] signifies 
the state after 
‘things have been 
investigated’ and 
‘the knowledge 
has been extended 
to the utmost.’” . 
589 
 
What is meant by 
“making the wills 
sincere.” is the 
allowing no self-
deception, as when 
we hate a bad 
smell, and as when 
we love what is 




gentle man must 
be watchful over 




There is no evil to 
which the mean 
man, dwelling 
                                                          
589 This section is based on Derk Bodde’s translation; alterations are made accordingly. For the details 
of Derk Bodde’s translation, see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. by Derk Bodde, 
(Princeton, 1983), 2, 561. 
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retired, will not 
proceed, but when 
he sees a gentle 
man, he instantly 




displaying what is 
good. The other 
beholds him, as if 
he saw his heart 
and reins;-of what 
use is his disguise? 
This is an instance 
of the saying 
—”What truly is 




gentle man must 
be watchful over 
himself when he is 
alone. 
 
The disciple Tseng 
said, “What ten 
eyes behold, what 
ten hands point to, 
is to be regarded 
with reverence!” 
Riches adorn a 
283 
 
house, and virtue 
adorns the person. 
The mind is 
expanded, and the 
body is at ease. 
Therefore, the 
gentle man must 
make his wills 
sincere. 
 
Above is the sixth 
chapter of the 
Commentary 
which explains the 
meaning of 












本 ben： root or substantial, essential, 
博 bo：erudition  
誠 cheng：sincerity  
持敬 chi-jing： to hold fast on conscientiousness 
粗 cu： crude or crudity 
禪宗 chan-zong：the school of Zen Buddhism or simply Zen  
大學 da-xue：the great learning  
道 dao：Way  
道統 dao tong: the transmission of the Way 
德 de： virtue or quality 
德性之知 de-xing-zhi-zhi：innate knowledge  
多 duo：many or multiplicity  
涵養 han-yang：nourishing the self-nature 
格物 ge-wu：the investigation of things  
觀理 guan-li：to observe the Principle or principles  
工夫 gong-fu：the art of personal cultivation 
貫通 guan-tong： thorough comprehension 
己 ji：self  
積累 ji-lei：accumulation  
集註 ji-zhu：collective commentary 
教 jiao：teaching or doctrine  
進學 jin-xue：to advance learning   
敬 jing：conscientiousness 
靜 jing：quiet or quietness 
經 jing： scripture 
精 jing：fine  
靜坐 jing-zuo： quiet sitting or meditation  
經學 jing-xue：scriptural learning  
覺 jue：awareness 
空 kong：empty or void 




禮 li： ritual  
理一分殊 li-yi-fen-shu：one Principle with many manifestations 
良知 liang-zhi：innate moral awareness  
論 lun：treatise  
命 ming： mandate 
明德 ming-de：enlightening virtue  
末 mo：the trivial or unimportant  
內 nei： internal  
平天下 ping-tian-xia：to pacify the world  
氣 qi：the cosmic matter or material force 
齊家 qi-jia：to regulate family  
氣質之性 qi-zhi-zhi-xing：man’s physio-psychical nature  
情 qing：sentiment  
窮理 qiong-li：to probe the Principle  
仁 ren： humanity or benevolence 
身 shen：body 
神 shen：godly beings or miraculous 
聖 sheng：sage 
聖賢 sheng-xian ：the sages and worthies 
實 shi：actuality or reality 
士 shi：scholar-official  
疏 shu：further explanation of a scriptural commentary 
四書 si-shu：The Four Books- The Great Learning (Da Xue 大學), The Analects (Lunyu
論語), The Book of Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), and The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong Yong
中庸), 
太極 tai-ji：the great ultimate 
體 ti：substance or entity 
體用 ti-yong：substance and function 
天 tian：heaven 
天地之性 tian-di-zhi-xing：man’s heavenly nature 
天命 tian-ming：the mandate of heaven 
同 tong：same    
外 wai：external  
聞見之知 wen-jian-zhi-zhi：knowledge acquired through senses 
無 wu：nothing or nothingness 
無極 wu-ji：the non-ultimate 
五經 wu-jing: The Five Classics-The Book of Poetry(Shi Jing 詩經), The Book of 
Documents (Shang Shu 尚書), The Book of Rites (Li Ji 禮記), The Book of Changes (Yi 
Jing 易經), and The Spring and Autumn Annals (Chun Qiu 春秋) 
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五行 wu-xing：the five elements  
物 wu：things  
心 xin：mind, heart or mind-heart  
信 xin：trust or faith 
新民 xin-min：renewing people  
心學 xin-xue：the school of mind  
性 xing：nature  
行 xing：action  
修身 xiu-sheng：personal cultivation  
孝 xiao：filial piety 
小學 xiao-xue：the elementary learning  
形而上 xing-er-shang：what is above the form or metaphysical  
形而下 xing-er-xia：what is under the form or physical  
虛 xu：void 
虛無 xu-wu：voidances and nothingness 
虛空 xu-kong：empty, void sphere 
學 xue：to learn or learning  
一 yi： one or oneness 
異 yi：difference or different  
意 yi：meaning or implication  
義 yi：righteousness  
易 yi：easy or change, usually referring to The Book of Changes 
易簡 yi-jian：easy and simple  
意根 yi-gen：the root of will 
陰陽 yin-yang： the negative and positive  
庸 yong：common or commonality 
用 yong：function  
有 you：something in opposite to nothing 
有無 you-wu：something and nothing 
約 yue：simple or simplicity  
章句 zhang-ju：a genre of commentary focusing on the syntactic and semantic 
analysis of chapters, sections, sentences and phrases of an ancient text 
知 zhi：knowledge or knowing 
智 zhi：wisdom  
治國 zhi-guo：to govern the state 
至善 zhi-shan：the ultimate goodness  
致知 zhi-zhi：the extension of knowledge  
知至 zhi-zhi：to know to the utmost  
中 zhong：middle or balance   
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中和 zhong-he：the state of balance and harmony 
中庸 zhong-yong：the mean usually referring to The Doctrine of the Mean 
註 zhu：commentary  
傳 zhuan：commentary embedded in a scripture 
子學 zi-xue：the thoughts of the pre-Qin masters in contrast to the scriptural learning 







Da Xue Huo Wen 大學或問 Questions and Answers Concerning The Great 




Question: The way of the great learning has been regarded as the education system for 
the adults, why? 




Question: May I ask for what reasons it is called the learning of the youngsters? 
Answer: I have given a brief explanation in my foreword to the book, and the ancient 
way of education that is still applicable to the current situation has been edited into a 










Question: I have overheard that a gentleman aims at what is far and great, whereas a 
mean person focuses on what is near and small. Now you are going to tell us something 
about the way of the great learning, yet you recommend us to study the books of 
elementary learning, why? 
Answer: It goes without saying that some differences are to be seen between the great 
and the elementary learning. Nevertheless, the two different systems of learning aim to 
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pursue the same Way, in that sense, they are united as one. That is the reason why one 
should embark on the elementary learning in childhood, doing otherwise at this age will 
lead to a failure in self-concentration and moral cultivation, while moral cultivation 
serves as the very foundation upon which the great learning is to be built. For one who 
has come of age, further education in the system of the great learning is necessary, 
otherwise, one is bound to fail in acquiring the ability either to perceive the principles 
or achieve the social accomplishments, hence stands little chance to harvest the fruit of 
the elementary education.  
Therefore, it is the various curriculum practised by a child and a grown-up that 
accounts for the difference between the two forms of learning, thus the distinction made 
between them should be regarded as differences in terms of the depth of the content and 
the sequence of practice, namely, one is higher and the other lower, one is relatively 
profound and the other superficial, one is more urgent than the other, and one is prior 
to the other. It is not a huge contrast as what distinguishes the past from the present or 
the righteous from the lucrative, nor is it so incompatible as water and fire. Suppose we 
let the youngsters start with sweeping the floor and responding to questions, practising 
the ritual, music, archery, driving a chariot, literacy and mathematics, when they grow 
up, let them step into the learning that aims at resuming the enlightening virtue, 
rectifying the citizens and attaining the ultimate goodness. That is just following the 

















Question: For the youngsters, it will be very fortunate if they could follow the steps as 
you just listed and gradually advance in learning, since in so doing they will be free 
from the mistakes in the sequence and manner of learning. But for those who have come 
of age yet missed the chance of practising the elementary learning, if you let them start 
from the scratch, I am afraid they will not be able to take on such a huge project and 
unavoidably end up with vain attempt. Should they embark upon the great learning 
straightaway, they would possibly be jeopardising the proper sequence of learning and 
consequently fail in self –fulfilment. What are they going to do then? 
Answer: As for the time that had passed away, surely there is no way to get it back. 
Nevertheless, there are plenty can be done to make up for the contents of education that 
one had been neglected in the past so far as I am concerned.  
It is said that the word ‘conscientiousness’ (jing-敬) constitutes the very line that 
should be closely followed throughout the whole process of the divine learning. One 
who has deviated from it in the elementary learning will be prone to incompetence in 
cultivating the original source of morality, thus fail to accomplish the proprieties in 
conducting minor activities such as sweeping floor, answering questions and 
responding to present situations, and will hardly master the six arts (rites, music, 
archery, driving a chariot, literacy and mathematics) in classical education. Likewise, 
one who has deviated from it in the great learning will hardly fulfil one’s intellectual 
potential, nor will it be likely for him to develop his virtue and improve his study, 
therefore stand little chance to achieve the goal of resuming the enlightening virtue and 
renewing the people.  
For those reasons, Master Cheng Yi readdresses the methodology of investigation 
things and in particular gives elucidation upon that issue. For those who have 
unfortunately missed the chance of receiving the elementary education in their early 
days, there is still possibility to make a progress in the great learning and in the 
meantime make up for the missed lessons, if they really work hard on it in this way. If 
that is the case, then their proceedings in Confucian learning will be well established 
and they will not be far from self-fulfilment. As for those who are physically too frail 
to cope with both of the great and elementary learning, it is still possible for them to 
gain benefit from this approach in the sense that the root of innate knowledge will be 
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nurtured, and the innate power that sustains one’s physical strength be nourished alike. 
In a way, they will be free from the shortcomings they used to have.  
Like one who starts to look for the remedy after having been ill for a long time, the 
chance of success will be very slim unless one hundred times more efforts are put into 
it. If one keeps blaming what had happened in the past and being obsessed with the 
previous mistakes, and fails to catch up by one’s own endeavours, I can see how in vain 
his struggle will be, and how perplexed a state of mind he will be in, surely he will get 
nowhere in terms of acquiring knowledge and of putting that knowledge into practice. 






Question: With regard to the so-called ‘conscientiousness’ as you just mentioned, could 
you please elaborate more upon the practical means of it?   
Answer: Master Cheng Yi used to clarify that point in terms of concentrating on 
oneness and of cultivating a focused, undivided mind, in other places he also interpreted 
it as tidiness and earnestness. As this doctrine was transmitted to his disciples, there 
emerged the so-called the method of ‘being constant vigilant’ composed by Xie and 
that of ‘keeping the mind so focused and pure that no trace of anything is to be seen in 












Question: It makes sense that one should hold fast to ‘conscientiousness’ at the early 
stage of learning, but I cannot understand why the practice of Confucian learning is 
supposed to be culminated in ‘conscientiousness’?   
Answer: ‘Conscientiousness’ is to be regarded as the master of the mind and the root 
of the ten thousands things. Should one truly understand the means by which 
‘conscientiousness’ is to be applied in practice, it would then be clear that the 
elementary learning cannot be initiated without one’s being conscientious, likewise the 
ultimate goal of the great learning cannot be achieved without one’s holding fast to 
conscientiousness. Thereupon, the principle of ‘conscientiousness’ has undoubtedly 
constituted a thread that runs through the program of learning as a whole.  
Once the mind has been set upon it, one is about to practise the investigation of things 
and the extension of knowledge so as to probe the principles of things, thus proceed 
into the domain of cultivating moral virtues and of conducting intellectual enquiries. 
Following the same line, one moves to the program of personal cultivation in terms of 
keeping the will sincere and rectifying the flow of thoughts, so that the core of the 
function of mind will be firmly established and one will not be distracted as a result. 
Adhering to the same principle, one takes care of one’s family, governs the state and 
pacify the whole world at the end, that is the way to realise the meaning of ‘setting the 
citizens at ease through cultivating one’s own virtues and pacifying the whole world 
through a faithful and respectful manner’.  
Therefore, the principle of being conscientious has never been abandoned for one 
single day, what else but the word ‘conscientiousness’ consists of the key to the divine 















































Question: May I ask you to elaborate in detail on the three items of the great learning—
to resume the enlightening virtue, to renew the people and to repose in the ultimate 
goodness?  
Answer: In the universal movement of the divine power lies the key to the creation and 
sustenance of the ten thousand things. The secret of the universal creation consists in 
the two types of the cosmic force Yin -Yang and the five elements. And the existence 
of the Yin -Yang and the five elements entails both of the Principle and the cosmic 
matter, and the former is prior to the latter. When it comes to the creation of particular 
things, it is due to the integration of the cosmic matter that each takes its own form. 
Therefore, the birth of human and all other beings is conditioned by the Principle which 
gives rise to the innate natures such as the quality of being vigorous and submissive and 
the four moral principles—humaneness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom; and by 
the cosmic matter that composes the body which consists of the two types (negative 
and positive) of vital energy, the five organs and the one hundred bones of the skeleton. 
That is what Master Chou means by the core of the Non-ultimate, the essence of Yin-
Yang and the five elements, and the miraculous integration and crystallisation of the 
above agents.  
Seeing the ten thousand things in light of the Principle, we will come to the 
conclusion that all things share the same origin thus no distinction should be made 
between human species and other beings, between nobility and vulgarity. Whereas in 
light of the cosmic matter we may see the difference between human and other sentient 
beings in the sense that human is endowed with the pure and well-circulated part of the 
cosmic matter and others the impure and blocked part of it, hence arise the distance 
between the noble and the vulgar. Whatever falls into the category of vulgarity will 
stand little chance of realising the whole truth of the original substance due to the 
inherent tendency of being obsessed by the imperfect form and the impure energy of its 
own. Human beings are the only species that have been endowed with the pure and all-
pervading part of the cosmic matter, hence possess the most noble and sublime nature.  
That is why in the very organ whose size is no more than one square inch lies the 
invisible and miraculous faculties of mind in which reside the ten thousand principles. 
That is exactly what distinguishes man from the animals and what allows man to attain 
sagehood like Yao and Shun and be able to stand between Heaven and earth so as to 
participate into the cosmic transformation as a co-creator. That also indicates what the 
ancients mean by the enlightening virtue.  
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Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the difference between the pure and impure is not 
to be eliminated in spite of the fact that mankind as a whole has been granted with the 
well-circulated part of the primitive matter. Likewise, the distinction between the 
benign and the malign cannot be erased although mankind as a whole possesses the 
pure part of the cosmic matter. Hence those who are endowed with the purer quality of 
the cosmic matter tend to be wise whereas those who are endowed with the cosmic 
matter of a less pure quality turn out to be dull; those who are endowed with the kind 
of benign cosmic matter are likely to be benevolent whereas those who are endowed 
with the kind of malign cosmic matter are prone to malice.  
Only one who is born with the supreme innate capacity to become a sage will be able 
to fully realise the divine nature. As for one who has managed to obtain such a divine 
consciousness to a less degree, his awareness of the enlightening virtue will hardly be 
perfect and complete. To those who are less gifted, the situation will be less favourable 
in the sense that one is applying one’s defective mind to the ever-changing external 
things hence will unavoidably be obsessed with the sensual desires—eyes for colour, 
ears for sound, mouth for flavour, and the four limbs for physical comfort, which will 
in turn do tremendous harm to the innate virtue.  
Clearly the two factors—the inherent defect lies in the primitive matter one is 
endowed with and the temptation of the external world—will repeatedly influence each 
other and each will be strengthened as a result of that. Thus the brilliance of this innate 
virtue will be overshadowed and the miraculous faculty of mind may only reach the 
domain of personal emotions and desires, and be occupied with calculating of 
advantages and disadvantages. In that case, man is not much different from an animal 
despite being endowed with a human body. Although man has the potential to become 
a sage and form a trinity with Heaven and earth, the way to self-fulfilment is somehow 
blocked in reality. 
 Nonetheless, it is worth bearing in mind that the innate enlightening nature as a 
heavenly gift for mankind will by no means be utterly overshadowed. Therefore the 
possibility is still there even for the most ignorant, somehow they can be awakened out 
of blue and the true nature will be illuminated at that moment. For that reason, the sages 
have established a system of education in which the innate nature is to be nurtured in 
the stage of the elementary learning and then be illuminated through the way of the 
great learning. And it is essential to start the process of the great learning with the 
practice of the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, because in so 
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doing one’s well-nourished innate nature as a result of the elementary is to be stimulated 
in one’s contacting with the external things, thus the intellectual faculty is to be 
activated. It will then be followed by the programs of the sincerity of wills, the 
rectification of mind and the personal cultivation, so that one may apply the newly 
awakened intellectual power to self-reflection, hence illuminate the innate nature with 
genuine knowledge.  
As long as the intellectual faculty is activated and the innate nature is illuminated 
with genuine knowledge, what man has received from Heaven will be fully resumed; 
man will then be free from the material temptations and the sensual desires as a result. 
Therefore what the ancients mean by resuming the enlightening virtue does not indicate 
the attempt to get on with something beyond the realm of human nature. On the contrary, 
the so-called enlightening virtue refers to what has been granted to all human beings, 
not to my own private property.  
Since we all used to be obsessed with the physical desires, no big contrast between 
the worthies and the ignorant ones was seen in the past. Now I am fortunate to have 
obtained a realisation of my innate nature, when looking at those who have possessed 
the same nature yet remain ignorant of it and are not averse to being caught in the 
situation of abjection, filth, contemptibility with little awareness, I cannot help feeling 
sympathy for them and trying to save them from that state. Therefore, I have to extend 
what I have realised so as to reach them by taking care of my family as a starting point, 
then moving on to governing my state, and ending in pacifying the whole world. In so 
doing, those who are endowed with the same enlightening virtue yet unable to realise 
it by themselves will obtain self-realisation and be free from the contaminants they used 
to be obsessed with.  
In that sense, the effort in renewing the people denotes nothing that is to be imposed 
upon or added to them. The reasons for realising my own enlightening virtue and 
fulfilling the duty of renewing the people so as to awaken the same virtue lying in them 
do not consist in the domain of human power; and the legitimacy of such attempts is 
not to be conditioned by my personal preferences and arbitrariness. It is due to the 
unchangeable Principle inherent in the heavenly gift for man which can also become 
manifest in the daily affairs that the above activities run their course. That is what 
master Cheng means by the ultimate subtlety of the Principle which is hard to describe, 
for the sake of convenience, we temporally regard it as the ultimate good, whose major 
contents are to be seen in the moral principles such as the humanity required of being a 
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king, the respectful manner of being a minister, the benevolence of being a father and 
the faithfulness in interacting with each other. None of those is not to be found in the 
mind of the ignorant mass, yet lies dormant in some cases. The scholars may be aware 
of it to some extent, but seldom resolve on attaining the ultimate good.  
For those reasons, the item of attaining the ultimate good is included in the doctrine 
of the great learning and serves as the goal of the other two—resuming the enlightening 
virtue and renewing the people. The concept of the ultimate good is in particular 
addressed to those who have managed to retain the Principle to a certain degree, thus 
hold on to a understanding of it that is far from perfect; and those who have overcome 
their selfishness to some extent and gone halfway towards mastering it, in hope of 
leading them to complete the journey in terms of personal cultivation as well as 
interpersonal governance. Should one embark on resuming the enlightening virtue and 
on renewing the people, and resolve to attain the ultimate good in a sense that he would 
never stop until the perfect point, which implies the mean state between the two 
extremes of overdoing and under-doing, is finally reached, in that case, one will be able 
to overcome the human desires and retain the heavenly Principle to great length, hence 
have nothing to regret for.  
Generally speaking, the core of The Great Learning consists in the eight steps, and 
the core of the eight steps lies in the three programs which, I firmly believe, constitute 
the framework of the system of the great learning. Unfortunately, the way of Confucian 
learning has fallen from grace since the death of Mencius, and the gentlemen of the 
time simply pick whatever seems to be convenient as the content of their learning. Thus 
emerged the various trends under the current academic circumstance, one merely takes 
political administration and legislation system as sufficient equipment for renewing the 
people hence pays no attention to the program of resuming the enlightening virtue; and 
the other concentrates on a solitary approach to self-perfection and claims that practice 
in self-cultivation alone will be adequate to lead one to resume the enlightening virtue, 
hence shows no interest in renewing the people. There is another group who seems to 
understand the necessity of being engaged with both of the programs, yet seldom 
resolves to achieve the ultimate goodness, and often gets stuck on some minor successes 
and is contented with the short-term benefit. In a word, they are all mistaken in 
understanding The Great Learning, as a result, they will hardly succeed in achieving 











Question: Master Cheng has changed the word qin [親] (literally love) to xin [新] 
(literally new), and you seem to be in line with him on that point. Could you please let 
us know upon what ground such an alteration is based and for what scriptural reasons 
do you follow and confirm his view in that regard? Besides, I’m afraid changing the 
scriptural text in accordance with one’s personal ideas is not what the commentary 
writing aims for, what do you think? 
Answer: Provided the scriptural text is to be altered without further exploration, it is 
truly like what you have mocked of. But in this case, the phrase qinmin [親民]-loving 
the people does not fit the context and seems to be nonsensical, whereas the phrase 
xinmin [新民]-renewing the people makes perfect sense if referring to the text of the 
relevant comment on it. In his treatment of this part, Master Cheng has taken that into 
consideration. He did not delete it from the original text, instead pointed out this word 
should be understood as such, which is simply an unavoidable change as what the Han 
scholars do. What harm will that do to the commentary writing? Should one take 
preserving the original text as a golden rule in scriptural study, consequently some will 
repeat the defective points despite knowing the errors, and even deliberately give 
strained interpretations and draw farfetched analogies so as to make it sound coherent. 
In so doing, they are smearing the words of the sages and misleading the younger 














Question: ‘Only if one knows where one ultimately aims for can one find a place to 
anchor; only if one knows where to anchor can one fix one’s mind and heart; only if 
one has had one’s mind and heart fixed can one obtain peace and tranquillity; only in 
peace and tranquillity can one live with contentedness and ease; only in a state of 
contentedness and ease can one consider and contemplate; and only through 
consideration and contemplation can one achieve the ultimate aim.’590  Why is it stated 
this way? 
Answer: The above reasoning is based upon the meaning of the preceded paragraph, in 
order to illuminate the reasons why the programs of resuming the enlightening virtue 
and renewing the people should be culminated in the ultimate goodness. Surely both of 
the practice of resuming the enlightening virtue and that of renewing the people should 
finally reside in the ultimate goodness. However, it would be impossible to obtain that 
ultimate aim and take residence in it unless one has acquired some knowledge of where 
the ultimate goodness lies. Like an archer who intends to hit the target in practising 
archery, had he fail to know where the target is in advance, he would stand no chance 
of finding the target and hitting it. The term ‘knowing where to rest’ indicates the state 
after things have been investigated, knowledge extended and the ultimate goodness of 
everything under the heaven has been comprehended. That is what I mean by the place 
where one should finally reside. Having known the place to rest upon, one will come to 
see that everything has possessed an inherent principle in it, which is also something 
internal to one’s mind. 
Once that is realised, then the mind will not be disturbed hence be able to attain the 
state of tranquillity and peace. After peace and tranquillity has been found in one’s 
mind, one will always be contented wherever one is.  Being contented, one will be able 
to handle the surroundings with leisure and ease in daily routine, and precisely estimate 
things at hands so as to take all into consideration. That being able to give full 
consideration to things means one’s capacity for thorough observation has been 
developed, thus one will survey the principles in dealing with things and enter into the 
                                                          
590 James Legge’s translation of The Great Learning, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748g/ 
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most profound and thorough exploration, eventually all will rest at the most appropriate 
place. Should one be truly aware of the resting point, certainly one would not be too far 
from achieving it. The four points in between (knowing the resting point and achieving 
the resting point) are illustrating the reasons for that, which differs from what Confucius 
had been through—from setting the mind on learning to following the desires of the 
heart without transgressing the rules, or what Mencius had claimed—from being 
desirable, faithful to the sagely and miraculous state. The latter indicates a variety of 
levels and the sequence one will go through in a life-long self- cultivation. 
 




Question: It will be very close to the Way that being able to distinguish the essential 
and the minor details in dealing with things, keeping up the same spirit from the 
beginning to the end and knowing the proper sequence. Why? 
Answer: That is to conclude the meaning of the last two paragraphs. For the practice of 
resuming the enlightening virtue as an internal issue is corresponding to that of 
renewing the people which is relatively an external matter, thus one serves as the 
essential, the other as the minor details. Knowing the resting point allows one to 
complete a task once starting it, hence the starting and the ending of an operation will 
be inter-dependent, for that reason, it is called the end and the start. Should one truly 
understand that the essential is prior to the minor details and the end is preceded by the 
start, one would proceed in accordance with the appropriate order and be no far from 


























Question: The ancients who intend to resume the enlightening virtue all over the world 
will firstly govern their own country; in order to govern their own country, they have 
to take care of their own family in advance; in order to take care of their own families, 
they have to cultivate themselves; in order to cultivate themselves, they have to rectify 
their mind; in order to rectify their mind, they have to retain the sincerity of their will; 
in order to retain the sincerity of their will, they have to extend the knowledge of their 
own; in order to extend the knowledge of their own; and the key to the extension of 
knowledge lies in the investigation of things. Why? 
Answer: That is an explanation of the order of the great learning which indicates the 
contents of the main programs. The practice of the investigation of things, the extension 
of knowledge, the sincerity of will, the rectification of mind and of self-cultivation all 
fall into the category of resuming the enlightening virtue. The issues with regard to 
taking care of the family and governing the country fall into the category of renewing 
the people. The attempts of investigating things and extending knowledge aim to know 
where the ultimate goodness lies. All the efforts, from the sincerity of will onwards till 
the practice of pacifying the world, aim to attain the state of the ultimate goodness and 
dwell within it.  
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What it means by resuming the enlightening virtue all over the world is that one 
should firstly embark on resuming one’s own enlightening virtue, and then extend it to 
renewing the people so that people all over the world will have their enlightening 
virtues resumed. If all have resumed their enlightening virtue, then each will keep his 
will sincere, rectify his mind, cultivate himself, love his parents and respect his elder 
siblings. In that case, there will be nowhere in the world that is not in peace. However, 
the substantial element of the world lies in each state, so one who wants to pacify the 
world must have firstly governed one’s own state. Likewise, the substantial element of 
a state lies in each family, so one who wants to govern the state must have firstly taken 
care of one’s own family. And the core of a family lies in each person, so one who 
wants to take care of one’s family must have firstly practised self-cultivation.  
Whereas the body is subject to the command of the mind, once the mind deviates 
from its original propriety, the body will be in the absence of its master. Even though 
one intends to bring oneself into self-cultivation, it will be hardly successful. Therefore, 
self-cultivation must be preceded by rectification of the mind. What is issuing from the 
mind becomes the will, once the will is contaminated by selfish desires, there will be 
untruthful element in one’s reinforcing the good and in eliminating the evil, thus the 
mind will be caught up in such a state and will hardly be rectified despite all the forceful 
attempt in this regard.  
That is why one has to firstly keep the will sincere if one intends to rectify the mind. 
Whereas the miraculous function of the mind consists in the human intellect which 
makes the principles exquisite and is the master of the ten thousand things. No one has 
been deprived of it, yet one may not be able to make full use of it, hence what is true 
will be mixed with what is false at the level of invisibility and subtlety, which makes it 
impossible to attain sincerity even though one deliberately works hard on it. Therefore, 
the sincerity of will must be preceded by the extension of knowledge. The word 
‘extension’ literally means to stretch out and reach the end. For instance, the operation 
of a funeral will culminate in arousing the feeling of condolence, meaning to extend it 
to the utmost.  
Whereas everything in the world possesses the ontological reasons (‘to be’) and the 
moral rules (‘ought to be’), to which the so-called principles refer. No one fails to know 
it, yet one may not be able to explore all the details to the utmost including the subtle 
and the crude, the implicit and the explicit. Hence the principles are yet to be completed 
and the knowledge will be imperfect likewise. In spite of deliberate effort being put into 
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it, one will hardly succeed in extending the knowledge. So the key to the extension of 
knowledge lies in observing and investigating the principles of things at hand. And 
word ‘investigating’ means ‘reaching the ultimate’, like reaching the most remote 
ancestor, meaning to investigate it thoroughly and completely.  
These are the programs of the great learning, and the profound and complete 
procedure that the ancient sages and worthies had followed in the way of teaching 
people. However, one hardly sees any work produced by the Confucian scholars had 
ever reached this point since the Han and Wei dynasties. Not until the Tang Dynasty 
had it been mentioned by Han Yu in his An Inquiry on the Way, however, his work 
focuses on the rectification of mind and the sincerity of wills and pays no attention to 
the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things, which seems to have 
skipped the step of exploring the origin and started with the secondary stuff. Thus Han’s 
work is still not free from mistakes due to his failure in prioritising the tasks and in 
giving detailed explanations, in that sense his work is not qualified to form a criticism 









Question: After the things have been investigated, it will be followed by the extension 
of knowledge, the extension of knowledge by the sincerity of will, and the sincerity of 
will by the rectification of mind, the rectification of mind by the self-cultivation, the 
self-cultivation by the regulation of family, and the regulation of family by the 
governance of the state, the governance of the state by the pacification of the world. 
Why? 
Answer: That is to repeat what has been said in the previous paragraph. That having the 
things investigated means to have attained to the ultimate and have grasped the whole 
picture of the principles of things. Once the principles inherent in the things have been 
attained to the utmost, the knowledge inherent in me will become complete accordingly. 
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Once the self-knowledge become complete, whatever issuing from the mind will be in 
tune with the Principle, hence self-deception will be avoided. If the will is void of self-
deception, the entity of the mind will be established whose uprightness will never be 
waned by the external things. Once the uprightness of the mind is established, one will 
not get stuck on one corner but cultivate oneself in all aspects. Being fully engaged with 
self-cultivation, one will be able to extend it in further so as to handle the national and 
international affairs with ease, which is totally different from those who have forsaken 
self-cultivation and focus on polishing tactics and pursuing profits which are merely 








Question:  At the beginning of this text, the program of resuming the enlightening virtue 
parallels that of renewing the people, which obviously intends to focus on self-
illumination. Yet the statement of resuming the enlightening virtue reappears in the 
paragraph as to pacifying the world, as if the issue of renewing the people had been 
included in it. How come your statement is so inconsistent and ambiguous?  
Answer: The three programs listed at the beginning constitute the outline of the great 
learning. However, so long as the priority and the procedure are concerned, the program 
of resuming the enlightening virtue becomes the outline of the other two and runs 
through them. At the end, it comes to an all-embracing conclusion in terms of the 
wholesome of the substance and the function, and summarises it in one sentence. In that 
way, it makes it very clear that the substance of my mind pervades all despite the 
immenseness of the world; and the function of my mind covers all despite the 
numerousness of the things. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse it so as to exhaust all 
the minor details in an appropriate order, and then generalise it so as to complete its 











Question: From the Son of Heaven (the emperor) to the ordinary mass, all adhere to the 
principle of self-cultivation which is treated as the root. It will never last if the root is 
in chaos whereas the branches in good order, nor will there a possibility that what has 
been cherished bears less importance than what is less privileged. Why? 
Answer: That is to conclude the meaning of the previous two paragraphs. So far as 
person and state are concerned, the former is the root and the latter the branches. With 
regard to family, state and the whole world, the distinction between the thick and the 
thin ought not to be ignored, and the differentiation in between should be realised, 
although the principles of which do not vary. Hence one who fails to carry out the 
investigation of things and the extension of knowledge so as to keep one’s will sincere, 
to rectify the mind and to perform self-cultivation, will be bound to spoil the root and 
leave the branches in chaos. One who does not love one’s own parents or respect the 
elderly in one’s own family, is neglecting what is thick, in that case, he will by no means 
extend his love for the parents and the elderly of others. That is for sure, just as what 
Mencius said ‘if what is thick has been treated in a less attentive manner, then nothing 

















Question: To govern the state and pacify the world are issues that only the kings and 
the ministers are qualified to take charge of. Those who stand in a position lower than 
ministers are not supposed to get involved. However the great learning proclaims the 
doctrine of resuming the enlightening virtue in the world, isn’t that indicating the way 
in which one’s thinking overrides one’s commission and abuses one’s lot? How could 
this kind of teaching be regarded as learning for one’s own sake?  
Answer: The decree of the Heaven is endowed upon all sentient beings; it is shared by 
all and cannot be taken as my private property.  Therefore a gentleman should possess 
such an open mind and a broad heart that no single thing under the heaven will be 
excluded from his concern, and no one affair in the world will be beyond his duty. In 
spite of being a bumble citizen, he still takes it as his mission to follow the way of the 
ancient sages Yao and Shun in treating the king and the people. Besides the doctrine of 
the great learning is designed for the first-born prince and the other descendants of the 
king, for those who are from an esteemed family of the high officials, and for those who 
are selected for their own capacity. All of them are under the mission of taking charge 
of the country in the future, surely they should be educated and nourished by the 
teaching that what is happening in the whole country and the world should be taken as 
their own business. How would it be possible to expect them to rectify the origin and 
purify the branches if they were taught otherwise?  
That point seems to have been obscured in the later education system. Neither the 
parents nor the kings are able to take it into consideration, what they can see is confined 
to the need of the present. Therefore the world is in chaos most of time and rarely rests 
in peace, and the kings of the defeated states and the lords of the collapsed families are 
constantly seen one after another till today, which is truly mournful. Whoever asks this 
question has failed to reflect on this and doubts the legitimacy of the sacred teaching 
on the contrary. Generally speaking, whoever regards the business of the whole world 
as one’s own and takes it for granted to get on with it, is learning for one’s own sake, 
regardless of the type of business one is engaged with, be it military, commercial, 
religious or official affairs. Provided one’s action is motivated by being known by 
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others, even though he cut his thigh, living in a hut at graveyard, or travelling in a worn-
out chariot pulled by a frail horse, he is doing for the sake of others.  
Great are the words of the revered Zhang Jingfu, ‘one who does for one’s own sake, 
is doing without bearing in mind that he is doing.’ Such is the importance of this 
statement that it contains profound teaching that has never been expounded by the 
worthies of the past. Provided those who have engaged with Confucian learning carry 
out their daily self-reflection on this issue, the difference between righteousness and 











Question: You hold that the scriptural text contains the words of Confucius recorded 
by Zengzi, and the commentary on it represents the thought of Zengzi scribed by his 
disciples. How do you possibly know that? 
Answer:  The language of the scriptural text is concise yet contains complete truth; it 
concerns things at hand yet has far-reaching references, which cannot be attained by 
one who has not attained sagehood. However, as there is no other proof and the meaning 
of it may be derived from the ancient ancestors, I only bear the doubt in mind yet dare 
not to question it. With regard to the commentary, some parts of which cites the words 
of Zengzi, and most of those words are compatible with the thoughts expressed by The 
Doctrine of the Mean and The Book of Mencius. Due to that fact we know the 
commentary is composed by the disciples of Zengzi, and it is undoubtedly the doctrine 
that Zisi had handed down to Mencius. What is meant by ‘realising the goodness’ in 
The Doctrine of the Mean is equivalent to the effort in investigating the things and 
extending the knowledge; and what is meant by ‘cultivating sincerity in oneself’ to the 
effect of keeping the will sincere, having the mind rectified and the self cultivated. 
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Likewise what Mencius means by ‘knowing the nature’ is no other than having the 
things investigated; by ‘exhausting the mind’ having the knowledge extended; and by 
‘preserving the mind, nourishing the nature and cultivating oneself’ keeping the will 
sincere, rectifying the mind and practising self-cultivation. Other sayings such as that 
of being vigilant in solitude, of lacking self-contentment, of differentiating 
righteousness from lucrativeness, and of the order of speech and action in normal 
manner, all go well with one another. That is why master Cheng regards this book as 
the posthumous work of Confucius, hence should be given priority over The Analects 














Question: Master Cheng gives this book priority over The Analects and The Book of 
Mencius, however his teaching does not seem to have touched on The Doctrine of the 
Mean, why? 
Answer: This book serves as the great scripture whose teaching can be universally 
applied to the whole world and its words meant to be handed down generation after 
generation. By contrast, The Analects and The Book of Mencius contain the aphorisms 
referring to the way one interacts with the surroundings, or hold the words that arise 
from specific circumstances. In spite of its massive structure, this book is consistent 
from the beginning to the end, the outlines of which can be grasped, the programs 
included in which are clearly laid out, and whose method for self-cultivation provides 
step by step instructions relevant to the daily life of a learner.  
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   Although the teachings of The Analects and The Book of Mencius are also relevant to 
things at hand, however in both cases more than one person are involved in asking 
questions and more than one involved in scribing. Hence it lacks a clear order in laying 
out the sequence and the depth of the questions, and in its hints on moral judgement. In 
both there are elements showing no clear relevance to daily life and which cannot be 
grasped by a beginner. That is why Master Cheng gives this book priority over The 
Analects and The Book of Mencius on the ground of the levels of difficulty and the 
degrees of urgency, which does not mean that he differentiates the words of the sages 
in terms of quality.  
    As for The Doctrine of the Mean, it retains the ultimate words that have been 
transmitted within the school of Confucianism, and that are particularly hard for the 
learners in later generations to hear or attain to. For that reason, it is not touched on by 
Master Cheng in his teaching. Does that not give the hint that once the teaching of The 
Analects and The Book of Mencius is mastered, the access to The Doctrine of the Mean 
will then be available? So one who fails to start with the book of The Great Learning 
will by no means be able to grasp the main themes and outlines, so as to comprehend 
the subtlety and profundity of The Analects and The Book of Mencius. Without referring 
to The Analects and The Book of Mencius, there is no chance of completely 
understanding the whole system of thought and attaining the ultimate truth in which 
The Doctrine of the Mean reposes.  
Provided the ultimate teaching of The Doctrine of the Mean is not grasped, on what 
could one fall back to establish the great foundation (for one’s learning) and to master 
the great scriptures, so that one will have the capacity for reading all books and 
discussing all affairs in the world? From that point of view, it is clear that those who 
engage with teaching Confucian classics cannot postpone the curriculum of The Four 
Books, and those who are studying The Four Books have to start with The Great 
Learning. Teachers nowadays may leave it aside and start with other teachings, very 
rarely will they escape from indulging in emptiness, getting lost in utilitarianism and 







Question: According to the edition of Zheng, the text from the first to half of the third 
chapter follows by the phase ‘never will it be forgotten generation after generation’. 
Whereas master Cheng posits it next to the sentence ‘that is what is meant by knowing 
to the utmost’. On what ground do you refute both of them and deem it the first chapter 
of the commentary? 
Answer: Knowing that scripture serves to navigate commentary, and commentary 
affiliates to scripture, the proper order of these paragraphs will be clear and the fault of 






Question: However it says ‘controlling’ the enlightening virtue in the text, why? 
Answer: It is meant to say that the King Wen is capable of resuming his own 
enlightening virtue. We all know that the innate virtue should be realised and also intend 
to do it, however, we are held back by the defective matter we are endowed with and 
the material desire we have acquired. Therefore we are not able to accomplish it despite 
our attempts to do so. The King Wen’s mind reflects nothing but the heavenly Principle, 
it is self-illuminating, not conditioned by human effort. The reason for saying so lies in 
two matters: to stress the point that no one but King Wen has the capacity for it; and to 






Question: It says ‘attending to the decree of the Heaven with great cautiousness’, 
why? 
Answer: Man standing between Heaven and earth is endowed with the essence of it. 
Therefore the enlightening virtue of man is nothing but the decree that Heaven grants 
me and the place where the ultimate goodness is accommodated. The whole substance 
and the principal function of it always manifest through things at hand in daily routine. 
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It is only because people do not attend to it, they are overwhelmed by the humanly 
desires and know little about how to attain self-illumination. Should one keep an eye 
on it at all times to the extent that it appears in the front while one is standing and 
emerges on the crowbar when one is sitting in the chariot, then the heavenly nature will 




Question: What does it by ‘being able to illuminate the lofty virtue’? 





Question: Obviously these three are about the issue of self-illumination, is there an 
order to be followed in its wording? 
Answer: The Announcement of Kang speaks about resuming the virtue in general. The 
text of Tai Jia means to illustrate that in the beginning the Heaven is no different from 
man and man is no different from the Heaven. The Canon of the Emperor (Yao) 
concentrates on the issue of fulfilling the innate virtue and represents the ultimate truth. 






Question: Script is carved on the bathtub, what is the reason for that? 
Answer: Bathtub is a daily used utensil; script is a word of self-reminding. The ancient 
sages and worthies are so diligent in self-cultivation that they are constantly in the state 
of vigilance and conscientiousness. In spite of that, they still have concerns for 
temporary dissipation, therefore having some words carved on the daily used utensils 
in accordance with the situation for the purpose of self-restraint. Every time when the 
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script is seen, vigilance will be aroused inside, so that it will not be forgotten or 




















Question: Why is this kind of script carved on the bathtub? 
Answer: Man has this virtue just like he has this body. The virtue is initially illuminated 
just like the body is originally clean. The light of virtue can be obscured by man’s 
craving for the worldly advantages, just like the body can be smeared by the dirt. Once 
attempt is made to retain and nourish the innate virtue and endeavours are put in self-
reflection, one will be renewed daily as the craving for the worldly advantage is 
minimised. It works in the same way as one manages to get rid of the dirt that used to 
smudge his body. However, once the effort of renovating ceases, one will relapse into 
the obsession of the worldly desire as before. Just as the body, once being cleansed, 
would become dusty again if the effort of cleansing is discontinued. Therefore, once 
the renewing is initiated, it should be kept up on a daily basis; so that the work of 
retaining, nourishing and self-reflecting will not to be interrupted for a second, and the 
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light of the enlightening virtue will constantly shining out and one will not be obsessed 
with the worldly desires once more. Like one who is having a bath on a daily basis, so 
long as the cleansing work is not to be halted and the body will remain clean at all time, 
thus one will not relapse into the previous state of uncleanness. That is exactly the way 
through which the king Tang attained sagehood. 
Some compliment his virtue in terms of ‘keeping distance from the temptation of the 
worldly music and beauty, staying away from breeding the material profit,’ and of 
‘managing affairs through the principle of righteousness and restraining mind through 
the principle of propriety. Others describe it as ‘having no disobedience in taking 
advices and showing no stinginess in correcting mistakes,’ or ‘never demanding other 
people to be perfect and always concerning about his own lack of self-reflection’. All 
these are proof of his capacity for renewing his virtue day by day.  
As for the so-called ascending daily in the quest for sageliness and conscientiousness, 
the more concise the language, the more compelling and profound is the implication. 
However the reason for Tang’s accomplishment could be traced back to what he had 
learned from Yi Yin and what he thus expounded. Therefore Yi Yin proclaimed his 
sharing the same virtue with the King Tang when he brought Tai Jia back to the throne, 
and admonished him to hold fast to the one doctrine throughout and to renew it daily. 
At that time Tai Jia just returned from Tong (the area where he had been sent into exile), 
he was still in deep remorse and had sincere yearning for virtue, thus was among those 
who just achieved self-renewal. Because of that, Yi Yin gave Tai Jia the same 
admonition as he used to advise Tang, in the hope that he would inherit the virtue 
accomplished by his ancestors. And the purport of his message runs deep. 
    Afterwards the King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty received the admonition of Dan 
Shu591from his great master-father Shang when he ascended to the throne. It goes as 
‘that conscientiousness overrides idleness is auspicious, doing otherwise will be 
destroyed; one who allows righteousness to prevail over personal desire will fulfil 
himself, doing otherwise will be destructive and detrimental’. After hearing this, the 
King Wu had the script carved all over his bedchamber- his bed, his drinking vessels 
and dish utensils, his sword, the door and windows, he was inspired by the King Tang. 
                                                          





His words are still preserved in The Book of the Ritual, to which one should not fail to 
refer, provided he is a king who wishes to govern the state or a noble man who resolves 




Question: Here the issue of renewing the people lies in the heart, what is the point of 
quoting all of these? 
Answer: It is referring to the root, which means to deem it the end of self-renewal and 






Question: In the Announcement of Kang it says ‘being a new person’, what does that 
mean? 
Answer: After conferring this land upon Kang, the King Wu composed the 
Announcement to remind him thus and so, for the local people were so used to the 
ignoble custom of the deceased Shang that they had the least awareness of their original 
mind. He meant to invigorate and stimulate them, so that they would discard evil and 
take on virtue, forsake the old custom and attune to the new one. That will by no means 







Question:  In his brief preface master Kong reckons the Announcement of Kang as the 




Answer:  That is the viewpoint of Hu Wufeng. I had done some research because of 
that, from the titles such as ‘the younger brother of the king’ and ‘your elder brother’, 
we can see that it is the King Wu’s monologue, which is truly reasonable and also 
supported by suffice evidence. On this point it is very clear that the saying in that 
preface is not trustworthy. As it does not concern the main idea of this book, I would 






Question: In the Book of Poetry, it is said, “Although Zhou was an ancient state the 
ordinance which lighted on it was new.”592 What does that mean? 
Answer: Since the state of Zhou was established, that means if we counted from the 
time of  Hou Ji-the primogenitor of the Zhou family, it had been over a thousand of 
years. In the reign of the King Wen, the divine virtue was ever refreshed and an 
enormous change also occurred in the people. Therefore the ordinance of the country 
was new despite of its long history. As the people were watching the example of their 
king and trying to emulate, and in the people consisted the eyes and ears of Heaven. So 
long as the virtue of the king is renewed, the moral renewal of the people will come 







Question: What is meant by ‘whatever he is engaged in, a gentleman will always do it 
to the utmost of his ability’? 
Answer: That refers to the meaning of the preceding paragraph. The script on the 
bathtub is concerning self-renewal, the Announcement of Kang pertains to renewing the 
people. The poetry of the King Wen indicates the summit of self-renewal and renewing 
                                                          
592 James Legge’s translation. 
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the people. That is why it says ‘a gentleman never fails to do it to the utmost of his 
ability. The word ‘utmost’ means the ‘ultimate good’, and the phrase ‘doing it to the 




Question: What is the reason for quoting the poem of the black bird? 
Answer: As the border of each state signifies where the people should stop, so there is 





Question: Here it seems to quote a poetry composed by the uncivilised and then 
combine it with the words of Confucius, how on earth did Confucius ever utter this kind 
of words? 
Answer: That is Confucius’s remark on poetry. He meant to say that when a bird intends 
to rest, it knows where the resting place is. How come a human being, ranking the top 
of all sentient beings, does not have as clear an idea of his own resting place as a bird 
does?  It gives the hint that man should seek a resting place, which is of profound and 















Question: The quotation of the poetry of the King Wen is followed by the morals in 
which one should find repose in dealing with the relations of ruler-subjects and of 
father-son, as well as one’s interaction with his fellow citizens. What are the reasons 
for that? 
Answer: From the place whereby a sage dwells, we shall see the repose in which the 
ultimate good lies. Heaven, in the course of generating the numerous human beings, 
has endowed all things with specific principles, hence an appropriate repose is inherent 
in all things and affairs. As things stand in different positions, so does the goodness 
vary accordingly whereupon each individual thing finally dwells. Therefore being a 
ruler, one ought to seek resting in ‘humanity’; being a subject, one should seek resting 
in ‘conscientiousness’;  being a son, one should seek resting in ‘filial piety’; being a 
father, one should seek resting in ‘kindness’; and in contacting with the fellow citizens, 
one should seek resting in ‘truthfulness’.  
All of these hold the Heavenly Principle and human ethics to the ultimate, which 
emanate from the depth of the human mind, and contain such complete and conclusive 
truth that nothing whatsoever is supposed to be added upon it, even in the case of the 
King Wen who, on that account, set an example for the whole world which was to be 
transmitted to the generations to come. Since the ordinary people are tainted by the 
impurity of the matter they are endowed with and the physical desires of their own, they 
cannot persistently hold fast to  the way of ‘conscientiousness’, and thus miss the point 
where they are supposed to repose.  
Only the mind of a sage is entirely pure and is not being obscured at all, therefore is 
able to be constantly illuminated and never fails to be conscientious, and repose 
nowhere but in the ultimate good. In the case of a sage, it is not necessary that he has 
to know where to repose before formally reposes there. For these reasons, the poetry is 
quoted here to illustrate the factuality of the reposing point, so that people in the later 
generations will have an example to emulate.  Should one truly realise what is derived 
from his original mind on this respect and hold on to it so as to keep this light constantly 
shining out, his attainment concerning the ability of maintaining conscientious mind 
and of reposing the most appropriate place will be no different from that of King Wen. 
That is what it means by the poetry: ‘the way that the almighty Heaven sustains (the 
universe) is inaudible and beyond the perception of the sense of smell. The ritual and 
registration set up by the King Wen are to be adopted and verified in the ten thousand 






Question:  According to Confucius’ remarks on poetry, the word ‘reposing (止)’ that is 
combined with the word ‘conscientiousness (敬 )’ is deemed an auxiliary word to 
enhance the mode of the speaking, how come in this book it means ‘where to repose’? 
Answer:  When the ancients picked some poetry from a context, sometimes they simply 
quoted it to illustrate their own ideas, therefore it is not necessarily in line with the 









Question: Despite being concisely articulated, what the preceding five items imply is 
all-inclusive. Your interpretation contains the words such as ‘ponders upon the refined 
and subtle implications of them, and further extends (this conception) analogically to 
the understanding of others.’ For what reasons do you give such an utterance that 
sounds excessive and not closely attached to the original text?   
Answer: Concerning the sketch of the morals and the general name for it, one word or 
sentence will suffice. However, when it comes to the reasons for it, one word or 
sentence will never be enough to expound the beginning and the end, the essential and 
the accidental of it. Knowing the name of a concept without grasping the reasons for 
that name, it will incur unfavourable consequences, namely ‘humanity’ will be 
degraded into over-tolerance, ‘respectfulness’ will turn into flattering, ‘filial piety’ may 
ruin the father, and ‘kindness’ might spoil the son. Moreover one’s adhering to 
‘faithfulness’ will not necessarily prevent one from the kind of actions exemplified by 
Wei-sheng593 and Bai-gong594. Let alone what listed in the commentary only gives an 
                                                          
593 The young man Mr Wei insisted on waiting for his girlfriend under the bridge when the water was 
rising; finally he was drowned, due to the stubborn way in which he chose to keep his promise.  
594 Lord Bai insisted on revenge for his father’s death regardless of the stability of the whole country.  
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example to illustrate that everything must have entailed in it an end where it is to finally 
rest upon. Besides, two of the cardinal morals are not even mentioned here. If one fails 
to extend it to other things so as to obtain a comprehensive understanding of it, there 










Question: It is followed by another quotation of the poetry Qi-Yu, why?  
Answer: What is said in the preceding phrase has fully illustrated the meaning of 
‘reposing in the ultimate good’. However it has not touched upon the question why it 
is by that means we will achieve the ultimate goal, nor does it mention the manifest 
signals by which one’s attainment of that state could be verified. For that reason this 
poetry is quoted to further expound it. The metaphor of ‘cutting and filing’ means to 
say that one endeavours to perfect one’s learning after having mastered it; and that of 
‘chiselling and polishing’ intends to show that one attempts to enhance one’s personal 
qualities despite having been through an elaborate procedure of self-cultivation. That is 
how one has attained the state of ultimate good through a long term of persistent 
accumulation of one’s effort in holding fast to goodness.  
    The manner of graveness signifies the inner solemnity; and the deportment of 
majesty manifests the brilliance of the light that is shining out. The inner brilliance, 
when it is so filling up and overflowing inside, would transform even the looks of the 
whole body-face, back and four limbs, whenever that occurs, it should be the sign of 
one’s accomplishment in the ultimate good. Such is the goodness of the great virtue 
that it cannot be forgotten by the people. Because all human beings share the same mind 
which has already been realised by the sages, through whom the greatness of the human 
mind becomes explicitly overflowing and prominent. Therefore people all look up to it 
and cannot forget it. The word ‘great virtue’ is adopted to describe one’s 
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accomplishment in self-cultivation, and that of ‘ultimate good’ indicates the Principle 
in the utmost sense, in which all the effort of ‘cutting, filing, chiselling and polishing’ 





Question: For what reasons the effort of ‘cutting, filing’ is distinguished from that of 
‘chiselling and polishing’, the former falls into the category of learning, the latter self-
cultivation?     
Answer: It is easier to cut and file the bone as it has veins to follow, hence the start of 
the work in searching for order; and it is more difficult to chisel and polish the jade as 








Question: What is the reason for quoting the poetry of Lie Wen and saying that the 
former kings would not be forgotten throughout the generations? 
Answer: A king, should he regard the worthies as worthy, his name would be heard and 
his great virtues and deeds be admired; should he love those who should be loved, he 
would be supported by the descendants; should he let people have delight in what is 
delightful, they would have life-nourishing food in their mouth and joyfully drum on 
their belly; should he make people benefit from what is beneficial, they would cultivate 
the land and dig well to enjoy the benefit of it. All these are the evidence of the gracious 
legacy of the former king due to his achievement in the great virtues and the ultimate 
good. That is why people miss him after he passed away, the longer he has gone, the 
better he would be remembered.  
    The quotation of the poetry Qi Yu in the preceding paragraph focuses on the point 
that the realisation of the enlightening virtue entails an end to rest upon, thereby initiate 
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the programme of renewing the people. And the poetry of Lie Wen being quoted here 
pertains to the accomplishment of renewing the people, so as to illustrate the effect of 






Question: The two sections—Qi-Yu and Lie-Wen—are preceded by the chapter of 
sincerity of wills in Zheng’s edition, and master Cheng locates them in the last chapter. 
How do you know that both are incorrect and you posit them here? 
Answer: The two editions do not form a text that is of coherent meaning, therefore 
should not be followed.  Moreover, from what is said about ‘the great virtues and the 
ultimate good’, and ‘not being forgotten throughout generations’, we know it is proper 






Question: The chapter of hearing litigation, in accordance with Zheng’s edition, is 
preceded by ‘end in faithfulness’ and followed by the sections of rectifying the mind 
and self-cultivation. And master Cheng places it after the text of the scripture and before 
the sentence ‘that is what is meant by having the knowledge extended to the utmost’.  
You do not follow that and put it here, why? 
Answer: Referring to the conclusion of the commentary, we will see that that it is to 
explain the roots and the branches. Checking it with the text of scripture, we will 
understand that it undoubtedly fits here. Some defects are found in the two editions, 









Question: But how could the phrase ‘to hear litigation yet have no litigation to be heard’ 
goes with the meaning of ‘resuming the virtue and renewing the people’? 
Answer:  The sages have cultivated their virtues and humanity to the full, and the 
reasons for their self-realisation will exhaust all the ultimate good under the Heaven. 
Therefore a sagely character will have the capacity to tame the mind of their people, so 
that the ordinary mass dare not to utter one single untruthful word. Although the way 
he hears litigation shows no difference from that of the ordinary people, there will 
naturally be no litigation to hear.  
    Once self-realisation is achieved, the virtues of the people will automatically be 
renewed, such is the evident effect of the realisation of the root or the essential. If that 
could not be accomplished, one will then intend to have the same effect of renewing 
the people by merely being engaged in disputes, arguments and litigations, which, is 
(dealing with) the branches. That is the author of the commentary meant to say in 





Question: But the author does not mention the beginning and the end, why? 
Answer: The ancients only attend to the main idea in their scriptural interpretation. 
They may not be so attentive to such trivial details. Besides, some passages are omitted 
in the following chapter, how would you know that it is not the case, meaning it initially 





Question: The sentence ‘that is what it means by knowing the essential’, in one case, 
serves as the conclusion of the chapter of hearing litigation, which means ‘to know the 
destiny’. In another case - in Zheng’s version, it appears between the text of the 
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scripture and the phrase ‘that is what it means by knowing to the utmost’. But master 
Cheng takes it as redundant words. Why? 










Question: The sentence ‘that is what is meant by knowing to the utmost’, in Zheng’s 
edition, is placed after the scriptural text together with ‘that is what is meant by knowing 
the essential’, and is followed by the chapter of ‘making wills sincere’595.  Master 
Cheng deletes the repeated sentence and places it in the chapter of ‘hearing litigation 
and knowing the essential’, so that it precedes the chapter of ‘resuming the virtue’. 
There must be some reasons for the two editions.  On what ground do you know that 
                                                          
595 With regard to the translation of cheng yi 誠意, there are a few points to be addressed: the meaning of 
yi意 is twofold: will and thought. Not until Liu Zong-zhou had the twofold meaning of yi意 been clarified. 
Liu makes a distinction between yi 意 will and nian 念 thought. The former serves as an ontological 
substance which is eternal and beyond changes and movements; the latter refers to the ever-changing 
flow of thoughts. In the work of Zhu Xi and Wang Yang-ming, we do not see such a distinction. That is 
precisely the cause of dispute between the two. Referring to the context of Da Xue 大學 The Great 
Learning, it is seen that Zhu Xi takes the step of ge wu 格物 the investigation of things as one that entails 
both the internal and external things, which implies that one ought to examine the thoughts in one’s mind 
and make sure they are free from prejudice and obsession, hence hold true. Therefore, the effort of 
making one’s thought truthful should be included in the first step, which can be related to the phrase bu 
cheng wu wu 不誠無物 in Zhong Yong 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean, indicating a connection between 
truth and existence; it can be understand as ‘lacking truthfulness will lead to non-existence’. In general, 
Zhu Xi intends to show the importance of truthfulness, and stresses the seeking of truth in Confucian 
learning. By comparison, the effort of making the will sincere is of secondary importance. In other words, 
Zhu Xi makes the point that one has to know truth from falsity and right from wrong before one does 
self-reflection upon one’s will. Wang Yang-ming somehow plays down the sequence and blends the two 
together. 
   The complexity of this question makes it difficult to give an accurate translation of cheng yi 誠意. James 
Legge translates it as ‘make thoughts sincere’, whereas Wing Tsit Chan translates it as ‘making wills 
sincere’. Both use the word ‘sincere’ and they only differ as to the meaning of yi 意. My understanding 
is that by stressing the order of the steps in Confucian learning, Zhu Xi consciously gives truth priority 
over goodness; likewise he gives intellect priority over will, hence the truthful thought is prior to a sincere 
will. If we believe that keeping the thought truthful should be dealt with in the step of ge wu 格物, then 
cheng yi 誠意 is to be understood as ‘making wills sincere’ as Chan puts it in his translation. See Chan, A 
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton & New Jersey, 1969); James Legge’s translation of The 
Great Learning; and Tu Wei-ming, Way, Learning and Politics (Singapore, 1989).  
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neither of them is entirely correct and you take one bit and leave another according to 
your own judgement? 
Answer: There is no other aim involved. Looking at the scriptural text, no discussion 
over ‘knowing the essential and knowing to the utmost’ is seen there, so we know that 
it is not appropriate to attach it to the text of scripture. As for the chapter of ‘hearing 
litigation’, insofar as it ends in ‘knowing the essential’ and has no saying of ‘knowing 
to the utmost’, we can see that it is not proper to link it with the section of ‘hearing 
litigation’. Besides, the following chapter of ‘resuming the virtue’ should be the start 
of the commentary text, how could it be preceded by this sentence? These are the places 
where I cannot withdraw my doubts. However, by referring to the order of the scriptural 
and commentary text, what master Cheng deletes and what is followed by in Zheng’s 




Question: On what ground do you know it is the closing sentence of the explanation of 
‘knowing to the utmost’, and believe that there should be some omitted text preceding 
it?  
Answer: According to the meaning and the context, we know that it is to explain 
‘knowing to the ultimate’; according to the structure of the sentence, we know that it 
serves as a conclusion; according to the format of the commentary, we know that some 


















































Question: In this text the meaning of the whole scriptural preface is clear except the 
part preceding the section of ‘making wills sincere’. That means only the literal 
meaning of the words-‘investigation of things and extension of knowledge’ is 
ambiguous, and it happens that this part is not seen in the commentary. Besides, it is 
the first step of self-cultivation and there is no preceding text to fall back on. Thereby 
you provide a Supplement to it and claim that your Supplement is according with the 
idea of master Cheng. How do you know that the words of master Cheng will 
necessarily match the original meaning of the scripture? And what you have said does 
not seem to be entirely derived from master Cheng, why? 
Answer: When being asked by what kind of learning one will achieve self-realisation, 
master Cheng answered that nothing is prior to the extension of knowledge so far as 
learning goes. If one is able to extend one’s knowledge, one’s thinking will be more 
illuminated day by day and self-realisation be attained after a long term of accumulation. 
It is said in the Book of Odes that thinking implies illumination, and illumination leads 
to sageliness. That is what Master Dong meant to say when addressing the point that 
by through arduous endeavour, one will become erudite and more illuminative. If 
learning does not bring about self-realisation, what is the point of doing it?  
Someone posed the question to master Cheng—Loyalty and faithfulness might be 
achieved through effort, what to do if one encounters difficulty in extending the 
knowledge? He answered: of course one should make effort in achieving 
sincerity/truthfulness and conscientiousness. However, if one does not foremost know 
the principles under Heaven, there is no chance of trying to put it into practice. 
Therefore according to the order of the great learning, one must firstly extend the 
knowledge and then make the will sincere. These steps are not to be skipped over. If 
one is not as intelligent and illuminative as a sage, yet intends to merely emulate the 
action of a sage, how would he be so flexible and spontaneous as a sage and never fail 
to accord with propriety? Only when one holds the light of the Principle will he be able 
to have delight in observing the Principle without much effort. Since the nature of man 
is originally good, it should not be hard to act in accordance with the Principle. However, 
only because one fails to extend the knowledge to the utmost in the first place, and 
intend to achieve it solely through effort, therefore one finds it difficult and does not 
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know the pleasure in doing so. Once the knowledge is extended to the utmost, it will be 
joyful to observe the Principle and be painful if one does otherwise. Should that be the 
case, why would I deprive myself of the pleasure in observing the Principle? I saw one 
person talking about how a tiger attacked human, among the audience only one person 
reacted with a change in his expression. The reason for that reaction is because he used 
to be harmed by a tiger. Everyone knows that tiger can harm human beings, but some 
respond it with heartfelt fear, others do not show that sense of fear; similarly some may 
have obtained the knowledge in a genuine and unaffected way, others may not. One 
who is engaged in learning must know the Way to the same extent as the man who 
knows the tiger, only then will his knowledge reach the utmost. If one says he knows 
doing evil is not right yet still does it occasionally, then he surely does not know what 
he is saying. Both intend to illustrate that the investigation of things and the extension 
of knowledge should be prior rather than posterior to other programs. 
When being asked what practical effort should be given priority when it comes to 
self-cultivation, master Cheng answered that nothing should be prior to that of 
rectifying the mind and making the will sincere. However, in order to keep the will 
sincere, one has to extend the knowledge; in order to extend the knowledge, one has to 
investigate things. To extend means to exhaust, to investigate means to reach. If there 
is one thing, there will be one principle in it, hence the investigation of things is meant 
to exhaust and reach the Principle. However, the ways to investigate things vary. For 
instance, reading books and lecturing on moral truth; talking about the characters of 
past and present and making a distinction between their right and wrong doings; or 
responding to the surroundings and dealing with the appropriateness as well as the 
inappropriateness of things, all these are practice of probing the Principle.  
When being asked whether the investigation of things means that things must be 
investigated one by one, or suggests that by investigating one thing the other ten 
thousand will be understood all together, Master Cheng answered that the investigation 
of one thing will bring about the comprehension of ten thousand principles indicates a 
state that even Confucius’s favourite disciple Yan Hui falls short. 
The only feasible way is to investigate one thing today, and another thing tomorrow, 
after a long period of accumulation will a breakthrough be made all on a sudden. He 
also said that from what is contained in an individual’s personal life to the principles of 
ten thousand things, the more one understands, the more likely a sudden self –
realisation will dawn on him.  
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Moreover, he mentioned that the investigation of things does not mean to investigate 
all things under the Heaven, but to investigate one thing to the utmost, and the others 
will be known analogically. Taking ‘filial piety’ as an example, one has to seek for the 
reason why it should be observed. If one cannot exhaust a principle through one thing, 
then let him move on to something else. One may start with what is easy or alternatively 
with what is hard, all depend on personal situation, just like there are thousand or ten 
thousand routes leading to the country, so once you have got access to one path, the 
others will also be accessible through analogy. Because each of the ten thousand things 
possesses one Principle, and the ten principles are derived from one source. That is why 
each one is connected with all the others and one could be known analogically through 
the other.  
On top of that, he said there must be a principle inhering in each thing, and all of the 
principles should be probed, such as why the heaven is so high and the earth so deep, 
and why the ghosts are dusky and the spirits illustrious. If one is content with simply 
knowing that the sky is high and the earth deep, the ghosts and the spirits dusky and 
illustrious, then he is only repeating what has been said, there is no principle to be 
probed in that case.  
What’s more, he said, if one wants to put filial piety into practice, one should know 
the means of and the reason for such doing. For instance, what is the most appropriate 
manner to look after your parents, how to take into consideration the comfort of your 
parents-to keep them warm in winter and cool in summer. After having all these 
investigated to the utmost, one will then be able to do it. Being merely attached to the 
word ‘filial piety’ will never suffice.  
Someone asked master Cheng, with regard to the observation of things and self-
reflection, whether it is true that one turns to self-reflection only because he sees things 
under his eyes. He said it is not necessarily so. Things share one Principle with me. To 
know one thing will naturally lead to the understanding of another, which is the way of 
integrating the external with the internal. A learner should ponder upon all the reasons 
ranging from why the heaven is high and the earth deep to why a small thing is the way 
it is.  
Someone asked master Cheng— is it proper to start from reflecting on the four 
beginnings? He answered: with regard to sentiment and nature, of course it should be 
sought through personal experience. However, the Principle is also inhering in every 
single grass and tree, which ought not to be neglected.  
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He also said that the key to the extension of knowledge is to understand where the 
ultimate good lies, such as being a father should repose in kindness and being a son in 
filial piety. If one fails to dwell on this and intends to generally observe the principles 
of the ten thousand things, he is probably behaving like a wondering army which has 
gone too far to find the way home. And there is no better ways to investigate things 
than self-reflection, whatever one learns by that will bears the particular meaning of 
one’s personal experience. 
    The aforementioned nine points all indicate the areas in which one should make 
endeavours to investigate things and extend knowledge, it also spells out the procedure 
of this project.  
In addition he said that concerning the investigation of things and the extension of 
knowledge, once one sets his heart on it with sincerity, he will get there sooner or later, 
depending on how intelligent he is. And the entrance to the Way is no more than 
conscientiousness, no one will be able to extend knowledge without being 
conscientious. The key to moral cultivation lies in conscientiousness whereas the key 
to advancing learning lies in the extension of knowledge; whereas to extend knowledge 
depends upon how to nourish the root, and the way to nourish the root and to extend 
knowledge is no more than refraining from desire.  
The investigation of things indicates the beginning of one’s attainment of the Way. 
If one intends to investigate things, he is already close to the Way. Why? Because he 
withdraws his mind and does not allow it to be scattered. All the five aforementioned 
points are concerned with the effort in nourishing the root or the source, therefore 
implying the essential elements of the investigation of things.  
That would cover the teaching of master Cheng, which is fully expounded in the 
Commentary on the Investigation of Things. Now I find no doubt in checking the idea 
and logic of it, and by examining the meaning of the words I see that it is well-grounded. 
As for its relevance to other books, we can list the saying of ‘learning, congregating, 
discussing, and debating’ in The Commentary (on the text of Qian diagram), the 
expression of ‘knowing and choosing the good’ in The Doctrine of the Mean, and that 
of ‘knowing nature and the Heaven’ in The Book of Mencius, all address and adhere to 
the initial significance of man’s endeavour which, is also verified by the first instruction 
of the great learning whose focus lies in the same area. I once studied it time and again 
and now I believe it is certainly and necessarily so. Hence adopt his view to supplement 
the omitted text of commentary. How dare I commit the offence of using his name, utter 
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groundless words and proclaim myself to be standing between the sacred scripture and 



























Question: May I have the chance of hearing the whole lot of your own idea? 
Answer: According to what I have heard, the ever-moving cosmic power creates and 
sustains. Whatever assumes sound, colour and form and fills up the space between the 
heaven and the earth, are called things. So far as a thing exists, there will be the reason 
331 
 
for its being such a thing which entails the rules of necessity that cannot be suspended. 
These are all granted by Heaven and cannot be achieved through man’s effort.  
As far as the most direct and the closest is concerned, the mind as a thing serves the 
purpose of commanding the body, whose substance consists in the nature of 
humaneness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom and whose function consists in the 
feeling of sympathy, shamefulness, respectfulness and the sense of assent or dissent. 
All blend intrinsically into one and each serves its own function orderly and gives 
response accordingly.  
The next closest thing will be what the body possesses which indicates the function 
of mouth, nose, ears, eyes and the four limbs. The next will then be what the body has 
contact with, thereby arise the relationships between lord and subject, father and son, 
husband and wife, the elder and the younger, and friends. All entail the rules of 
necessity which cannot be suspended, and that is the so-called Principle.  
Externally speaking, it reaches to other people, so the Principle of others does not 
differ from that of mine; talking from afar, the Principle of things does not differ from 
that of human. Concerning the maximum of it, the running of the universe and the 
change between the ancient and the present are all included; concerning the minimum 
of it, a thing as tiny as a dust and a moment as short as a breath will not be excluded. 
That is the bliss granted by the Heaven and the virtue with which man is endowed. It 
also indicates what master Liu means by being placed in the middle between heaven 
and earth; what Confucius calls nature and the way of heaven, the nature of the 
Heavenly decree by Zisi; the awareness of humaneness and righteousness by Mencius; 
the inborn mean by master Cheng; the one origin of ten thousand things by master 
Zhang; and the form and body of the Way by master Shao.  
However, when it comes to the cosmic matter each individual thing is endowed with, 
the distinction will arise which separates the pure from the impure, and the fair from 
the deflected; insofar as the material desire goes, there will be some differences between 
the shallow and the deep-rooted, or between the thick and the thin. Hence the 
irremovable distance between man and things, and between the worthy and the ignorant.  
On account of the same Principle, there will be no principle of things in the world 
that cannot be known by the mind of each individual person. But due to the difference 
lying in the cosmic matter that each thing is endowed with, one may not be able to 
probe the Principle of things. Because the Principle is not probed, the knowledge is not 
comprehensive; because the knowledge is not comprehensive, what issues from the 
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mind will not be the Principle in its entirety, but will be mixed with one’s selfish 
material desire. So long as the will is not sincere, the mind is not rectified, the self not 
cultivated, and the state and the world not properly governed.  
The ancient sages already had concerns for that, thus the education system was 
established. It starts with the elementary learning in which students are to be engaged 
in cultivating the habit of being sincere and conscientious, so that the scattered mind 
will be drawn back and the virtue be nourished. Throughout the elementary education 
this kind of effort is to be made to the best of one’s ability. As one advances into the 
great learning, he will be taught to have contact with things and extend his knowledge 
from what he has known to what is yet to know, until the ultimate is achieved. In so 
doing, one’s knowledge will become comprehensive, precise and complete.  
As for the means, one may investigate the clear evidence of an affair, or examine the 
subtle trace of the thoughts, or seek it in the written words, or find it through discussing 
and lecturing, so as to grasp the rules of necessity that cannot be suspended and the 
reasons of causality that cannot be changed under whatever circumstances, be it 
concerning the attributes of one’s body, mind and temperament, or the common rules 
for the daily inter-personal relationship, even the miraculous change of heaven and 
earth or the natural law for the birds and beasts, the grasses and trees. It must proceed 
to the extent that the external and the internal, the refined and the crude are to be fully 
explored, and further extend it to know others in an analogical manner. A breakthrough 
will be made one day and the dawn of enlightenment will suddenly occur, as a result, 
the principles of things in the world will be thoroughly investigated to the utmost, and 
my intelligence will then exhaust the whole substance of the mind. That is the reason 
for my writing Supplement to the commentary. Although it does not entirely adopt 
master Cheng’s own words, the main idea of it is hardly incompatible with his view. 
















“Question: Your method of learning seems to be seeking truth in the visible traces rather 
than in your mind, resorting to the external instead of the internal. I am afraid the 
learning of the sages should by no means appear as superficial and fragmented as yours.  
Answer: What one seeks in his learning, is nothing but mind and Principle. Although 
the mind seems to serve as the commander of the body, its intelligence does possess the 
power to grasp all the principles under the Heaven in terms of its substance. Whereas 
Principle is pervading in ten thousands of things, its subtle and miraculous function 
consists in each individual mind. Thus fundamentally speaking, it is not appropriate to 
attribute the external to Principle and the internal to the mind, nor is it justified to 
classify one as the refined, the other as the crude.  
However, the one who is not aware of the intelligence of the mind, will under no 
circumstance probe the wonder of the principles due to the disordered and scattered 
condition of his mind. Should one fail to have a glimpse of the wonder of the principles 
and makes no attempt to probe it, one will remain stubborn and narrow-minded and the 
power of mind will never be fulfilled. Thus Principle and mind depend upon each other.  
Based on the above understanding, the sages, in establishing their teachings, always 
on the one hand lead one to be aware of the intelligence of mind, to preserve it in his 
civility, quietness, and concentration, and to take it as his substantial ability to probe 
the principles; on the other hand, lead one to believe the existence of the wonder of the 
principles, and then seek for it in intellectual inquiries and discussions so as to exhaust 
the function of the mind. In that sense, the explicit is contained in the implicit, the 
animated is nurtured in tranquillity, and vice versa. There is no need to initially 
distinguish the external from the internal, or make a choice between the refined and the 
crude. After one gradually accumulates one’s efforts to a certain point, one will see the 
unity of mind and Principle and realise there is no such thing as the division between 
the internal and the external, between the refined and the crude.  
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Should one insist to regard this method of learning as superficial and fragmented, 
and intend to advocate another kind of learning which is devoid of forms and shapes, 
and seems to be profound, sophisticated and inaccessible, the one who is to take up this 
kind of learning will be taught to dwell on the realm to which no human language can 
obtain access. Those who keep saying that ‘you must seek for truth in this way so that 
you may get there one day’ are the followers of Buddhism nowadays. Such is the harm 
of their heretical doctrine that it will ruin the real learning practised by the ancients 
whose purpose of learning lies only in the realisation of the enlightening virtue and in 















Question: A distinguished Confucian scholar in our time gives his interpretation of the 
investigation of things. To investigate, according to him, is to defend or resist, meaning 
one will be able to know the ultimate way after having resisted the external things. 
Some pushes his saying one step further and holds that man is born to be quiescent, and 
his nature is nothing but good, the evil doing is caused by the temptation of the external 
things. Thus the so-called ‘investigating things in order to extend knowledge’ is 
interpreted as resisting the temptation of the external things and the inborn good nature 
will naturally be revealed as a result. Isn’t that also kind of proper interpretation?  
Answer: When the Heaven gives birth to the mass people, both things and rules arise. 
Thus from the very beginning there has never been a time that things and the Way are 
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separated. Now if one says that resisting things will lead to knowing the ultimate Way, 
which means one has to firstly forsake the relationship between father and son in order 
to know the morals of filial piety and kindness, or to abandon gentleman so as to know 
the meaning of humaneness and conscientiousness. How could that be sensible?  
If one believes that the external things only refer to the evil temptations with no 
relevance to the relationships between lord and subject, or father and son, then we have 
to admit that none is more irresistible than the desire for food and the lust for sex as far 
as the temptations of the external things are concerned. Once we look into the root of 
such desire, we will find that it is no more than something that human beings should 
inherit and cannot do away with. 
Nevertheless, there is naturally a distinction between the heavenly Principle and the 
human desire which, ought to be grasped without even a tiny bit of deviation. If one 
merely knows there are the external things, yet fails to understand the reason for one’s 
being entangled with them, and to detect which one pertains to the heavenly Principle 
and which one to the human desire, then he will fall short to restrain his selfish desire 
and to conform to propriety, thereby the external temptation will overshadow the 
original state of the heavenly Principle.  
Now if one fails to approach the things and to investigate the source of them, but 
simply loathes the temptation of them and intends to resist and get rid of them all 
together, then he has to shut his mouth and empty his stomach in order to gain the 
proper way of eating; one has to make the species extinct so as to perfect the distinction 
between man and woman. This kind of teaching cannot even be accepted by the 
barbarians whose doctrine denies both king and father, let alone being approved by the 
great, the most appropriate Way of the sages, one should under no circumstance be 

















































Question: Ever since master Cheng interpreted the investigation of things as probing 
the Principle, his pupils have provided various comments on it, which are widely seen 
in written books. Is there anyone who has developed his master’s teaching, which may 
offer some help to the learners of coming generations? 
    Answer: Master Cheng’s teaching is close to oneself without neglecting things; based 
upon the genuine capacity for praxis without forsaking the effect of the written words; 
reaches the mighty parts without ignoring the minor bits; probes into the refined without 
overlooking the crude. If one advances one’s learning in this way, he will not fall into 
the trap of focusing on eruditeness yet being stuck on the fragmented opinions, nor will 
he cling to simplicity and slip into arrogance and ignorance as a result. He will not 
abolish the effort of gradual accumulation, and what he means by the dawn of a 
thorough knowledge all of a sudden, is not to be obtained by one’s sense of seeing and 
hearing. With regard to the meaning of scripture and the approach to moral virtues, it 
is justified to say that master Cheng has fully reiterated everything with details, his idea 
thus does not await any further expounding. As for the disciples, despite their claiming 
to have followed the master’s steps, I am afraid none of them has qualified himself for 
such a claim, according to my own research on this matter.  
    Some hold that the investigation of things means one must probe the same one source 
of the principles of ten thousand things; and the extension of knowledge means to know 
the ten thousand things are all derived from the same one Principle. For instance, by 
integrating the internal with the external, [one will see that] Heaven and human, things 
and myself are one; by comprehending the way that is running through the day and the 
night, [one will see that] life and death, light and darkness are one; by obtaining a 
thorough knowledge of the sentiments such as sorrow and joy, loving and loathing, [one 
will see that] human, birds, beasts, fish and tortoise are one; by exploring the fluctuation 
between bending and stretching, decline and growth [one will see that] heaven and earth, 
mountain and river, grass and tree are one, etc.  Here when the necessity of probing the 
principles of the ten thousand things is stressed, it exclusively refers to the external 
things, thus the intrinsic principle lying in oneself is not being illuminated. It merely 
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focuses on the analogical similarity of the multitude things, yet fails to examine the 
distinctive nature and attribute of each individual thing, thus the delicacy and subtlety 
of the Principle is to be somehow neglected. It wants no difference yet cannot be free 
from the differences within the four theories [developed by the four prominent 
disciples]; it intends to drive all into similarity yet fails to attain the oneness of the same 
origin. Hence it is simply a futile attempt to forge far-fetched interpretation without 
glimpsing the beauty of a thorough comprehension of all. What do you think of it in 
comparison with master Cheng’s teaching? 
    Some believe that the effort of probing the Principle is nothing but to find the spot in 
which lies the right or the good; and it must be grounded on self-extension and start 
with the big issues. In that sense once a thorough understanding of one thing is achieved, 
all the others will be understood likewise. What he says about finding the spot where 
lies the right or the good indicates the state of fulfilment; whereas his announcement 
that taking self-extension as the very foundation, suggests the means to fulfil the virtue 
of humaneness, which does not pertain to the matter of probing the Principle. He also 
says that to begin with things at hand is more applicable to an individual’s personal 
case than to start from the big issues. And he declares that a thorough understanding of 
one thing will lead to the comprehension of all things. Having claimed as thus he seems 
to be suggesting something that even master Yan falls short and master Cheng dare not 
give voice to. His theory therefore differs from the kind of effort to extend and 
accumulate [one’s knowledge], which could be carried out by following an orderly 
procedure, and would certainly lead one to the state of fulfilment. 
    Some believe that although things in the world cannot be completely probed, 
nonetheless they are entirely possessed within me, thus should not be acquired from 
without.  With regard to the investigation of things, he says that by introspecting one’s 
self, sincerity is to be achieved, thus there will be no single thing in the world that is 
not inherent in me. That seems to be right. However, the kind of sincerity obtained by 
introspection indicates the state after things are investigated and knowledge extended. 
It is said [in the book of Mencius] that after probing the Principle to the extent that all 
things are fully investigated, the state will be attained that all of the principles in the 
world will become nothing but total reality; it is so real to me just as my seeing with 
my own eyes, hearing with my own ears, holding with my own hands and walking with 
my own feet, once I turn around to seek it within myself. But the aforementioned 
statement shows no reference to the program of the investigation of things, nor does it 
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suggest that by being utterly engaged in introspection, all the principles in the world 
will automatically be realised. The statement of illuminating the goodness in The 
Doctrine of the Mean is talking about the matter when things are investigated and 
knowledge extended; and the saying as to one’s personal sincerity is to discuss the result 
of one’s effort in making the will sincere and having the mind rectified. If the goodness 
is not being firstly illuminated, then the sincerity will not be fully realised by 
introspection. Therefore the effort of this kind should be made according to the right 
order, which ought not to be altered at random. How can it be justified if a theory is 
formulated on the basis of such a [defective] interpretation of the investigation of things? 
    Some have doubt as to the saying ‘to investigate one thing today, and another thing 
tomorrow’, and does not believe it is said by master Cheng.  But according to the 
various versions of the transcription of master Cheng’s words, this sort of statement 
occurs more than once, it cannot be that they are all mistaken on it. Besides, this is 
precisely what is stated in The Doctrine of the Mean concerning the matter of ‘learning, 
questioning, thinking and distinguishing’ and that of ‘never stop until the goal is 
achieved’; and it shows no contradiction to the Principle. I have no idea what is wrong 
with this theory and what is the cause of his doubt. Is it due to the fact that he is so used 
to the simplicity of adhering to conscientiousness that he becomes sick and tired of the 
complexity of observing the principles [of things]? Or is it because he has never heard 
about it so that he does not believe that it had been known by others? Undoubtedly 
master Cheng had made it clear that neither the effort in adhering to conscientiousness 
nor the observation of the principles [of things] should be abolished. It cannot be 
sensible if one does not believe something simply because he happened not to have 
heard about it. Even a person who is so much like a sage such as You Zi [有子] cannot 
make up his mind without the help of Ziyou [子游], with regard to the discussion over 
Confucius’s saying that he would rather see one is poor in funeral and would like the 
body to be perished very soon. How could it be justified if one intends to scrap 
something that had already been heard by many others, just because he himself is not 
informed of it? 
    Some hold the view that to apply the effort of investigation to one thing after another 
will lead up to [knowing] oneself, [which will be performed] in a roundabout way.  For 
instance, to observe the operation of heaven aims to reinforce self-perseverance, or to 
explore the topography of the earth is in purpose of deepening one’s virtue, which 
seems to be a sound theory. However, by saying that every single thing is to be 
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investigated, he has overlooked master Cheng’s view that it is not necessary to exhaust 
all things in the world. By claiming that in a roundabout way one resumes one’s self, 
he has missed master Cheng’s point that there is one Principle between things and 
oneself, hence the understanding of things will lead to the illumination of oneself. In 
addition, his theory such as observing the operation of heaven so as to reinforce self-
perseverance, or exploring the topography of the earth in order to deepen one’s virtue, 
is nothing but imposing a well-known denomination upon an obvious attribute, which 
is far from perfect, comparing to what master Cheng meant by inquiry into a reason by 
which a thing is as it is and a rule to which it should conform.  
    The only one that shows a proper understanding of what it means by the word 
‘investigation’, would be the person who says that ‘being close to things and affairs, 
neither loathing nor forsaking it, but exerting oneself to investigate it so as to perfect 
one’s knowledge’.  With regard to the means by which things are to be investigated, it 
is stressed that one must make the resolve so that he may have the root settled; likewise 
one must hold on to conscientiousness so that his revolve will be preserved. And one’s 
resolve should be established above things, whereas the exercise of conscientiousness 
will penetrate into the kernel of things. After that is done, one’s knowledge will then 
become perfect. These words seem to accord with the meaning of ‘no one is able to 
extend knowledge without being conscientious’. However it is uttered in a tone that is 
quite blemished by hastiness, and the meaning of it fails to fully reflect the grand 
structure of the master Cheng’s system, and bears no sign of effortlessness or easiness, 
nor does it show the effort in long accumulation which will result in a thorough 
understanding of all. 
    Alas, master Cheng, as seen in his answer to questions and response to queries, 
articulates [his thought] in such a clear and comprehensive manner! What a contrast 
between master Cheng’s own words and the theories formulated by his disciples! In 
spite of one or two places where resonance may be heard, none of the aforementioned 
interpretation reflects anything better than a partial understanding of master Cheng. In 
this case it seems that the great teaching had already been deviated even before the 
departing of the seventy disciples, not to mention that one or two will be expected to 
develop the teaching and contribute some help to the learners of coming generations.  
    At leisure and in solitary, I reflect upon what my tutor Yan Ping used to teach. He 
maintains that at the beginning one should persistently hold onto this mind and never 
let it be overshadowed by other things. Once coming across an affair, one should focus 
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on it and make a thorough exploration in order to probe into the principle of it. After 
this one is fully understood, it is then ready to move gradually and orderly on to the 
investigation of another affair. If one keeps it up for a long time, the accumulation of 
this effort will naturally lead one into the state of effortlessness, which cannot be 
grasped through language. Chewing these words, I find that although the structure of 
his theory and the logical formulation of it by no means catch up with that of master 
Cheng, nonetheless what he teaches as to the gradual procedure of the practical effort 
as well as the profound meaning and the earnest concern has surpassed all the others. 
Only those who truly make endeavours on this will have a grip of the meaning, it is not 






Question: However what is the difference between an erudite who is highly 
knowledgeable about things and current affairs and the one who is engaged in the so-
called investigation of things and extension of knowledge? 
Answer: One aims to reflect upon oneself and to exhaust the Principle, which entails 
the necessity of an inquiry into the root and the branches, the right and the wrong to the 
utmost. The other is exposing himself to the external things and is occupied in boasting 
about his eruditeness, thus overlooks the effort in checking the authenticity of things he 
has learned, be it concerning the internal or the external, the truth or the illusion. If one 
takes it as necessary to carry out the investigation to the utmost, it will be the case that 
the more knowledge he obtains, the more illuminated his mind will become. If one fails 
to check the authenticity of what he has learned, he will be in the situation that the more 
he knows, the more narrow-minded he becomes. That is the distinction between the 
learning for one’s own sake and the learning for the sake of others which, ought to be 




























Question: With regard to the essential point of the sixth chapter, is it possible to grasp 
the details and elaborate upon it? 
Answer: The world is ruled by two moral laws, namely the good and the evil. If we are 
to explore the origin of the two and to trace the proceedings of them, it will be seen that 
what is good pertains to the natural state when the heavenly decree was initially 
received; whereas the evil stands for what is vicious and filthy which arises from the 
physical desire. Therefore the perpetual nature of human beings is entirely good and no 
evil at all, and the natural state of mind is prone to goodness and disinclined to evil.  
    However, a human being, once bearing the burden of the physical body, will be 
restricted by the dispositions he is endowed with. Thus man is surmounted by the 
selfishness out of the physical desire, and the natural state of the heavenly decree 
becomes blurred. In that case, his knowledge of the principles of things would surely 
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be tainted with such an ambiguity that the place where the good or the evil exactly lies 
is hardly realised; or he would be stuck in a superficial understanding and unable to 
grasp the ultimate reason which tells why goodness is to be desired and evil be loathed.  
Without knowing that goodness is truly loveable, one’s love for goodness will by no 
means be free from being entangled with his dislike for it which is refusing it internally, 
despite his claiming of the love for it. Without knowing that evil is truly objectionable, 
one’s hate towards evil cannot be free from an inclination for it which arises from within. 
Therefore self-deception will hardly be avoided and some insincere element will be 
found in what issues from the will. If one’s love for goodness lacks sincerity, one will 
not merely fail to do good, but worse than that, will deal a damaging blow to goodness. 
Likewise, if one’s hate towards evil lacks sincerity, not only will one fail to dispel evil, 
but also one will be encouraging the evil because of the insincere element in one’s 
hatred of it. Hence it will only incur damage to a higher degree, how could it bring on 
any help at all?  
Having concerns over this, the sages then set up the education of the great learning 
which must be initiated with the program of the investigation of things and the 
extension of knowledge, in order to enlighten one’s mind and make one know where 
exactly the good or the evil lies and also understand the necessity of what is to be loved 
or loathed. From here one will then be instructed to proceed to the program of making 
the will sincere, and further be advised to remain vigilant especially in the case when 
one finds oneself in solitary, so that the kind of sloppiness and self-deception will be 
nipped in bud. Thereby whatever issues from the mind, if being entitled ‘the love for 
goodness’, it will not contain one single tiny bit of dislike for it from within and without; 
if bearing the name of ‘the hate towards evil’, there will be no trace of inclination to 
evil to be found from within and without. That the kind of love for goodness with no 
tiny bit of dislike for it inhabiting from within, means one’s love for it is as genuine as 
one’s love for beauty which, is merely seeking pleasure for  one’s own eyes rather than 
doing it for the sake of other people in the first place. That to hate evil with no tiny bit 
of proneness to it, means one’s hatred of it is as genuine as one’s dislike for the odour 
which, aims to content one’s own nose rather than doing it on account of others.  
Having achieved truthfulness as thus in all things that issue from the mind, this level 
of honesty would then be preserved at every single moment, in things fine and subtle, 
and would persist throughout the flowing of thoughts with no interruption in between. 
Hence the internal and the external would be illuminated and fused into one, the 
344 
 
appearance and the inherence become limpid, never would the rectification of the mind 
fall through, nor would a failure occur in the personal cultivation.  
A mean person, on the contrary, would try to cover his fault by demonstrating himself 
under the name of goodness, despite all the evil deeds he carried out in solitary. In this 
case, we cannot say that he is utterly ignorant of the distinction between good and evil, 
but rather that he does not really know why the good is to be loved and the evil be 
loathed, what’s more, he does not have the capacity to remain vigilant in solitary so as 
to nip the sort of sloppiness and self-deception in blossom. Hence he has fallen to such 
an extent with little awareness of it.  
The details of this chapter are as thus. Certainly it should be primarily attended to in 
terms of self-cultivation. However the honesty of one’s loving and loathing will never 
be fully realised unless the truthfulness of one’s knowledge is firstly fulfilled. Therefore, 
it must be stated that one who wants to keep his will sincere has to extend his knowledge 
in advance, and that after the knowledge is extended, the will would become sincere.  
Even after that is attained, one should not then fall back on his own knowledge and 
follow the direction of the mind wherever it is leading to. For that reason, it is further 
said that one must keep the will sincere, remain vigilant in solitary, and ought not to 
deceive oneself. Thereby the practical means of the great learning entails an orderly 
and coherent procedure, which is obviously independent from other approaches and not 
to be intermingled with them. All the following are stated in like manner, I am not going 
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